



A P P E A L  
TO THE  
P E O P L E  
OF  
ENGLAND AND SCOTLAND,  
IN BEHALF OF  
WARREN HASTINGS, Esq.

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**W**HEN the ambition of France openly threatened Europe with universal monarchy, the duke of Marlborough turned the tide of success, and, controlling fortune by the superiority of his genius, seemed to proceed, by a sure march, from fortress to fortress, to the gates of Paris. But in the midst of this career of prosperity and glory, that military ardour and high spirit of liberty, which had lately shone forth among all ranks and orders of men in England, was suddenly exchanged for a rooted aversion to war, an anxious desire of peace, and a superstitious dread concerning the

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than Mr. Hastings is allowed to possess even by his enemies, might have easily diverted the arrows of reproach, and secured an undisturbed retreat from a life worn out in the service of the

visited Major Scott was, as he understood, that he came to him with the olive branch; that Mr. Hastings might come home with perfect security, with his half million, or whatever might be the amount of his fortune; that the ministers had strength enough to carry the India bill, but that they knew it would be opposed at the India House. The condition therefore required from Major Scott was, that the friends of Mr. Hastings would not join in the opposition to the bill. In reply to this communication, Major Scott at once said he would not meet Mr. Sheridan, but that he should go to the gallery of the House of Commons, where he should hear Mr. Fox himself: and he further told the gentleman who called upon him, in answer to some doubts that were expressed whether Mr. Hastings would come home when recalled, that all the world knew there had been a letter upon the table of the Court of Directors, since the month of September, in which he expressly desired them immediately to appoint a successor to the government of Bengal. The gentleman who waited upon Major Scott further told him, that, if the negotiation came to nothing, no notice was to be taken of any offer of the kind having been made. Mr. Fox made his famous speech on that day, the 18th of November, in which he grounded the necessity for his bill upon the mismanagement of Mr. Hastings, and said his whole proceeding was the proceeding of a man who had

drawn

the public, and full of activity, trouble, and danger? That engine of defence he neither possessed nor required. His own virtue was the shield which he opposed to the shafts of his adversaries,

drawn the sword, and thrown away the scabbard. The following morning, the 19th, Major Scott, and the friend who had called upon him, met again, when the latter clearly declared, that, after Mr. Fox's speech, Mr. Sheridan had no right to expect secrecy from either of them. The press was not idle; every paper teemed with gross and *anonymous* abuse of Mr. Hastings, with threats of vengeance, and now and then with something like a promise of favour, if the friends of Mr. Hastings would be less active. In answer to one of these paragraphs, Major Scott, not like a skulking assassin, who stabs in the dark, but openly, and with his name at full length to the assertion, publicly avowed, on the 27th of November, ten days after Mr. Sheridan had visited his friend, that he, Major Scott, "*rejected the offer of an act of oblivion for his principal, provided he would remain silent during the present attack upon the East India Company.*" This avowal, written before the Committee of Proprietors at the India House, and inserted in the Morning Chronicle, was never answered; nor was the gentleman whom Mr. Sheridan had visited, or Major Scott, taxed with a breach of secrecy.

In the month of March, 1786, two years and four months afterwards, Major Scott again alluded to the circumstance in the House of Commons. The allusion occasioned a meeting between Mr. Sheridan and the gentleman whom

adversaries, in whom disappointed hopes, as the world conjectures, converted affected indignation into real resentment. And the same magnanimity which disdains the compromises of conscious demerit will carry him triumphant through all his troubles.

The reasonings of his accusers, divested of all adventitious ornaments, bear a nearer re-

whom he had visited, and the consequence of that meeting was, a perfect agreement between Mr. Sheridan and that gentleman, that Major Scott had mistaken both the extent of the offer that was made, and the ground upon which it was made : but admitting the fact, as it must be admitted where two gentlemen only were present during a conversation, and agree exactly as to the particulars of it, what does the admission amount to ? Not that Mr. Sheridan did not pay that gentleman a visit the night before the day on which Mr. Fox brought in his bill---not that Mr. Sheridan did not agree to meet Major Scott the next morning---not that Mr. Sheridan did not say Mr. Hastings might come home with security, &c. It merely went to this, Major Scott was mistaken, first, in believing that Mr. Sheridan's offer was made with the knowledge of Mr. Fox, and all the confidential men belonging to the Duke of Portland ; and, secondly, he was mistaken in supposing that the condition required from him was that he and his friends should not oppose the India bill ; whereas, in fact, all Mr. Sheridan wanted to know was this, whether the man who had written for a successor would come home, if recalled under Mr. Fox's Bill ?

semblance

semblance to the verbal disputes of logicians and casuists than the solid arguments of legislators and statesmen seriously concerned for the welfare of the republic. In the whole compass of morality there are two things principally to be considered: First, what are the sentiments and what the tenour of conduct that denominates one action, or course of actions, virtuous, and the contrary vicious? And, secondly, by what principle or law is virtue recommended and authorized, and vice stigmatized, and reprobated? Concerning the last of these questions, metaphysicians have differed, and will for ever continue to differ; but with regard to the first and most important, they are all of them very nearly, if not entirely agreed. If we examine all the writers on the law of nature, from Plato to Payley, we shall find, that whatever the theories are with which they set out, they all of them terminate in public utility and advantage. They assign, as the ultimate reason for every rule which they establish, the necessities and the convenience of mankind, and readily admit that the first and fundamental law in all political constitutions is the preservation of society \*.

On

\* The great and good Mr. Locke, the assertor of the rights, and the expositor of the nature of man, in what he writes

On the prospect of war in general, it has uniformly been the practice of all countries, on probable grounds of suspicion, of which the executive branch of the legislature always exercised the

writes on civil government, says, that " Where the legislative and executive power are in distinct hands (as they are in all moderated monarchies and well-framed governments), there the good of the society requires that several things should be left to the direction of him that has the executive power: for the legislators not being able to foresee, and provide by laws, for all that may be useful to the community, the executor of the laws, having the power in his hands, has, by the common law of nature, a right to make use of it for the good of society in many cases where the municipal law has given no direction, till the legislature can be conveniently assembled to provide for it. Many things there are which the law can by no means provide for, and those must necessarily be left to the discretion of him that has the executive power in his hand, to be ordered by him as the public good and advantage shall require: nay, it is fit, that the laws themselves should in some cases give way to the executive power, or rather to this fundamental law of nature and government, that, as much as may be, all the members of the society are to be preserved. for since many accidents may happen wherein a strict and rigid observance of the law may do harm (as not to pull down an innocent man's house to stop the fire when the next to it is burning), and a man may come some-

times,

the prerogative of judging, to secure the persons of individuals thought to be disaffected to the state, by which great public calamities are prevented. On the same ground of public necessity, villages are destroyed, lest they should afford shelter to the enemy. It is true, that in such cases reparation is made to the inoffensive inhabitants: and accordingly reparation has been made, notwithstanding the indications of an hostile disposition to the English, on the part of the Princesses

“ times within the reach of the law, which makes no distinction of persons, by an action which may deserve reward and pardon. This power to act according to discretion for the public good, without the prescription of the law, and sometimes even against it, is that which is called prerogative, and, whilst employed for the benefit of the community, and suitably to the trusts and ends of government, is never questioned; for the people are very seldom or never scrupulous or nice in the point. He that will look into the history of England, will find that prerogative was always largest in the hands of our wisest and best princes; because the people, observing the whole tendency of their actions to be the public good, contested not what was done without law to that end: or if any human frailty or mistake (for princes are but men made as others) appeared in some small declinations from that end, yet it was visible that the main of their conduct tended to nothing but the care of the public.”

of Oude, by Mr. Hastings, as far as the resumption of their jaghires is concerned. A provision was made for replacing their income at the exact rate at which it had stood in their own estimate, while they held the jaghires, by making it the condition of the resumption, that they should receive a pension equal to the amount of those possessions, in equal monthly payments; and these, for the fullest security, were made payable from the produce of the Company's assignments. Has the British parliament, in which we find the men who held in their hands the reins of government, during that interesting conflict with so many nations whose afflicting consequences we all feel and deplore, and which has given birth to so many charges and so much re- crimination, has the British Ministry and Parliament in all cases made compensation to those who have suffered in the cause of England, as ample, as equal, as permanent and secure as that which the justice of Mr. Hastings has granted to the Princesses of Asia? The American Loyalists, on the very scene, braved the fury of prevailing rebellion with an intrepidity and constancy that reproached that timorous and temporizing policy in Administration, that indolence and infatuation  
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in the servants of the crown both by sea and land, and that cruel rage of faction, which impeded the wheels of a weak government, in more forcible strains than the most piteous complaints that could be poured forth before a generous people. But what pen or tongue can describe the calamities which attended, and the horrors which followed on the issue of their noble conflict? In what pathetic accents might not the inimitable eloquence of Sheridan and Burke represent the disconsolate widow, sitting in solitary places, mourning an husband slain, an infant lost\*! Or, if in the varying and sudden emotions incident to the impassioned soul, grief

“ \* She weepeth fore in the night, and her tears are on her  
 “ cheeks : among all her lovers there is none to comfort  
 “ her . all her friends have dealt treacherously with her,  
 “ they are become her enemies She is in bitterness, when,  
 “ in the days of her affliction and of her misery, she re-  
 “ membered the pleasant things she had in the days of old,  
 “ when her people fell into the hands of the enemy and  
 “ none did help her . when the comforter that should re-  
 “ lieve her soul is far from her ; when her children are de-  
 “ solate because the enemy prevailed , when the children  
 “ and the sucklings swoon in the streets of the city, and say  
 “ to their mothers, where is corn and wine ? For they  
 “ swooned as the wounded in the streets of the city, and  
 “ their soul was poured forth into their mothers bosom.”



at the sorrows of our fellow subjects should be converted into indignation at the causes from whence they sprung, what field for invective to the thunder of Fox ! and what profound silence in the listening senate ! while he devotes to destruction the authors of such calamities, and in the heat of passion, which throws all artifice at a distance, almost confesses that the misfortunes of the Loyalists are not wholly owing to the errors and the selfish views of Administration.

Amidst such candour and sincerity of sentiment, as such a scene in the House of Commons would inspire, could not all the logical distinction of Mr. Pitt find some precedent or pretext for ranking the misconduct of Mr. Hastings, and the sufferings of women who have been reduced to the necessity of accepting a yearly pension from their son, instead of a landed estate ; might not, I say, the subtlety of Mr. Pitt find, if he pleased, some reason for ranking the misconduct of Mr. Hastings, and the grievances of the Begums, in an order inferior to the enormities that disgraced different parties in the conduct of the American war, and the cruel calamities that afflicted and still afflict the loyal subjects of Great Britain across the Atlantic ? Does the pittance allowed by Government as an indemnification

demnification to the Loyalists bear any proportion to the income continued to the Begums? Ladies secluded from the world in the recesses of a seraglio, and in whose hands political power and importance served only, by nourishing a spirit of ambition, to dissolve the ties of blood, and to embitter the fallen state of their family by domestic discord? Far different from theirs is the condition of the dispersed families of the Loyalists! Aged parents, accustomed to receive their kindred and friends with plenty and hospitality, now in the character of petitioners for some provision against the extremity of want for themselves and their children; and the tender sex struggling by every effort to unite that delicacy and dignity of sentiment in which they have been bred, with the means of self-preservation! While such objects, related to us by blood, by language, manners, and religion, by friendship ill-requited on our part, and fond confidence misplaced on theirs; while such objects present themselves to our view, whence all this gallantry to Bow Begum, and the women of the Haram of Sujah ul Dowlah?

In the relation that subsists between sovereigns and their subjects, if allegiance is implied on the one part, protection is presumed on the other.

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The Loyalists, therefore, if the affairs of state, even on the greatest emergency, are to be squared by the abstracted accuracy of eternal justice and truth, have an undoubted right to an absolute restitution of all they have lost, and reparation, as far as that is possible, for all they have suffered. But is it argued that full restitution as well as complete reparation to the unfortunate subjects of Britain in America is impossible? Then, it is admitted that political exigencies may not only suspend, but supersede the execution of justice. Under this conviction, then, let the candid mind judge of the conduct of Mr. Hastings respecting the Begums of Oude and the Rajah of Benares.

It is a matter of notoriety, that by the example and at the instigation of the Rajah Cheit Sing, the Zemindar of Benares, the inhabitants of that district revolted from our government, and continued in a state of rebellion from the 22d of August to the 22d of September, 1781. During that short but important period in which Mr. Hastings was confined to the Fortress and Plain of Chunar, and in a situation which in the apprehension of many men portended certain destruction to himself and his small party, the Begums of Fyzabad united their authority and influence to extend and aggravate the difficulties of the English. Circular  
letters

letters were written to the Zemindars of Oude, inciting them to rebellion ; rewards were proclaimed for the heads of English officers and soldiers ; a general revolt ensued, of which their agents were the principal leaders; the two chief eunuchs and confidential servants of the younger Begum openly levied troops in the great square of the city, for the avowed service of Cheit Sing against the English, which were employed by the Rajah in his battles against us. These facts have been proved by the depositions of Lieutenant Colonel Hannay, Major John Macdonald, Captain John Gordon, and many other witnesses, taken before Sir Elijah Impey, at Lucnow and Chunar, within three months of the time in which the events had passed. These, with other facts, are urged by Mr. Hastings in defence not only of a general resumption of the estates, but also of the treasures in the possession of the Begums, at the request of their son and grandson, the Nabob Affoph ul Dowlah, to whom they belonged by the right of hereditary succession, and without the aid of which he could not fulfil his engagements to the East India Company, which were absolutely necessary, by supporting their, to maintain his own authority.

In opposition to the truth of these facts, the  
accusers

accusers of Mr. Hastings enter into a long and intricate train of reasonings, conjectures, imposing associations of ideas, witticisms, hyperbolical expressions, and even appeals to the majesty and justice of Heaven; shifting the ground on which the general issue of the question concerning the merit or the demerit of Mr. Hastings is to be rested, just as it suits their purpose.

1. At one time they demand legal evidence for the truth of what Mr. Hastings advances in his own vindication; and at another, when that evidence is adduced, they endeavour to turn the necessary steps by which it was obtained into ridicule, and to convert them into arguments of conscious guilt.

2. If the Governor reasons on the invariable principles of human nature, they decry vague conjecture, and are not satisfied with any arguments not founded on solid facts; if facts are produced, they affirm, that these could not have happened, as they appear to them to be contrary to the general principles of human nature.

3. They pervert even the sagacity of the Governor General to their purposes. They suspect and condemn him for acting from the convictions of his understanding, even when these were justified by subsequent events, and where the conduct to  
which

which they led was indispensably necessary to the salvation of the English power in Asia.

4. If he uses rigorous measures, he is censured; but if, towards the same persons in the same circumstances, he uses lenity and indulgence, he is also accused.

5. If he takes shelter in the general principles of jurisprudence, they object to general questions and considerations on a complicated subject; if he enters into a detail of facts, and shews that such was the state of affairs, that no other measures than those adopted could have restored and secured the public safety, they drag him from the field of battle into the monastic cell, array him in the habit of an Augustin Friar, and try him by laws which, though sublimated from a congeries of facts in the imaginations of metaphysicians, cannot in all cases be reduced to practice, consistently with the great ends of political society.

6. To all these instances of prejudice and egregious injustice they add the enormity of reducing to the measure of the British laws and constitution, the administration of a magistrate who had been sent in the name of his country to govern a people in sentiments, manners, and modes of life so different from our own, that our laws and customs are their abhorrence; in cir-

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cumstances

cumstances of unparalleled difficulty and danger, and at a time when the projects for the government of India, formed at home, were perpetually changing, and every packet from England to Bengal carried out orders, not only contradictory to preceding orders, but inconsistent with themselves, and the whole taken not severally, but in conjunction, impracticable.

These are the charges which I bring before the people at large against the accusers of Mr. Hastings; and on all of these I proceed farther to speak in their order.

Mr. Sheridan not only alledged that there was no legal evidence of the Princesses of Oude being in a state of rebellion, but that there were no fair presumptions of their delinquency, or that they entertained hostile designs against the English. To reports and hearsays, even in circumstances full of alarm, he paid no manner of regard. Now, if the chief magistrate or governor of a province is not justifiable in exerting the power committed to him for crushing the infancy of a rebellion before he has legal proofs of its existence, why does Mr. Sheridan attempt to throw odium and ridicule on the Governor General for doing that which he himself requires, and what  
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the laws of England would have prescribed in any similar case? That is, using the best evidence that could be obtained, and giving it the best possible sanction. Can that be ridiculous which is wise and necessary? If it can, then ridicule is not a proof that the conduct of Mr. Hastings, in taking the evidence in question before the first British judge in India, was unnecessary: if it cannot, and that Mr. Sheridan shall contend that the conduct of Mr. Hastings and Sir Elijah Impey, in collecting evidence that a rebellion, though in its first stage, existed in the province of Oude, as well as in that of Benares, furnished real and genuine matter of ridicule, then was not their conduct necessary and proper; and a case may exist when the man in whose hands his country entrusts her distant and dearest interests, may act in discharge of his trust without observing legal forms. And, if this be so, it must be admitted, that, in proportion as Mr. Sheridan was successful in his endeavours, which in reality formed no inconsiderable portion of his speech, to throw ridicule on the Governor General and Chief Justice of British India, in that proportion exactly does he vindicate the conduct of Mr. Hastings; if, in over-awing and checking the beginning of commotion, he stepped beyond the



caution of an Attorney, and, assuming the freedom of an honest man, acted up to the character with which he was invested. In truth, it appears to the common sense of mankind, as it did to Mr. Hastings himself, that an excessive anxiety about *legal evidence*, in the circumstances in which *he* was destined to act, or his *country* to suffer, would indeed have justly seemed an object of ridicule. He did what a due regard to prudence on the one hand, and decorum on the other, naturally dictated to a firm and discerning mind. He authenticated his proofs before a British magistrate, and chiefly by British subjects. And here it is to be observed, that if Mr. Hastings had been conscious of any degree of guilt, or improper bias on his mind, he would naturally have been sedulous to heap proof upon proof of his innocence: dignity of mind would have shrunk before an apprehension of danger, and the anxiety of the criminal would have been a plentiful source of the darkest suspicions that could possibly spring up in an imagination fertile even to excess, and which can supply in abundance theories and conjectures to cover and protect whatever doctrine or fact he chuses to establish. The gentleman to whom I allude I firmly believe to be naturally humane, benevolent, and  
just;

just; but the finest genius and the most generous disposition is not unusually found in conjunction with an irritability of temper which magnifies its object. And when once the will begins thus to influence the judgment, fertility of invention, instead of being a lamp of light, becomes an *ignis fatuus* that leads into error. It will never be forgotten, while the present impeachment shall remain on our records, that the apologist of *Powel* and *Bembridge* was the accuser of WARREN HASTINGS.

But to return to Mr. Sheridan. Was it natural, decorous, and proper, if he either believed that Mr. Hastings deserved bonds, imprisonment, or death, or hoped to make it appear that he did, to set the House at every turn of his reasoning into a roar of laughter, and to convert a criminal trial into a scene of amusement? However natural it may be for Mr. Sheridan to turn tragedy into comedy, it was as unfair as it was unnatural, to pour forth on the object of his arraignment at once the torrent of ridicule and of invective: for I fear that not a few of his audience bestowed, as a reward on his wit and humour, what they could not concede to the force of his arguments. The indecent plaudits heard at the conclusion of his humorous harangue,

rangue, disgraced the assembled senate ; though, indeed, they were fit enough expressions of that species of satisfaction which we derive from A SCHOOL FOR SCANDAL.

Very different from that *supplodio pedis* which was practised not by the orator, but the judges, was the deportment of the gallery, in which different individuals, when Mr. Pitt declared himself against Mr. Hastings, expressed their concern and surprize in involuntary exclamations, which of course incurred a rebuke from the Speaker. The spectators of what passed in the House below, were not so much touched with the humour of Mr. Sheridan, as with indignation that such talents should be mispent in such a cause.

There was nothing in the testimonies of different gentlemen in the service of the Company in favour of Mr. Hastings impossible, nothing inconsistent, nothing contradicted by opposite evidence : but it was alledged that what they affirmed was improbable, and that they were under the influence of Mr. Hastings, by whom they had either been obliged, or from whom they expected future favours. There was nothing advanced against the evidence in proof of the rebellious designs at Fyzabad that would be sustained as a bar to its validity in an ordinary court

court of justice. But certain country gentlemen, and others assembled in the House of Commons, under the auspices of a rector of an university \*, a very witty author for their principal, and a student from Cambridge for their *regius professor*, undertook to invalidate it on the moral principles of the human mind. They objected to general reasoning, and required positive proofs : positive proofs being brought, they return to general reasoning on the nature of man, and the motives that influence his conduct in different situations. Having returned a second time to this ground ; on this ground, in the name of the God of Truth, let the dispute be decided.

It is not credible, say they, that an insurrection should be raised, or a war meditated against the English, whose power had been so recently and visibly displayed in dethroning or restoring princes, and exterminating nations, by two weak women secluded from the world in the inmost recesses of an Eastern seraglio. Is it then by bodily strength and personal prowess, as in the savage state of society, that either kings or queens wage war in Asia or in Europe ? Was it of any consequence in the confederate war, whe-

\* Mr. Burke is or lately was rector of the university of Glasgow.

ther the Sovereign of Great Britain, 'or, in the last Turkish war, whether the Sovereign of Russia, was of the masculine or feminine gender? But the very circumstance of their deep retirement, and the delicacy of oriental manners, afforded a security to their persons, which did more than counterbalance the want of manly vigour. What opinion can our orators entertain of the understandings of those whom they thus angle and inveigle with the illusions of puerile fancy? It was not the sex, nor the age of the Begums that Mr. Hastings was to consider, but the numbers of men that were at their devotion; the prevalence and strength of the principle that might unite these in action; the resources that might enable them to elude our forces, to prolong the war, to take advantage of the favour, and to weary out by perseverance the adversity of fortune; and, above all, their disposition to revolt, and the circumstances that might encourage them to excite rebellion.

Whoever imagines that by all the mildness we have mixed, or that it is possible for us to mix with our tyranny over the natives and princes of Asia, we shall be able to gain their confidence and affection, is egregiously mistaken. Whatever aromatics we may infuse in their bitter cup,  
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the bitter taste will still so far prevail as to induce a strong desire of casting it from them whenever they can: and the greater the hope of being able to do so, the more ardent also will be the desire. It is a property in human nature, that any emotion which attends a passion is easily converted into it, though in their natures they be originally different, and even contrary to each other. Hence hope is able not only to inflame the desire of obtaining any particular object, but also to excite anger against the person who with-holds it, or to heighten it where it was before-hand the predominant passion; agreeably to that saying of the poet Virgil, *spes addita suscitât iras*. To govern reduced provinces, especially such as are remote from the seat of government, by slackening the curb of power, and granting a few indulgencies to a subjected people, imperious nations have always found to be difficult, and for the most part impossible. After what has so recently passed in America and in Ireland, we cannot be at a loss to judge of the effects of partial concession. Every degree of liberty indulged to men tends to produce at once a desire, and a sense of their natural right to enjoy it in its full extent.

Mr. Francis said, that it was through the old

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Begum

Begum that the right of dominion and property in Oude descended, she being the daughter and only heir of the antient Soubah. This Princess, he added, was in fact, at least in right, the real Sovereign of Oude. She is allowed to be a woman of an high spirit, and her pride is naturally heightened by the recollection of her ancestry, and of former times, she, therefore, considered the English as the oppressors of her family, and the usurpers of its inheritance. The resentment which she naturally entertained against our nation, there was reason to dread, would be inflamed by the hope of gratification. She was not uninformed of the situation of affairs in the western world. The crowns of that monarch, whose power she had long equally dreaded and detested, seemed now to totter on his head; and that of America had already fallen. The French, the Spaniards, the Dutch, the three greatest maritime powers in the world next to ourselves, and whose strength was but too well known in the east, pressed with their united weight on the English, and the standard of revolt began to be raised in Benares. In such circumstances what confidence could Mr. Hastings repose in the attachment of the high-spirited Begum, or what in her numerous subjects? Mankind are governed  
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by opinion; and the opinion by which they are governed is two-fold: an opinion of interest, and an opinion of right. Ideas of right have an influence on the minds of men which have been found, in some instances, to prevail over those of interest. Hence in all nations, and in none more than in Great Britain, Chiefs have been found, who, in the full possession of their privileges and fortune, have flown to the standard of exiled princes, followed by bands of voluntary vassals. But in Asia, where the reverence to royal blood is stronger than in Europe, and where the oppressions of Europeans, compared with those the people suffer under their native princes, are greater, in Asia, where all ranks of men are divided against us by an opinion both of right and interest, and ready to start into a posture of hostility on every occasion where there is any prospect of success, and in circumstances so full of alarm, why should Mr. Hastings deem it incredible that the Princesses of Oude should join the general conspiracy of the world against Great Britain, or seek for theories by which he might reconcile hostile appearances with benevolent intentions? Is not our government over the natives of India, whatever palliatives we may apply or project, in reality despotic? Is not the



first principle of despotism, jealousy of its subjects? Was there no ground of jealousy, jealousy heightened beyond the pitch of its usual vigilance, in the circumstances in which the Governor General of Bengal was placed towards the close of the year 1781? If there was, is his country, which his services have so eminently contributed to save, to make no allowance for the force, for the violence with which reports of military preparations must have fallen on a mind anxious for the preservation of all that was committed to the exertion of its powers? On the one hand, it was at least probable that a revolt was begun in the province of Oude as well as in Benares, and more than probable that it was intended: on the other, it was possible that the reports concerning the orders and designs of the Begums might be false. In this dilemma, ye accusers of Mr. Hastings, what would ye have done? If his fears should prove to be groundless, and that, in seizing the resources of the Begum, he should commit an injury, that injury might afterwards be repaired, but if, on the presumption that their intentions, notwithstanding all appearances to the contrary, were pacific, he should forbear to act as he did, the empire of Great Britain in the East might be lost.

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In our wars with the House of Bourbon, have we not been accustomed, on the appearance of hostilities on the part of that kingdom, to anticipate an attack by making one? Is this conduct to be condemned? Are the ministers who followed it with success to be impeached, and those who, notwithstanding the communications from Lord Stormont when ambassador at Paris, neglected it to the disgrace of Britain, to be promoted and honoured? Was not the conduct of Mr. Hastings exactly in the spirit of the great Earl of Chatham? And whether are we to reprobate the memory of the father, or to approve the *legal policy* of the son; who, as if he were born to refute the doctrine that the qualities of the mind are hereditary as well as those of the body, condemns in Mr. Hastings what raised his progenitor to immortal honour?

It will not be said that the Earl of Chatham acted improperly, when, being apprehensive of the designs of Spain, by a sudden blow, he prevented their execution. Yet there was no overt act on the part of the Spaniards, no declaration of intended hostilities. What then is the circumstance, or what the circumstances of discrimination between the two cases of Lord Chatham and Mr. Hastings, which justify the conduct

duct of the former, and condemn that of the latter ? It may be said, that the Begums of Oude were living under the protection of our friend and ally, or, to speak the truth, that they were in fact our subjects : and it also may be said, that the danger to which Great Britain was exposed from Spain, was greater than that which was threatened by the Begums. Besides these, there is no circumstance of distinction between the two cases of Chatham and Hastings, which can affect in the smallest degree the question at issue.

Though the Begums of Oude lived under the protection of our ally, and were in fact our subjects, they were divided from the English by all those circumstances of diversity which commonly prove the sources of animosity and contest among nations. Though overborne by superior power, the unconquerable will remained of shaking off the English yoke ; and who, reasoning on the principles of the law of nature, will affirm that they had not a right to spurn it, if they could ? The very circumstance of their subjection was a reason why we should be jealous of their endeavours to overturn it. There were more points of opposition between them and the British nation, than between the British nation and the Spaniards : and  
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their minds were at least equally hostile. What is the magic then, in the name of God, of their being our friends, allies, or subjects, that should supersede the propriety of considering what are their real inclinations, and what their power in all situations when vigilance becomes the first duty of a statesman, when jealousy becomes a virtue? The only question is, concerning the different degrees of the dangers which threatened Great Britain from the Spaniards in 1762, and from the Princes of India in 1781. And here an opportunity is presented of displaying the striking contrast between the glorious successes of the English arms in the former period, and the misfortunes which menaced our independence in the latter. But it is superfluous to dwell on so fertile a theme. For who that, dismissing the illusions of the imagination, yields to the conduct of his understanding, does not perceive the absurdity and injustice of applauding the vigour, promptitude, and prevention of the Earl of Chatham in times of national splendour unsullied by a cloud, and condemning the same qualities and a similar course of conduct in Mr Hastings, when condensing storms seemed ready to wreck the state on rocks and shoals, or overwhelm it in the troubled ocean? As to the comparative evidence on which an apprehension of hostilities

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on the part of the Spaniards, and on that of the Begums of Oude, was founded, there was no overt act of hostility, which Mr. Pitt declared to be necessary, in order to ascertain hostile intentions, that could be charged and proved against either. But both had made military preparations, reports in both cases had prevailed of hostile intentions, and in both the circumstances of the times were such as to render those reports highly credible. The reports in India which Mr. Sheridan treated as vague, fortunately for this country, made that impression on the mind of Mr. Hastings, which they were naturally fitted to make on a sound understanding and a resolute mind; and that impression was afterwards justified by evidence on oath before the chief British magistrate in India.

But the enemies of Mr. Hastings observe, that this evidence was posterior to the actions which presupposed them; and they contend that whatever pretensions Mr. Hastings may have to penetration, and however fortunate the measures he pursued, he did not act towards the Begums on legal evidence, even supposing the testimonies produced to have been unquestionable, which they deny. Suppose that Mr. Hastings had been placed in such a situation as to have over-heard a conversation involving rebellious designs, and fixing the measures

measures for carrying them into execution, between the Begums and their confidential servants, but that he was the only person in the world that ever had any reason to suspect such designs, or to be made acquainted with the measures proposed for effecting them; would he have acted in an unjustifiable manner, if he had frustrated their intentions by cutting off the means of fulfilling them? Mr. Hastings, from his knowledge of the country, the people, and the circumstances of the day and hour, must be allowed to have been a better judge of the credit due to the reports that prevailed of the designs of the Begums, than any person in Great Britain at the present moment, at so great a distance of space and time. It appeared by subsequent discoveries that he judged rightly. How ridiculous then is it to condemn him for acting according to the dictates of his understanding, when these were afterwards proved to have been wholly conformable to the truth?

But in order to weaken the evidence that was produced in proof that his convictions concerning the designs of the Begums were in fact conformable to the truth, the accusers of Mr. Hastings enter at great length into the situation of the witnesses, and the nature of their evidence. The witnesses, they say, were men on whom he had

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bestowed,

bestowed, or on whom he might bestow favours; or who, from whatever cause, were attached to his person. There, it must be owned, they have a field of objection to all the testimony that can be brought in vindication of his conduct: for the sublimity of his genius had gained an ascendancy over the understandings, and the generosity of his disposition, and the unassuming modesty of his manners, had won the hearts of all whom arrogance and rivalry had not rendered blind to his exalted talents and virtues, and indifferent, nay, inimical to the prosperity of their country, if it depended on his exertions, or was connected with his name. It may naturally be supposed, therefore, that as the British in India, in general, would be forward to bear testimony in favour of the Governor-General, so the few who might be otherwise disposed, would be willing to avoid a contrary conduct: yet the popularity of any Commander or Chief cannot certainly be urged as a legal objection to evidence in his favour, if that evidence bears no internal marks of falsehood. The facts alledged amount to a clear proof of both rebellious designs and actions, and the testimonies by which they are supported are sufficient both with regard to numbers and respectability. The slight difference between the  
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testimony of Sheikh Mahomed Aumeen Mheir, the second officer in the service of Cheit Sing, and that of Colonel Hannay, and the other English officers; the first, supposing the troops sent to the Rajah to have been sent from Lucknow, the last knowing them to have been sent from Fyzabad, but all agreeing that one thousand swordsmen were sent by orders of the Begums; the slight difference, I say, between these testimonies, disagreeing in an immaterial circumstance, but perfectly coinciding in the point for which they were produced, instead of invalidating, corroborates their joint evidence, as it is a clear proof that it was not preconcerted. But the grand objection to the vindication of Mr. Hastings, as written by himself, in what Mr. Sheridan calls his first and second Defences, is, that the chain of evidence is not brought up from the commandant in the service of Cheit Sing, and from Colonel Hannay and the other English officers, through every intermediate link, to the Begums issuing orders to their eunuchs in the recesses of the seraglio. Who told the Moorish Commandant, and the English officers, that circular letters were written to the Zemindars of Oude, inciting them to rebellion; that rewards were proclaimed for the heads of



English officers, soldiers, and sepoys; and that all this was done in consequence of orders from the Begums? What Zemindar, Polygar, or Ryot? Specify his name and place of residence. Tell us precisely what he said, and where, and when. If not, we shall hold your evidence in favour of Mr. Hastings as careless, vague, irregular, irrelevant, and unsatisfactory. This is their great fortress. In this they triumph.

It has been observed above, that conscious rectitude is not curious about the means of self-justification, and that excessive anxiety about exculpation is not unnaturally construed into a symptom of guilt. Or, if the accusers of the Governor, when they touched on this point, happened to be in a merry vein, what a field, as Mr. Hastings very justly observes, for triumph and derision would he have afforded to his accuser, had he exhibited the names of unknown witnesses attested by Cauzees of uncertain existence! Might it not, too, have been very plausibly alledged, that the Governor General, in the plenitude of his power, was able to extort from individuals what declarations, and from the lawyers of the country whatever attestations he pleased? These considerations are sufficient

to account for the neglect on the part of Mr. Hastings and his friends to collect and record the names of the witnesses on whose testimony prompt measures were taken for quashing in good time the designs of the Begums of Oude. But, lest all these reasonings should prove unsatisfactory, and that the omitting to mention, or the concealment, if they please, of the names of the Zemindars who acquainted the servants of the Company with the designs of the Princesses, should foster injurious suspicions, Mr. Hastings and his friends, and all who are concerned to investigate the truth in this matter, may safely rest the issue of the whole cause on this question; Can a sufficient reason be given why the English officers in the evidence they gave before Sir Elijah Impey, should studiously conceal the names of the Zemindars from whom they received intelligence of what was transacted and intended in the province of Oude?

There is no person, however independent in fortune, that can bear to be shut out from the sympathy and society of his fellow-men. To be frowned on by every countenance, to be regarded with aversion and abhorrence by every eye, is a state of misery and despair from which there is not an human being who would not willingly take  
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shelter in the silent grave: but he who should have held an estate or farm, or any possession in the province of Oude, and at the same time have appeared in character of an informer against the Begums, would have been exiled from the society and the affectionate regards of his fellow-men, and become an object of universal hatred and execration. Mr. Sheridan puts the question, Is it natural to suppose that the Zemindar, or native Hindoo of whatever denomination, should wish to have it concealed, that he had done a service to the Prince, his new master, and to the victorious and flourishing English? Would he not rather boast of his merits, and look for protection and reward? No. Constituted like other men, endowed with the common feelings of humanity, there is no reward which he would put in competition with a total exclusion from human society.—A reward of thirty thousand pounds was offered after the battle of Culloden, 1746, to the man that should deliver up or discover the Pretender, who wandered for many months in the Highlands and islands of Scotland; yet was there not found a man, among thousands struggling with poverty and want, who would relieve his sufferings by the price of blood. The Highlanders are an inoffensive, humane, and generous  
race

face of men; yet it is not to be supposed that there was not one among so great a number who would not have yielded to such a temptation, if he had not dreaded, as worse than poverty, or any evil from which wealth could secure him, the universal abhorrence of mankind. In London the reward would have operated on the minds of thousands, because in the obscurity of that immense capital thousands of wretches are to be found who can skulk from the face of their former acquaintance, and in new alleys and lanes escape the condemnation of their infamy. This was not the case in the Highlands of Scotland; nor yet in the Zemindaries of Oude. The Zemindar or Ryot who should have discovered any fact that might affect the fortune or the dignity of the Begums, if it had been known that he discovered it to his neighbours, would have found life insupportable; while, at the same time, various motives may be conceived that might have induced him to court the favour, and even to wish for the stability of the English Government. Is it any wonder, then, that the natives or subjects of Oude, who communicated intelligence of the rebellion to the English officers, should desire that their intelligence might be kept secret? Or is it a wonder that English officers should keep their plighted faith to the Zemindars

dars who committed their future happiness into their hands? It would seem, that no inconsiderable part of the accusation brought against Mr. Hastings, and those who acted with and under him, is founded on their very virtue.

As the good faith and humanity exercised towards the Zemindars and others, who gave intelligence, has been converted into a subject of suspicion, so also has the lenity and forbearance shewn to the eunuchs and confidential servants of the Begums, after the discovery of their treasures. The treasures discovered, says Mr. Sheridan, the eunuchs are set at liberty, and all persecution of their mistresses immediately ceases: Does this look like an inquiry into a preconcerted rebellion, or an act of deliberate rapacity? If Mr. Hastings had continued to press down the load of suffering, if the eunuchs had been thrown into dungeons, and outrages committed against the Begums, a court of inquisition instituted, and evidence invited, or even extorted; then would Mr. Hastings have escaped the imputation of interrupting severities the moment the end was obtained for which they had been applied; but he would have also forfeited the praise which is due to the magnanimous moderation of his conduct. “ Enough had been  
“ done

“ done for the restoration of the Nabob’s autho-  
 “ rity, and for the security of the peace of his  
 “ country ; enough had been done for an exhibi-  
 “ tion of example.” It is unfair to judge of Mr.  
 Hastings’ actions taken singly and by themselves.  
 We ought to view them as they are performed in  
 succession, and combined to a salutary purpose.  
 Mr. Hastings consulted at once his own feelings  
 and the ends of his administration, when, with the  
 measures that he judged to be necessary for sup-  
 porting the authority of the Nabob, he united re-  
 spect for the sex and a regard to the necessities of  
 the mother and grandmother of our princely  
 ally. And, on the whole, let the world judge,  
 whether ever any Governor, viceroy, or prince,  
 who had so difficult a part to act as Mr. Hastings,  
 mingled greater respect to the feelings and rights  
 of human nature, with that system of conduct  
 which was necessary to maintain the authority of  
 Government. This, this is the grand and deci-  
 sive point on which Mr. Hastings ought to be  
 tried by his country, and on which he will be  
 tried, and justified too, if not by his country that  
 reaps the fruits of his faithful services, yet by the  
 common sense and justice of all civilized nations,  
 but by none more readily than that enlightened  
 people, whose inordinate ambition his measures  
 so effectually restrained.

This did not escape the shrewdness of Mr. Sheridan. It was therefore the consideration of this point, with which he set out in his artful, entertaining, and prolonged oration. Mr. Dempster had put some questions to the witnesses at the bar tending to ascertain that extremity of danger which was threatened by the long arrears due to the army. Mr. Sheridan animadverted on those questions with great rhetorical emotion, and contended that no political necessity whatever can vindicate an act of injustice. On the same and on other subjects Mr. Fox has at different times exclaimed in the House of Commons, *fiat justitia, ruat cælum*; a maxim which, as a writer of distinguished reputation justly observed, would be an absurd sacrifice of the end to the means. As matters of fact always exist before law, and laws are never so numerous as cases, new conjunctures must sometimes arise, in which it is absolutely necessary to act according to the supreme law of the general advantage. And the purest moralists as well as theologians, have concurred in opinion, that a case may exist in which it is even "expedient that one man should die for the people." Even the Stoic philosophy, from an enthusiast in which Mr. Fox borrows, and Mr. Sheridan takes the occasional use of that glowing expression

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just quoted, admits that the interest and the very life of an individual member may be justly sacrificed on certain emergencies for the good of that body of which he forms a part. Laws arise out of the mixed state of human affairs: human affairs, in their present stage, are not squared to the abstracted nicety of pre-existent laws. Mr. Sheridan and Mr. Fox would not be so great *Stoics* as to carry their doctrine into practice, if Providence should place them in a situation in which it would be necessary for them either to adhere to their maxim, or to ruin, not heaven and earth, but even that narrow spot called Great Britain.

*Vincit amor patriæ, laudemque immensa cupido.*

Supposing therefore, not granting, that there was not sufficient evidence to convict the Begums either of rebellious actions or designs, before an ordinary court of justice in ordinary cases, yet if the situation of affairs was such, that either the public safety must be ruined, or some sacrifice or other made for its preservation, it was the duty of Mr. Hastings to make such a sacrifice: and if there was an option of sacrifices, it was also his duty to fix on that which was the most effectual for obtaining its end, and which could be made with the least violation, or appearance of violation, of justice. But to resume the jaghires (an equi-



valent being intended), and to seize the treasures of the Begums, was the most effectual sacrifice that could be made. It was also that which could be made with the least violation, or appearance of violation, of justice; for there was at least a degree of probable evidence that those Begums entertained hostile designs against the English, and that they had even begun to carry them into execution: therefore, the measures taken by Mr. Hastings on the emergency in question, were, in all respects, the most proper that could have been possibly imagined. If they were improper, let the English nation restore their treasures to the Begums.

If in human nature there are qualities by which it is distinguished from the animal creation, men are themselves, in different climates, greatly diversified: and they not only find in their condition the sources of variance and dissension, but they appear to have in their minds the very seeds of animosity, and to embrace the occasions of mutual opposition with alacrity and pleasure; a constitution of nature, which, in the mysterious course of Providence, gives room for the exercise of the noblest virtues. From this diversity among the different nations there arises a diversity in the modes by which they are governed. One form of government suits  
one

one country, and one another. The governments in Asia are despotic, and it is by summary proceedings alone, and a strong arm, by which, in their present moral condition, they can be governed. To introduce new forms of government into nations, if practicable at all, is the work of time. Attempts were made to introduce liberty into Russia at once, but they proved abortive; and, in like manner, the steps that have been taken to introduce the English law into India have been attended with great confusion, and been productive of much inconvenience and mischief. It is found difficult to govern the Hindoos by our laws even in times of profound peace. What then was Mr. Hastings to do in times of infinite difficulty and danger? In proportion to the embarrassments of the English, the ideas and pretensions of the native princes of India naturally revived. The novelty and the odiousness of our institutions were more sensibly felt; the sanctions by which they were established were weakened; and all things seemed rapidly to revert to that situation in which we found India, when, under the pretence of being the treasurers and tax-gatherers of the Great Mogul, we extended our power over so many provinces of Asia. The British power in India was only of an artificial kind,

kind, the whole mass of numbers and opinion of right being against it. If the truth must be told, it was purely despotic, and depended for its efficacy on the principle of FEAR. Should the pressure and weight of Government be lessened, the fire, which was smothered only by that weight and pressure, must break out with an explosion fatal to the oppressors. The feeble, the partial, and varying attempts that had been made to establish a new order of affairs, had not formed such a strength of Government as could be depended on in a new and unprecedented situation, big with danger and final destruction. The artificial mounds by which we had sometimes endeavoured, and might yet propose to confine and lead the stream of popular opinion, would give way to that storm which was ready to fall, and restore all things to their usual and their deepest channel. It is justly observed by the Roman historian Sallust, that dominion is easily preserved by the same means through which it was gained. On the occasion of an extraordinary and alarming conjuncture in India, the Governor-General of Bengal reverted to the principles by which our dominion there had been both acquired and supported, and provided for the public safety by expedients, which, in times of tranquillity, and in European Governments,

vernments, might be deemed violent and irregular, but which, in the circumstances in which he was placed, were proper, because they were salutary.

If ever a case existed in which a ruler of a people might assume a latitude of conduct suitable to political exigences, Mr. Hastings is justifiable in the measures in question, by all that can justify an extraordinary step in an extraordinary situation: rectitude of intention; the wise adaption of the means to the end; and complete success. The measures he pursued were not pursued for his own emolument, (for Mr FRANCIS does not charge him with a spirit of private avarice and rapine,) but for the public safety. In resuming the jaghires, and seizing the treasures of the Begums, he consulted the public tranquillity, and by settling on those sequestrated Princesses a yearly revenue in money, instead of land, he provided for their own. His administration has been crowned with glorious success: nor would a nation so generous as the English have been contented with merely abstaining from all criminations of so amiable a private, and so great a public character, if private resentment, indefatigable labour, and the utmost acuteness of understanding, had not combined to exhibit a malignant and partial view of his actions

actions in detail, instead of tracing the mutual connections and contemplating the result of the whole.

For of what, my countrymen, is Mr. Hastings accused? Not of snatching the morsel from him that is ready to faint: not of tearing the scanty vestment from shivering limbs: not of extorting by refined torments, like a Cortez or Pizarro, or some of our own nation, whose names the imagination of the reader will readily supply, hoarded treasures for swelling a private fortune; but, at the very worst, for saving an empire by irregular means. Who, henceforth, will nobly dare to break through the restraints that malice and cabal, armed with the chicanery of law, impose on every mind that is more anxious about self-interest than the public prosperity and safety? Shall it henceforth be necessary, for the conduct of our distant concerns, to send out the Judges of Westminster-hall, or his Majesty's Solicitor and Attorney-General? What is to be our situation in Asia, if our affairs are directed in that quarter of the world, not by the towering genius of Warren Hastings, but the creeping caution of Pepper Arden? In the successful, I will add, in the mild measures adopted by the Governor-General, was there ought repugnant to the spirit by which our dominions in India had been uniformly governed?

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The conditions on which our territorial property in India was transferred to the East-India Company, were indeed plausible, but those conditions were not observed. The king of Delhi granted certain rights to the Company, on condition of their paying that tribute which he was unable to raise from the refractory Nabobs of the Mogul empire. But if he was unable to enforce his demands on the native Princes of India, he was still less able to enforce them on the Company, armed with the troops and the navies of Britain. The Company exacted the tribute from the Princes, but withheld it from the Emperor. They violated their engagements, and pursued a system of rapine. Nor let it be said that these were the acts of the Company only: the British Government were accomplices in their schemes; they defended them by their power, and they shared in the plunder. The East-India fair trade was hardly able to support itself. It was the territorial property, and the private fortunes acquired in India, that made this trade beneficial to the nation at large, and which alone enabled the Company to pay the annual sum stipulated with Government. It cannot be concealed that this was the real ground on which our affairs stood in India, and this the principle on which they were conducted. The

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Governor General represented the Genius of Britannia in the East, which was not smiling and soft, but commanding and austere. If to maintain this tone was a crime, it was not the crime of him in whose person it centred, and by whose fidelity to his engagements it was displayed. No, my countrymen, it was not Mr. Hastings that was reduced to the necessity of over-awing by seasonable severities the rebellious designs of the Rajah of Benares and the Begums of Oude, and crushing in the bud a general revolt in India. It was our mismanagement and disasters in the West: it was our love of gain and ambition in the East: it was the combination of the world against us, that obliged the man in whose hands our safety was entrusted, to use the best means in his power for its preservation. It was said of old,

*Quod si violandum jus, regnandi causa violandum est.*

This maxim was not delivered in defence of cruel and wanton ambition. It imports, that, as political government is the greatest blessing of human society, it is to be preserved and maintained at all adventures. Every political grievance may be remedied by a nation while it possesses the force and spring of legislative authority:

but

but when that is lost, all is lost. Were the intentions of Great Britain, then, towards the natives of India humane and gracious? The light and temporary distresses of the Princesses of Oude was a cheap price for so great a purchase: for I assume it as a maxim, that, without that sacrifice, the power of Britain in India must have been annihilated. But this would not have happened without a struggle: so that the question that Mr. Hastings had under consideration was, Whether, when the fortune of Great Britain stood trembling on a precipice, and the strongest probabilities (if our lawyers impugn the denomination of *legal evidence*) existed, that the Begums of Oude had taken the first steps of revolt, whether he should follow the course he in fact pursued; or, by yielding to the inevitable necessity of a mutiny, or of disbanding the army, cut off the hopes of a political reform in India, by cutting off the power of England on which it depended, involve the whole country in anarchy and bloodshed, expose the English to the revenge of the natives, and render the final dissolution of our power in the East as violent and painful, as its first commencement was plausible, and its progress prosperous? In such a dilemma, could the rigour of justice, could the tenderness of mercy, condemn even such an expedient as that which was resorted to by the



Marquis of Fauquieres in the confederate war, in the reign of queen Ann ? The Marquis was sent out, at the head of a party which was to pass in the night through a wood in deep silence, and to perform a service which required equal secrecy and expedition, and on the performance of which the very salvation of the French army depended. Towards the morning, but while it was yet dark, one of the men under his command began to cough violently, and could not by his utmost efforts suppress that irresistible convulsion. The commander sacrificed the life of one man to that of thousands \*. The French nation lamented the hard fate of the innocent man ; but did not condemn the action of the general. Compare with this deed the conduct of Mr. Hastings in Oude, and the innocence, and even services of the French soldier, with the hostile intentions and preparations of the Begums ; and say, if either, which was the most to be condemned ?

In a critical and biographical introduction to an history of the reigns of King William and queen Ann, by Mr. Alexander Cunningham, the English Resident at Venice, just published, and which, I trust, will be read and studied by every man who is a friend to the liberty, who

\* See Fauquieres' Memoirs.

delights in recollecting the purest and most glorious times of our republic, and is disposed to watch the many-formed ambition of France: in the Introduction, I say, to that history, there is an anecdote recorded of the great Prince Eugene, which I submit to the consideration of the accusers of Mr. Hastings. At the battle of Malplaquet, while victory yet hung in suspense, a youth of the name of James Campbell (afterwards General Sir James Campbell, of Laurs), at the head of a party of horse, sprung forward out of the line, cut through the enemy, and even the Gens d'Armes of France, and through again to the confederate army. This daring action struck a panic in the French, inspired our men with courage, and decided the fate of the day. Certain officers of our army murmured against Campbell, and were severe in their censures of his conduct. But Eugene, who, as the writer of the Introduction observes, conceived that a conjuncture might exist wherein the transgression of rules might imply the highest degree of merit, thanked him for having so nobly and successfully exceeded his orders, on the day after the battle, at the head of the army. Is the power of France less now than it was then? Is her ambition, though better concealed, less dangerous? Is the merit  
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of Hastings less than that of Campbell? No! but an Eugene is wanting to proclaim his just praise in the face of his enemies.

But it was not only India that Mr. Hastings saved to the British empire. The conquests that were made there, by the valour of the British troops under his government, were exchanged, at the late peace, for other places, which, but for those conquests, must have remained in the hands of our enemies. Now, Mr. Fox, and others of his party, as Major Scott told them in their teeth without being contradicted, about two months before the peace was concluded, declared in the House of Commons, that without a peace of some kind or other this nation was undone. A peace as honourable and advantageous to Great Britain as her situation could possibly leave room to expect was concluded; and immediately Mr. Fox and his friends, who had so often devoted Lord North to the block, unite for the purpose of turning the man out of his office, by whom the peace was made. So that both the man who made the peace, and the man who, by the vigour of his administration in the East, enabled him to make it, without sacrificing our West India Islands captured by the French, are rewarded, the one with the loss of office, the other

other with an unprecedented and ridiculous, but vexatious persecution !---Never surely were services so ill requited as those of Mr. Hastings to this country. In private life he was the friend, and patron, and bountiful assistant of thousands, devolved by their friends on fortune and on his goodness. In his public character he saved India by the gentlest sacrifice that was ever yet made by prince or ruler in circumstances so full of alarm and danger : yet this is the man of whom Mr. Burke says, that “ it is indecent that “ he should be permitted to go about at large, “ enjoying the common benefits of liberty, fresh “ air, and social life.”

As I introduced these observations on the charges brought against Mr. Hastings by his enemies, and on the arguments by which they are supported, with a great name, to whose character and fortune those of that gentleman bear a striking resemblance ; so I shall, in like manner, conclude them, by remarking a similarity between his conduct, on his return from India, and that of another great spirit, when his fortune and fate were committed to the general opinion and determination of the English nation. “ While “ the succession was yet unsettled, King William “ entered into no intrigues either with the

“electors or the members of parliament; and  
 “so far was he from forming cabals with the  
 “leaders of parties, that he disdained even to  
 “bestow careffes on those whose assistance might  
 “be useful to him\*.” Admirals have lost oppor-  
 tunities, Generals have lost armies, and Com-  
 manders in Chief auspicious conjunctures and  
 times never to be recalled; but they threw them-  
 selves into the scale of opposition, and were  
 loaded with offices and honours. Mr. Hastings,  
 the favour of the nation, courts not the favour of  
 any party, but looks confidently to the nation for  
 justice. It might have become Administration,  
 as well-wishers to the support of the British Go-  
 vernment, to have shewn so much countenance  
 at least to the cause of Mr. Hastings, as to have  
 used their influence, which prevails so much in  
 other matters, in order to obtain a patient hearing  
 to the evidence and arguments urged by Mr.  
 Burges, Mr. Nicholls, Major Scott, and others.

The little jealousy and cunning of the Minister  
 of the day begin already to be generally sus-  
 pected, and the motives which directed his voice  
 against Mr. Hastings to be understood. I trust  
 to the generosity of the English nation, that

\* Hume's History of England.

the meanness of that iniquitous policy will one day be made manifest; that it will lay the name with the power of that *cunning youth*, low in the dust, and serve as a foil to display the magnanimous virtue of Mr. Hastings, concerning whose praise no tongue or pen that describes the present, in any future times, shall be silent. Were it not that the example of his ill-requited merit may strike its roots too deep into the hearts of other commanders, and that the enemies of our country will triumph over us, I should almost rejoice that so great, so well regulated, and composed a mind as that of Mr. Hastings, has found, like the glorious objects of *antient astringism*, in the persecution of his countrymen, the noblest theatre of virtue, and the loudest trumpet of fame. And yet the vote of the House of Commons on the 8th of February, and particularly that of one man, I cannot reflect on without surprize and indignation. I do not wonder that the warm imagination of Mr. Burke is over-heated by so long and close an attention to one object. I do not wonder that Mr. Sheridan, though of a disposition naturally honest, generous, and noble, should, from political views, act the part so wisely committed to his powers by his political friends: far less do I wonder that even

he, who in such suspicious circumstances abandoned the inquiry into the affair of Rumbold, and who had acknowledged so emphatically, that, but for the exertions of Mr. Hastings, India must have been lost, I do not wonder that he who had no character for consistency to lose, should sit silent amidst the criminations against the man whom he had praised, and sneak off under the shadow of the ministerial wing to vote against him: but I wonder, that Mr. Pitt, who owes his station to the friends and to the personal magnanimity of the Governor General, in refusing to purchase his *quietus* by joining a faction against him; I wonder that Mr. Pitt, who pretends to stand solely on the confidence of his countrymen, should so meanly and so impolitically desert that great man to whose influence and virtue he owes his power, and his country its safety. Do you wish, young statesman, by such truckling conduct, to gain the good opinion and friendship of your opponents? There is a generosity in the nature of Fox, of North, of Burke, and Sheridan, which will never coalesce with the cunning of yours. Though the fortune of political war has placed these men in the opposite lines, their hearts and minds are congenial with those of Hastings. Are you

you so weak, notwithstanding all that is taught by the law of nature, and even by the sacred Scriptures, as to plead scruples of conscience? Go then, exchange situations with Doctor Prettyman, abandon the government of a great nation, and preserve the peace of your mind by relinquishing your power, not by sacrificing your friend. But is there not somewhat of jealousy at the bottom of your opposition to Mr. Hastings? The world thinks so; and, I believe, your countrymen will soon convince you that they do.

The persecutions carried on against great and good men, and the triumphs of the wicked and weak, with which the English history, and especially in its latest periods, abounds, shew how unworthily popular favour may be gained, and how undeservedly lost; how quick those transitions from one extreme to another, which are incident to popular governments; and with what caution and reserve we ought to yield our assent to the doctrines of the day, or our approbation to the measures of the moment, the true motives of which are seldom avowed, although plausible pretexts are easily found for recommending them to the multitude, who, from malignity, from a love of innovation and amusement, and from the very sociability of their nature,

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ture, are eager to catch and swell whatever tone happens to be uppermost, for the time, which originates for the most part, in private and unjustifiable views, and which is circulated at first by selfish industry, and at last by the tides of sympathy and currents of popular passion. But these tides and currents, sooner or later subside, and return by a natural and necessary reflux in an opposite direction ; *sometimes*, as in the general sorrow which followed the death of Socrates, even to a point when unavailing repentance manifests itself in acts of outrage and madness. It is not until such tumults are calmed that the characters of men are justly estimated, and their names duly embalmed in the faithful page of history.

F I N I S.

A

L E T T E

TO THE

RIGHT HONOURABLE

EDMUND  BURK



**L E T T E R**

**TO THE**

**RIGHT HONOURABLE**

**EDMUND BURKE,**

**PAYMASTER GENERAL**

**OF HIS**

**MAJESTY'S FORCES.**

**BY**

**MAJOR JOHN SCOTT.**

**L O N D O N :**

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L E T T E R  
TO THE  
RIGHT HONOURABLE  
EDMUND BURKE.

Right Honourable Sir,

**I**N the distribution of different parts to the ministerial orators who support the new India bill, in the application of their different powers to this one important object, it was natural that all the topics which afforded play to a wandering imagination, and to tragic description, should have been allotted to Mr. Burke. The field of fancy is almost exclusively your's; and when it was resolved, that in or-

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der to palliate the intended invasion of our charter and our property, the atrocious acts of barbarity and cruelty committed by the servants of the East-India Company abroad, should be held up to the detestation of the House, and of the public, and form one grand engine of the attack, your talents both for the *pathetic* and the *fabulous*, gave you a double claim to this branch of the service. Your feelings are so trembly acute, your nerves are so strung to compassion, your language is so attuned to lamentation, that forms of horror and distress, scenes of destruction and desolation, seem to arise *spontaneously* in your mind, and to occupy that portion of the sensorium, which, in men of irritable habits, is the province of reason, of judgment, and of common sense. I am, therefore, one of those who were exceedingly surprised that the right honourable framer of the new bill should so palpably have encroached upon your privilege in his late harangues, as to exhibit a very glowing and highly-coloured picture of the inhumanities of our countrymen in India. There is honour among thieves: surely it cannot be wanting among Ministers. But I shall hereafter be less inclined to wonder at any unwarrantable attempt to invade the prerogatives of the subject,

subject, since I have seen, among yourselves, so glaring an invasion of your's!

If avarice and rapacity were subjects open to the eloquence of Mr. Fox, the tortures, the bloodshed that accompanied them were themes that appertained solely to Mr. Burke. The right honourable *Secretary* might inveigh as he pleased on the manner in which the debts due to the Company had been contracted—but it belonged to the right honourable *Paymaster* to expatiate on the severities necessary for extorting payment of them. In short, Sir, you have been superseded in your functions: *The Minister*, who is soon to unite in his own person the rights of the Company, the powers of the Crown, and the riches of the East, has begun his career of injustice by excluding you from the path in which you hoped to have trodden without a rival. *He* snatched from your hands Colonel Boujour's letter—*He* told the piteous tale of Cheyt Sing, the woes of Asophrul Dowla, and the misfortunes of his grandmother! I wonder you can ever forgive him. To take your long prepared victim out of your clutches, to go out of his way, and against his own repeated professions, for the sake of abusing the Governor General of



Bengal, and to abuse him too for a sanguinary, murderous disposition, of which till that moment you had prided yourself (and with reason) as the sole discoverer, was a hard trial of your patience. But to drive you from every strong hold of your Committee, to leave you nothing but the stale defence of Shah Allum, the expulsion of that virtuous monarch Cossim Ally, and the defraudation of that disinterested Plenipotentiary, Omichund, whereon to erect your plea of participation in the spoils of Hindostan, must engage your very opponents in your behalf. They cannot but have beholden with an eye of pity the shifts to which you were driven, the distress in which you were involved by the necessity of a vague and uninteresting retrospection.

To plunge into the forgotten abyss of distant revolutions, to revive the convicted slander of artificial famines, to tread on the tender ground of injurious monopolies previous to the year 1772, (*with your friend General Smith at your elbow*) was indeed a bitter pill — but gilded as it is with five and twenty thousand a year from Government to yourself and your relations, you contrived somehow or other to swallow it: and even now that it is down, it cannot fail,

fail, I think, to excite a few qualms — for you must at times be apprehensive that your language and your conduct on former struggles with respect to India, should live in the world's recollection: that it should be whispered how strenuous and how loud an advocate you were in the year 1772 for the chartered rights of the East-India Company. How you then reprobated the ministerial iniquity of your now-noble friend Lord North — How warmly you defended the innocence of the Company's servants of *that* day — and how quickly, upon a proper application, *pulveris exigui jactu*, you can “renounce your principles, and eat your words.”

In this formal recantation of your un-pensioned habits of thinking and speaking, Mr. Woodfall has been particularly cautious not to omit that you were upon your legs upwards of two hours. This is a morsel of information for us out of doors only. The members who retired to dinner when you got up, knew they had full two hours of spare time; and when they returned, you had not sat down. But as you took only somewhat more than two hours to disgorge all you had taken in during three years of hard study, and as in that time you contrived to unsay *every thing* that

that you had been heard to utter on the discussion of the Regulating Act of the 13th of the King, I must allow that you performed it *with great expedition*; with an expedition proportioned to the *necessities of the times*, and to the hurry of the whole transaction. The speech which Mr. Woodfall has made for you in Tuesday's Chronicle, deals so exceedingly in *generals*, that I cannot follow up with that accuracy and closeness which I am inclined to bestow upon the subject your "prodigious detail of the conduct of the Company in Asia, from their first establishment there." But I must be permitted to remark, that it is somewhat extraordinary to observe you ostentatiously vaunting your late three-years course of study, as the ground of your claim to the attention of the House, when it is notorious to the most superficial observer of your Reports, that every object of enquiry in your committee, has been religiously confined to the single period of Mr. Hastings's administration, and when it is evident, from the whole tenour of your oration, that you had been almost expressly referred, by a ministerial mandate, to events antecedent to that administration. One article was indeed generously given up to you, wherein there was a possibility of implicating the Governor General:—a history of that pompous,

ous non-entity, *the mildest of Monarchs*, that Allah. His *mildness* however I shall leave in your quiet possession; for that quality has been seldom disputed to Monarchs who were without subjects. But that he is "the most beneficent, humane," (i. e. *mild* once more) "generous," (i. e. *beneficent*) "wise, philosophical," (*wise* again) "and religious of men," I must a little contest with you, notwithstanding your ingenious reduplication of epithets. Of his beneficence I cannot at once recollect an instance, except a donation (hardly gratuitous) of two lacs of rupees—and that portion of his merits you should have left to the panegyric of General Smith. In wisdom I hold him greatly inferior to the Raja of Tanjore; for in the *choice of friends*, which is one great criterion of judgement, the latter has infinitely the advantage. His religion, as it is that of a Mahometan, is of little consideration in a Christian assembly; and you had better have given him a good share of morality; however, I must acknowledge to have heard, that his Majesty is famous for copying the Koran with peculiar neatness of character, and that he is not much interrupted in this august employment by attention to the management of his extensive empire, and to the welfare of his innumerable

able subjects. Between ourselves, Sir——He is a weak man. Lord Clive gave him the provinces of Corah and Allahabad, which would afford him a handsome maintenance, and were five times as much as he could ever have acquired in any part of India without us : and we also allowed him twenty-six lacs of rupees yearly from Bengal for the support of his dignity. But he was too much of a *philosopher* to attach himself to the good things of this world, so threw himself into the arms of his natural, hereditary, and constitutional enemies the Marattas; ceded to them, *without our consent*, the provinces we had given him, and undertook a chimerical expedition to Dehli. Are you surprised that we took those provinces back again, when the King could not, or would not, keep them ? or that we did not continue him the subsidy of twenty-six lacs of rupees to be lavished away among Marattas ? Self-preservation forced upon us the conduct we observed on that occasion ; it was warmly approved *at home*, by both ends of the town ; and it certainly has contributed more than any other cause, to keep Bengal still in our hands. I hope the new Commissioners will now afford this great and virtuous Prince some solid instance of their compassion — and that they will restore him those provinces,

provinces, or some others in their stead, as well as his subsidy—by way of contrast to the measures of Mr. Hastings.—In the “Magna Charta of Hindostan,” it would be a miserable oversight to omit the Great Mogul; and surely he has a claim upon the justice of the state, and still more upon the gratitude of individuals, for restitution of his countries and revenues.

It does not indeed perfectly meet my comprehension how you could explain the circumstance of the *sale* of this monarch to Sujah Dowla, nor the *sale* of Sujah Dowla *to himself*. No doubt you made this matter perfectly clear to your scanty remnant of an audience, but Mr. Woodfall has sunk the particulars. I know very well, that when his beneficent and philosophical Majesty ran away, we re-assumed the provinces which he chose to evacuate. I know that as they were too difficult to be managed by us, we parted with them for a valuable consideration to Sujah Dowla; by which means we strengthened our own frontier against the Marattas. I know also, that upon various occasions on which we afforded powerful military assistance, or important political services to Sujah Dowla, we endeavoured to balance the ac-

count in some degree, by stipulations for a pecuniary return. If, however, that Visier purchased *himself* by any of those transactions, he certainly thought himself a gainer by the bargain : and as there is evidence before the Select Committee, that he lived and *died in perfect independence*, it is manifest that, in this instance at least, the Company broke through the system of treachery, dishonesty, and injustice, with which you have charged them, by leaving Sujah Dowla in full and quiet possession of himself, after they had thus sold him to himself.

So you have asserted that “ that they sold Ragoba to “ the Marattas, and the Marattas to Ragoba.” What a childish play upon words ! Did we not in the same manner sell America to France and France to America ? What is there in the resolutions respecting Ragoba to justify such indecent puerilities ? Our Bombay Council had seen *that* Chief the ostensible and the avowed head of the Maratta government. — A revolution displaced him, and he threw himself under our protection. — It was natural he should make liberal offers for our aid in re-establishing his affairs : it was politically just that we should accept them.

Was

Was it ever imputed as a crime to the French Court that King James was received and protected there after his abdication? or can it be doubted that he had bound himself to the performance of most ample concessions, in case of a restoration through the means of France? On that first treaty with Ragoba you mean, I presume, (for I have no data) to ground the sale of the Marattas to *him*; on the treaty of Poorunder you must of course fix the sale of Ragoba to the Marattas — But here, a vote of the House of Commons authorises the sale, by an approbation of that treaty. But the second and late treaty of peace which provides a residence and a stipend in the Maratta dominions for Ragoba, nearly the same as was done by the treaty of Poorunder, has another article, by which “the English and the Peshwa mutually agree, that neither will afford any kind of assistance to the enemies of the other;” and this inclines you to tremble for the safety of Ragoba. — Had you turned to the sixth article of the same treaty, you would have seen that Ragoba’s quiet abode, comfortable support, and perfect security, is expressly provided for *by name*: and therefore if the Peshwa, or any of his people, offer any injury to Ragoba as long as he continues quiet, *they* will



have infringed the sixth article; and consequently the fourteenth, on which your objection is founded, will have become void of course.

The other Rajas and Princes whom the Company may have *sold*, are all packed up by the *dozen* or *gross* in Woodfall's paper, so that it is not in my power to go into the merits of each particular bargain : but from the general purport of your speech I am led to conclude, that let who will have been guilty of this general auction, this *sale* of Hindostan, the Crown (or rather the present Ministry) is understood to have a right to all the benefits of a purchaser. I am not indeed yet exactly clear whether the present possessions, territories, and sovereignties belonging to the East-India Company, be liable to be ranked among the *lots bought*, or the *lots sold*; but I am sure that Government exhibits at once the most interested eagerness in appropriating the whole to itself, and the most perfect indifference as to the validity of the title by which they are now held. To me it appears very little consonant to justice, that the Crown should profit by the iniquities of the Company. Nothing can be more evident, than that the Crown was not concerned in the *acquisition*

*cession* of the Company's present estates: on what plea should it now assume them? If there were rapacity, or treachery, or fraud, or barbarity, in the manner by which they were first gotten, nothing short of restitution can repair the mischief. Is it less rapacious, or treacherous, or barbarous, for a Government to seize the property of its own subjects, guaranteed to them by frequent acts of its own, than for those subjects to have originally seized it in the same manner from the then lawful owners? Of the 180,000 *square miles*, which this Bill is to vest in the hands of . . . . . I know not whom — much has been granted by public and authoritative deeds of cession to the East-India Company: — and such is indisputably the tenure of the twenty-four Pergunnahs near Calcutta, and of the province of Gauzipoor and Benares. These are held by grant from the Nabob of Bengal, and the Vizier of Oude, who were then sovereigns, *proprio juris*, and competent to the grant. The Dewanny of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa rests on a very different title, on a firmaun from the present Mogul, whose power was never acknowledged in any of those provinces, and who by that act gave away what he never could have the smallest

smallest hope of making his own. The *Dewanny* itself, considered as a Mogul establishment, confers nothing more than the appointment to collect the revenues for the Emperor's use. The internal government, the military command, are offices totally distinct, and were never, that I know or suspect, granted to the Company at all. These are branches of the *Nizamut*; and a part of them at least is still exercised under the name, and on the authority, of the Soubadar of Bengal. Surely a Bill brought into Parliament for the express display of national justice, for the declared purpose of doing away former acts of violence and oppression, a Bill which is to benefit both the Company and the Public at home, and to be the *Magna Charta* of Hindostan, should have paid some attention to these differences in the tenures of the Company's possessions. A plea of political necessity may perhaps be sufficient to wrest from them the exercise of *sovereignty*: but their *private* property should at least be inviolate. Even that despotic monarch, the Vizier of Oude, did not at once confiscate to his own use the nett collections of all the Jaghires which he took out of the hand of the Jaghiredars. There is a medium for tyranny itself to observe — and if the Company were

to be deprived of all power, of all credit, of all existence abroad, it would at least have been decent to have left them their house and warehouses at home untouched. A whole province forcibly seized in Asia would have excited less murmur and indignation, than the bursting of a single door in Leadenhall-street: and though your cousin may hector and domineer in the palace of the Rajah of Tanjore, I trust in God that the fag-ends of Mr. Fox's ministry will have the modesty to wait a few months before they assert their superiority over all the dukes and peers of the realm. It cannot however be doubted, but that as soon as this bill is passed, the very secretary of a secretary, the very deputies of those who will then be the masters of the Crown with the title of its servants, will have more real importance, more weight, more efficacy in the government of this devoted country, than the first independent members of the House of Lords.

Much has been said of the insufficiency of the present Court of Directors to manage the Company's affairs; I believe it indeed to have been but indifferently served by some few of them: and the public is at no loss to discover something more than suspicious traces of  
underhand

understand management. But in fact, the objections; I find, went not so much to the incapacity of the persons, as to the imperfection of their powers: and I think the four and twenty gentlemen of the present list might have been as competent to the better direction of the Company's concerns, as your sixteen new Directors, had you but given them the same enlarged authority. I would not be personal — and therefore I avoid all comparison of the present objects of preference with the rest of their brethren; as a Proprietor, however, I have something of a plea for knowledge of their several merits, and I own I am in some instances at a loss to divine the motives for their selection. You, Sir, have ascribed much of “ the evils which have desolated India, to the sort “ of persons sent out by the Company. Young men “ without education, and with no other talents than “ such as matured to rapacity and barbarity. A “ *grey-headed Englishman is a phenomenon unknown “ in India.*” (Vide Morning Chronicle.) Mr. Hornby, surely, who has been at Bombay forty-two years, must have a wonderfully green old age, if he be not yet grey. But perhaps the *grey-headed Receiver in the city* is not satisfied with his present pickings, and this speech is preparatory to his Indian appoint-

appointment. And why object, Sir, to young men? Is there not something to be learnt, is there not some apprenticeship necessary in every sphere of life? Would you have the trade, and the revenue, and the government of all our affairs in India turned over at once to blockheads who have not the smallest idea of the principles of commerce, or of the laws, or the customs, or the language of the country, merely because they can display a few grey hairs? Nor do the young men who are usually sent to India want education so much as you would insinuate. That error perhaps you may have adopted on the observation of some classical deficiencies in one of the luminaries of your Committee: but He has figured most in a military line; and few soldiers, you know, pride themselves in an attachment to the belles lettres. I must beg leave to inform you, Sir, that the Company's service in India is of itself a system (and no bad one) of education for a man of business: and that if you were in habits of conversing with those gentlemen who have come from thence, you would find them at least on a par in liberal and classical accomplishments with any of their home-bred neighbours. Let me add, that Mr. Hastings is, in the strictest sense of the word, *a Scholar*—That his

knowledge of the Persian and Hindostanic dialects is superior to that of most of his countrymen, that in school proficiency he excelled most of his contemporaries at Westminster, and that his style of composition in his native language is such as few writers by profession can emulate. Mr. Rouffe, one of your Committee, who (though he went young to India, and continued there several years) had previously received the best of educations, will, I doubt not, corroborate my assertion. "This rapid succession of boys" to which you impute so much of our calamities, is another creature of your own imagination. A moment's glance at the printed lists of the Company's civil and military servants at the different presidencies would have proved the contrary. In Bengal, exclusive of the Governor General, whose services are of more than thirty years standing, the seniors on the civil line take date from 1762—at Madras are several who have been there upwards of twenty five years---at Bombay there are six whose residence is of thirty years duration. But it suited the purpose of the moment that they should all be thought boys---and one of the usual figures of your rhetoric made them so---I wish there had been no other unqualified assertion! But your doctrine of monopolies

lies

lies (as given away in India,) was equally unwarrantable—"A monopoly of opium" you are made to say "was sold on the moment of the contract entered into for 40,000l. the next moment it was sold for another profit; and in the course of a short single day, with an almost equal enormity of advantage, was sent through a variety of hands."—By this account here must have been upwards of five lacks of rupees, perhaps ten lacks, made at once by the mere transfer of a contract from hand to hand; than which nothing was ever more remote from reason, from probability, from fact. The whole of your information in this business arises from the evidence of Mr. Higginson given before your Select Committee, who mentions it as a current *report* at Calcutta that the opium contract granted to Mr. Sullivan had been by him disposed of to another. Mr. Higginson could not ascertain the *truth of the report*; and I have very good grounds for believing it to be false. After all, the monopoly of opium, and some other monopolies, *must* of necessity subsist in some shape or other, as your new Directors, and new Sub-Directors, and new Governor General and Council will find—or the trade will go rapidly to ruin. I do not indeed pretend to dive into the system by which the



Despots of the present bill will render their appointments a benefit to the Proprietors and the Public; but I am sure if they tamper with the established routine of the trade, if they unhinge the business of the investment, and try *experiments* in the commercial line, as is the fashion in the political, the Company's threatened insolvency will exceedingly anticipate the close of their present commission.

It is curious to observe the different grounds on which the present bill has been supported: the Right Honourable Secretary admitted that it was a violation of charter, but pleaded a precedent in the act of 1773, in *that act*\* which you at the time so manfully opposed on the very principle that it *was* a violation. You now take the opposite line, and deny *this act* (which is a thousand times more grossly subversive of our rights, than the former was) to be any violation at all—You soften it down to “the generous modelling of charters that had been strictly forfeited for delinquency”—You say “the equity of the present bill is unparalleled.” And you add that “the *rights* and *property* of the India Company are safe as merchants, but their government is justly taken from them, as incompetent

\* See Mr. Burke's speeches in the Parliamentary Register of 1773.  
printed by Alden

pretent politicians." Facts are utterly against you in the whole of these assertions. The company is no longer free; its rights no longer subsist, either to the merchant, to the proprietor, or the politician. This I undertake to prove. The accursed act of 1773 cramped them in all these capacities, and the present bill rivets their chains. It is the nature and essence of commerce to deal more or less upon credit. The merchant who sells upon trust, takes up money upon bills. His *real* capital supplies him with the means to raise, and authorises him to use a *fictitious* capital. He borrows money upon the strength of his stock: and if that stock be clearly responsible, and if his trade be extensive, his requisitions for a loan are almost sure of success. Former acts have deprived the Company of this necessary resource, of this resource which is open to every merchant. The Company cannot borrow but of Parliament. Let its stock be ever so large, let its commerce be ever so flourishing, let its assets be ever so demonstrably satisfactory, it is not permitted to avail itself of any or all of these advantages<sup>9</sup> to procure an occasional supply of cash. This is the true foundation, Sir, of all the Company's calamities. The goods in the warehouses must lie unsold, until the stated times of sale

no controul whatsoever. It will no longer elect its own managers; *they* will be no longer chosen from its own body; they will no longer be responsible to it. Even the *nine shadows*, the make-weights of the directorial office, will be alike indifferent to the Proprietors' censure and applause: They are removable only by their masters, THE MIGHTY SEVEN. The very books of accounts, so essential to the satisfaction of the Proprietor, so necessary to his security, are no more to be open to his inspection. The report of the Company's property is to be made by the *Commissioners*, (I cannot bring myself to call them *Directors*, till they have made their triumphal entry into Leadenhall-street;) and from that report there is no appeal. The servile Proprietor may attend at the Quarterly General Court, like a starved Parisian at the Hotel-de-Ville, gaping for his annuity, to hear such a statement of the general affairs, as his high and mighty Lords the *Septemviri* shall be graciously pleased to honour him withal. But no questions—no whispering—no remonstrances.

“ Such, as we have laid before you, is the Com-  
 “ pany's actual situation; here are *our* accounts  
 “ according to act of Parliament, and here is *your*  
 “ dividend. Pass your vote of thanks to my Lords  
 “ Com-

“ Commissioners, and dare no more approach this  
 “ place, till this day, three months.” A very generous  
*model* this ; a very pleasant sound to the ears of an  
 Englishman ! But it is at best a very accurate sketch  
 of the substance of what will be uttered *ex cathedra*  
 at the new General Courts. As the commercial and  
 proprietorial rights of the Company have been thus  
 essentially infringed by former acts of Parliament,  
 their political power has been no less cautiously re-  
 stricted. The original *Regulating Act* of 1773 en-  
 joined the Directors of the East India Company to  
 communicate to his Majesty’s Secretaries of State,  
 all the information they should receive respecting the  
 politics of India, and all the orders they meant to  
 issue in consequence. The acts of their govern-  
 ments, the state and management of their revenues,  
 their whole system of administration at large and in  
 detail, have been regularly submitted to the inspec-  
 tion, and (as may be presumed from *two singular*  
*instances of disapprobation* to particular paragraphs  
 in the Company’s proposed letters to Bengal) to  
*the control* of his Majesty’s Ministers. The Court  
 of Directors can neither have approved, nor censured  
 any particular measure of their servants *abroad*, can  
 neither have advised nor prohibited any plan of policy

or any act of government *from home*, but in conformity to ministerial sentiments, but with the implied approbation of the cabinet. It should seem then that we must admit one of the two following propositions; *Either*, that his Majesty's Ministers, in not correcting the errors, or reforming the plans of the Company's servants, as laid before them for examination, were no less *incompetent politicians* than the Court of Directors; *or*, that administration, by *purposely* concealing its lights and withholding its corrections, paved the way for its own violent assumption of the power and patronage of India, on a plea of the Company's imbecility. If the Ministry could suggest no better mode of action than that submitted to them by the present managers, they are alike *inadequate to the trust*. If their opinions were stifled, if their advice was dissembled, and their right of approbation insidiously prostituted to serve their own ends, they are *unworthy of it*.—You have taken upon you to prove, that the India Company have forfeited their charter, and *therefore* that the present bill, which is a modification, a *modelling* of that charter, is *lenient*, is *generous*, is *equitable*, *beyond parallel*. I will not ask you *how* the charter has been forfeited, because you will run over your black catalogue of rapine, plunder, robbery,

robbery, inhumanity, extortion, injustice, oppression, and murder—upon which I shall not join issue with you, until evidence be brought to the bar of the House. But I wish to know *when, at what specified time, the charter was forfeited?* If *previously* to the year 1773, all your eloquence at that period was thrown away: your abuse of the noble Lord now in office for his famous Regulating Act, will be deemed to have had no more connection with *truth* than with *decency*;\* your vociferous exclamations against the *violation of all chartered rights in general*, as included in the violation of this one charter of the Company, were not only daring and intemperate, but *false, scandalous, and seditious*: your defence of the Company's servants of *that day*, your pamphlets, your speeches in their behalf, and in that of the great body they served, were mere convenient, catch-penny contrivances, insidious baits to hook in popularity. "*Regulation*" you could then discover to be† "*injustice*" and "*reform*" "*robbery*." Have words altered their quality, has negation taken the place of assertion, since that memorable æra?—I much suspect it. If you date the Company's forfeiture of their charter

\* See Mr. Burke's speeches in the year 1773, on the India Regulating Act—Published by Almon.

† Ditto.

*subsequently to the year 1773, for what purpose did you go back into the annals of their first establishment in Asia, and to the treaty of Allahabad? Every thing, upon your own principles, was right and just and legal up to that year.\* “It was necessity, not choice, that had involved the East-India Company in war”—“They bore their own expences, but they conquered for the state,” (i. e. the present Ministry; and that part of your sentence has the merit of prophecy:) you cannot however deny, that the power of controul over all the politics of the Company’s territories abroad has virtually rested with his Majesty’s Ministers ever since 1773: so that they seem implicated in all the causes of forfeiture from thence up to the present day. But as a happy knack of reconciling inconsistent assertions may be one indispensable qualification to a ministerial appointment, I will admit the doctrine of necessity, in palliation of your palpable self-contradictions: wishing at the same time that they had been confined to objects of less national magnitude. In your allusion to the Bank, you stand, I think, alone, at least on the ministerial side of the House. Much has, no doubt, been said and felt without doors respecting the danger to which the character of that *soul of the state* would be exposed, if the present bill should afford so glaring a precedent for its vio-*

\* See ~~Mr.~~ Burke’s Speeches in 1783—Published by Almon.

nation. But your happy facility of putting a question is  
 to silence all our murmurs, and to calm all our apprehensions. "If the Governors, (says Woodfall for you)  
 "if the clerks, or other servants of the Bank, had mis-  
 "applied the public money; if they had abused the  
 "trust reposed in them, if they had almost brought  
 "the nation to ruin, would it be unjust to use legis-  
 "lative interference for the public protection?"—No  
 surely; but then you should first bring *evidence* of  
 this misapplication and breach of trust to the bar of  
 the House: you should *prove* not only that the  
 Bank had done wrong, but that it had possessed  
 within itself the means of doing right; you should  
*prove* that its acts had been *all its own*, and not  
 liable to revision, to reformation, or suppression, by  
 any superior authority; you should *prove* the *fact*  
 both of the Bank's misbehaviour, and of the injury  
 sustained by the public; you should *prove* that your  
 legislative interference in behalf of the public would  
 more than counterbalance the damage that would  
 result to public credit by that very interference.  
 Now, Sir, permit me the indulgence of a question;  
 it shall be as short as your's. If the rioters in 1780  
 had succeeded in their attack on the Bank; if in  
 spite of all resistance made by the Directors, a mob  
 had broken in and carried off two or three milli



in hard cash, would the consequent distress of that body have justified the legislature in violating or annulling its charter? Such is exactly the distress of the East-India Company, arising principally from the losses of trade and heavy expences incidental to the late national war. It wants nothing but a little ready money, which the legislature will not suffer it to raise upon *its own credit*; it is, therefore, by this cruel act, laid at the mercy of Parliament, and Parliament now uses its power, acquired by a former stretch of power, in *most unmercifully* abridging the rights of the Proprietors, and new modelling (that is, annulling) the charter.—I am within bounds when I hint at the damage which will result to public credit by this bill. Damage has *already* resulted. India stock has fallen twenty per cent: Bank stock (the most solid and the most unfluctuating of all our funds) four per cent—the three per cents above two. Is not this a clear loss to the whole monied interest of the nation? a loss, which you can never make up from the revenues of India. I repeat what I have said in another place—that the produce of our territorial acquisitions in Asia can never be realized here but through the medium of the India trade. Until you can import more goods,  
and

and *ensure their sale in Europe*, the country gentlemen may gape for a decrease of the land-tax, and the traders may petition for a recal of the stamps, but you will not be able to alleviate in the *smallest* degree the burthen of either. It is demonstrable, that the Company already import as much merchandize as they can possibly dispose of ; and that if more were brought to market, their price would so exceedingly diminish, as not only to absorb all the profits of the trade, but even the capital. *Twenty* acts upon the present plan will neither so much benefit the Proprietors nor the public, as one which would *decisively* and *effectually* eradicate the practice of smuggling. In the article of tea only, the Company is said to be defrauded of 1,000,000 per annum. Here is a subject for the display of patriotism, for the exercise of talents. Prevent this fraudulent occupation, and you will *then* have done somewhat towards deserving the wonderful salaries which yourself and your relations enjoy from the public purse.

You have been pleased to consider the opposition which has been made to the proposed India bill, as proceeding rather, from an eager desire to overthrow the present Ministry, than from a conviction of the violence

lence

lence of the measure, "to effect their removal," say you, (I quote from Woodfall) "no means, however unjustifiable, no acts, however unprecedented, have been scrupled to be practised, or left untried." I most humbly conceive, Right honourable Sir, that it is very possible to oppose a ministerial bill in Parliament upon principle, upon conscience, upon conviction: that it is very decent, perfectly *justifiable*, and by no means *unprecedented*, to present an *account* at the bar, when a matter of account is to be argued: and that those persons who think their fortunes or privileges endangered by the operation of a new bill, are at liberty to publish their thoughts upon the subject, pending the discussion of the bill in either house. *Unjustifiable means*, and *unprecedented acts*, I take to be such as the *following*; an insidious advertisement promising 1000 guineas for a writer's place at Bengal — The offer of 100l. for discovery of the writer of an incendiary letter, which most assuredly was never written — The industrious circulation of idle and groundless stories of the Governor General's death, of his being crowned king of Bengal, or of his having involved the nation in a new war — An exclusion of impartial (or if you will, anti-ministerial) discussions on subjects

subjects of national importance; from the daily papers, by money. — By whom, and for what purpose, such acts have been applied (and the facts alluded to are of the most open and barefaced notoriety) it becomes not me to conjecture; but I will whisper in your ear, that they do not come from the opposers of the bill.

As it is perfectly understood, Sir, by the public, that in the present address I am not guilty of an unnecessary, voluntary, or officious presumption, that I now write merely in conformity to the known functions of my mission, and *from no personal motive whatever*, I cannot lay down my pen without advert-  
ing to a few circumstances, which, though not immediately contained in the *speech* I have just done myself the honour to discuss, are yet intimately connected with the subject before us, are of the utmost consequence to my *Principal*, and are generally allowed to *proceed from you*. A moment's reflection will inform you that I allude to the *eleventh Report from the Select Committee*. So criminatory a performance, so artfully interwoven with hints of mysterious concealment, with insinuations of guarded corruption, with mutilated extracts, and partial deduc-

F
tions,

tions, has not, I believe, been frequently exposed to public notice. It is not without concern, Sir, that I have perused this singular production, because, as you pointedly state in the work itself, "*Mr. Scott* "*professed himself perfectly uninstructed upon almost every part of the subject.*" I need again assure you in the most solemn manner, that I have never received the smallest instruction upon the transactions alluded to in your Eleventh Report, and that this total silence of Mr. Hastings to me on the several articles *there* exhibited, conveys to my mind an irresistible conviction of his perfect innocence. As you have obligingly *recorded my incapacity* to defend my Principal on points where he never expected an attack, it would have been worthy of Mr. Burke's *known humanity* to have furnished the public with at least all those slender documents that *do subsist*, to have generously assisted my incapacity by the communication of those lights which enabled *him* to see his way so clearly through the mist of the present business, *so have published the Appendix together with the Report.* At such a critical moment to withhold so considerable and so necessary a part of the evidence, *for twelve days already*, and I know not how much longer the delay may endure, would in any other

other man have been detected cruel, indelicate, and unfair. Of circumstances so insidiously arranged, so partially worked up, and so imperfectly displayed, men can hardly have the chance of forming a liberal, candid, and favourable opinion: that they are mysterious at best, that they are so unfortunately obscure, as to be incapable of satisfactory explanation in their present state, I readily acknowledge, and I have already acknowledged it to your Committee; but it is now incumbent on me to announce, *what in justice you ought to have announced in the Report*, that Mr. Hastings has informed the Court of Directors of his readiness to answer all questions respecting his receipt and disposal of presents “*upon his honour and upon his oath.*” It will be too late to read this six months hence in your Appendix; your turn will have been long served, and the prejudice you intended to raise will have had full time to operate. But such concerns of the Governor General as relate to money, are out of my department; I can only declare upon my conscience and before God, that I know his fortune in England to be quite incompetent to his rank in life, that I never knew him to have expended a shilling in the purchase of any corrupt influence ei-  
ther

ther here or abroad — that no grounds have ever been traced on which to found a plausible suspicion of any such transaction, and that I will stake my life upon his integrity.

I shall now, Sir, take my leave, with profound acknowledgements for the very polite and liberal manner in which you were pleased *yesterday* to turn me out of that most humane, impartial, just, and free assembly, *the Select Committee*. My intrusion proceeded from the mistaken notion that *Your's was an open Committee*.

I am, with all respect,

Right Honourable Sir,

Your most obedient,

Humble Servant,

J O H N   S C O T T.

LONDON,

December 6, 1783.

# NARRATIVE

OF THE

TRANSACTIONS

IN

BENGAL,

DURING THE

ADMINISTRATION

OF

MR. HASTINGS.

BY

MAJOR JOHN SCOTT.

---

LONDON:

For J. DEBRET, opposite BURLINGTON  
HOUSE, PICCADILLY.





# P R E F A C E

TO THE

FIRST EDITION.

**T**HE controul which the Supreme Council of Bengal holds over the other Presidencies, makes the members of that Government in some measure responsible for the peace of India. It will appear very clearly, upon enquiry, that the Governor General and Council exerted themselves to the extent of the powers vested in them by the Legislature, to avert those misfortunes which have been experienced upon the coast of Coromandel ; but that a war with a country power should have been commenced with such circumstances of disgrace to our arms, was not apprehended, I will venture to say, either by the Supreme Council or by any man in India.

Much pains have been taken in India, and the same efforts will doubtless be used in England, to attribute every unfortunate event upon the coast, to the Mahratta war; which, by some in Bengal, and by most of the gentlemen in Madras, has been denominated Mr. Hastings's war. The Court of Directors, who, perfectly acquainted with the circumstances which led to the war, highly approved of the conduct which the Governor General took in it, will, doubtless, do him the justice to contradict this assertion.

In the following sketch I mean to relate the events which led to a war which, from the year 1778, uniformly successful on our part, must have produced an honourable and advantageous peace many months ago, if the invasion of the Carnatic, the destruction of a third part of our army, and the expectation of a French armament, had not given fresh spirits to a vanquished enemy.

Upon other articles the conduct of the Governor General has been grossly misrepresented: it may not therefore be unacceptable to his friends, to relate, as concisely as the importance of the subject will admit, the  
prin-

principal transactions in Bengal, from the period of his arrival in February, 1772, to the day of my departure from Bengal the 9th of January, 1784; first premising that I will not advance a single fact which I cannot prove, either from my own knowledge or from authentic documents now in my possession.

No man has more severely suffered from unjust and illiberal insinuations than Mr. Hastings; nor has any man less deserved them: since, even in his own justification, he has carefully avoided all personal reflections. It is much to be lamented, that the public has suffered as well as Mr. Hastings, by the impression which such insinuations did at the time make upon the Court of Directors; for to what other cause can it be owing, that, for so many years, they withheld their confidence from a man they once thought so worthy of it? Conscious of the rectitude of his own actions, he has been too little solicitous to stem that torrent of calumny and abuse which his opponents have so liberally bestowed upon him. It is now high time to refute these calumnies. I do not hesitate to declare, nor am I

apprehensive of committing myself too far by such a declaration, that to render our possession of Bengal of consequence to the British nation, Mr. Hastings must be supported, and with effect, both by Government and the East-India Company. The event will prove that my judgment has not been warped by my private affections.

FEBRUARY,  
1782.

JOHN SCOTT.

PREFACE

# P R E F A C E

DO THE

## SECOND EDITION,

**I**N the present very critical and important situation of the affairs of the East-India Company, a re-publication of the following Narrative, which has long ago been out of print, may perhaps not be unacceptable to the Public, as I have studiously confined myself to a relation of such facts as are of public notoriety, or are capable of complete proof from the records at the India House. It has been, of late, too much the fashion to misrepresent the conduct of our countrymen in India, and to assert that Bengal is going fast to decay. — I conscientiously believe that the merits of the Governor General, and his Council, from the commencement of the war in the Carnatic, to the date of the last dispatches from India, will secure to them the  
applause

applause of the candid and dispassionate part of mankind, when the prejudices which have been industriously raised by artful and designing men shall cease to operate: — and from every observation I was capable of making in the course of fifteen years residence in Bengal, I am convinced that that country has very considerably increased in population and manufactures, from the year 1767 to 1781, although a famine in 1770 swept away a third of its inhabitants. Since that period the Company has been involved in a very hazardous and expensive war; and for a considerable time our army in the Carnatic was fed as well as paid from Bengal. The astonishing resources of that country, and the abilities of the men who have governed it, are now generally known and acknowledged; and however the calamities of war may have desolated the Carnatic, it is certain that at no period has Bengal enjoyed a greater degree of internal prosperity than during the government of Mr. Hastings. The Narrative is now continued to the period of the latest accounts we have received from India.

JOHN SCOTT.

QUEEN SQUARE,

JAN. 4. 1784.

A NARRATIVE.

A  
N A R R A T I V E  
O F T H E  
T R A N S A C T I O N S  
I N  
B E N G A L.

**M**R. Hastings was appointed by the Court of Directors to succeed to the Government of Bengal, in the month of April, 1772, immediately after the great famine. They were also pleased to invest him with some extraordinary powers, not heretofore vested in a Governor, from a conviction, that if their affairs there were yet retrievable, Mr. Hastings, (whose perseverance, firmness, and integrity, both in Bengal and Madras had been remarkably conspicuous,) was the most proper person to be employed in so arduous an undertaking. It is well known that the Government of Bengal was from various causes at this time reduced to the greatest distress. The late Governor, though a most amiable and respectable character, possessed neither the vigour



or resolution which his public station required; and the Members of his Council submitted to the continuance of evils which they wanted either the power or the inclination to reform. The Company's annual expences in Bengal considerably exceeded their revenues; and although bills had been drawn upon the Court of Directors for more than a million sterling in 1770, there still remained a bond debt of a million and a half sterling, due to individuals in Bengal. There was a prospect also of this bond debt being monthly increased to the degree, that the expences and the investment exceeded the actual revenues of the provinces.

So supine a Government must have sunk of itself in a few years. That this was the real state of public affairs at Bengal, when Mr. Hastings arrived there, is known to every man at that time in India. In April 1772, he succeeded to the chair, and, arduous as the task of reformation is in all countries, but more particularly in Bengal, he instantly began upon it. The excessive civil charges in Calcutta were retrenched, unnecessary appointments were abolished, and that spirit of extravagance and dissipation which had pervaded all orders of men, was suppressed, both by precept and example.

Notwithstanding opposition from many individuals, Mr. Hastings steadily pursued his plan of reformation, regardless of the personal obloquy which attended it, and in less than a month from his accession to the chair, the face of affairs was totally altered.

altered. Every resolution of Government was carried into effect with a promptitude and spirit which did honour to its executive members.

The Court of Directors at this time determined to stand forth themselves as Dewans of the provinces, through the agency of their own servants; and Mr. Hastings lost no time in carrying orders so beneficial to the Company into execution. He proceeded to Moorshedabad, the residence of the Nabob and the native officers of the Government, attended by three Members of the Board, with an intention to investigate the state of the revenues, to reduce the charges incurred in the collection of them, and to establish provincial Courts of Justice, which might prevent those acts of oppression and arbitrary power that had hitherto been so much complained of.

Unfortunately for the Company in this, as in many other instances, Mr. Hastings had not the power to carry his whole plan into execution; but those regulations which he did establish will ever remain as the strongest proofs of the extent of his genius, and of the laborious attention he paid to every point which could in the least degree contribute to secure the natives of Bengal in the possession of their property.

<sup>a</sup> It was at this period, that Muny Begum was appointed the guardian of the young Nabob, and the Court of Directors, as soon as they heard of the appointment, expressed their approbation of it in very warm terms.

The same unremitting attention was paid to public business, on his return to Calcutta; and the Court of Directors were very early in their acknowledgements of Mr. Hastings's services, and of the benefits which were derived from them.

At the close of the year 1772, a new scene was opened in Bengal. To the spirited and decided part which Mr. Hastings then took in foreign politics, are the Company and the British nation indebted for the dominions and the extensive influence which they now enjoy in Indostan. To set this matter in its true point of view, and not with a design to reflect upon the political conduct of any person, it is necessary to revert to the period of Lord Clive's government.

The East-India Company's affairs were so thoroughly investigated by a Committee of the House of Commons in 1772, whose proceedings have since been made public, that it is needless to relate the steps by which we have arrived at our present power in India. The Company's agents in Bengal were inoffensive and reputable merchants when they were attacked without provocation, by that most despicable of tyrants, Surajah Dowlah, the grandson of an usurper: They were at first driven from their possessions, but had afterwards the good fortune to see their persecutor vanquished and deposed: His successor, Meer Jaffier, who owed his promotion entirely to us, beheld the increase of our power with a jealous eye, and concerted a scheme with the Dutch for our destruction. The  
firmness

firmness of Colonel Clive defeated the project, and in the succeeding Government it was necessary to depose the Nabob. A chain of well-known events brought on a war with the successor, and his restoration. In one campaign, Cossim Ally was driven from the provinces. Sujah Dowlah, Nabob of Oude and Vizier, unprovoked by us, invaded Bahar; he was defeated, and had thrown himself upon our mercy at the time that Lord Clive returned to Bengal in 1765; his Lordship dictated his own terms to the King, Sujah Dowlah, and the young Nabob of Bengal. We had certainly a right to retain the possession of countries which we had conquered in a just and necessary war, and Lord Clive undoubtedly gave the Princes of Indostan a conspicuous proof of his moderation, when he only required fifty lacks of rupees from the Vizier as a compensation for the restoration of his country, and the cession of Benares.

By the treaty which his Lordship concluded with the King, he guaranteed to him the possession of the provinces of Corah and Allahabad, and engaged to pay him twenty-six lacks of rupees annually from the provinces of Bengal. Perhaps all the objections to so fatal a drain of specie from Bengal did not then occur to his Lordship, or Patna or Monghier would have been fixed upon as the place of his Majesty's residence. In this case, the evils which have since befallen the unhappy monarch would have been prevented, and our provinces considerably benefited, by having the amount of the tribute annually circulated in them. Still the condition

dition implied in the treaty was undoubtedly, that his Majesty should reside under our immediate protection at Allahabad, which he quitted in June, 1771, at the instigation of the Marattas, who had engaged to conduct him to Delhy; a project this prince had much at heart.

By leaving Allahabad, he quitted our protection; and Mr. Hastings, who arrived in Bengal early in the next year, very justly concluded, that the first use which the Marattas would make of their royal guest, would be to extort from him the provinces of Corah and Allahabad. He had authentic intelligence soon after, that grants of these provinces were actually made to them and signed by the King; and if his Majesty's commands were at all events to be obeyed, we might be required in another year to evacuate Bengal. The danger that was to be apprehended from having the Marattas (not at that time broken by intestine divisions) so near us was early foreseen, and wisely guarded against by an alliance with Sujah Dowlah, which being concluded on the firm basis of mutual interest, was in no danger of being violated.

It is well known that this Prince had been considered as a disaffected Ally during the governments of Mr. Verelst and Mr. Cartier. By his conduct in 1768 he had so far excited the suspicions of a majority of the Select Committee, that they deputed two of their members, and a gentleman of the Council, to expostulate and to treat

\* General Richard Smith, Mr. Cartier, and Mr. Russell.

with him. In Mr. Hastings's administration he became a most useful and valuable ally.

When Mr. Hastings succeeded to the Government, the province of Bengal had been nearly exhausted of its circulating specie, by the annual tribute of twenty-six lacks of rupees to the King, by the remittances in silver to China, to Madras, to Bombay, and to Europe; not a rupee of which ever returned again; by the total stop which was put to the importation of bullion from Europe, in consequence of the great increase of our own investment, and the supplies which were afforded to foreign companies, by the servants of the Company, who had no other means of remitting their fortunes to Europe; the fatal effects of which Mr. Verelst had foreseen, and represented very fully to the Directors in a series of letters which do great honour to his abilities and foresight.

The regulations which were framed by Mr. Hastings on his accession to the chair, although they immediately contributed to the happiness of the natives, and would in time prove highly beneficial to the Company, were not efficacious to relieve their present wants. The distress of the Directors for cash at home was very great; they had been obliged to have recourse to Parliament for assistance, in consequence of the large drafts which had been made upon them from Bengal. Their chief dependance was upon Mr. Hastings to extricate the Company from their difficulties, both in Europe and in Asia. Their confidence  
was

was not misplaced, and their most sanguine expectations were fully answered. Foreign trade was encouraged to a greater degree than had before been known\*, and a new commerce, by the way of Suez, was opened in consequence of the encouragement given to it by Mr. Hastings, which promised a relief to the languid circulation in Bengal, opened a quick communication with Great Britain, and has since been of the most essential advantage to us. Dustucks were abolished in the provinces, and every species of undue influence suppressed as far as the authority of Government could suppress it.

The King, as I before observed, having ceded Corah and Allahabad to the Marattas, it became a question, whether we should tamely permit them to take possession of those provinces with the prospect of Bengal being invaded the following year, or instantly secure them. The latter resolution was taken, and a member of the Council was deputed to form an exact statement of their revenues in May, 1773. The King was at this time a prisoner at large at Dehly, slighted and despised by the Marattas, who proposed to invade the dominions of Sujah Dowlah, by the route of Rohilcund. To prevent this invasion, the first brigade, consisting of one regiment of Europeans, six battalions of Seapoys, and twenty pieces of cannon, had formed a junction

\* In 1773, Mr. Hastings deputed Mr. George Boyle to Thibet. He was very hospitably received by the Grand Lama, where he resided above a year. a communication has since been kept up between the two countries, which is highly advantageous to Bengal, and promises to be still more so in future.

with the troops of Sujah Dowlah and the Rohillas, and were advancing towards the banks of the Ganges, by forced marches. The Marattas, who had forded that river, recrossed it with precipitation, as we advanced, were pursued, and prevented from doing any other damage than the plundering and burning a few inconsiderable villages in Rohilcund. When the approach of the rains swelled the Ganges, our troops returned to Oude. This expedition laid the foundation of the Rohilla war, of which I shall speak more fully hereafter.

Sujah Dowlah had repeatedly and earnestly solicited a personal conference with Mr. Hastings, to which he consented, and met him at Benares, in September, 1773, a few months after we had taken possession of Corah and Allahabad.

It was at this time that Mr. Hastings concluded the treaty of Benares, which in its consequences was so extremely beneficial to the East India Company.

The principal articles were the cession of Corah and Allahabad to the Vizier, the increase of the subsidy, and our engagement to assist him in the conquest of Rohilcund.

The nominal revenues of Corah and Allahabad were twenty-five lacks of rupees per annum; but the actual collections fell greatly short of this sum: nor could any collections be made without the assistance of a strong military force. Several disaffected Zemindars were to be reduced; and these provinces were separated from our other possessions by the Zemindary of Cheyt Sing, the Raja of Benares,



at that time a tributary to Sujah Dowlah. Mr. Hastings, after the maturest reflection, consented to cede these countries to Sujah Dowlah, in consideration of his paying fifty lacks of rupees to the Company. This article of the treaty was highly approved of by the Court of Directors.

We were bound by Lord Clive's treaty with the Vizier to assist him with a military force, and he was to pay thirty thousand rupees a month for a complete brigade; which was supposed to be equivalent to the additional expence incurred in the field, though it was in fact very inadequate to it. Mr. Hastings thought, and with justice, that Sujah Dowlah should pay the whole expence of an army acting at his requisition, or a sum equivalent to it. This he consented to, and it was fixed at two lacks and ten thousand rupees a month.† This alteration was warmly approved by the Directors.

The articles by which the Company were engaged to assist the Vizier in the conquest of Rohilcund, however severely attacked both in Bengal and in England, may certainly be defended on the strictest grounds of policy and justice.

The Rohillas‡ were a tribe of Afghan Tartars, who about twenty-six years before this time invaded and conquered a large and fertile tract of country lying to the eastward of the Ganges, bounded

\* 3000l. † 21,000l.

‡ Dow's History of the Decline of the Mogul Empire, published in 1768, p. 37, gives this account of the Rohillas: "In the year 1744, Ali Mahummud, a Patan of the Rohilla tribe, a soldier of fortune, and native of the mountains of Cabalistan, begun to appear

ded on one side by the north-east frontier of Oude, and on the other by what are called the Cachmere-hills, which are a continuation of those mountains that separate Bengal from Thibet. Some of the original invaders of this country are yet living. The fixed inhabitants are Hindoos. The Rohillas are Mussulmen and soldiers to a man. The revenues were regularly collected and divided amongst the different chiefs, of whom the most considerable were Fyzula Cawn and Hafez Hamet. The Vizier had long beheld, with great mortification, the settlement of the Rohillas in a district which had formerly been dependant upon Oude; but as our

in arms. He had some years before come to Dehly, and was entertained in the service of Mahummud Shaw, and the command of a small district between Dehly and Lahore was conferred upon him, here he entertained all vagrants of his own clan, who came down in quest of military service from their native mountains, not paying his rent, Hernind, the Feogedar, to whom he was accountable, raised 15000 men to expel or chastise him, he was defeated with great slaughter, and thus Ali laid the foundation of the Rohilla government. Upon this defeat, the Vizier sent 30,000 men under his son against the rebels. Each side averse to a decision by battle, a treaty was concluded, whereby Ali was to keep the country before governed by Hirhind, upon paying the ancient revenues to the Crown: no payment was made, and Ali continued to strengthen himself, and ravaged the neighbouring country to subsist his army: at last the monarch himself was obliged to take the field. Ali shut himself up in Bangur, where he was obliged to capitulate. He was carried a prisoner to Dehly, where he remained six months, at the end of which the Patans not only obtained him his release, but the Feogedarship of Sirhind. There he maintained himself, and collecting his dispersed tribes, kept possession not only of Sirhind, but several districts between the rivers, and beyond the Ganges, without remitting one rupee to court." This happened in 1747.

Góvernment had entertained so strong a jealousy of his power, previous to Mr. Hastings's accession, and had kept up a correspondence with the Rohillas, he had been prevented from subduing them ; and it is also probable that he did not think himself equal to the conquest of the country without our assistance.

A bare inspection of the map will prove of how much consequence it was, that the power in possession of Rohilcund should be in a strict alliance with us.

The soil is so fertile, that an army of Marattas might subsist in it for any length of time. It is full of strong forts for the security of plunder ; and from hence, in the course of one season, their ravages might have been extended through the dominions of the Vizier into Bengal. When, therefore, the Marattas were masters of the King's person and of Dehly, and threatened to invade the country of an ally, whom by treaty, and from policy we were bound to defend, it was absolutely necessary either to conclude a defensive alliance with the Rohillas, or to take possession of their country.

Many small states in Europe have been precisely in the same situation. It was impossible that they could remain neuter in our approaching rupture with the Marattas ; and they concluded an alliance with the Vizier and the Company, by which we engaged to protect their country from the ravages of the Marattas ; they on their part were to join us with their forces, and at the conclusion of the campaign to pay forty lacks of rupees, as their proportion of the expences of the war.

The

The Marattas, as I before observed, did invade Rohilcund, but we arrived so opportunely, that they were obliged to retreat very precipitately. The Rohillas, as we advanced, peremptorily refused to join us, and it was proposed to storm their camp; which they prevented, by forming a junction when we were upon the point of carrying this design into execution.\*

On the return of our troops to Oude, the Vizier demanded the stipulated payment of forty lacks, which at first was evaded, and afterwards absolutely refused.

Such was the state of this business when Mr. Hastings met the Vizier at Benares.

That the Rohillas would dread the Vizier's resentment, for this breach of faith cannot be doubted; and that, to guard themselves against the effects of it, they would apply to the Marattas for assistance was highly probable. In truth they did negotiate with them. I need not mention the many fatal consequences with which such an alliance would have been attended. Success in the Rohilla war extended and secured the frontier of an ally; and it was founded on their breach of a treaty, to which we were guarantees, and their alliance with his enemies.

The advantages which the East-India Company were to reap from the war, were great indeed: Our exhausted provinces were to be relieved from the pay

\* It was at this time that Sir Robert Barker denominated the Rohillas the most faithless and treacherous of men, and proposed that we should put the Vizier in possession of their country.

of a third part of our army during the service ; and we were to receive fifty lacks of rupees at the conclusion of it.

The danger apprehended from an increase of the Vizier's power was merely ideal, as the event has fully proved. Mr. Hastings, who had studied his character, knew it perfectly well ; but the gentlemen at home, who had for a long time been alarmed by accounts of the *dangerous ambition* and *high spirit* of Sujah Dowlah, deemed every addition which we might make to his power a measure founded upon *wrong policy* \*. Fortunately, however, for the Company and the British nation, the man who managed their political affairs in Bengal, clearly foresaw, and steadily pursued their true interest.

The Rohilla war commenced in 1774, the conquest of the country was effected in seven months, and an equitable peace was concluded with Fyzula Gawn, the principal Rohilla chief, which has continued from that period uninterrupted.

I should exceed the bounds which I have prescribed to myself, were I to enter into a detail of Mr. Hastings's public proceedings from his return to Calcutta in September 1773, to the commencement of the new Government in October 1774, when his authority was effectually annihilated. But

\* General Richard Smith's letters to the Select Committee of Port William, when he commanded the army, contain strong expressions of suspicion against Sujah Dowlah. It has since been fully proved, that the General had entirely mistaken the Vizier's real character:

the concurrent testimony of the English gentlemen then in Bengal, the flourishing state of the Company's affairs, the increase of wealth, and the affection shewn by the natives to our Government, are ample proofs that every moment of his time was employed in pursuing the true interests of his constituents.

In the year 1767, I have travelled four hundred miles through a country very thinly inhabited; the appearance of an European with his attendants excited distrust and apprehension. I have travelled the same road since that period; I then found it in high cultivation. The natives, secure under the protection of humane and equal laws, were encreasing in numbers, and no longer looked upon Englishmen as enemies.

It is certain, however clamour may have obscured the truth, that the lower ranks of people in no part of the world live more happily, or are less oppressed than the natives of Bengal and Bahar. The abuses which existed after our accession to the Dewanne, are more to be attributed to a defective system of Government, than to the want of inclination to correct them in the members of administration; nor could these abuses be corrected until the Governor and Council were authorised to break through the forms of a double Government.

At Mr. Hastings's accession to the chair, he entirely new modelled the public offices, and allotted to each its distinct business. The mode of collecting the revenues, as well as the quantum to be collected,

lected, had heretofore been regulated by the Resident of the Durbar and Mahomed Reza Cawn; and even after the establishment of provincial councils, Moorshedabad continued the seat of Government. But when the double Government, as it has been properly called, was abolished, Mr. Hastings removed all the native officers of it to Calcutta, and brought every department of finance immediately before the Council.

His regulations of the public offices, of the collections, and the various oeconomic reforms, which, notwithstanding the difficulties preventing, and the odium consequent, he had effected in the short space of thirty months, added to the supply of treasure, which the treaty of Bengal afforded, had raised the reputation of the government of Bengal to the highest pitch, and the Company's affairs, which, when he succeeded to the chair, were thought to be irretrievable, bore the strongest aspect of affluence and prosperity. The time however was now come, when the abilities of the man who had done so much for the Company were to be decried, and his character exposed as a subject for public derision.

On the 19th of October, General Clavering, Colonel Monson, and Mr. Francis, arrived in Calcutta, and with the Governor General and Mr. Barwell, composed the Supreme Council of India. No Government could have commenced under more favourable circumstances. Our treasury was full; foreign trade flourished to a greater degree than had ever been known in Bengal. Inland commerce was freed  
from

from every impolitic restriction. The reputation of our arms was great, and the supply of wealth to Great Britain by the investment (the only proper mode of enriching our native country from India) had increased every year since Mr. Hastings came to the Government. The Gentlemen who then arrived from England, had no personal connections to gratify; they had not been bred up in the Company's service; nor had they formed friendships, to which a small portion of their constituents's interests might have sometimes been sacrificed; (human nature will still be the same!) and their own appointments were so ample as to preclude even the temptation to act from interested motives. With such advantages, why has it happened that the British nation has not experienced all those good effects which the wisdom of the Legislature predicted when the Supreme Council of India was established? I shall relate facts as they happened, without a wish to reflect in the smallest degree upon two gentlemen of great honour and undoubted integrity, who are now no more; and who, I think, would have heartily co-operated with Mr. Hastings, if much pains had not been taken to deceive them by designing men, who unfortunately were but too successful in so pernicious an undertaking.

Although Mr. Hastings received an addition to his former title by the act which constituted the Supreme Council, his powers were considerably curtailed by the instructions of the Court of Directors. Under these circumstances, he was at first undeter-



mined, whether to resign or to retain the Government; but the violent conduct of a decided majority determined him to remain in the chair at all events.

The flame of opposition broke out with great violence at the second meeting of the Supreme Council. The Governor General, for the information of his colleagues, drew up a clear and distinct statement of our political situation. Our alliance with the Vizier, the advantages which we had already received, and might in future expect to receive from it. Our alliances or connections with the native powers in Indostan, and every other particular which it was necessary to communicate to gentlemen vested with so high a public trust, and who at the same time were so intirely uninformed with respect to a country, which from that moment they were to govern. To elucidate some part of his minutes, Mr. Hastings delivered into the Board several extracts from Mr. Middleton's letters, who had resided for some months by his appointment at the Court of Sujah Dowlah.

A member of the Board immediately proposed that the Governor General should lay before them the whole correspondence of Mr. Middleton. This was so direct an attack upon the honour of Mr. Hastings, that he absolutely refused to comply with the requisition, and from this moment commenced the attack upon his former administration.

They began with the Rohilla war. It was a war, they said, which would bring dishonour upon the nation. The money to be received, which they declared

clared would never be paid, was the price of blood. Our army was exposed, in the dominions of a treacherous ally, to the most imminent dangers, and the majority determined to recall it immediately, provided the retreat could be effected with security to our own troops, though at that time Fyz Ulla still stood out ; and by abandoning the Vizier, the fifty lacs which we were to receive from him would not have been demandable.

By proceedings thus violent and unjustifiable, the great advantages which have since accrued to the Company had nearly been forfeited ; but the earnestness of the Governor General for a short delay in the execution of these intemperate orders had fortunately some effect. The non-payment of the subsidy due from the Vizier to the Company, was the principal cause assigned for the recall of our army, although the bad policy of advancing our troops beyond the Carumnassa \* was warmly insisted upon at the same time. A part of the money due by the treaty was soon after paid by the Vizier ; this payment, as well as that of the remainder, was represented as the recovery of a desperate debt ; and it was confidently asserted, that the recovery of so large a sum was owing to the firmness and resolution of the majority, though it had never been conceived that he meant to deduct any part of the payment.

Mr. Middleton was immediately recalled from his station ; and Mr. Bristow, the confidential friend of

\* That river divides the province of Bahar from the province of Benares.

Mr. Francis, appointed Resident at the Vizier's court in his room. &

The Governor General's conduct, in points which had already been referred to the judgment of the Court of Directors, was severely attacked; a most melancholy picture was drawn of the distressed state of the provinces; the natives were said to groan under every species of oppression, and even murders to have been committed with impunity in our most populous cities.

To those, who for more than two years had lived under a Government, vigorous far beyond what had ever been known in India, such a representation appeared extraordinary indeed.—On Mr. Hastings's arrival, our dominions and our influence were bounded by the banks of the Carumnassa. The Company was sinking under the weight of a heavy bond debt, an expensive civil establishment, and an army which cost more than a million sterling annually, and which could not with prudence have been considerably reformed. When the majority of the Supreme Council assumed the Government, the bond debt was reduced, and funds provided for paying off the remainder; the public disbursements were regulated; the pay of a third of our army was furnished by Sujah Dowlah; and by its remaining in Oude we had a prospect of still farther advantages, which were afterward realized.

Mr. Hastings, sensible of these advantages, and of the falsehood of the gloomy prelates of the majority, in his separate letters to the Directors, assured  
them,

them, that their affairs were at no former period in so flourishing a situation ; that they would receive a large investment ; the bond debt would be paid off, and a large sum retained in the treasury for emergencies in the course of the following season.

The majority contradicted and ridiculed this representation ; but the event has proved that it was not made without full consideration ; nor can it be denied that Mr. Hastings alone is entitled to the merit of paying off a debt of a million and a half, of reserving an equal sum in the treasury of Bengal, of supplying Madras, Bombay, and China with cash, and adding very considerably to the annual investment. His civil regulations in 1772, and his negotiations with Sujah Dowlah in 1773, have, in their consequences, fixed us so securely in the possession of Indostan, from the source of the Ganges to the Ocean, notwithstanding the temporary distress under which we now labour, from Hyder Ally Cawn's successes in the Carnatic, that we are in no danger of a reverse of fortune, except from internal dissensions.

In the condemnation of past measures, no public act of the Governor General's was passed over without a comment. By giving up Corah and Allahabad to the Vizier, he sold what was the property of another ; by withholding the tribute which we were by treaty engaged to pay to the King, he forfeited the national faith ; and even admitting that it would have been imprudent to furnish his Majesty with so large a sum, when he was a prisoner with the Marattas, it  
ought

ought at least to have been reserved as a deposit in Calcutta : Probably the consequences of withholding such a sum as a crore of rupees from circulation, when we could hardly find money for our necessary expences, was not considered by the majority. However, as the Court of Directors in the first letter which was received from them in 1775, very highly approved of the sale of Corah, and the non-payment of the tribute, no farther remarks were made on Mr. Hastings's conduct in these points.

I now enter, and I confess with much regret, upon the conduct of the majority towards Mr. Hastings as a private gentleman, in which his reputation was principally concerned. I lament sincerely that gentlemen of high honour and unblemished characters should have been so warped by their prejudices. But such are the fatal effects of party spirit.

This attack was authorised by a very impolitic though well-meaning order of the Court of Directors ; " That the Supreme Council should " enquire into past abuses." A similar order had been given to Mr. Hastings on his accession to the Government, and it is now needless to lament the fatal consequences which were occasioned by an inattention to his opinion upon it. Mr. Hastings had found it impossible to detect or to punish those who had abused the confidence reposed in them. Much valuable time was lost, and much odium incurred by the attempt.

Mr.

Mr. Verelst and Mr. Cartier were men of honour, whose public virtue could not be better proved than by the very moderate amount of the fortunes which they brought home with them. From various causes, however, the Company's affairs were in great confusion; and the Directors attributing it to the bad management of their servants in Bengal, were, with reason, anxious to detect those who were guilty, and therefore earnestly pressed Mr. Hastings to commence a retrospect of their conduct. But when the Supreme Council arrived in Bengal, our affairs were in so flourishing a state, that such an order was surely unnecessary.

I will quote Mr. Hastings's opinion upon this subject; it reflects the greatest honour upon him. The letter from which I have taken the following extract, is dated the 11th of November, 1773; and if not received in London before the departure of the majority of the Supreme Council, might have been transmitted to them very shortly after.

“ All my letters addressed to your honourable Court, and to the Select Committee, repeat the strongest promises of prosecuting the inquiries into the conduct of your servants, which you had been pleased to commit particularly to my charge. You will readily believe that I must have been sincere in those declarations, since it would have argued great indiscretion to have made them, had I foreseen my inability to perform them. I find myself now under the disagreeable necessity of avowing that inability; at the same time that I will  
 “ boldly

“ boldly take upon me to affirm, that on whomso-  
 “ ever you might have delegated that charge, it would  
 “ have been sufficient to occupy the entire attention  
 “ of those who were entrusted with it, and even  
 “ with all the aids of leisure and authority, would  
 “ have proved ineffectual. I dare appeal to the  
 “ public records, to the testimony of those who  
 “ have opportunities of knowing me, and even to  
 “ the detail which the public voice can repeat of the  
 “ past acts of this government, that my time has  
 “ been neither idly nor uselessly employed. Yet such  
 “ are the cares and embarrassments of this various  
 “ state, that although much may be done, much  
 “ more, even in matters of moment, must remain  
 “ neglected. To select from the miscellaneous heap  
 “ which each day’s exigencies presents to our choice,  
 “ those points on which the general welfare of your  
 “ affairs most essentially depends, to provide expe-  
 “ dients for future advantages, and guard against  
 “ probable evils, are all that your administration can  
 “ faithfully promise to perform for your service, with  
 “ their united labours most diligently exerted. They  
 “ cannot look back without sacrificing the objects  
 “ of their immediate duty, which are those of your  
 “ interests, to useless researches, which can produce  
 “ no real good, and may expose your affairs to all  
 “ the ruinous consequences of personal malevolence  
 “ both here and at home.

“ May I be permitted to offer it, in all deference  
 “ and submission to your commands, as my opinion,  
 “ that whatever may have been the conduct of indi-  
 “ viduals,

“ virtual, or even of the collective members of  
 “ your former administrations, the blame is not so  
 “ much imputable to them as to a want of a princi-  
 “ ple of government adequate to its substance, and  
 “ a coercive power to enforce it. The extent of  
 “ Bengal and its possible resources are equal to those  
 “ of most states in Europe. Its difficulties are greater  
 “ than those of any, because it wants both an esta-  
 “ blished form and powers of government, deriving  
 “ its actual support from the unremitted labours  
 “ and personal exertions of individuals in power,  
 “ instead of the vital influence which flows through  
 “ the channels of a regular constitution, and impercep-  
 “ tibly animates every part of it. Our constitution  
 “ is no where to be traced but in the ancient char-  
 “ ters which were framed for the jurisdiction of your  
 “ trading settlements, the sales of your exports, and  
 “ the provision of your annual investments. I need  
 “ not observe how incompatible these must prove to  
 “ the government of a great kingdom, and for the  
 “ preservation of its riches from private violence, and  
 “ embezzlement.

“ Among your servants, who for a course of years  
 “ have been left at large, in possession of so tempt-  
 “ ing a deposit, it is not to be wondered at, that  
 “ many have applied it to the advancement of their  
 “ own fortunes; or that those who were possessed of  
 “ abilities to introduce a system of order, should  
 “ have been drawn along by the general current;  
 “ since few men are formed with so large a share of  
 “ public virtue as to sacrifice their interest, peace,



and social feelings to it, and to begin the work of reformation on themselves.

"I should not have presumed to expatiate on a subject of this nature, although my own justification has made it in some measure necessary; but that your late advice has given hopes that we shall speedily be furnished with your instructions for establishing a system of law and polity, which we hitherto want. Whenever this work shall be accomplished on a foundation of consistency and permanency, I will venture to foretel, from the knowledge which I have of the general habits and manners of your servants, that you will have as few instances of licentiousness amongst your servants as amongst the members of any community in the British empire."

What impression this solid and conclusive reasoning of the Governor General made upon the Court of Directors is not known; but the East-India Company would have felt the good effects of it most sensibly, if, in consequence of this opinion, the Court of Directors had new-modelled their instructions.

The disagreement in the Supreme Council became the general subjects of conversation in India. New hopes and fears were excited in all—every former transaction of Government was harshly censured—and the majority publicly declared, that they expected Mr. Hastings would be dismissed with disgrace from his station, as soon as their representations arrived in England.

When every act of Government which could be attributed to Mr. Hastings had been canvassed, his  
private

private character was attacked, and the man who had filled the most important stations in India, with an unblemished reputation, who might with ease have accumulated a fortune of two hundred thousand pounds, during the many years that he was resident at the Court of Meer Jaffer, but who, it is well known, returned to his native country without a competency, was publicly accused of the most flagrant acts of rapacity and extortion, and of having amassed a fortune of four hundred thousand pounds in little more than two years.

To those who are acquainted with the moderation of Mr. Hastings's character, with his neglect of his private interest, this accusation appeared as absurd as it was ill founded; but the proof was at hand, and Nundcomar stepped forth to support what they had advanced. It would indeed have been a cruel circumstance if the oath of Nundcomar had operated to the disadvantage even of a man as bad as himself; but that it should have had the least weight in the accusation of a character so respectable, and so firmly established as the Governor General's, will hardly be credited when the spirit of party has subsided: yet certain it is, that upon the assertion of this wretch, the majority fixed Mr. Hastings's fortune at forty lacks of rupees.

To gentlemen at all conversant in the affairs of Bengal, the character of Nundcomar was well known. Mr. Hastings had employed him on his first arrival by the express order of the Directors, to whom he had explained his sentiments of the man very freely.

He in fact foretold to them, that part Nundcomar would act, if ever he had an opportunity. Captain Swinton, in his evidence before a Committee of the House of Commons, declared that Nundcomar had been repeatedly guilty of forgery, and for this crime he suffered death in August 1775; whether strictly legally has been questioned, but there never was a doubt of the fact of his being perjured, nor of the majority knowing he was so, when they accepted his service in accusing Mr. Hastings.

This man, before he was committed to custody, had opened what may properly be called an information office in Calcutta. It was well known, that he was countenanced by the majority. I am very clear that neither General Clavering nor Colonel Monson were aware of the dangerous use to which he would apply the power which he had acquired; but certain it is that the most liberal encouragement was given to informers of every denomination by the majority. Accusations as absurd as improbable were hourly received against the Governor General; but although divested of all power, although Nundcomar was possessed of the means of proving his guilt, had he really been guilty, after the fullest inquiry, with rewards offered on the one hand and punishments denounced on the other, in order to procure the evidence which he wanted to criminate the Governor General, nothing appeared that reflected either upon his honour or his integrity; unless it could be deemed a crime to receive from the Nabob a certain fixed sum for his expenses during his residence at Moorshedabad, in conformity to the customs of the country,

and

and to the examples which had been set him by his predecessors, Lord Clive, Mr. Verelst, and Mr. Cartier. It was acknowledged by Sir George Wombwell in the General Court in 1776, that the allowance was to be taken, and that if he had given the Company credit for it, he might have charged them the expences of his progress: this allowance had been settled by Lord Clive in lieu of purveyance. \*

Let it for a moment be supposed that Mr. Hastings had accumulated the large fortune which the majority supposed him to be possessed of. Was it made at the expence of the East-India Company—had he added to the weight of their bonded debt—had he involved them in dangerous or expensive alliances—had he neglected to make the necessary remittances of cash to our other Presidencies, or to China—or had he diminished the annual investment to Europe—there might have been some excuse for inquiring into the amount of his private fortune, and how he amassed it. But when this inquiry commenced, the Company's bond debt of a million and an half was paying off; supplies had been sent to China, Fort St. George, and Bombay; two additional ships, the Anson, and the Northumberland, had been taken up in Calcutta. So much was the investment increased; and the death of Sujah Dowlah gave us a prospect of a still farther addition to our power, our influence, and our resources.

\* General Smith must know this state of the fact to be correct; and he knows that he himself never passed through Moorthedabad without receiving a complimentary present, agreeable to the custom of the country.

However,

However, I will take upon me to affirm, that when the amount of the Governor General's private fortune is known, it will appear to the most moderate man in England to be greatly inadequate either to the length or to the importance of his services.

During these violent attacks upon the character of Mr. Hastings, all public business was suspended. The inferior servants of the Company were divided into parties, and after the example of the Presidency, each Provincial Council had its majority, and minority. Expensive prosecutions were commenced in the Supreme Courts of Judicature against the Governor General of India, who was reluctantly obliged, in vindication of his own honour, to bear a part in this disgraceful scene. At a time when our dominions and our influence were so greatly increased, at a time when the gentlemen of Bombay had commenced a war against the Marattas, at a time when the attention of every member of the Board should have been entirely employed in the consideration of the great political questions which were before them—at this time, the Governor General and Council were attending as evidences or parties in a Court of law; Mr. Hastings in his own defence, and the gentlemen of the majority, as guardians of the interests of the East-India Company, to criminate the man who had so essentially served his constituents.

So salutary were the regulations which Mr. Hastings had established, so firmly was the government fixed in all its parts, that notwithstanding these

these unhappy dissensions, our affairs were at no former period in so flourishing a situation; and in the course of the years 1775 and 1776, every promise which the Governor General had made to the Court of Directors was amply fulfilled. Whether this prosperity was owing to Mr. Hastings's regulations, and the political connections which he formed previous to the 19th of October 1774, or to the abilities and exertions of the Supreme Council since that period, can at once be determined by an examination of the Company's records.

A treaty highly advantageous to the Company was concluded with Asoph ul Dowlah, by which the sovereignty of Benares, with all the rights and powers annexed to it, was transferred to us, and a nett revenue of twenty-four lacks of rupees acquired. The continuance of a brigade in the Vizier's dominions was another article of the treaty, and the subsidy fixed at two lacks and sixty thousand rupees a month. Let not the Governor General be deprived of the merit of these important acquisitions. The majority would never have agreed to advance our troops beyond the bounds of the Carumnassa; they even were anxious to recal them immediately, and were only prevented from actually doing so, by the earnest opposition of Mr. Hastings. In either case, the death of Sujah Dowlah would have been attended with no advantages to the Company. The provinces of Oude, Corah, and Allahabad would have been torn by civil wars, and must, in the end, have been subdued, either by Nuzeph Cawn or the Marattas.

In

In September 1776, Colonel Monson died. No man was more ready to do justice to that gentleman's abilities than Mr. Hastings, or more sincerely lamented the unhappy prejudices which he imbibed on his first arrival in Bengal. Bred a soldier, and having served with distinguished reputation in India, he was admirably calculated for the command of our army in Bengal; to which had he fortunately been appointed, and confined to his professional duties, the Company would have experienced the good effects of his return to India in a very sensible degree.

At this period too we received advice of the extraordinary revolution at Madras. The Supreme Council were unanimous in their opinion of the measures to be taken upon so critical an occasion, and of the powers which Lord Pigot claimed, as President of a Council in which he had only a casting voice when the numbers were equal. That the powers of a Governor in India are very inadequate to the dignity of his station, and to the responsibility annexed to it, is beyond a doubt. This was Mr. Hastings's opinion, and he expressed it very freely to the Court of Directors, in the letter of which I have already given an extract: but until those powers are enlarged, a Governor, with a majority against him, must be a meer cypher. The Governor General had only taken upon him to break up the Council, when the majority had called Nundcomar before them, for the extraordinary purpose of pre-  
ferring

ferring a criminal accusation against their President, and the first British subject in India. For this small exertion of authority he was severely reprimanded by the Court of Directors, and plainly informed, that he had no distinct authority annexed to his station, but that all the powers of government were vested in a majority of the Board. Could the Governor General allow, that a law which was to bind him, was not of force when applied to the Governor of a subordinate presidency? The Court of Directors' sentiments on this subject were of sufficient force to determine the Supreme Council, had the reference made to them by the gentlemen of Fort. St. George been a point of difficulty.

It was necessary to mention this unhappy business, because Mr. Stratton has published some partial extracts of a private letter, which he received from the Governor General immediately after that revolution, from which it might appear that he was interested in the dispute, although he had not the smallest personal concern in it. To those who have seen the whole letter, this explanation is unnecessary.

By the orders of the Company, wisely framed with a view to comply with Asiatic customs, all political negotiations are conducted through the channel of the Governors of the different presidencies. A native of India can have no idea of a participation of power, and he very naturally concludes that a Governor is either absolute, or has no power in the state over which he presides.



When the connection of this government with Fajah Dowlah was more closely cemented, Mr. Hastings thought proper to appoint Mr. Nathaniel Middleton his private agent at the court of that prince. When the Supreme Council was divided into two distinct parties, Mr. Middleton was retailed, and Mr. Bristow, the confidential friend of Mr. Francis, appointed in his room.

By this step the annihilation of the Governor General's political influence was completely proclaimed to every power in Indostan. While Mr. Bristow remained at Lucknow, Mr. Hastings could only be looked upon as the constrained instrument of an authority raised upon the ruin of his own. This evident truth will not be disputed by any man who has served in India; from the period of Colonel Monson's death to the time of Mr. Middleton's re-appointment to the Vizier's court, the attention of every man from Calcutta to Dehly was fixed upon this single point, as the criterion by which he was to judge, whether Mr. Hastings meant to retain or to give up the government. I do not rest the propriety of this measure upon the obligation which Mr. Hastings lay under, of doing an act of justice to an individual who had suffered severely for his attachment to him. But I insist upon it, that the public service could not be carried on with effect, while an opinion prevailed in Oude, that Mr. Hastings was upon the point of quitting the chair; and such would have been the conclusion had Mr. Bristow been permitted to remain there. He was known to  
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be the confidential friend of Mr. Francis; and however Mr. Hastings might have approved of his conduct, he could not give a person so situated his entire confidence, even admitting it possible to answer the other objections, which I will venture to affirm are not to be controverted.

The Governor General surely should not be expected to conduct the complicated affairs of an extensive empire, where our countrymen bear so very small a proportion in point of numbers to the natives, upon principles so different from those upon which all countries are regulated, and so totally different from those by which the late majority professedly acted. The late Mr. Playdell was deprived of the office of superintendant of the police (which was immediately given to the brother-in-law of Mr. Francis) for his activity in presenting an address to the chief justice that was obnoxious to the majority\*. Mr. Playdell complained bitterly of the ill usage which he had received, but it was observed in reply, that what had happened to him, was the chance of the worthiest men in England upon every change in administration, and that no wise government would ever employ men in offices of trust under them, of whose attachment they were not very well assured.

\* Writs had been attempted to be taken out, which would have reached every part of Bengal and brought natives to Calcutta; the Court refused them. This moderation and justice procured them an address of thanks from the different sets of inhabitants at Calcutta.

This reasoning, however it may appear in the case of Mr. Playdell, whose appointment was of very little consequence to the state, is surely conclusive in that now before us.

The removal of Mr. Fowke from Benares was from the same motive.

Benares is one of the richest cities in India. It is the residence of learned men, and the center of all political business. Vackeels, or agents, from every prince in India reside here, and as the British government is confessedly now the most important in Indostan, it is absolutely necessary that the resident at Benares should be dependant upon the ruling party in the Supreme Council. Upon this principle was Mr. Fowke sent there by the majority, and upon the same principle was he recalled after Colonel Monson's death. It is sufficient to state these facts as they really are, and then the Governor General's conduct towards Mr. Bristow and Mr. Fowke will need neither a justification nor an apology. Whoever shall attribute these removals to a personal pique, or shall conceive Mr. Hastings capable of gratifying a private resentment at the expence of Mr. Bristow and Mr. Fowke, will be much deceived. He is too liberal to act from such narrow principles!

Every measure proposed by the Governor General, however salutary, was opposed by General Clavering, and supposed to be ultimately intended to answer some private view. The settlement of the lands, having been made for five years only, was on the point of expiring soon after Colonel Monson's death:

death: Mr. Hastings proposed to obtain the fullest information of the state of the country, that the revenues might be fixed upon an equitable scale: to assist him in the laborious task which he had imposed upon himself, he had fixed upon two gentlemen of distinguished abilities and irreproachable characters, whose proceedings were to have been laid before the Council at large, in whom was vested the power and decision upon every point. Much valuable information was procured and transmitted to the Court of Directors in consequence of this investigation, both as to the state of the country and its population and resources; but at that time it really appeared sufficient to blast every scheme, however beneficial, that it was proposed by Mr. Hastings: The minority questioned its legality; and General Clavering denominated it a trick to extort money from the Zemindars for the benefit of Mr. Hastings and his friends.

The last material act of Mr. Hastings's administration, previous to the death of General Clavering, was, the increase of our military establishment; a measure which has been attended with infinite advantages to the public and to individuals, and has effectually secured the continuance of our influence in the extensive dominions of the Vizier. To set this matter in a clear point of view, and to free it from the false lights which may be thrown upon it, I will briefly relate the steps which led to it.

Sujah Dowlah died in February 1775. His eldest son, Asolph ul Dowlah, was declared the heir of his father's

father's dominions; but he owed his peaceable succession to the Musnud to the presence of our army. Intrigues were immediately formed against him, and in his troops, mutinous and disaffected, were many officers in the interest of his competitors. The Vizier, justly alarmed for his personal safety, which had frequently been endangered, disbanded the most turbulent of his battalions, and applied to the Supreme Council for British officers to discipline those which he retained in his service. In consequence of this requisition, nine captains and thirty subalterns were appointed to his service, and were to receive the pay of the rank next above that which they held in Bengal. No funds were fixed for the payment of these officers, or of the troops which they were to command; so that, in fact, this new establishment was subject to all those inconveniencies which it was meant to redress.

A General spirit of mutiny broke out amongst the Vizier's troops immediately after the arrival of our officers; this in some batalions was carried to the most alarming lengths. Many officers were seized, confined, and threatened to be put to death. The storm at length subsided. The principal mutineers were punished, and discipline was in some measure restored. Many however were the disadvantages which our service sustained by this establishment. The emoluments were so considerable to those who had the good fortune to be appointed to the Vizier's service, that it created a general spirit of discontent amongst our officers in Bengal; and trifling as the  
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establishment was in point of numbers, the expence of it so far exceeded all bounds, that the Vizier was unable to keep it up, and to discharge his debt to the Company. Certainly a service in which the emoluments to individuals so far exceeded those in our own, required some regulations. Mr. Hastings had seen the bad effects of a similar establishment in the Carnatic, and the Company at this moment most severely feel it: upon Colonel Monson's death he proposed a remedy for them.

On the principle that our interests and the Vizier's were thus closely connected, Mr. Hastings brought his plan before the Board, which was, that three regiments of horse, three companies of artillery, and nine battalions of Sepoys, should be added to our establishments, and with this addition of force we were to protect the Vizier's dominions. The disciplined corps in his service were to form this body; and to fix them more firmly in our service, they were to take their tour of duty in our provinces, and to be subject to the same regulations with respect to pay as the rest of our army. The Vizier was to appropriate certain fixed funds for the payment of these troops, so that this important addition to our army was made without the smallest expence to the East-India Company.

Beneficial as this plan must appear, and to which only one objection could be urged, the difficulty of procuring the Vizier's assent to it, it was vehemently opposed. Mr. Francis contended, that all military arrangements should originate with the Commander  
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in Chief, although this was evidently a great political regulation of the highest consequence. The General's objections were numerous. The Vizier's consent was obtained through the agency of Mr. Middleton ; the plan was soon after carried into execution, and has so completely answered every good end which was proposed by it, that even those gentlemen who lost considerably by the alteration, have been candid enough to declare, that no act of Mr. Hastings's administration redounds more to his honour or to the Company's advantage, than this establishment, formed against the opinion of the Commander in Chief, and the opposition of Mr. Francis.

The provinces of Oude, Corah, Allahabad, Rohilcund, and the Doab, have been protected, the revenues have been collected, and the troops have been regularly paid from the day this establishment took place ; and in the year 1780, the general relief of the army was effected ; by which these new battalions were brought into our provinces, and relieved by an equal number from Bengal.

In August 1777, General Clavering died. A man whose character must be always considered with respect, as his errors arose from a good principle, the hatred of corruption. He certainly brought with him to Bengal a rooted prejudice against the Company's servants in general, and a very unjust one against Mr. Hastings in particular. The Court of Directors, by their instructions, in which, from the best motives, they authorised a review of past transactions,

actions, opened so wide a field for imposition, that the General's prejudices were still more confirmed by the improbable tales which were hourly brought to him. The violence of the majority absolutely created a party, where otherwise there would have been none.

Mr. Hastings, through the whole course of his public life, had given the strongest proofs of his integrity and disinterestedness; Sir John Clavering's has never been questioned; had some pains therefore been taken to unite such respectable characters, the intention of the Legislature in forming the Supreme Council would have been effectually answered; but as it was, the first impressions which the General received, from a certain perseverance in his temper, grew stronger every day, and the interest of the East India Company unhappily suffered by it.

I do not mean to infer that no abuses existed in Bengal when the Supreme Council arrived there. Let it be considered that Mr. Hastings was the President of a Council, in which he had a casting voice only when the numbers were equal, consequently that he would sometimes be obliged to accommodate his opinion to the sense of the majority of his Council; but it is a certain truth, that whilst he had the lead, he did more to reform abuses than any other man would have done or attempted: The establishment of the Supreme Council was calculated for completing his plans of reformation, a work in which he would most cordially have taken the lead; but unfortunately he was obliged to give up that time,



which might have been so valuably employed for the public service, to the justification of past, and successful measures, and even to the defence of his private character.

Passing over common occurrences, I come to that period in which arose the present expensive (though when Mr. Hastings's scheme prevailed, successful) war with the Marattas. It has been industriously endeavoured to impute the origin as well as the progress of this war to Mr. Hastings. The Court of Directors are possessed of the fullest evidence to the contrary; and both living testimony, and authentic documents prove, that its origin is not owing to him, and that the continuation of it is the effect of necessity.

It will be proper to take up this important subject from the first connection of the Bombay Council with Ragonath Row, otherwise called Ragobah.

Although the nominal sovereignty of the Maratta state was in a Raja, the real administration of government, as well as the power inherent to it, was possessed by a Bramin family, under the title of Pashwa, or Chancellor; and this authority was so fixed in them, that it became hereditary; and in case of infancy, the State was governed by a Regent, who was generally the nearest in blood. Narrein Row, the last Pashwa, died, leaving no children; and Ragobah, who was his uncle, became Pashwa. During an expedition, which carried him to a distance from his capital, the Council (consisting of Bramins) dispossessed him, giving out that the widow of Narrein was with child,

child, and accusing him of having assassinated his nephew. The first of these facts was doubtful, the latter most probably false, he having been in confinement for a long time before that event, without any communication with the conspirators. Soon after it was given out that the widow of Narrein was delivered of a son; and Nana, with Saecaram, and others of the Bramin Council, acting, as they alleged, in support of the infant, drove Ragobah from Poona, and reduced him to such distress, that he applied for assistance to the Presidency of Bombay.

Not relying solely on the justice of his cause, the more readily to obtain assistance, he offered to make some very valuable cessions of territory to the East-India Company. A treaty was concluded, by which we engaged to assist him with a military force; and an army from Bombay took the field under the command of Colonel Keating; whether our forces, in conjunction with Ragobah's would have conducted him in triumph to Poona is uncertain, but it can hardly be doubted that a few spirited operations would have been productive of an advantageous peace with the ministerial party, both for the Company and for Ragonaut Row.

Intelligence of the transactions at Bombay, was received at Calcutta a few months after the first meeting of the Supreme Council, whose authority having been totally disregarded, either from inadvertence or design, produced very serious consequences. The treaty with Ragobah having been concluded without the sanction of the Governor

General and Council, was disavowed ; and an officer of rank (Lieutenant Colonel Upton) was deputed to Poona, with instructions to conclude a peace upon almost any terms, with the ministers who were denominated the ruling members of the Maratta state ; and the English army was ordered to march back.

So glaring a condemnation of past measures, and so pointed an interference in their affairs, naturally tended to destroy the influence of the gentlemen of Bombay, upon the Malabar coast ; while it provoked their passions and excited their resentments. Under these circumstances, a co-operation with Colonel Upton could not be expected. It had been fortunate if, from that moment, the Government of Bombay had been fixed upon a plan of the most rigid economy ; and their troops had been confined to the defence of Bombay, the castle of Surat, and the island of Salfette.

Mr. Hastings, although he joined with the other members in disapproving the conduct of the Presidency of Bombay, thought that there might exist circumstances which should prevent the return of the army, but he was over-ruled, and the moderation of our demands was attributed very naturally, by the Marattas, to a want of ability to carry on the war. Colonel Upton was five months on his journey to Poona. He was treated with great disrespect by the Maratta Chiefs through whose countries he passed. The Ministers, on his arrival, complained bitterly of our interference in their family disputes ; and were so high in their demands, insisting even upon the restoration of Salfette, that Colonel Upton broke off the nego-

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negociation ; and by his first dispatches to Calcutta, it was supposed that the war would be continued. But this was a mere trick of the Ministers, who were anxious for an accommodation ; and on the first of March, 1776, a treaty of peace was signed by Colonel Upton, on the part of our government ; and on their side was authenticated, by the seal of the Pashwa, an infant of about two years old, and by the signature of his two Ministers, Sacaram Bappoo and Nana Furnese. By one article of the treaty, a provision was made for the subsistence of Ragobah, their late competitor, on condition of his residing in the heart of the Maratta dominions, with a guard appointed by the Ministers themselves, for his state and security. This clause, as might reasonably be expected, defeated the intention of the treaty, since it left Ragobah at the mercy of his enemies, without any pledge or engagement for his safety. The consequence was, that he fled to Bombay, and claimed the protection of that Government for the security of his person.

The Ministers exclaimed against this protection ; and mutual complaints of the violation of this treaty were made by them and the Bombay Council. About the Month of May, 1777, the Chevalier St. Lubin made his appearance at Poona, in the public character of a Minister from the Court of France. He was received with great honour, and in a little time written engagements were mutually interchanged between him and Nana Furnese, by which he promised to bring a regiment of Europeans, with military stores to Poona, for the service of the Maratta state. Intelligence of this treaty, at first doubted,

was soon confirmed by authorities of unquestionable credit, and by a series of facts of public notoriety. It had been always the Governor General's opinion, that this was the only way by which the French could hope to regain their consequence in India, or to affect ours; and he reasonably expected, that the Presidency of Bombay, which was more immediately interested in the effects of such a connection, would take some steps to render it abortive. This was by no means difficult. The Maratta army under Hurry Punt Furkia, was at that time engaged in an unequal war with Hyder Ally. The Ministers quarrelling among themselves, possessed little authority, and were dependent for that little upon their own vassals. The Presidency of Bombay had long shewn an impatience to revive the cause of Ragobah; and the slightest movements made by them in his favour would have proved sufficient to overthrow the feeble power which they had to contend with, and to establish their own influence in the Maratta state on its ruins. But Mr. Hastings, that he might leave no means untried to avoid a rupture with the Marattas, and to counteract the French influence at Poona, formed a treaty, which he meant should remedy all the defects of that concluded by Colonel Upton; every article of which, at that time remained unexecuted. This treaty was laid before the Board at Calcutta, with a very long explanatory minute, on the 23d of January, 1778, and will, if read with the attention it deserves, entirely exculpate the Governor General from the smallest suspicion of a desire to involve the East-India Company in a war with the

the Marattas. On the 25th of January, whilst this minute lay for consideration, a letter was received from Bombay, dated the 12th of December, 1777, informing the Supreme Council that a proposal had been secretly made to the Governor and Council, through their agent at Poona, by a party which had been formed against Nana Furnese, consisting of Saccaram Bappoo, who had signed the treaty, and other considerable men, with a potent Raja, Tuckajee Holkar, to assist them in the design of reinstating Ragobah in the chief administration of the Maratta state; and that they had agreed to join in it, requiring only, as a preliminary condition, a written application to the same effect, under the hands and seals of the confederates. They excused themselves for having so far engaged, without the previous authority of the Supreme Council, by the obvious necessity of an immediate decision; and they requested their acquiescence and assistance in it. On the receipt of this letter, the Governor General and Council resolved to ratify what they had done, to authorize them to proceed, and to send them an extraordinary supply of ten lacks of rupees for the undertaking. It was also resolved, to assist them in the execution of their plan with a military force.

In forming these resolutions the majority of the Supreme Council were swayed by the following considerations.

1st. In the event of a rupture with France, which was daily apprehended, the connection formed by Nana Furnese with St. Lubin, and the engagement he had entered into to land a regiment of Europeans

Europeans with military stores at Poona, might, if carried into effect, be productive of the most dangerous consequences to the Company's influence, and their possessions in India. This could be prevented only by the removal of the party so closely connected with our natural enemy, and therefore this was an object of the first importance; and Ragonaut Row was the instrument for this purpose. Mr. Hastings had no predilection for this Chief, nor is it possible to attribute his conduct to any interested view.

2dly, Authorising the gentlemen of Bombay to take part with Ragobah, was a strict compliance with the orders of the Court of Directors contained, in the following paragraph of their general letter of the 5th of February 1777.

“ His (Ragobah's) pretensions to the supreme  
 “ authority, either in his own right, or as guardian  
 “ to the infant Pashwa, appear to us better founded  
 “ than those of his competitors; and therefore, if  
 “ the conditions of the treaty of Poona have not  
 “ been strictly fulfilled on the part of the Marat-  
 “ tas, and if, from any circumstances, you shall  
 “ deem it expedient, we shall have no objection to  
 “ an alliance with Ragobah, on the terms agreed  
 “ upon between him and the Governor and Council  
 “ of Bombay.”

3dly, The restoration of Ragonaut Row would have been attended by an accession of territory upon the Malabar coast to the amount of the annual expences of the Presidency of Bombay; by which means no farther drains would have been made from our treasury in Bengal,

4thly,

...thly. The restoration of Ragobah was not a breach of the treaty of Poona, because that treaty was signed by Saccaram Bappoo and Nana Furnese only; and Saccaram, the first Minister in rank, with the principal officers of the Maratta state, joined in the proposal to the gentlemen of Bombay, for his return to Poona.

Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheeler, however, strenuously opposed the measure, on various grounds; and amongst others, because it was in disobedience to the order of the Court of Directors.

I must here interrupt my narrative, to observe in what view the Directors considered the conduct of the Governor General in this instance.

About the 29th of July, 1778, the Court of Directors received dispatches both from Bombay and Bengal, in which they were informed of the plan proposed to the Presidency of Bombay, by the opponents of Nana Furnese, of the sanction given to it by the Governor General and Council, and of their resolution to assist them with money and a considerable reinforcement, in order the more effectually to carry it into execution, and to support them in the consequences of it. These advices the Court of Directors thought of such great importance, that on the 29th of August 1778, Colonel Capper was applied to by the Select Committee of the Court of Directors, to carry a packet to Bombay, of the greatest national importance. He accordingly left London the 1st of September, and by the letters which he brought, both the gentlemen of Bengal and Bombay had the satisfaction to receive the fullest approbation of the  
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Directors, who express very strong anxiety for Ragoonah's restoration, and the overthrow of that party at Poona in alliance with the French. The friendship of the season brought out a complete approbation to Mr. Hastings, for the part which he had acted in this important business.\*

On the 23d of February, 1778, orders were issued for forming a detachment of six battalions of Sepoys, one company of native artillery, with a regular proportion of field artillery, to which were afterwards added the first regiment of cavalry and five hundred of the Vizier's Candahar horse. Colonel Leslie was appointed to command this force, and ordered to march directly to Bombay by the shortest route he should judge most practicable, and for the sequel of his operations, he was to obey the orders of the President and Council of Bombay. This detachment crossed the Jumma the latter end of May, with slight and ineffectual opposition from Ballajee Pundit, the chief of the Maratta territories dependent upon Culpee. In the mean time the design which had furnished the occasion of this expedition was suffered to sleep at Bombay, the violent ardour of that Presidency for the cause of Ragonaut Row ceasing with the removal of the bar which had been laid on the prosecution of it. It produced however the principal effects intended by the promoters of it. These suddenly assembling their forces on the 30th of March, deprived Nana Furnese of his authority, and invested Moraba Furnese with it in his stead. This easy revolution, without bloodshed or contest, proved

\* These letters were approved by his Majesty's Ministers.

the extreme weakness of the Maratta government, and the great facility with which the plan, offered to the Presidency of Bombay, might have been executed in its full extent, had they immediately engaged in it. When the gentlemen of Bombay first heard of Colonel Leslie's march, they ordered him to halt, and a few days after, they sent him an order to prosecute his march, but without any object described, or plan of operations proposed, or thought on: thus abandoned by the Presidency of Bombay, Mr. Hastings had recourse to other means which were more within the compass of his own direction, and for which he had in some degree made a provision a considerable time before, on the presumption of the utility of which it might prove in the event of a rupture with the Marattas.

When the Supreme Council determined to send a detachment to the other side of India, the Governor General applied to the Raja of Berar to grant his permission for its free march through his territories, with such assistance as it might require on the way. He received an immediate answer to his application on such terms as he wished, and the Raja at the same time sent a person to the banks of the Nerbudda, which bounds his dominions to the north, with a store of grain for the subsistence of the detachment, and orders to attend it through his country, of which he advised Colonel Leslie, inviting him to take that route, and assuring him of his most friendly reception.

The nominal Sovereign of the Maratta state, who had languished in honourable confinement at Sattarah,

Rajah Ram Rajah, died in December, 1777. He left no children; and Moodajee Boosla, Rajah of Berar, had the fairest pretensions to the succession, being in direct lineal descent from the ancient stock, and the adopted son of Sahoo Rajah, the predecessor of Ram Rajah, though deprived of his right by the artifices of Ballajee, who was the Pashwa, when Sahoo Rajah died. Mr. Hastings judged Moodajee Boosla to be a proper person to supply the place of Ragobah, in the plan offered to the Supreme Council for overturning the French influence at Poona. He possessed wealth, power, and a territory extending from the borders of Bengal almost to Poona. Ragobah had neither wealth nor power, nor had he influence to supply the want of these requisites, except what might arise from the Presidency of Bombay taking an active part in his favour, and it did not then appear that they took any. Mr. Hastings wished and expected the proposal of an alliance to come from Moodajee, and he had deputed his Vackeel to him for that purpose, a man of understanding, and well instructed; but it now became necessary to take a more active and determined part.

On the 7th of July, 1778, advices, deemed worthy of credit, were received from Cairo that war had been declared between Great Britain and France; at Paris on the 18th, and in London on the 30th of March. The destination of Count d'Estaing's fleet was not then known. It was very naturally supposed to be intended against Bombay, and the first advices which were received from England tended still more strongly to confirm this supposition:

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The Chevalier St. Lubin was known to be still at ~~Bengal~~, and to hold frequent conferences with the ~~officers~~ of the Pathwa. The Supreme Council, regardless of all personal consequences, determined instantly to take possession of all the French settlements in Bengal, and of the ships in the river.\* At the same time, they earnestly recommended to the Presidency of Fort St. George, to commence the siege of Pondicherry immediately, and if possible to secure the friendship of Hyder Ally Cawn. It was also resolved to enter into a negotiation with Moodajee, on the grounds which I have mentioned above. Mr. Elliot was deputed on this service. At Cuttack he overtook Mr. Chevalier, the Governor of Chandernagore, who had escaped from that place, and was so far in his way to Pondicherry. Mr. Elliot had the address to persuade Moodajee's Deputy at that place, to consent to his apprehending Mr. Chevalier; which he did, and sent him a prisoner to Fort William. By his papers, the reality of the French scheme against us was fully evinced. He then proceeded towards Naigpore, the capital of Berar: the whole service could not have afforded an agent more proper for such an embassy, and Mr. Hastings's hopes were proportionably raised, but as suddenly blasted by the untimely death of that very valuable young man, about a fortnight after he had left Cuttack. It is more than probable

\* The Governor General and Council took possession of all the French settlements and their ships in the river of Bengal, in consequence of the private advices transmitted to them from Cairo by Mr. Baldwin.

that if Mr. Elliot had arrived at Neigpore, an alliance of the most beneficial consequence to the East India Company would have been concluded with the Rajah of Berar.

Colonel Leslie, when Mr. Elliot died, had advanced but 120 miles from Calpee, having employed so much of his time in settling the family disputes of the Bundella Chiefs. He was recalled from his command on the 7th of October ; but by his death, Colonel Goddard had succeeded to it before the letter reached the camp.

Colonel Goddard immediately prosecuted his march to the banks of the Nerbudda, and was empowered, on his arrival there, to treat with Moodajee. He deputed his interpreter to the Court of that Prince ; who, in his letter to Mr. Hastings, after the death of Mr. Elliot, had desired the negotiation might be transferred to his secretary ; and had expressed the strongest inclination to bring it to a conclusion.

A second, and unexpected revolution was effected at Poona on the 16th of June, and Moraba Furness was imprisoned, with his principal adherents. Moraba, before his imprisonment, had made proposals to the Presidency of Bombay, who had resolved to conduct Ragobah with an army to Poona ; a circumstance well known to Moodajee, who, in consequence of it, declined the alliance which was proposed to him, deeming Ragobah's interests incompatible with his own : but with very cordial professions of friendship for the English nation, which he evinced,

evinced, by furnishing Colonel Goddard with cash, provisions, and draft cattle for his artillery. Colonel Goddard advanced towards Poona by quick marches.

: I have already observed that the Bombay gentlemen had reassumed their design in favour of Ragobah. The period at which they reassumed it was unfavourable; Ragobah's principal adherents were confined, and Colonel Goddard, whose army would by its presence have insured success, was at a considerable distance. I wish to relate facts, and not to comment upon them. On the 23d of November the Bombay army, consisting of one hundred and forty-three artillery, five hundred and forty-eight European infantry, two thousand two hundred and seventy Sepoys, and five hundred Lascars, was transported to the Continent. On the 23d of December, they ascended the Gauts, and marched towards Poona, and on the 9th of January it was determined to retreat, on account of a scarcity of provisions, although they had a supply for eighteen days, and there was but one short day's march to Poona. So much alarmed had the ministers been for the event, that, by their agent at Bombay, they had offered fresh terms to the Governor before the army advanced. The commanding officer, Colonel Cockburn, when consulted, said, that he had not a doubt of the army's marching to Poona, but that our troops had not been used to retreat. However, the resolution was not to be altered. The army was formed into three divisions, encumbered with baggage,

gale, and moved off by night. They were attacked by numerous bodies of Marattas, but defended themselves with the utmost bravery, and sustained loss comparatively small, if the length of the action and the numbers of the foe are considered. In the evening of that day, application was made to Nana and Sindia, for an undisturbed retreat of the army to Bombay; this was granted, upon the humiliating terms, that Salcot, and every other acquisition by the Bombay Government since the time of Mahderow, should be given up, and that orders should be sent to Colonel Goddard, to return with his army to Bengal. It is true the Committee \* who governed that army, gave an express declaration, in writing, that they had not the power to bind the Supreme Council to the observance of these terms, and the Maratta Chiefs know it was so.

By this fatal check the honour of the British arms was tarnished, the cause of Ragobah Row given up; and, had the treaty been valid, all our conquests upon the Malabar coasts ceded to the Marattas. That the corps which took the field from Bombay, was strong enough to resist the united force of the Maratta empire, is beyond a doubt; that it was able to surmount every obstruction which the suddenly-collected army of the Marattas could have thrown in its way, is highly probable, (since two of our

\* The Council of Bombay, on the 4th of November, appointed Mr. Carnac, Colonel Egerton, and Mr. Mostyn, a Committee to carry their plan into execution; this was called the Poona Committee. Mr. Mostyn died during the expedition.

battalions, with four field pieces, in February, 1780, put twenty thousand of their best troops under Madajee Sindia to the rout) but that by waiting the junction of General Goddard's army, every possibility of a failure would have been avoided, cannot be disputed.

Colonel Goddard, when he was about three hundred miles from Surat, and the same distance from Poona, received an order from the Poona Committee to return to Bengal, without any notice being taken of the disaster, and retreat of the Bombay army; after mature reflection, he determined, notwithstanding this order, to advance towards Surat. On his march, a Vackeel from the Maratta ministers arrived in his camp, with a copy of the convention. Colonel Goddard denied that the Committee had any authority over him, and said that he was directed to march to Bombay for the security of the Company's possessions against the designs of the French, and that he should prosecute his march. He effected his arrival at Surat on the 18th of February, 1779.

Sir Eyre Coote arrived in Bengal on the 27th of March, 1779; the Supreme Council was then complete, and the Governor General at the first assembly of the Board, although they had not received a full account of the transactions at Bombay, proposed that we should, if possible, conclude a lasting peace with the Marattas, upon the terms of Colonel Upton's treaty. His proposal was unanimously agreed to, and Colonel Goddard appointed the minister of this Government.



The Supreme Council were as unanimous in disavowing the convention of Worgaum, concluded by the Poona Committee; but, anxious for peace with the Marattas, and on a supposition that the gentlemen of Bombay might not heartily co-operate with them, Colonel Goddard was instructed to use his utmost endeavours to effect a reconciliation. All these resolutions were moved by the Governor General; no member of the Board proposed to avow the convention of Worgaum; upon what grounds therefore hath Mr. Hastings singly been charged as the author of the second Maratta war?

Colonel, now General, Goddard, when he had received his instructions, communicated his appointment to the ministers at Poona; and they deputed a Vackeel to negotiate a treaty of peace with him. Before this Vackeel arrived at Surat, Ragobah had made his escape from the officers of Sindia, who had charge of his person, and were conveying him to a place of confinement. He fled to Surat, and General Goddard agreed to give him personal protection; informing the ministers at Poona of this unexpected event. The Vackeel arrived at Surat — received our proposals — returned to Poona, and promised to forward a categorical answer in three weeks. After some delays, during which time General Goddard received intelligence that the ministers were negotiating a treaty with Hyder Ally, and making every preparation for war, the Vackeel returned to Surat, with the only terms on which the Marattas would consent to a peace. These were, that we should cede  
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Salute to them, and deliver up the person of Ragubah now: Thus were the efforts of the Supreme Council disappointed. Can this disappointment be attributed to a want of zeal for an accommodation, either in the Governor General or General Goddard?

General Goddard at the same time received intelligence, that an alliance had been concluded at Poona, between Hyder Ally, the Marattas, Nizam Ally Cawn, and Moodajee Boosla. By the principal article of it, the Marattas, under Madajee Sindia and Tukajee Holkar, were to act against General Goddard in Guzzerat; Hyder Ally was to invade the Carnatic; the Nizam the Northern Circars, and Moodajee Boosla, Bengal. The truth of this intelligence has since been fatally confirmed. The Nizam, the projector of the treaty, acted the part which he did, in revenge; for the Presidency of Fort St. George having concluded an alliance with his brother, Bazalut Jung, by which they acquired possession of the Guntoor Circar; and Hyder Ally Cawn very strongly expressed his disgust at our acquisition of that Circar. This business will doubtless be fully investigated; and it is foreign from my subject to take any farther notice of it here. Moodajee Boosla was very unwillingly drawn in to take a part against us. Of this there cannot be a doubt, as he regularly kept the Governor General informed of the designs which were formed against us, and purposely delayed the march of his army until the season of action should be past, with the hope that

in the last rains our differences with the Marattas would have been accommodated. The Nizam has hitherto been inactive, though the original projector of the confederacy.

The army at Surat was strengthened by detachments from Bombay and Fort St. George; and General Goddard was furnished with discretionary orders, should the treaty with the Marattas prove abortive. He took the field in December, 1779; and soon after concluded a treaty with Futty Sing Guicawar, by which the extensive province of Guzzerat was equally divided between the East-India Company and him. He immediately advanced towards Ahmedabad, the capital of that part of Guzzerat which was in the possession of the Marattas. This place our troops took by storm; a conquest which added greatly to the splendour of our arms. In three months he entirely subdued the whole province. Madajee Sindia, who had assembled the Maratta forces, was marching with an intent to relieve Ahmedabad, not supposing that we should so soon be in possession of it. General Goddard, leaving a garrison in this place, advanced towards the Maratta army to offer them battle; which, notwithstanding their great superiority of numbers, and the unfortunate event of the Bombay expedition, which must naturally have attended them, their General declined upon every oc-

casional anxious was General Goddard, knowing the consequence of engaging the Maratta army, on the 2d of April, 1780, he left his army on their

their ground, and advanced to storm the enemy's camp at the head of two hundred Europeans, ten companies of grenadier Sepoys, three battalions of Sepoys, two twelve and ten six-pounders, with the first regiment of Cavalry and the Candahar horse: with this force, so greatly inferior to the troops that retreated before the Maratta army the preceding year, he advanced, passed their principal guards, and instantly attacked the main body drawn up ready to receive him. Our artillery did great execution amongst their numerous cavalry, and in an hour from the commencement of the action they retreated, after a considerable loss; nor did a single horseman appear to molest our army in its return to camp. Every action of this campaign was equally glorious to our arms. Captain John Campbell, of the Bengal establishment, was detached with a foraging party to a considerable distance from their camp; and on his return with a large convoy of provisions, he was attacked by Sindia at the head of twenty thousand men, the flower of the Maratta army. Captain Campbell formed his detachment, consisting of two battalions of Sepoys, and four field pieces, to the best advantage, repulsed the Marattas, who lost between five and six hundred men, many of whom were killed by the fire of the flank companies of our line. Captain Campbell, after this remarkable action, joined General Goddard without the loss of a man, or of any part of his convoy. Lieutenant Welsh, of the Bengal establishment, was detached by General Goddard on the 3d of May,

When he surprized a body of six thousand Marattas, his force consisted of the first regiment of cavalry and a battalion of Sepoys. Lieutenant Wellesley when he had performed half his march, found, by calculating the time which remained, that if he waited for his infantry, he should not arrive before day break in the enemy's camp. He therefore came to the spirited resolution of advancing at the head of the cavalry only; with this force he entered the Maratta camp, and seized the enemy's cannon, which he turned upon them in their flight. The rout was general: The commanding officer and a great number of the Marattas were killed; and the artillery, bazar, ammunition, &c. fell into our hands.\* No victory could be more decisive: and this officer had the good fortune soon after to get possession of two forts, which entirely completed the conquest of Guzzerat.

Major Forbes, of the Bengal establishment, at the head of two battalions of Sepoys, effectually surprized and routed a body of 7000 Marattas, and with this action closed the campaign of 1780, both parties retiring to winter quarters for the rainy season. General Goddard commenced the present campaign by the conquest of the important fort of Bassein, and by a decisive victory over the Maratta army, which had been sent to relieve the place. The Marattas themselves deeply feel the loss of this important fortress, which they had taken from the Portuguese after a siege of two years.

We now return to the transactions in Bengal, where the measures proposed by Mr. Hastings were attended with the most brilliant advantages.

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When the Governor General found, by General Goddard's dispatches, that we had no hopes of an accommodation with the Marattas, he concluded that the only mode of bringing them in one campaign to reasonable terms would be by attacking them in every quarter; for this purpose he entered into a treaty with the Rana of Gohid, an independent prince, whose country had been invaded by them. Mr. Hastings's motives for entering into this alliance were, to distress the Marattas, by making a considerable diversion in one of their best provinces; in conjunction with the Rana's forces, and, if possible, to acquire possession of the important fortress of Guahier. But he had another view, which would effectually have humbled the Marattas, and in which he must have succeeded, if the distracted state of our Government, and the continual reports of his dismission from his station, had not deterred the Rajahs dependent upon them from entering into a closer connection with us.

The principal revenues and resources of the Marattas arise from the annual tribute paid to them by the Rajahs of Oudepore, Joudpore, Zeynagur, Bopaul, Narva, Bundelcund, &c. &c. These Princes, who take every opportunity of evading their payments, had now a fair opportunity of shaking off their dependance. And had the Government of Bengal been at liberty to have exerted itself at this time, or had not an idea of a change of men and measures unhappily been industriously propagated throughout  
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Indoſtan, the Maratta war would have been concluded upon our own terms many months ago.

I will now proceed to relate the important conſequences which were produced by our alliance with the Rana of Gohid, ſmall as his dominions may be. When the treaty was concluded, the Marattas were in poſſeſſion of the beſt part of his country. Major Popham, at the head of 2000 Sepoys, 40 European artillery, a body of 120 horſe, and 4 field pieces, fix-pounders, marched to his aſſiſtance. With this little army, he in a few months drove the Marattas out of the Rana's country, purſued them, and entirely conquered one of their provinces, producing an annual revenue of ſix lacks of rupees. In the courſe of this ſervice he took ſeveral forts, beat up the Maratta camp; nor were all the efforts of above 15,000 Marattas able to oppoſe the ſucceſs of his gallant little army. The moſt important action ſtill remains to be related. When Major Popham's detachment had cantoned for the rains, Mr. Haſtings propoſed to him to make an attempt upon Gualier. He knew this place to be ſo ſtrong, that it never could be taken by regular approaches; and he knew too, that the enemy, confident in the natural ſtrength of the place, would be more liable to be ſurprized. The importance of the conqueſt may be well conceived when it is known, that by all ranks of men in all ages, this place has been denominated, The impregnable Fortreſs of Gualier. As ſuch, Colonel Dow ſpeaks of it in ſeveral parts of his Hiſtory of Indoſtan.

In a country where we retain our authority, by an opinion which the natives have, not only of our superior genius for war, but also our good fortune, such a conquest, at such a time, would be equal to the most decisive victory in the field. I believe there was not a man in Bengal who differed in opinion with Mr. Hastings as to the importance of this place; but I well remember when the treaty with the Rana of Gohid was concluded, the impossibility of our getting possession of Gualier was frequently mentioned. Major Popham, who by the surprize of this place, has acquired immortal honour in India, had the good fortune to receive some important information from a party of Mewattes, who had found means to enter the place by night at different times.

He employed spies to examine the place where these men had entered, and from their report conceived the design to be possible. In compliance with Mr. Hastings's repeated solicitations, and guided by his own judgment, he made every preparation for the attempt with the utmost secrecy, only two persons being privy to it. The night before the execution of it, he wrote to the Governor General, informed him that the attempt was to be made early the next morning, and he hoped in case of failure, that Mr. Hastings would do him the justice to say, it was at his desire that he had undertaken an enterprize, which, if it failed, would be denominated rash and impracticable; if it succeeded, would redound as much to the honour of the Governor General, by

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whose



whose advice it was undertaken, as of those by whom it was executed. The success was equal to the spirit and prudence of the action; it was taken on the 4th of August, 1780, and that with the trifling loss of 20 Sepoys wounded.

It is impossible to describe the despondency of the Marattas upon this important event. The whole country adjoining to Gualier was immediately evacuated by their troops, and our military reputation, proportionably raised. This was the favourable moment for us, and if Mr. Hastings could have profited by it, as he wished to have done, the power of the Marattas in India, would have sunk at once. Mr. Hastings, previous to the capture of Gualier, had proposed to form a strong detachment in Gohid, for the purpose of advancing into the province of Malwa, the country of Sindia, the Maratta general. In this the Governor General was over ruled; although he had every reason to believe, that in the conduct of that branch of administration he was to meet with no opposition. If the detachment had been formed, as Mr. Hastings had proposed, the capture of Gualier ensured us the utmost success in its operations.

General Goddard had earnestly pressed the Governor General and Council to invade the province of Malwa, which would have diverted the attention of Sindia from Guzzerat; and one campaign would have finished the war with honour and advantage on our side. An event which no Member of the Board more earnestly wished to see accomplished than  
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Mr. Hastings, particularly as Hyder Ally Cawn had, in July, 1780, invaded the Carnatic, where our forces were utterly unprepared to receive him.

On the 19th of September an express arrived in Calcutta from the Secret Committee of Fort St. George, informing the Supreme Council that the flower of their army had been cut off or taken prisoners by Hyder Ally, and that Sir Hector Munro, with the part of the forces under his command, had retreated to the mount with the loss of his baggage and part of his artillery. This intelligence was accompanied by advice that a considerable French fleet, with land forces on board, were on their way to India.

This important intelligence left little room for deliberation, and at the first meeting of the Board, the Governor General proposed that Sir Eyre Coote should be requested to take the command of the army at Madras. That a reinforcement of Europeans should be sent to the coast by sea, with a supply of fifteen lacks of rupees; and that a large detachment of Sepoys should be formed to march to the Carnatic as soon as the season would permit. That an instant offer of peace should be made to the Marattas upon terms so advantageous to them, as almost to ensure their acceptance of them. The season was so far advanced that the embarkation of troops would be attended with difficulty and danger. But the Governor General, justly considering that every

risque was to be run, when probably the very existence of the Company would depend upon their arrival, despised every inferior consideration. Mr. Francis opposed the embarkation of the troops, and would only agree to seven lack of rupees being sent from Bengal. However, all these motions were carried by the majority: and Sir Eyre Coote, with six hundred and forty Europeans, fifteen lacks of rupees, and a great supply of provisions arrived at Madras, in less than two months, computed from the return of the army under Sir Hector Munro, at the mount on the 14th of September, to the arrival of the last ship of the fleet, the Duke of Kingston, at Fort St. George, on the 5th of November. It will undoubtedly reflect great honour upon Mr. Hastings and Sir Eyre Coote, that they had spirit enough to afford such extraordinary aids to the Presidency of Fort St. George, at a season in which the navigation from Bengal to Madras had hitherto been interdicted on account of the dangers which attended it.

I have related as briefly and as clearly as I was able, the rise and progress of the Maratta war, from the 12th of December, 1777, to the close of the year 1780. Upon what ground or suggestion this war can be attributed to Mr. Hastings, let every man judge who reads this account.

The occasion of the war was planned and executed without the knowledge or previous consent of the Governor General, who had another participation in  
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it than by providing, by an extraordinary exertion, for the support of the measures undertaken by the Presidency of Bombay if they succeeded, and for its preservation if they failed. The Court of Directors have warmly approved of the exertions made by the Government of Bengal. Colonel Goddard arrived seasonably for the preservation of Bombay, and for the redemption of the national honour, which had without it been irretrievably lost. Our successes in every part, after the Marattas had rejected all reasonable terms of accommodation, gave the Governor General the strongest hopes of speedily terminating it by such advantages as should have amply recompensed the Company for the expences which had attended it, and the calamities with which it had commenced. In the midst of our successes, another and more interesting occasion called for the exertion of the Government of Bengal. The preservation of Fort St. George depended upon their resolutions. The misfortunes upon the coast cannot be attributed to Mr. Hastings. If the general opinion is to have weight, the invasion of the Carnatic might have been prevented by the assembly of our army in the month of June. If the confession of the Nizam to Mr. Holland may be credited, (and it is confirmed by the evidence of the most public notoriety) that invasion was the sole effect of a confederacy formed at his instigation, and dictated by his resentments of the infringements made by the Select Committee of Fort St. George on his rights obtained by the treaty

treaty subsisting between him and the Company, and his natural apprehension of hostilities, intended by that government against him.

When Mr. Hastings proposed to conclude a treaty of peace with the Marattas, he recommended to the Board to form the treaty in Calcutta, to send it executed by the Supreme Council, to Moodajee Boosla, the Rajah of Berar, who had repeatedly offered himself as mediator between our Government and the Marattas. This treaty was rejected, and the reason was obvious; Hyder Ally Cawn had cut off a third of our army. He had taken Arcot, when he was proclaimed Nabob of the Carnatic. He had boasted, that he would prevent the English army from moving from the Mount, and that he was to be joined in a month by 3000 French regulars from the Islands, when he would commence the siege of Fort St. George. The French fleet, six sail of the line and five frigates, appeared on the coast of Coromandel. Under these circumstances, the Marattas deeming our situation a desperate one, rejected all treaty, except upon the most disgraceful terms to us.

Sir Eyre Coote took the field on the 23d of January, 1781. On his march to Pondicherry, he repeatedly offered battle to Hyder Ally Cawn.

His detachments were upon all occasions successful, against every superiority of numbers. The army under his command was the finest that ever took the field in India, in point of discipline and numbers, and completely provided with artillery and military stores. The men were eager to revenge the late defeat

lost and destruction of their companions. The French fleet, after appearing off Madras, on the 29th of January, went off without even making an attempt to destroy the ships in that road, in which they must have succeeded. The fleet had not a single soldier on board, except their marines, and on a report that Sir Edward Hughes was returning from Bombay to the coast of Coromandel, quitted the coast on the 16th of February, and returned to the islands. In addition to the army under the command of Sir Eyre Coote, Colonel Pearse was advancing from Bengal with ten battalions of Sepoys and twenty pieces of cannon. This force would arrive in the neighbourhood of Madras in the month of June.

The Marattas at the commencement of this campaign, had been defeated in a general action by General Goddard, who the day after took the fort of Bassein. Lieutenant Colonel Camac, advancing at the head of twelve battalions of Sepoys to the province of Malwa, has had the good fortune to gain a complete victory against an army of 30,000 men, commanded by Sindia in person, the effect of which must be greatly beneficial to General Goddard's designs. Gualier was garrisoned by our troops, and by that means a safe communication was preserved with the dominions of our ally the Vizier. Our forces in Bengal were so stationed, as to prevent all danger from an invasion, should it be attempted. These favourable circumstances make an honourable peace with the Marattas a probable event.

In this review of the rise and progress of the Maratta war, let it be remembered, that the main design of marching an army across India, was not to assist the Presidency of Bombay in the execution of their original plan, but to support them in the consequences of it to us, and to protect the interests of the East-India Company from the effects of a connection well known to be formed between the ruling member of the Maratta state and the avowed agent of the King of France. General Goddard very opportunely arrived at Surat for the preservation of Bombay. The Governor General, who saw in as strong a light as any other member of the Board, the disadvantages even of a successful war with the Marattas, (however great the necessity might be of relieving our military reputation) should the operations be continued beyond one campaign, proposed to them the most equitable terms of peace; and in a letter which he himself drew up to the Committee at Bombay, the Supreme Council observe, " Having  
 " given full powers to Colonel Goddard to negotiate and conclude a peace with the Marattas, we  
 " have only to repeat, that we look to the issue  
 " of that commission as our primary object, and the  
 " termination of all our political views on your side  
 " of India, if it prove successful." To Colonel Goddard, the Board observe, " Our first desire is to  
 " obtain peace."

When Ragonaut Row had escaped from Madajee Sindia, and had joined General Goddard; who consented to give him personal protection, the Supreme Council

Council approve of its being continued to him, provided he shall "not attempt to defeat the effect of your negotiations, to which you are to give your entire attention without regard to any other consideration." With such proofs of Mr. Hastings's sincere disposition to accommodate our differences with the Marattas, what are the grounds to suppose he was less inclined to a pacification than Mr. Francis, or any other member of the Board? The Governor General was not at all involved in the disgrace which the gentlemen of Bombay had incurred by their ill-timed expedition; on the contrary, the Court of Directors had conveyed to him, by an express over land, their approbation of the part which he had taken in their affairs. The answer of the Poona Durbar to our proposals was conveyed in few words. "They would only consent to a peace on these conditions: That we should give up the person of Ragobah, and cede the island of Salsette to them." Was it even proposed by any member of the Supreme Council to purchase a peace by such concessions? It was not. The war was therefore a war of necessity on our part; and from this moment it ought to have been prosecuted with the utmost vigour. Thwarted and opposed as the Governor General was, the brilliant successes which have attended our arms will fully prove what our Government when united may be capable of.

That I might not break in upon the narrative of the Maratta war, I have passed over the other transactions of Government during that period. The



resolution to commence hostilities against the French, on the 7th of July, 1778, before any regular advices of a rupture had been received from England, reflects honour upon every member of the Supreme Council in proportion to the responsibility which each incurred by so spirited a measure. The celerity with which two ships of 40 guns each were fitted out, and joined Sir Edward Vernon before Pondicherry, arriving there against the monsoon, in less than two months from the day when they were ordered to be equipped, the plan formed for the defence of the river, when the destination of the Toulon fleet was unknown, the reinforcements ordered to be raised for the army, the disposition of our forces, and the assembly of the militia, are substantial proofs of the attention of the Governor General and Council to the preservation of the valuable empire committed to their charge, and the spirit which animated all ranks of men living under their Government.

Why the French missed so favourable an opportunity of attacking us on the Malabar coast we know not, but it would have been a very poor satisfaction to his country if Mr. Hastings had stopped the march of the army destined for the preservation of Bombay, at so critical a period, either on account of the expense attending it, or to add still more to the security of Bengal, already well secured, if that place had been attacked the following year. The majority of the supreme Council therefore determined at this time, that their army should advance; and the Governor General had the strongest and best founded

founded expectations of carrying the projected alliance with Moudajee Boohla into execution ; which was intended effectually to preclude the French nation from territorial possessions in every part of India.

The temporary agreement between the Governor General and Mr. Francis, and the extraordinary event it produced, are facts, the elucidation of which is disagreeable. Certain it is some agreement was made as to the conduct of the war, as certain that Mr. Hastings, as well before as in the meetings which he had with Mr. Francis, insisted, that as the whole responsibility of the war with the Marattas was, by Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheeler, thrown upon him, he should have the entire conduct of it, and as certain that the persons in Mr. Hastings's confidence understood that was agreed to.

The Governor General's plan for carrying on the war was confessedly the best that could have been proposed. The operations of a small army the last campaign had put us in possession of an extensive country, had considerably added to our military reputation ; and during the rains, that very season in which Mr. Francis contended nothing could be done, Major Popham took the important fortress of Gualier. By Mr. Francis's opposition to the Governor General's plan, our army, which was formed the last campaign, was distressed for pay, and continued inactive, when it might have moved with great effect : that army which must have so completely divided the forces and the attention of the Marattas, and made us successful in every quarter.

The plan which Mr. Hastings proposed for carrying on the Maratta war exactly corresponded with one drawn up by an excellent officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Upton, of whom Mr. Francis himself had the highest opinion. This gentleman had travelled to Poona by land, and his sentiments were certainly a strong confirmation of the propriety of the Governor General's propositions. The great expences of the war are doubtless to be lamented; but there are seasons when great expences are absolutely necessary; nor can a Government, like ours, hope to be secure, if in time of war we are contented to guard our frontier only. This we must do at a considerable expence, and with the loss of reputation; but by invading the dominions of our enemies, we have kept them at home, we have deprived them of resources for carrying on the war, we have infused such a degree of spirit into the native troops in our service, that they look upon themselves as invincible when headed by British officers; and the conquests which we have made would have amply repaid us for all our expences, had the invasion of the Carnatic not taken place.

The Governor General would have had no difficulty in extending the influence of the Company through all the countries now dependent upon the Marattas, if the native powers of India had had the same opinion of the continuance of his authority, as was universally entertained of his superior abilities and good fortune. But unfortunately, Mr. Hastings, notwithstanding his utmost efforts, could ne-  
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ver efface those ideas which had so generally been conceived from Benares to Dehly, and in the Decan, of his speedy removal from the Government of Bengal.

Before Sir Eyre Coote's arrival, it was universally given out by the friends of Mr. Francis, that he would undoubtedly take a decided part against Mr. Hastings. These declarations so often repeated, made a deep impression upon our allies, and were attended with very serious consequences. I will mention one that immediately occurs to me.

When our military establishment was considerably increased, in consequence of the war with France, Mr. Hastings thought it reasonable that Cheyt Sing, the Raja of Benares, and a vassal of the Company, should pay a proportion of an expence incurred for our common defence. This he fixed at five lacks of rupees per annum, and the Raja was with some difficulty prevailed upon to advance this sum, but he positively refused to continue the payment beyond the first year; and in this resolution he was confirmed by a knowledge of Mr. Francis's sentiments, who disapproved of any compulsion being used for the continuance of the payment. The intrigues of the Raja's Vackeel in Calcutta, previous to the General's arrival, were very well known; but as Sir Eyre Coote supported the authority of the Governor General, the Raja was obliged, not only to pay five lacks of rupees for another year, but in addition to it, the expences incurred by the march of two battalions to Benares, for the purpose of enforcing the payment,

payment, if he should continue obstinate. If the Rajah had not received the most positive assurances from his agent at Calcutta, that Mr. Francis was on the point of succeeding to the Government, he never would have reduced Mr. Hastings to the necessity of taking so violent a measure, for the support of his own authority and the Company's interests.

If the expectation of a change in Bengal had been productive of no effects more detrimental to the public service than the contemptible opposition of the Raja of Benares, it had been fortunate; but independent of the great relaxation of Government in our own provinces, which was, and always must be the consequence of it, such an expectation very essentially interfered with the only plan by which the Maratta war could be brought to a speedy and successful termination. The Rajas of Jaynagur, Naiva, Bundelcund, &c. were all, I can affirm from the best authority, eager to throw off their dependence upon the Marattas; the slightest assistance from us would have enabled them to do it. The successful operations of Major Popham's little army has very probably produced this effect, if a peace is not yet concluded.

Our political influence was extended immediately upon Mr. Hastings's accession to the chair. Every power in India has an agent in Calcutta; and these men regularly transmit to their principals the intelligence of the day. Influenced by the intelligence thus received, they have universally dreaded, and expected Mr. Hastings's removal, and have been  
deterred

deterred from taking part with so unsteady a Government.

Mr. Francis will excuse me for observing that he is responsible for the fatal consequence which followed, from the opinion of a change in the Government being so universal. The paragraphs of the general letters, from the direction which reflected most severely upon Mr. Hastings, were industriously circulated; Mr. Francis, in the most unreserved manner, expressed his certainty of succeeding him in a few months, nor could all the efforts of Mr. Middleton at Lucknow, or Mr. Graham at Benares, obviate the bad effects which such positive declarations produced throughout Indostan. I affirm, nothing can be so detrimental to the interests of the British nation in India, as a divided or unsettled administration in Bengal, and whatever system the Court of Directors may adopt in future, or whomsoever they may think proper to employ, they ought to give the ruling members every public support in their power. The hands of Government should be strengthened by every possible means. Prosperity attended the confidence which they placed in Mr. Hastings; and reverse of fortune, the diminution, or more properly the annihilation of his authority.

I now beg leave to offer a few remarks upon the state of our affairs in India.

Our situation is indeed so very alarming, that there are many men who will believe, and many more who will affect to believe them irretrievable; I must confess that it will require all the abilities, the integrity, and the firmness of the Governor General,  
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with every possible degree of support that can be given from home, to restore Bengal to its former prosperity ; but that Mr. Hastings will effect this, if he is treated with that confidence which his great and important services entitle him to expect, I have not the smallest doubt.

What was our situation in Bengal, when Mr. Hastings arrived there in 1772 ; and what is it at this time ? To bring this subject to one point of view, I must recapitulate what I have already observed. At the former period, the Company's debt at interest was above one hundred and twenty lacks. The Court of Directors the season before had been drawn upon for one hundred and twenty lacks. There was no prospect of providing future investments but by an increase of the bond debt, as our civil and military expences were barely defrayed by the annual revenues. In one year only what a change was effected. The alliance with Sujah Dowlah brought such an ample supply of treasure into Bengal, that every service was fully provided for, and the bond-debt reduced. Until this period, our foreign connections only served to accelerate the ruin of our provinces, by draining them of the little specie that remained in them.

No one good effect was experienced from our alliance with Sujah Dowlah, before Mr. Hastings's accession to the chair ; an entire brigade kept at Allahabad, which was paid by the exportation of silver from Bengal, was a ruin.

A very considerable sum was saved by the reduction of the stipends paid to the Nabob and his ministers.

Ministers. In this particular, where the interest of the Company was concerned, Mr. Hastings paid a pointed attention to the orders of the Court of Directors. At the season when the Supreme Council arrived, our investment was so considerably increased, that two extra ships, the *Anson* and the *Northumberland*, were sent home. The following year we obtained a clear additional revenue of twenty-four lacks from Benares, and the expence of at least a third of our army was defrayed by the Vizier. These beneficial advantages are the result of Mr. Hastings's treaty of 1773; a treaty which the majority of the Supreme Council decried in all its parts the first month of their arrival. China, Bombay, and Madras, have been supplied with treasure to a very considerable amount; and the annual investment from 1774 to 1779, was considerably above a million sterling each year. The bond-debt was entirely paid off, and a large balance of cash in our treasury. I had forgot to mention the erection of public granaries, by which the return of famine, which so depopulated that country, is totally prevented.

A series of events which I have already related brought on the Maratta war; a war in Europe obliged us to increase our military establishment very considerably, to provide a marine force, to reinforce Sir Edward Vernon, and for the defence of the river. These exertions were attended with additional expence, but they were absolutely necessary, and have been fully approved of at home. The French, contrary to their usual policy, missed the



fairest opportunity which they ever could have had to regain their influence in India. Why they were so remiss we know not ; but what would Mr. Hastings have deserved, had he taken no steps to counteract their intrigues at Poona, and in consequence of them, two regiments and a hundred French officers had landed at Choule. When our successes against the Marattas gave us every reason to expect an honourable peace, the Carnatic was invaded. This was a fresh demand upon Bengal for men, money, and provisions. The exertions of the Governor General and Sir Eyre Coote, have saved Fort St. George. After so many great drains from our treasury, after supporting an expensive war against the Marattas, and affording Bombay such effectual assistance in cash, provisions, and stores, after doubling our investment for many years, that debt which, when Mr. Hastings came to the chair, was above one hundred and twenty lacks, was, on the 15th of December last, only sixty-six lacks of current rupees, and we had eighty-eight lacks of goods in the Company's warehouses.

I have already stated my reasons for supposing that we are now at peace with the Marattas. An accommodation with Hyder Ally, or his entire overthrow, must soon follow. When these events have taken place, our military establishment may be considerably reduced ; the Presidency of Bombay must support its expences from the revenues arising from their late acquisitions. The Carnatic cannot recover itself for many years. Before its invasion, the country was almost ruined, and the Nabob either  
 wanted,

wanted, or pretended to want, money for his private expences.

The Government of Bengal must supply Bombay and Madras with cash, as it has constantly done, if their own resources are inadequate to their disbursements. And from the revenues of Bengal must the interest of their bond debts be paid. This I contend can easily be done, if some care is taken to prevent Bengal from being unnecessarily drained of its specie, and if foreign trade is properly encouraged. To effect these points, the Court of Directors must fix upon some equitable mode, by which the private fortunes of their servants can be remitted to England. At present they are under an absolute necessity either of sending their fortunes home in cash, which is ruinous to Bengal, or of lending their money to foreigners, by which means the Company's sales in England must be essentially injured.

If foreigners should once be under the necessity of bringing bullion to Bengal to purchase cargoes, such a flow of treasure to our exhausted provinces would amply compensate for a trifling diminution of the public sales in England; and if the Company's servants are restricted from lending money to foreigners, they must either bring bullion to Bengal, or relinquish the trade altogether. I can say, from my own knowledge, that it is from necessity, not choice, the Company's servants supply them with cash. But an equitable mode of remittance once fixed by the Directors, dismissal from the service should be the punishment of any man who should lend money to foreigners or to foreign companies.

Perhaps the Court of Directors do not know the extent to which this trade is carried on. Four Portuguese ships have sailed from Bengal this year. I came to Lisbon in one of them. Her cargo was valued at five lacks of rupees. The others were still more valuable. Some of these ships were taken up in India; the captains and owners borrowed as much money as they wanted to purchase both ships and cargoes, on the following terms:—The lenders to receive 12 per cent. interest, and two shillings for each current rupee at Lisbon, three months after the arrival of the ship. Prejudicial as this trade may appear to the Directors, it is not half so ruinous to Bengal as the remittance of fortunes in silver would be. The Dutch and Danish Companies, as well as individuals of both nations, have borrowed large sums last year, and the season preceding, upon the terms above mentioned.

The trade to Suez should, if possible, be again opened; it is advantageous to Bengal in every point of view, and can never interfere with the Company's sales in England. Mr. Hastings deserves the highest credit for his encouragement of this trade, and for his attempts to establish a regular communication with our native country by this route. We owe the early capture of Pondicherry entirely to it.

I own I depart from the line of my profession when I presume to hazard opinions upon commercial subjects; but as I have been fifteen years in Bengal, and have not been an unconcerned spectator of the various changes which have happened in that time,

I may

I may be excused for declaring my sentiments upon a subject of such importance.

Arts, agriculture, and commerce, have greatly increased since my first arrival in India. The riches of Bengal are its manufactures.<sup>1</sup> For them there will always be a market; and while we increase in population, we must increase our manufactures. Mr. Hastings, it must be recollected, succeeded to the Government at a most unfavourable period. The loss by the dreadful famine of 1770 has been estimated at four millions of people; and from my own observations in various parts of Bengal, I do not think this an exaggerated account.

However I may be mistaken when I speak of trade, I will venture to affirm, that our affairs in Bengal are much more alarming in appearance than in reality.

Let us suppose that by the time the war in India is at an end, and a general peace has been established in Europe, the bond debt in Bengal amounts to 200 lacks of rupees\*. This is not so large a sum as was in fact owing when Mr. Hastings came to the chair. The bond debt was then 120, and the Directors had been drawn upon for above 100 lacks of rupees only the season before. I hope it will be recollected that this great debt was contracted in times of the *most profound peace*; and the greatest part of it even before

\* I cannot avoid desiring the attention of the public to this part of my Narrative. It was written on my passage from Bengal to Lisbon in 1781. What I have ventured to foretel, has in a great measure happened — We have peace in India, and our bond debt in Bengal is 199 lacks.

the famine. Dreadful as was that calamity, its effects were more severely felt after Mr. Hastings's accession to the Government than at the time it happened. It is a fact that the collections in the year of the famine; and the year after, were higher than in either of the two preceding ones.

The interest of 200 lacks of rupees will be 16 lacks a year. All our establishments upon a peace will be considerably reduced; and if the Governor General is properly supported, the Government of Bengal will acquire a vigour, to the want of which, and not to the Maratta war, we owe our present misfortunes.

To pay the interest of this debt, let us examine our funds, and compare them with those of 1772. I will suppose the actual collections from Bengal, Bahar, and Orixá, to be only what they were at that period.

The savings under the different heads of tribute to the King, stipends to the Nabob, his ministers and dependants, are at least 50 lacks of rupees a year.

The Vizier pays 70 lacks of rupees annually towards our military expences.

We shall receive annually from Cheyt Sing, 24 lacks of rupees.

When our dominions and our influence, at least an influence advantageous to the Company, were bounded by the banks of the Carumnassa, our military expences were 105 lacks of rupees a year.

Our connection with Oude, now so profitable, was a most disadvantageous one before Mr. Hastings arrived in Bengal. To the Company it was ruinous, although

although it answered the interested purposes of certain individuals perfectly well.

Can one good reason be given for the very curious deputation to Sujah Dowlah in 1768, against the opinion of Mr. Verelst, at that time the Governor of Bengal? or for keeping the third brigade at Allahabad until the middle of the year 1769, at the Company's expence?

The transactions of that period are worthy the public attention — I may enlarge upon them hereafter.

At a peace our military expences can and will be reduced to 110 lacks of rupees a year.

The interest of our debt, supposing it 200 lacks, will be 16 lacks a year.

When Mr. Hastings came to the Government, the Company owed something more than 120 lacks.

Upon comparing the accounts of 1771, and they are applicable to a former period, with those at a so-much-wished-for peace, the balance will be 133 lacks a year in favour of the Company, as appears by the following statement:

#### EXPENCES in 1771.

	Rupees.
Military, — — — — —	105
Interest of bond debt, — — —	10
Paid in tribute, stipends, &c. but retrenched } by Mr. Hastings, — — — }	50
Total — —	165

EXPENCES

EXPENCES at a P E A C E.

					Rupees.
Military,	—	—	—	—	110
Interest of debt,	—	—	—	—	16
					<hr/>
Total	—				126
					<hr/>

Credit in favour of the Company.

Difference of disbursements,	—	—	—	39
Paid by the Vizier,	—	—	—	70
By the Raja of Benares,	—	—	—	24
				<hr/>
Total,	—			133
				<hr/>

While arts, manufactures, and commerce, are encouraged in Bengal; while the natives continue happy under our Government, and attached to it as the great body of the people are; while population increases, as it has done the last seven years, Bengal must be a most valuable country to Great Britain; but it can only yield its tribute by the increase of the annual investment.

Mr. Hastings has been very severely charged with disobedience of orders—Upon this subject I must add a few words. I do not mean to justify the Governor General's conduct by pleading precedent for it, yet I am reduced to the disagreeable necessity of contrasting it with the conduct of his predecessors in power in Bengal.

I affirm

I affirm that it had long been reported, Mr. Hastings was to be dismissed the service, that Mr. Francis was to succeed him; and the reinstatement of Messrs. Bristow, Fowke, and Mahomed Reza Cawn, were connected with Mr. Francis's accession to the Government. This report, circulated for months throughout Indostan, obliged Mr. Hastings to adopt measures which were by no means agreeable to the natural humanity of his temper, or to that regard to the just claims of individuals which he is known to possess. He assigned his reasons to the Directors for keeping them out of office, and if they were not approved, he of course expected to be dismissed from the service. To those who served in India I appeal, whether it is not absolutely necessary to strengthen the hands of Government by every possible means, and to impress the natives with an idea of its stability; That the reinstatement of Mr. Bristow, Mr. Fowke, and Mahomed Reza Cawn, would have had a contrary effect is universally known.

When General Richard Smith was Commander in Chief of the Company's forces in Bengal, and third member of the Secret Committee and the Council, he wrote the following letter to the Secret Committee, 24th November 1767, and forced Mr. Verelst to do an act of greater severity than Mr. Hastings was ever guilty of in the whole course of his political life. I must affirm here, that the East-India Company was saddled with the expence of an establishment of a Supreme Court of Judicature, in consequence of the discussions which this famous letter produced.



“ The nature of the intelligence transmitted from  
 “ Calcutta to Sujah Dowlah is without limits. The  
 “ Nabob is almost as well acquainted with the Par-  
 “ liamentary proceedings as I am ; how far the im-  
 “ portance and dignity of the Company, and the  
 “ weight and influence of administration is lessened  
 “ in his esteem by such communication, may be easily  
 “ conceived. Whilst a Vackerl is so ready and so  
 “ sure a channel to communicate intelligence, few  
 “ men will be found so hardy as to maintain a direct  
 “ correspondence with the Nabob ; but there is a  
 “ man who has obliquely offered so great an insult  
 “ to *our President*, that was I present at the Board, I  
 “ would move for the exertion of our authority to  
 “ its utmost extent to free the settlement from so  
 “ dangerous an inhabitant, I mean Mr. Bolts ; and  
 “ the inclosed copy of a letter to Mr. Zentil, where  
 “ he asserts an absolute falsehood, which tends to  
 “ lessen *that essential dignity and necessary influence of*  
 “ *our President*, is surely deserving of your severest  
 “ resentment.”

I approve highly of General Richard Smith's arguments ; if he had known how *the essential dignity and necessary influence of Mr. Hastings*, would have been affected by carrying the Director's orders into execution respecting Mr. Bristow, he would upon his own principles have concurred in the disobedience of them, had he been a member of the Supreme Council in December, 1779.

Three poor Armenians, the trading agents of Mr. Bolts, a keen trader himself, who perhaps wanted  
 to

to come in for some share of the plunder of Oude and Benares, were afterwards seized, and treated with too much rigour. Most men in Bengal attributed General Smith's conduct to private motives. It is strictly justifiable upon public grounds; however I must add in this place, and I can prove it, that our connection with Sujah Dowlah at that time was ruinous to the East-India Company, in as great a degree as it was advantageous to a few individuals in power.

The Directors' most positive orders have been repeatedly disobeyed or evaded during my residence in Bengal. Two very particular instances I will now mention.

As soon as the Court of Directors were informed of the salt monopoly of 1765, they sent positive orders to Bengal to abolish it immediately on the receipt of their letter. In defiance of this order, the monopoly was continued almost two years longer, and the profits arising from it were divided amongst the members of the Council, General Richard Smith (Commander in Chief at that time) and the principal civil and military servants in Bengal.

The Directors had positively prohibited their servants in Bengal from drawing upon them except for a certain amount, and a rate of exchange much more favourable than the present. Yet by a resolution of the Council, in October, 1769, bills were drawn upon them at a very unfavourable exchange for the Company, to the amount of one million and sixty thousand pounds sterling. I affirm that three-

fourths of the money paid into the treasury in Calcutta might have been borrowed upon bond until the Directors' pleasure was known.

Let these instances of disobedience be compared with the charges brought against Mr. Hastings.

I will here quote General Richard Smith's sentiments upon the subject of disobedience of orders.

In his minute of the 25th of September, 1769, when he proposed opening the Company's treasury, and to grant bills upon the Directors, he says, " Although the Court of Directors' orders are strong  
" in prohibition, yet I think we shall be *fully warranted* to deviate from those orders, and I do not  
" think I should perform my duty to the Company  
" as a member of their administration, if I did not  
" enter this my opinion upon the public records."

Upon another occasion, 24th November, 1767, General Richard Smith writes to the Secret Committee, whose orders he was bound to obey in the same degree as Mr. Hastings is those of the Directors. " My zeal for the welfare of the state I serve  
" would, on occasions of great emergency, induce  
" me not only to hazard my commission, but even  
" subject my life and honour to the sentence of a  
" general court-martial, rather than the *public service*  
" should suffer by delay. Whenever I act *contrary*  
" to their orders, it is not that I entertain the most  
" distant idea of disobedience or *independence*, but  
" from a conviction that *at this distance from the Presidency, their orders and the welfare of the state may*  
" happen, they have happened, to be incompatible; and  
" whenever

*“ whenever I take upon me to deviate from their orders,  
 “ it is not from independent authority I presume, because  
 “ I know I am totally responsible to them for such a  
 “ deviation.”*

This is the language of a sensible man. It is manly language. It is the language of Mr. Hastings; but in the Governor General's case, the arguments operate with ten-fold force, when we consider the situations of Mr. Hastings and General Richard Smith; the former could only receive answers from *his superiors* in fifteen or eighteen months, the latter in as many days.

I will now mention a few essential points in which Mr. Hastings pointedly obeyed the orders of the Directors. He employed Nundcomar by their orders.

He reduced the Nabob's stipend from thirty-two to sixteen lacks of rupees. He abolished nominal pensions to a large amount. He suspended Mahomed Reza Cawn from his office; he brought him to a trial before the Council for his former conduct; and to the justice, the impartiality, and the attention of Mr. Hastings, Mahomed Reza Cawn has always declared, he was indebted for his life, which the valour of Nundcomar would have deprived him of. In November, 1773, Mr. Hastings received the thanks of the Directors for his great attention to their orders, and for his other eminent services.

Soon after the majority of the Supreme Council arrived in Bengal, they asserted that Mr. Hastings had made 40 lacks of rupees, or 400,000*l.* from the  
 revenues

revenues of Bengal, in less than three years. The despicable character of the man on whose information this declaration was grounded, the well-known moderation of Mr. Hastings, his active and vigorous administration, the state of his private fortune at that time, or at present, which any man may know that chooses to inquire, are solid proofs of the falsity and the folly of this assertion. Are the great servants of the Company who preceded Mr. Hastings in high stations, although not in the chair, willing to put their integrity to this test; will they declare the amount of their private fortunes?

I do affirm, that if public and repeatedly asserted declarations have any weight, the amount of the private fortunes of three gentlemen, of high station, who left Bengal in the course of the year 1769, or in January 1770, equalled the amount of all the private fortunes that have been accumulated during Mr. Hastings's government of ten years, from the revenues of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa, by the civil and military servants of the Company.

. If we were to judge from vague reports, what character could be sheltered from calumny. I can recollect perfectly well, that in the year 1768 and 1769, it was universally said in Bengal, that a mint was established at Allahabad; that the good rupees, which were so absurdly sent from Bengal and Bahar to that place, were all recoined into base rupees, called Vizieri; that our troops sustained a very heavy loss by being obliged to receive their pay in this base money. That twenty-six lacks of sicca rupees were  
annually

annually sent from Bengal, for the payment of the King's tribute, but that his Majesty actually received it in viziery rupees; and that a very considerable share of the profits arising from this coinage, which was said to be unauthorized by the Governor and Council, centered in the Commander in Chief, General Richard Smith. It does not, however, follow, that this was the fact. I have been long enough in India to know, that men who are deprived of the opportunity of making money themselves, are very apt to exaggerate when they state the advantages of their superiors. It is very possible to investigate this matter thoroughly; and I must observe, that Mr. Hastings has been accused of peculation upon much more slender ground.

Upon the subject of presents received, which was one of the modes by which Mr. Hastings was accused of having made the enormous sum of 400,000*l*. I shall make but one observation:—That, upon a reference to the Governor General's Durbar charges, it will be found he has brought to the Company's credit the sums which he received, and has drawn the amount of the presents he made from the Treasury. This rule was observed, I believe, by his predecessors. In the Consultations of the 8th of December, 1769, and since printed in the Reports of the Secret Committee of 1773, I find, that General Richard Smith made the Mogul, Shaw Allum, a present to the amount of 2000*l*. sterling, *when his Majesty honoured him with a visit* to Sujah Dowlah, Bulwant Sing, and a string of et ceteras. Presents,  
for

for which he received from the Company one lack twenty-four thousand six hunderd and six Souaut rupees, or 16,000l. sterling. I do not see the presents which he received in return, brought to account; but if the invariable custom and usage of the country at that time to men of high rank and station was dispensed with, out of delicacy to his feelings, and he received no presents from the King, Sujah Dowlah, &c. his liberality was a very unnecessary waste of the public money.

The execution of Nundcomar has been again brought forward. The ingenious *English* writer of *A Letter from Calcutta* has, without any foundation, quoted the most respectable authority for calling his death a murder. My observations upon it will be very short.

Nundcomar was employed by Mr. Hastings, on his first arrival in Bengal, at the express desire of the Court of Directors. Mr. Hastings's choice of the man excited very general surprise, as the cause was not known. Nundcomar's villany was detected in the affair of Mahomed Reza Cawn, and Mr. Hastings ceased to employ him. On the arrival of the Supreme Council he gave in the curious information which I have already mentioned. It is remarkable, that when Lord Clive and the Secret Committee of 1765, were invested with all inquisitorial powers, Nundcomar gave in an information against Mr. John Johnston and other servants of the Company, similar to that which he afterwards gave in against Mr. Hastings, and upon a full enquiry, the information  
was

was found to be void of the smallest foundation. Mr. Hastings commenced a prosecution against him. The majority, and Mr. Joseph Fowke, visited him in confinement; an attention which, of course, attracted the notice of every man in Indostan, and induced Nundcomar to suppose that he should be protected at all events by the Supreme Council.

I now come to the forgery. In 1762, a Gentoo was condemned to be hanged for this crime. The sentence was repited; and his Majesty was pleased to pardon the criminal; but I believe it was understood that the royal mercy would never again be extended to a similar offender. Be that as it may, Nudcomar, when he committed a forgery many years after this period, accompanied with the most aggravating circumstances, well knew the consequence if he should be detected. A lawyer, in 1772, was said, and truly; I believe, to have received ten thousand rupees for suppressing his knowledge of the affair. Nundcomar was well acquainted with the nature of our laws. He had had a hundred causes before the Mayor's Court at different times. Before his prosecutor complained, he offered to settle the affair for fifty thousand rupees. He repeated the offer after Nundcomar was in jail. Was Nundcomar's refusal supposed to be the result of conscious innocence? Was there a man in Bengal questioned the fairness of his trial, or the characters of the jurymen who found him guilty? Was he not universally deemed the most unprincipled of all the intriguing natives of Bengal? I am not an advocate for the judges, but as a most illiberal and unjust



motive has been assigned for their conduct, and their desire to screen Mr. Hastings from the effects of his information, I must assert, and I do it in the most solemn manner, that Mr. Hastings was not concerned, either directly or indirectly, in the apprehension, the trial, or the execution, of Nundcomar.

The judges might have respited the execution of the sentence; I wish with all my heart they had; but something may be urged in their favour upon this head. It was the first grand cause that came before them. I was at Berhampore, about 100 miles from Calcutta, at the time of Nundcomar's trial and execution. It was the common subject of conversation amongst men of all ranks. I have heard the sentiments of several natives, then, and since upon it. At the time, they very generally observed, that Nundcomar, though he was undoubtedly guilty, was too rich a man to be hanged; and since his death, it was said, he depended upon the interference of the Supreme Council, or he would have compromised the affair before his trial. Might not the judges be supposed to have acted as they did, from a desire to impress the natives with an idea of the justice and the impartiality of the Supreme Court? Would not the same set of men, who think Mr. Hastings capable of so villanous an action as influencing the judges of the Supreme Court of Judicature, or those judges of being influenced upon such an occasion; would they not have concluded that Nundcomar, if his execution had been respited, had obtained that favour by improper means?

In

In this review of the transactions in Bengal, I have avoided as much as possible every expression which may be supposed to convey a personal reflection. It is from necessity, not from inclination, that I have been obliged to contrast his conduct with any man's. However strong the provocation may have been, Mr. Hastings has upon all occasions attended solely to his own justification. It has been the fate of the Governor General, whose liberality of sentiment can only be equalled by his moderation, or rather by his contempt of money, to be engaged in a perpetual course of party contention. No man could less merit such a fate. With integrity that has defended him against the most tempting offers of private advantage, with abilities and application that have surmounted greatest difficulties, he has been reduced to the painful necessity of defending himself from the extraordinary charges of private rapacity, and a want of zeal for the interest of his employers. To the first I shall only observe, that he has now been almost ten years at the head of the administration in Bengal, a period much more than sufficient to answer the private views of any man, if to accumulate money was his object. To the last, I shall oppose the very flourishing state in which the Supreme Council found Bengal, and in which it continued, until foreign wars, and what is still worse, a continued opposition to the Governor General, exhausted our treasury, and diminished or almost annihilated the necessary power of Government.

## P O S T S C R I P T.

**T**HE arrival of the Belmont enables me to carry on this review to the 31st of May last.

The Nizam remained inactive. In the latter end of April he expressed his wishes to join us in an alliance against Hyder Ally Cawn. On this account Mr. Holland remained at Hyderabad, although he had intended to quit it on account of his health. The Nizam's conduct is politic. Hyder aspired to the subaship of the Decan, and had applied to the King for sunnuds, through Nuzeph Cawn.

The engagement with the Rajah of Berar promises to be followed with the most important and beneficial effects. Colonel Pearse, in his march through Cuttac, received every assistance he stood in need of from the Naib of that province, and his camp was amply supplied with provisions. It is supposed he would be joined at Ellore by 2000 of the Berar horse; the remainder of that army was on its return to Naigpoore, except that part of it which was to act in conjunction with our forces against Guramundesa. It is impossible to detail the negotiation which brought on this agreement, but it reflects great honour upon Mr. Hastings, Mr. Wheeler, who entirely concurred in opinion with him, and Mr. Anderson, through whose agency it was concluded. No chour, as has been represented,  
was

was either given or promised, and our superiority appeared through the whole course of the negotiation.\*

On the same day, the 2d of April, an agreement was signed between the ambassador of the Nabob of Arcot, and the Supreme Council on the part of the Company. By this agreement, the whole revenues of the Carnatic are appropriated for the services of the war. Credit being given to the Nabob's creditors for the actual collections from those districts which had been previously assigned to them. The utility of this agreement will forcibly strike every impartial person.

Lieutenant-colonel Camac's night attack on the camp of Madjee Sindia, was attended with very favourable consequences. Many of the chiefs who were compelled to join him, had come over to us; and an overture for a pacification had secretly been made by Sindia himself. His army was dispersed, except about 7000 horse under Ambajee Punt, which were surprised and totally defeated by Captain Bruce, the officer who had so great a share in taking the fortrefs of Gualier. These successes and the alliance with Moodajee Boosla gave us the fairest hopes of a speedy accommodation with the Marattas, and their junction with us against Hyder Ally Cawn; events

\* Many severe strictures have been passed upon Mr. Hastings for this agreement. but the men best acquainted with Indian affairs, who have no interest in traducing his character, give him great credit for breaking the grand confederacy formed against us, and securing Colonel Pearse's march, at the trifling expence of sixteen lacks of rupees.

which

which Mr. Hastings most anxiously wishes to accomplish.

Provincial courts of justice had been established, agreeably to the Governor General's plan, and a controul vested in the chief justice. The Company and the natives, after six months experience, have sensibly felt the good effects of this regulation. To the former it is a very considerable saving; to the latter it has insured an impartial, and not an expensive distribution of justice.

The former mode of collecting the revenues has been abolished. An increase of 39 lacks or 390,000*l.* is expected from this regulation, which is Mr. Hastings's plan, formed in 1773, and the propriety of it confirmed by eight years experience of the former defective system.\*

The revenue from salt will be 30 lacks of rupees or 300,000*l.* sterling this year.† The gentleman Mr. Hastings has placed at the head of this business, whose abilities and integrity have never been exceeded in Bengal, has made this declaration, and the authority is incontestible; so that the additional resources from the revenues of Bengal may fairly be estimated for this year at 690,000*l.*

The cargo of the Belmont is valued at 16½ lacks, or 165,000*l.* prime cost; the Neptune, which was obliged to return to Bengal, had 14½ lacks, or 145,000*l.* on board; and there remained in the Company's warehouses in Bengal, goods to the amount of 59 lacks, or 590,000*l.*

\* The latest advices confirm the truth of this estimate.

† Increased to 370,000*l.* in 1782.

The investment for 1781-2 is fixed at 90 lacks, or 900,000l. and was providing when the Belmont failed ; so that for the ships of this season there will be goods to the amount of 1,600,000l. in Bengal.

The Company's dispatches by the Belmont will prove what exertions the government of Bengal is capable of when unanimity reigns in its councils.

On the 6th of July, Sir Eyre Coote gained a decisive victory over the army of Hyder Ally Cawn, and in the following month he was joined by the Bengal detachment, under the command of Colonel Pearse.

### C O N T I N U A T I O N .

The campaign of 1781, upon the coast of Coromandel was uniformly successful on our part. Hyder Ally was defeated by Sir Eyre Coote in August and September, the important fortress of Negapatnam was taken in November, and Trincomale in the following month. It is no part of my present plan to enter into a particular detail of the operations of our army in the Carnatic. — Sir Eyre Coote received in the course of the campaign the most ample supplies of money and provisions from Bengal, and he attributed his success, in a great measure, to the unwearied exertions of the Governor General and Council, for the support of the Presidency of Fort St. George, and the army under his command.

In the month of April 1781, Mr. Hastings carried into effect a plan which he had projected some time before, for collecting the revenues of Bengal and Bahar. The interference of Europeans in the interior parts of Bengal, and the various abuses heretofore

tofore alledged to have been committed by natives in the service of English gentlemen were effectually prevented. Every encouragement was held out to the Zemindars and farmers to induce them to attend to the cultivation and improvement of their several Zemindaries and farms; and a deduction was allowed to such of them as should pay their rents at Calcutta, (the Sudder.) The plan itself is in fact merely reverting to the system of collecting the revenues as established and practised when the Mogul empire was in its vigour. The three great points which Mr. Hastings had in view, have been most completely answered by the new system. — First, The ease and happiness of the native landholders and farmers: — Second, A retrenchment in the expence of collecting the revenues: — And third, An increase in the amount collected. The actual receipts for the year 1781 exceeded the receipts of the preceding year in the sum of three hundred thousand pounds.\* Another very considerable branch of the Company's revenue in Bengal, was increased by Mr. Hastings to the sum of five hundred and seventy thousand

\* The Select Committee made a report upon this plan in the month of May 1782, before it was possible that its effects could be known. It is something singular that they should condemn Mr. Hastings in the report alluded to, for taking the collections from Europeans, and putting them into the hands of the natives, but in the celebrated Ninth Report of the Select Committee, published the following year, the Government of Bengal is blamed for depriving the natives of every office of honour and emolument, which are stated to be vested in the hands of Europeans.

pounds, and in his opinion is capable of still farther improvement. In order to make this part of my narrative perfectly intelligible, I will state the different alterations which have taken place in the management of the salt revenue. It has been proved by incontrovertible evidence on a former occasion, that the manufacture of salt has invariably been a monopoly, either for the advantage of the state, or for that of individuals. This was the case long before the English possessed power in Bengal. Lord Clive established the monopoly for the benefit of the Company's servants, reserving a duty to the Company producing about one hundred and twenty thousand pounds a year. This scheme was disapproved of in England, and perhaps with reason. The trade in salt was ordered to be laid open, and a trifling duty to be collected upon it. The consequence of this scheme was, that this trade fell into the hands of wealthy individuals, and the duties fell considerably short of the moderate sum the Court of Directors had ordered to be collected. When Mr. Hastings succeeded to the government, he proposed, and it was determined to secure the manufacture of salt for the use of the Company. The scheme answered in some degree ; but after the establishment of the Supreme Council and the unfortunate dissensions which divided the Members, this branch of the revenue had dwindled to a mere trifle.

In 1780 Mr. Hastings brought forward a scheme for managing the salt revenue, which was adopted at his separate responsibility, and it has answered most



completely. It is a well known fact, that the natives do not pay more for the salt they eat now, than they did in former years, and prohibiting the importation of foreign salt into Bengal, is universally allowed to be a salutary and a wise regulation ; and to this too, in some degree, it is owing that the revenue upon salt has been so exceedingly productive in the two last years. When the importation of salt was permitted, it occasioned a considerable drain of specie from Bengal. The most accurate and authentic accounts that I have been able to procure of the returns made from Bengal by the importers of foreign salt are, that every native merchant bringing foreign salt to Calcutta, expended a fourth part of the produce of his cargo in coarse piece goods, and that the remaining three parts were actually carried from Bengal in specie \*. As it is certain the Company may manufacture salt to a much greater extent than they now do, if there was an encreased demand for it, it was surely a politic and a wise measure to prohibit the importation of salt from the Maratta countries, or the Northern Circars. Many People, uninformed upon this subject, may suppose that the monopoly of salt is carried to a much greater length than it really is ; but it is a monopoly only in the first instance, for the monopoly of the salt is limited to the manufacture, and the native merchants, who purchase it from the Company on the spot where it is manufactured, may dispose of it as they please

\* This drain may be fairly computed at ten lacks of rupees a year.

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throughout the provinces, without being subject to any exactions whatever. The present plan differs most essentially from that established by Lord Clive. There are no European agents dispersed through the interior parts of Bengal, to dispose of salt, either on the Company's account or for the benefit of individuals. The operation is simple and easy. The advantage arises to the Company from the sale of the salt in the first instance, they do not interfere with the fair commercial profit of the merchant, who buys it from them; and it is undoubtedly true, that although the Company clears five hundred and seventy thousand pounds by the plan, the mechanic and husbandman pays no more now for the salt he consumes than he did in former years. The revenues of Bengal were increased *above one million sterling* in the year 1782, from this source; the new mode of collecting the revenues, and the reduction in the first cost of the investment.

Another branch of revenue, for which the Company is indebted to Mr. Hastings, arises from the monopoly of opium; and this revenue will be considerably increased in consequence of the late treaty with Holland, which secures to us a free trade to the eastward of Bengal. Opium has always been a monopoly in the first instance; that is, a considerable sum of money must be advanced to the cultivator of the land which produces the poppy; and it requires, on the part of the person who makes the advances, the utmost attention, to prevent the opium being debased before it is packed up for sale. When the country government was in its vigour,

opium was a monopoly in the hands of some one of the most capital native merchants, whose interest it was to send it good and unadulterated to the sea ports of Bengal, for the foreign markets. It often happened, that the monopolist warranted it not only good, but that it should keep for a certain time, under this sanction the trade was carried on formerly, and produced rich returns in gold, and other articles of merchandize, into Bengal.

When the English acquired possession of the Duannee, the trade in opium was nominally laid open, though in fact the monopoly was, in a great measure, confined to our factory at Patna. The opium, however, was much debated from 1765 to 1773, and the trade considerably diminished in consequence. In 1772, when Mr. Hastings came to the government of Bengal, he secured a proportion of this trade for the Company. In 1773, the monopoly was taken into the Company's hands, and became a branch of their revenues. In 1775, it was debated by the Supreme Council, whether the trade should be laid open or not ? General Clavering concurred in opinion with Mr. Hastings, that the manufacture of opium must be, what it ever had been, a monopoly.\* All British subjects and natives were invited  
to

\* The reflection of the Select Committee on this declaration of General Clavering, is unfounded and unjust. They say it shews the General's opinion of the wretched state of the country. By no means. It was to prevent adulteration, and the loss of a valuable branch of export trade that opium had been a monopoly under the native Subadars;

to send in proposals for furnishing the Company with opium ; and Mr. Richard Griffith, whose terms were the lowest, obtained the contract. Mr. Mackenzie succeeded Mr. Griffith in 1777, and held the contract till 1781, on terms something more favourable for the Company than the former gentleman had agreed to ; and upon the same terms that it had been granted to Mr. Mackenzie in 1777, it was granted to Mr. Sullivan in 1781. This is the plain and simple state of a transaction which has been most shamefully and indecently misrepresented. The Supreme Council, who had every means of information before them, determined, in 1775, that opium must be a monopoly as it always had been ; Mr. Francis thought very properly, that it would be impolitic to give this contract on too low terms, because it was liable to abuses ; and on the equitable terms settled by Mr. Hastings, General Clavering, Colonel Monson, Mr. Barwell, and Mr. Francis, has it continued from 1775 to the present time. It produces to the Company about eighty thousand pounds a year, and will certainly be much more productive, as the demand for opium will increase considerably, which

Subadars ; and it would not have been in the power of any government whatever to have prevented adulteration, had the monopoly been abolished. The opium of Ghauzipore being manufactured with less care than the Patna opium, fetches an inferior price in all foreign markets. It is the duty of Government to see that the cultivator of the poppy gets a fair and equitable price for his labour ; and this was a sound argument urged by Mr. Francis against vesting the contract in the hands of the Company's servants at Patna, who were the proper checks upon the contractor.

must

must of course increase the price of it. I know of no monopolies in Bengal but those of salt and opium; if they are abolished, the Company will lose a revenue of seven hundred thousand pounds a year, which in all probability is by this time increased to a million; and I defy any man living to assign a single reason for the abolition of these monopolies, or to prove that salt and opium can be manufactured, except by the Company, or by individuals who are able to make very large advances of cash to the manufacturers, and who consequently will divide that profit amongst themselves, which is now secured to the Company, and makes a very considerable branch of their revenues.\*

In the month of July 1781, Mr. Hastings left Calcutta; in order to visit the dominions of the Nabob Vizier of Oude. The insurrection at Benares,

\* I will suppose for a moment, that the ungenerous and the unworthy modes practised by the enemies of Mr. Hastings to decry his character, were retorted by him upon his opponents, what would then be his reflections, or the reflections of his friends, upon the following transaction, I leave the world to guess. When the trade in opium was nominally laid open, it was undoubtedly a monopoly in the hands of the *Chief and Council* of Patna. In the month of July, 1782, when Mr. Robert Gregory was chairman of the Court of Directors, a letter was written by the Court to the Governor General and Council, in which they expressed their displeasure at their conduct, in granting the opium contract to Mr. Sullivan; they expressed their wishes that that, and all other monopolies, might be abolished, and they directed, that Mr. Robert Gregory's son should succeed to the *Chiefship of Patna*, though he was a younger servant than any one of the gentlemen who composed the Council at that place.

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seems now so generally understood, that I shall say very little upon the subject. But I desire to submit the following striking facts to the consideration of the public:

1st, That Bulwant Sing, the father of Cheyt Sing, had behaved so treacherously to us in the war with Sujah Dowlah, that the Governor and Council ordered him to be dispossessed of the Zemindary of Benares in 1765, though it was afterwards judged prudent to continue him in the management of that country.

2d, That no instance has ever yet been produced of services rendered to our nation by Bulwant Sing.

3d, That Lord Clive protected him from the vengeance of Sujah Dowlah, and secured to him a degree of independence which he never before possessed.

4th, That upon the death of Bulwant Sing, Cheyt Sing, his son, by a woman of a very low cast, was continued in the Zemindary, through our influence with the Vizier, although by Colonel Harper's account it appears, that Mehipnarain, the present Zemindar, ought by the Hindoo laws to have succeeded Bulwant Sing.

5th, That Mr. Hastings in 1773, procured from the Vizier a confirmation of Cheyt Sing and his posterity in the Zemindary of Benares, of which Bulwant Sing had only been the aumli, or collector.

6th, That

6th, That by the treaty of Lucknow, concluded in 1775, the *sovereignty* of Benares and Ghauzipore, with all the *powers and rights* annexed to it, was transferred from the Vizier to the East-India Company.

7th, That the Supreme Council yielded to Cheyt Sing the Cutwallie and the Mint, and treated him with the utmost indulgence, and stipulated that no demands should be made upon him on account of his annual revenue beyond the sum stipulated.

8th, That when the war with France broke out, Cheyt Sing was called upon to contribute his proportion to the additional expence which the Company, *his Sovereign*, would incur. That he was ordered to maintain three battalions of Sepoys, and the expence fixed at five lacks of rupees a year.

9th, That the propriety of this demand was debated in the Supreme Council, and that Mr. Hastings insisted upon it we had never yielded to Cheyt Sing *that right, which every government inherently possesses, to compel all its dependencies to contribute by extraordinary supplies, to the relief of extraordinary emergencies.*

10th, That Colonel Harper has proved it to have been the custom of the Zemindar of Benares, to furnish his *quota of troops* to *his Sovereign*, when he was at war. That he gave this in evidence to the Select Committee in 1781, long after it was known in England, that the Supreme Council, as represented in *the Sovereign*, had compelled Cheyt Sing, by  
military

military force, to furnish his *quota* of troops during the war.

11th, That in 1779, and 1780, the Supreme Council compelled Cheyt Sing to pay five lacks each year—that the attention of the Court of Directors and his Majesty's Ministers was particularly called to the subject, because it was mentioned in the general letters of three successive years, but that no mark of disapprobation whatever was expressed, either by his Majesty's Ministers, or the Court of Directors.

12th, That when Sir Eyre Coote was on the point of embarking for the coast, in October 1780, when it was uncertain whether or not Bengal would be invaded by the Marattas, and every exertion on our part was necessary, to preserve the sinking interests of the Company, he laid before the Supreme Council, his plan for covering Bengal and its dependencies from the expected attack of our enemies.

13th, That for the general defence, he proposed Cheyt Sing's cavalry should in this critical hour be put under our orders, to which the Board unanimously agreed.

14th, That Cheyt Sing evaded this demand after promising compliance, precisely in the same manner as he had evaded the payment of the money, after positively promising to pay it.

15th, That Cheyt Sing never disputed the right of his Sovereign to demand military aid from him, but that he sheltered himself under the plea of poverty, which was notoriously untrue.

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16th, That



16th, That the disaffection of Cheyt Sing was apparent to every gentleman who passed through Benares and Ghauzipore for two years before his revolt. That the insolence of his people was a perpetual source of complaint, and that Mr. Fowke, when resident, professed his inability to procure redress from Cheyt Sing, for injuries offered by his men to English gentlemen passing through the country to Oude.

17th, That Cheyt Sing had laid in a very great supply of military stores of all kinds; that he kept up a communication with the different discontented Zemindars of Bahar and Oude, and had determined to throw off his allegiance to the Company, on the first favourable opportunity.

18th, That Mr. Hastings never did communicate to Cheyt Sing his design of fining him forty or fifty lacks of rupees. That the answer returned by Cheyt Sing to the Governor General's letter, was insolent and unsatisfactory, and will be pronounced so by every man conversant in the Persian language.

19th, That Mr. Hastings, by securing the person of the Raja, acted in perfect conformity to the customs of Indostan, and that every thing which subsequently happened, is chiefly imputable to the inhuman massacres of our troops.

20th, That Cheyt Sing was a weak, headstrong, and violent young man. That he kept very low company, was addicted to liquor and those pleasures in which the most abandoned people of Indostan  
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only indulge themselves, and to dissipation of every kind. That he was not esteemed by the reputable inhabitants of Benares, and was undoubtedly both avaricious and rapacious.

21st, That the very great additional ease and security which he enjoyed as the subject of the East India Company, from what he or his father had known under Sujah Dowlah, instead of inspiring him with sentiments of gratitude, induced him to wish to throw off his dependence altogether, and in this he was undoubtedly encouraged by the means of vulgar men, who were his constant companions.

I believe the facts which I have stated will be very generally admitted, and I certainly mean to appeal to the knowledge of gentlemen of all descriptions, who have been of late years either in Oude or Benares, whether what I have said of Cheyt Sing, is not agreeable to the generally received opinion of his character in those countries. The other facts can be proved from the records at the India House.

A few days after Mr. Hastings retreated from Benares to Chanar, he was joined by the Vizier, and to the unmeaning declamation which I have heard of late, I shall merely reply, that if the Vizier had felt the British influence so exceedingly distressing and even intolerable, he had the fairest opportunity in the world of emancipating himself from it for ever, and at least of totally annihilating our power in Oude. He might have joined Cheyt Sing, and our destruction would have been almost inevitable.

So far, however, from doing this, he performed the most essential services, and after concluding a new treaty with the Governor General, he returned to Lucknow, perfectly satisfied with the interview. The rebellion of Cheyt Sing was effectually quelled in the month of October, and Mr. Hastings remained at Chanar with a view of settling with the Vizier's Minister the disordered state of the government of Oude. A plain relation of the events which reduced the dominion of the Vizier to the distress from which they are now recovered, will effectually clear Mr. Hastings from the charge of being the author of those distresses.

When Sujah Dowlah died, in February 1775, the Majority of the Supreme Council determined, contrary to the opinion of Mr. Hastings, that we should enter into a new treaty with his successor, which was concluded the following May. By this treaty, the Vizier, in a great measure, forfeited his independence. He ceded Benares to the English, and he agreed to an increase of subsidy for their troops stationed in his country. Mr. Hastings, at the time, acknowledged the importance of these advantages to the East India Company, but foretold, that in their consequences they would reduce the Vizier to a state of distress and insignificance. In the month of December following, the Vizier applied for British officers to command his troops. These were sent by the Supreme Council, and various appointments to offices in Oude were made in the course of the next year, by the Supreme Council, so that in fact, the govern-

government of Oude, may with some propriety, be said to have been conducted by the English Gentlemen, from the time the British officers were dispersed through his country, and a civil establishment fixed at his capital. In July 1777, Mr. Hastings regulated the military establishment of the Vizier, by putting the battalions under British officers upon the same footing as to pay and allowances with those in Bengal, and this was undoubtedly a very great relief to the Vizier, and a very necessary regulation for our own service. In November 1779, the Vizier found the establishment of English officers, which he had solicited himself, intolerably burthensome to him; and he wrote that very pathetic letter which Lord Sandwich quoted in one House, Mr. Fox in another, the Select Committee in the 11th Report, Mr. Debrett in the publication he calls a Report, and every news-paper editor in England, to his readers, on account, I suppose, of the figurative expression “When the knife has penetrated to the bone.”

It was absolutely impossible at that time to recall the officers, and to disband the battalions serving in Oude. The country must and would have been invaded by the Seiks, Nuzeph Cawn, and the Marattas; but Mr. Hastings very readily allowed the justice of the Vizier's complaints, and with truth observed, that he was not responsible for the distressed state of Oude. The treaty of Benares was his treaty; *that* left the Vizier's father in perfect possession of independence, and *he* was against any infringement of that treaty, when Sujah Dowlah died. One of the  
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first articles of the treaty concluded between Mr. Hastings and the Vizier was, that all the British officers in his Excellency's service, should be recalled, and that one of our brigades only, as settled by the treaty with his father, should be stationed in his country, and paid by him. If the Vizier should in future apply for farther military assistance, it was to be granted to him. Every cause of discontent being removed by this arrangement, the Vizier returned to his capital; but as that part of the treaty which respected the Nabob Fyzulla Cawn, has been the subject of much enquiry here, as well as the case of the Begums, I shall relate the facts as they really exist, being convinced that Mr. Hastings's conduct will need no farther justification. The late Vizier concluded an agreement with Fyzulla Cawn, in October 1774, by which the latter was secured in the possession of a Jaghire producing about fourteen lacks of rupees a year. He was to be obedient to the Vizier, and to join him with 2 or 3000 horse and foot when he called upon him. Colonel Champion sanctioned this agreement by his signature. In 1778, the Vizier made great complaints of the conduct of Fyzulla Cawn. A gentleman was deputed to enquire into the truth of these complaints, and his report was highly favourable to Fyzulla Cawn, by whose express desire the Company became guarantees of the treaty. In October 1780, after the invasion of the Carnatic, when Sir Eyre Coote formed his plan for the defence of Bengal and Oude, he proposed that Fyzulla Cawn should furnish a body of 3000 horse, agree-

agreeably to treaty, to join the Vizier's army. This request was not complied with by Fyzulla Cawn, and there were other complaints against him preferred by the Vizier. Mr. Hastings consented to withdraw the guarantee in September 1781, but expressly provided that no injury should be offered to Fyzulla Cawn, and he actually refused every solicitation in the following year from the Vizier, to permit him to resume Fyzulla Cawn's Jaghire, and to pay the amount in money. The reports relative to Fyzulla Cawn being very different, the Vizier, at the desire of the Governor General, deputed Major Palmer to him in January 1783, who concluded an agreement with him on the part of the Vizier, in the following month, by which every possibility of future dispute was avoided, as the Vizier agreed, under the guarantee of the Company, to the execution of a new treaty, which freed Fyzulla Cawn from every obligation to furnish military assistance, or any other aid whatever to the Vizier.

The following facts, authenticated as well as the foregoing, from the records of the East India Company, will fully justify Mr. Hastings for not interfering in the case of the Begum.

1st. That on the death of Sujah Dowlah, the Begum, his wife became possessed of all his treasures.

2d, That Mr. Bristow the English resident in Oude, represented to her that these treasures were the treasures of the State; and the property of the Sovereign her son.

3d. That

3d, That he complained to the Board of the conduct of the Begum and *her eunuchs*, who denied to submit to the Vizier's authority, and beat and abused the officers of his government.

4th, That the Begum consented to pay thirty lacks of rupees to her son, to be secured in the quiet possession of all the treasures of his father, and that the Vizier was compelled to submit to this agreement, Mr. Bristow being the guarantee of it.

5th, That Mr. Bristow observed to the Supreme Council in July 1776, that the Begum could claim no protection from this guarantee, having herself infringed the conditions of the treaty.

6th, That Mr. Bristow made repeated complaints to the Begum of the *rebellious conduct* of the eunuchs, that he pressed her on the part of the Vizier, to surrender her jaghires, and to receive the amount in money, observing that two rulers were too many for one country.

7th, That the extraordinary conduct of the Begum, was noticed by the Members of the Supreme Council, and in particular by Mr. Francis.

8th, That the Begum and her eunuchs excited a revolt in Oude, when the insurrection happened at Benares, is proved beyond a doubt.

9th, That Mr. Hastings consented to allow the Vizier to reclaim the treasures of his father, and to pay his mother the amount of her jaghire in future in money, as Mr. Bristow had proposed he should do in 1776.

10th, That

10th, That no violence of any kind was ever offered to the Begum or her servants, or any one man put to death. That she surrendered the treasures of the state by agreement, and has remained unmolested at Fyzabad, treated with every mark of respect.

11th, That these treasures were paid by the Vizier in liquidation of the debts of the East-India Company, and that no bad consequence whatever has or can result to the British interests in India, from the conduct of the Governor General and Council upon this occasion.

I have been more particular in stating those occurrences, because much pains have been taken in this country to impress the public with an opinion, that Mr. Hastings has forfeited our national character for moderation, justice, and good faith, in these instances, and that he had encouraged a son to plunder his mother in a most inhuman manner. I am positive I have stated the facts correctly; and I am not at all apprehensive that Mr. Hastings's character will suffer in the opinion of any unprejudiced man for the part he has taken, in compelling the Begum to relinquish the treasures of the state.

These are the most material occurrences of 1781, in India — but I cannot avoid joining with General Richard Smith, in applauding the wise and spirited conduct of Lord North, and his Majesty's Ministers of that day, who at a time of general distress, equipped so very considerable a reinforcement for the preservation of our possessions in the East Indies. In justice to Mr. Sullivan, and the late Sir William James, their great exertions at this period ought



also to be mentioned; the wise policy of writing such letters to Bengal, as tended to impress the different powers of India with an idea of the stability of the men who were to save India, if it could be saved, appears in a very strong point of view, when contrasted with the miserable policy which obtained when Mr. Gregory and Sir Henry Fletcher came into office.

It is impossible to continue this narrative without stating the effect which the change of Ministers, in 1782, had upon our affairs in India in the course of that year. Whatever part Lord North may have formerly or latterly taken with respect to Mr. Hastings, it is certain, that from 1780 to the time his Lordship resigned, he gave him very cordial support. For my part, I do not see how the Carnatic could have been relieved, or the operations of Government in India carried on at that most critical period, if Mr. Hastings's removal had been hourly expected. Lord North was undoubtedly convinced that a stable government was necessary, and that factions in our councils abroad had been as destructive there, as he at that time contended, they had been in England. I believe the administration of this country had not been changed many days, before Mr. Burke very publicly declared, that Mr. Hastings and Mr. Macpherson were to be removed:—and a resolution that the Directors ought to remove the Governor General, passed in May 1782. A majority of three in the Court of Directors did, in October, agree to Mr. Hastings's removal; but a majority of six to one in a General Court prevented

vented it. The first business attended to at the India House, after Mr. Gregory and Sir Henry Fletcher became the leading men, was to examine every act of Mr. Hastings's government; not so much with an intention of correcting evils, according to my judgment, as with a view of finding some transaction to condemn. I have seen many of the letters written at that period, in the Reports of the Select Committee, and upon my word, the fact appears to be perfectly as I have stated it. The advices received from India at this time were, that a French armament had arrived, that the Carnatic was in the utmost danger, that every effort that possibly could be made for its relief from Bengal had been made, and that prodigious supplies were daily going round. Advices were also received at this time, that the plan formed by Mr. Hastings for detaching Madajee Sindia from Guzzerat, by invading his dominions, had effectually answered. That a separate peace with Sindia, and a total cessation of hostilities with the Marattas had been the consequences of it. A reasonable man would have supposed, that Mr. Gregory and Sir Henry Fletcher, with these facts before them, might have followed the example set them by Mr. Sullivan and Sir William James, that they might have commended the zeal and exertions of the Governor General and Council in these instances at least: — but I have never been able to discover a single line of approbation conveyed to Mr. Hastings for any one act, from the day Mr. Gregory became Chairman to the day of Sir Henry Fletcher's resignation.

Intelligence of the change of Administration in

England arrived at Bombay in August, and at Madras and Bengal in September 1782. This was accompanied with positive assurances, that Mr. Hastings would be immediately removed, and the effects of such assurances were instantly perceived. The Maratta negotiation remained suspended, and the government of India lost half its vigour. Fortunately, however, early in the month of December, Mr. Hastings was informed of the cordial support which he had received from his generous and independent constituents; the Maratta peace was very soon after fully and finally concluded, and the government of Bengal again acquired a degree of vigour and stability. I hope I shall not be thought to affirm too much, when I declare it to be my opinion, that Great Britain owes its preservation of India to the interference of the Court of Proprietors in favour of Mr. Hastings; because, though very worthy men may differ as to the degree of merit to which he is fairly entitled, it will hardly be said by any man who is acquainted with the genius and temper of the natives of India, that a new Governor General, arriving in Bengal when the Maratta treaty was so far advanced, could have concluded that treaty at the time it was concluded, or have raised the supplies for supporting the war in the Carnatic.

The principal events of 1782, in India, were, continuing the most liberal and effectual supplies in money and provisions from Bengal, to the Carnatic and to Bombay, securing a very large investment at a reduced price from Bengal for the English market, supplying China with the means of loading the  
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Company's ships, by consigning opium to the supercargoes, relieving Fort Marlborough, increasing the revenues of Bengal without oppression, and preserving our own revenues in perfect tranquillity.

In the month of March, 1783, the Greyhound packet arrived in Bengal from England. The General letter contained the sentiments of a majority of the Court of Directors on Mr. Hastings's conduct at Benares, with a declaration that such further resolutions as the Directors might come to, would be sent by a future dispatch to Bengal. This letter naturally tended to weaken the authority of the Supreme Council. The subject was so violently agitated in this country, that the private letters sent by the Greyhound, generally predicted the recall and the disgrace of the Governor General and Mr. Wheeler. But I forbear to dwell upon this subject, because I trust it is now perfectly understood by all descriptions of men, that the Supreme Council ought to be supported from home, or the members who compose it immediately recalled. Lord North will do Mr. Hastings the justice to declare, that he has invariably held this language.

I have now given a summary account of the transactions in Bengal, to the period of our latest dispatches from Calcutta. It has been asserted by the author of the Ninth Report of the Select Committee, that the natives of Bengal are reduced to the lowest degree of depression and misery. A very long dissertation upon the trade of Bengal is also contained in the same Report. However respectable that authority may be deemed, I have not the least scruple of committing

mitting myself to prove, that since Bengal was under the British government, it never enjoyed so great a degree of internal prosperity as it does at the present moment. That Bengal has increased its population very considerably in every year since Mr. Hastings came to the government. That the manufactures have been greatly increased in point of quantity, and are still more improved in quality, in the ten last years, and in particular, the investments for the last three years are of a very superior quality to any since the Company acquired the Duannet. I have taken pains to ascertain these facts from the first authorities in London; and from these authorities I can also affirm, that raw silk is now provided in such quantities in Bengal, and so excellent in its kind, and in the improved mode of winding it, that the importation of raw silk from Italy has decreased very considerably in the two last years; and, in all probability, Bengal will in future entirely supply this valuable material for our manufactures in Great Britain. The culture of indigo is now carried to a considerable extent in Bengal, and will increase every year as the demand for it increases.\* It has been asserted in the Ninth Report, that there is, in fact, no trade in Bengal, except that of the Company's investment from revenue. No assertion can be more untrue. The fact is, that for the last three years, a number of ships

\* This is a new article of commerce from Bengal, and the indigo imported from thence, is of the very first quality. Let Mr Burke examine some of the first merchants in London as to the increase and improvement of our Bengal trade. Rum and fine sugar were formerly imported into Bengal; we now export both articles in great quantities.

have

have arrived in Bengal from Denmark and Portugal. These ships have procured very rich cargoes, without the smallest difficulty; and their whole amount may be estimated at one million sterling in each year, at the least. This fact is capable of proof. If the inland trade and the exports to the Gulphs have fallen off of late years, nothing can be more unjust than to impute this decline to the oppressions of the English. Are we accountable for the confusions which have prevailed for many years in Persia, for the depredations committed by Nadir Shaw in Indostan, or the total destruction of the Mogul Empire? All these events happened before we were known in India, except in the character of merchants. At what period of the history of Bengal has that country enjoyed so long a peace as since we acquired possession of the Duannee? Under the dominion of the native princes, scarcely a year passed without an invasion of some part of the province, or in which several were not put to death, either for being engaged in actual rebellion, or from an apprehension of their disaffection to the despot in office. I do not know a single instance of a native of India being put to death, except by a regular and legal sentence, since we became the sovereigns of Bengal. Let the mild conduct of the English be compared with the inhuman cruelties perpetrated by the Dutch and the Portuguese, in their progress to empire in Asia, and we shall be less inclined to vilify those of our countrymen who have distinguished themselves in Indostan. When I heard a celebrated and illustrious officer declaim, in general terms,

terms, without specifying the murders, massacres, monopolies, and oppressions which have been committed in India, I was inclined to believe that he meant, as in his American manifesto, "to speak daggers, but to use none." I declare again, most solemnly, that neither murders nor massacres have been committed by the English in Bengal: oppressions may have been exercised in that country as in every other, but these have been greatly exaggerated indeed; and the only monopolies existing are those of salt and opium, which, without oppression, produce an immense revenue to the East-India Company. A very ingenious member of the House of Commons has fixed the number of people who groan under every species of misery and oppression in India, at thirty millions;\* and this misery he states to be brought upon them by the English. As to the number of inhabitants in Bengal, Bahar, and our part of Orissa, they may be estimated, I think, at twelve millions, because those countries may now be fairly supposed to have recovered from the depopulation occasioned by the famine of 1770. I have not a doubt myself, but that the inhabitants of Bengal will be doubled in a very few years, so firmly convinced am I that the people of our provinces suffer neither depression nor misery.

\* The late Attorney General was unquestionably right in stating that a charter was wax and parchment, when compared to the happiness of thirty millions of people. But the East-India Company have a right to expect that Mr. Lee will not, without enquiry, adopt the opinions of Mr. Burke, in order to violate property. Can he seriously think that we plunder and oppress thirty millions of people?

The inhabitants of Benares and Ghäuzipore, under the sovereignty of the Company, may be estimated at two millions of people. They are neither rack-rented, nor disturbed in their possessions. The whole country has worn the face of tranquillity and prosperity from the time of Cheyt Sing's expulsion. The provinces of Oude, Corah, Allahabad, and Rohilcund, contain, I imagine, about eight millions of people. We have so far interfered in the government of these countries, since the accession of the present sovereign, that we should undoubtedly be responsible for the happiness of the natives; and I have never yet heard that they were reduced to a state of depression and misery. The personal distress of the Vizier arose, as Mr. Hastings foretold, from our exacting very great concessions in territory and money from him in 1775. However it will hardly be disputed, that on the death of his father, the Vizier owed his life to the presence of our army; and that we have preserved his dominions from falling into that state of confusion, anarchy, and distress to which the fine countries about Lahore and Dehly have been subject for the last thirty years. Admitting that our provinces, and those of our ally, contain twenty-two millions of people, I am confident that by far the greatest number would lament any revolution, by which they would revert to the state they were in before we acquired an influence in India. I am equally confident too, that the bulk of the inhabitants of no country upon earth, enjoy a greater degree of ease and happiness, than the lower ranks of



men in Bengal. The Northern Circars, which are under the government of Fort St. George, have been uninvaded during the late war; nor have I heard it asserted, that complaints of oppression have been received from the Zemindars of those districts. The balances due to the Company are doubtless very considerable; but we have not the least reason to suppose that inhuman means will be resorted to in order to recover them. The Carnatic has been desolated by a long and cruel war. Some parts of it, however, were in such a state as to afford a revenue to the Company; and as there was not an enemy in the country when the last accounts left India, we may reasonably hope that the distresses of the natives have been considerably alleviated. The countries to the southward of the Coleroon, were completely protected; and, as well as Tanjore, entirely exempted from the calamities of war, as appears by Lord Macartney's letter of March<sup>a</sup>; so that the number of inhabitants in the Circars, the Carnatic, and Tanjore, amount to seven millions. I do not know what authority Mr. Burke has to pronounce, that the thirty millions I have enumerated, groan under every species of oppression and misery. I have the utmost respect for the abilities, the ingenuity, and the invention of that gentleman; but, I can now and then oppose a fact to a flourish.

\* We have received advices from Madras of the 8th of September, and from Bengal of the 6th of August, since this Narrative went to the press. All was peace in India, except with Tippoo Saib, and we were negotiating a treaty with him. In the mean time we had three armies ready to act against different parts of his dominions, should he refuse to accede to reasonable terms; and all the French troops had quitted his standard.

Having concisely related the principal events which have occurred in India during Mr. Hastings's administration, I cannot conclude this narrative without taking notice of the late extraordinary proceedings in this country relative to the Governor General and the East India Company.

Some time before the rise of the last session of Parliament, a Committee of Proprietors waited upon Lord North and Mr. Fox, the Ministers of that day, in order to explain their sentiments of the conduct of Mr. Hastings, who had in the most explicit and manly terms, called upon the Court of Directors, and his Majesty's Ministers, either to support or to remove him. The Ministers, though thus earnestly called upon, suffered the session to pass over without bringing any proposition before Parliament. Mr. Hastings had informed his constituents, that the revenues of Bengal were increased a million sterling, and that peace would be shortly concluded with the Marattas. Perhaps his Majesty's Ministers confiding in this declaration, were less anxious to push forward the violent measures which they have since produced, but they were willing, at the same time, that the actual government of India should be as much degraded as possible; for on the last day of the last session, Mr. Burke moved, (and Lord North seconded the motion,) for certain papers to be laid before the House at their meeting, relative to transactions of the year 1775. What renders this matter the more curious is, that the papers moved for had all been perused in 1776 by Lord North, who then wished to remove Mr. Hastings, because certain charges

were exhibited against him which were never attempted to be proved; and at that time too, Mr. Burke's friends and patrons were his most strenuous defenders. In the course of the summer, two packets arrived from India; they brought a confirmation of the Maratta peace, and the most satisfactory accounts of our affairs in Bengal and its dependencies. It appeared also that, that every effort had been made by the Supreme Council for the support of the British interest in every other quarter of India. A few days previous to the meeting of Parliament, the Court of Proprietors, assembled, and voted, with one dissenting voice, the thanks of the Company to Mr. Hastings and his Council, for their great exertions in the public service, and a request that Mr. Hastings would not quit his government until peace was fully restored.

Mr. Fox, on the first day of the session, gave notice, that in a week he would move for leave to bring in a bill to regulate our Governments in India. His speech on the day he opened his plan, was indeed a most extraordinary one. — It will be sufficient to say, that every charge brought against Mr. Hastings on that day, has been often refuted. Lord North was not then present, or he would have corrected several of his honourable colleague's misrepresentations. I forbear to detail the progress of a bill which, I believe, is now universally reprobated without doors: — Suffice it to say, that in so far as Mr. Hastings is concerned, Mr. Fox adopted all the prejudices of his most inveterate enemies. Some mistakes perhaps he was led into by misinformation. In particular, Sir  
Henry

Henry Fletcher hazarded an assertion, for which there was not the smallest foundation in fact. The honourable Baronet surely could not do it in order to give Mr. Fox an opportunity of founding the praises of Lord Macartney, or of going out of his way, to gratify the friends of the late Lord Pigot, by wantonly traducing the character of Mr. Hastings. The fallacy of Mr. Fox's reasoning becomes more and more apparent to the public every hour. He pretends to adopt Mr. Burke's pretended idea, that thirty millions of people are oppressed by the English in India. This cannot be his real opinion; if it was, would he have suffered the last session to pass over, though called upon by Mr. Hastings, without doing or attempting any thing? Mr. Fox has never ventured to argue upon the actual state of India, when the latest advices came from thence: on the contrary, he dwelt upon transactions which happened fourteen, twelve, and ten years ago. Mr. Burke acted with less consistency; for he opposed the Regulating Act of 1773, and was then the asserter of the Company's rights, and the defender of the characters of the Company's servants.

Perhaps it will not be very becoming in me to make any observations on the capacity of the Director, nominated by Mr. Fox for the future Government of India. The noble Lord at the head of the Seven, is universally allowed to be a most amiable and virtuous character. But to be at the head of such a commission, requires a thorough knowledge of India, and the strictest impartiality. That the noble Lord is totally deficient in these requisites, must

must be clear to every one who heard his Lordship read one letter, dated in Bengal in 1769, and another in 1775, stating abuses or oppressions in the collection of the revenues, and arguing from those documents in favour of Mr. Fox's bill. The mode of collecting the revenues has been totally altered since those periods. I should scarcely suppose that the four Directors, whose names are inserted after the noble Earl's, have had either opportunity or inclination to study the affairs of India, as they must be studied by any man or body of men who mean to govern that country for the advantage of this. Mr. Gregory and Sir Henry Fletcher have been concerned undoubtedly for some years in the affairs of India. The former was many years a free merchant in Calcutta; the latter has been several voyages as a Mate or a Captain of an Indiaman; yet, with all due deference to the splendid abilities of both these gentlemen, I am yet to learn what particular services were performed by either of them, as Chairman of the Court of Directors. India has, undoubtedly, been saved by the exertions of Mr. Hastings, the Supreme Council, Sir Eyre Coote, &c. abroad; and by the assistance afforded to them from home in Lord North's administration, at the requisition of Mr. Sullivan and Sir William James, not merely in the reinforcements sent to India, but in that cordial and steady support and confidence, which should subsist between the government of Great Britain and its dependencies in India at all times, but more particularly in the hour of difficulty and distress.

It would lead me from the proper subject of this review,

review, was I to insert the remarks that must naturally occur to every man, who reflects upon the mean and unworthy acts which have been practised for some time past, to injure Mr. Hastings in the public opinion. The Reports of a Committee have been sold as pamphlets, unaccompanied by vouchers or explanations. What is called the Eleventh Report of the Select Committee, was sent under a blank cover to several noble Lords, while the bill was depending. This Report contained several strictures on these letters which Mr. Hastings had written to the Court of Directors. In one of them he had inclosed an account of sums received by him as presents, amounting to two hundred thousand pounds, and carried to the Company's credit. The Eleventh Report does not contain any copy of these letters, or of this account, though wonderful ingenuity is displayed by the compiler of it, in pointing out certain inconsistencies, which must remain unexplained for the present; but I am sure no man living, who reads the Eleventh Report, will conceive that the following paragraph was contained in Mr. Hastings's letter to the Directors of the 16th of December, 1782: "If I appear in any unfavourable light by these transactions, I resign the common and legal security of those who commit crimes or errors. I am ready to answer any particular question that may be put against myself upon honour, or upon oath." I am so confident that Mr. Hastings will be able to explain fully and satisfactorily his reasons for concealing for a time, from

from whom the several ~~items~~ alluded to were received, that I earnestly wish he may be publicly called upon to relate every minute circumstance attending the receipt of each separate article in the account; such an order, I trust, has already been sent to him. It would have been candid, therefore, in the compiler of the pamphlet, entitled the Eleventh Report, if he had waited for the arrival of the explanation; but if he really thought he had caught the Governor General at a disadvantage, it would have been just and honest in him, when he was commenting upon letter, to have inserted either the letter entire, or at least the very material paragraph which I have quoted.

A man of plain understanding might be led to suppose, from the ungenerous, paltry, and unfair practices, which all men have noticed for these two years past, that to a party in this country, the removal of Mr. Hastings from the government of Bengal, was of infinitely more consequence than the preservation of our Indian empire. Whether to the public measures of one set of men, or to the intemperate opposition of another set of men, we may attribute the loss of America, I cannot determine; but I believe upon my conscience, that the violent bill, proposed and supported by parties formerly so hostile to each other, would have deprived us of our possessions in Indostan, had it passed into a law.

A SHORT  
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A SHORT  
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T R A N S A C T I O N S  
IN  
B E N G A L  
DURING THE  
L A S T T E N Y E A R S.

By Major JOHN SCOTT.

L O N D O N.

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M.DCC.LXXXII.



## P R E F A C E.

**T**HE controul which the Supreme Council of Bengal holds over the other presidencies, makes the members of that Government in some measure responsible for the peace of India. It will appear very clearly upon inquiry, that the Governor - General and Council exerted themselves to the extent of the powers vested in them by the Legislature, to avert those misfortunes which have been experienced upon the coast of Coromandel ; but that a war with a country power should have been commenced with such circumstances of disgrace to our arms, was not apprehended, I will venture to say, either by the Supreme Council or by any man in India.

Much pains has been taken in India, and the same efforts will doubtless be used in England, to attribute every unfortunate event upon the coast to the Mahratta war ; which by some in Bengal, and most of the gentlemen in Madras, has been denominated Mr. Hastings's war. The Court of Directors, who, perfectly acquainted with the circumstances which led to the war, highly approved of the conduct which the Governor-General took in it, will, doubtless, do him the justice to contradict this assertion.

In the following sketch I mean to relate the events which led to a war which, from the year 1778, uniformly successful on our part, must have produced an honourable and advantageous peace many months ago, if the invasion of the Carnatic, the destruction of a third part of our army, and the expectation of a French armament, had not given fresh spirits to a vanquished enemy.

Upon

Upon other articles the conduct of the Governor-General has been grossly misrepresented: It may not therefore be unacceptable to his friends, to relate as concisely as the importance of the subject will admit, the principal transactions in Bengal, from the period of his arrival in February 1772, to the day of my departure from Bengal the 9th of January 1781; first premising that I will not advance a single fact which I cannot prove, either from my own knowledge or from authentic documents now in my possession.

No man has more severely suffered from unjust or illiberal insinuations than Mr. Hastings; nor has any man less deserved them: since, even in his own justification, he has carefully avoided all personal reflections. It is much to be lamented, that the public has suffered as well as Mr. Hastings, by the impression which such insinuations did at the time make upon the Court of Directors; for to what other cause can it

be owing, that, for so many years, they withheld their confidence from a man they once thought so worthy of it? Conscious of the rectitude of his own actions, he has been too little solicitous to stem that torrent of calumny and abuse which his opponents have so liberally bestowed upon him. It is now high time to refute these calumnies. I do not hesitate to declare, nor am I apprehensive of committing myself too far by such a declaration, that to render our possession of Bengal of consequence to the British nation, Mr. Hastings must be supported, and with effect, both by Government and the East-India Company. The event will prove that my judgment has not been warped by my private affections.

FEBRUARY

1782.

JOHN SCOTT.

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**M**R. Hastings was appointed by the Court of Directors to succeed to the government of Bengal, in the month of April, 1772, immediately after the great famine. They were also pleased to invest him with some extraordinary powers, not heretofore vested in a Governor, from a conviction, that if their affairs there were yet retrievable, Mr. Hastings, (whose perseverance, firmness, and integrity, both in Bengal and Madras had been remarkably conspicuous,) was the most proper person to be employed in so arduous an undertaking. It is well



well known that the government of Bengal was from various causes at this time reduced to the greatest distress. The late Governor, though in his private character very respectable, possessed neither the vigour or resolution which his public station required; and the Members of his Council submitted to the continuance of evils which they wanted either the power or the inclination to reform. The Company's annual expences in Bengal considerably exceeded their revenues; and although bills had been drawn upon the Court of Directors for more than a million sterling in 1770, there still remained a bond debt of a million and a half sterling, due to individuals in Bengal. There was a prospect also of this bond debt being monthly increased to the degree, that the expences and the investment exceeded the actual revenues of the provinces. \*

So supine a Government must have sunk of itself in a few years. That this was the real state of public affairs in Bengal, when Mr. Hastings arrived there, is known to every man at that time in India. In April 1772, he succeeded to the chair, and arduous as the task of reformation is in all countries, but more particularly in Bengal, he instantly began upon it. The excessive civil charges in Calcutta were re-  
trenched,

\* See the Appendix.

trenched, unnecessary appointments were abolished, and that spirit of extravagance and dissipation which had pervaded all orders of men, was suppressed, both by precept and example.

Notwithstanding opposition from many individuals, Mr. Hastings steadily pursued his plan of reformation, regardless of the personal obloquy which attended it, and in less than a month from his accession to the chair, the face of affairs was totally altered. Every resolution of Government was carried into effect with a promptitude and spirit which did honour to its executive members.

The Court of Directors at this time determined to stand forth themselves as Dewans of the provinces, through the agency of their own servants; and Mr. Hastings lost no time in carrying orders so beneficial to the Company into execution. He proceeded to Moorshedabad, the residence of the Nabob and the native officers of the Government, attended by three members of the Board, with an intention to investigate the state of the Revenues, to reduce the charges incurred in the collection of them, and to establish provincial Courts of Justice, which might prevent those acts of oppression and arbitrary power that had hitherto been so much complained of.

Unfortunately for the Company in this, as in many other instances, Mr. Hastings had  
not

not the power to carry his whole plan into execution ; but those regulations which he did establish will ever remain as the strongest proofs of the extent of his genius, and of the laborious attention he paid to every point, which could in the least degree contribute to secure the natives of Bengal in the possession of their property.

The same unremitting attention was paid to public business, on his return to Calcutta ; and the Court of Directors were very early in their acknowledgments of Mr. Hastings's services, and of the benefits which were derived from them.

At the close of the year 1772 a new scene was opened in Bengal. To the spirited and decided part which Mr. Hastings then took in foreign politics, are the Company and the British nation indebted for the dominions and the extensive influence which they now enjoy in Indostan. To set this matter in its true point of view, and not with a design to reflect upon the political conduct of any person, it is necessary to revert to the period of Lord Clive's government.

The East-India Company's affairs were so thoroughly investigated by a Committee of the House of Commons in 1772, whose proceedings have since been made public, that it is needless to relate the steps by which we have arrived

rived at our present power in India. The Company's agents in Bengal were inoffensive and reputable merchants when they were attacked without provocation, by that most despicable of tyrants, Surajah Dowlah, the grandson of an Usurper : they were at first driven from their possessions, but had afterwards the good fortune to see their prosecutor vanquished and deposed : his successor, Meer Jaffier, who owed his promotion entirely to us, beheld the increase of our power with a jealous eye, and concerted a scheme with the Dutch for our destruction. The firmness of Colonel Clive defeated the project, and in the succeeding Government it was necessary to depose the Nabob. A chain of well known events brought on a war with the successor, and his restoration. In one campaign, Cossim Alley was driven from the provinces. Sujah Dowlah, Nabob of Oude and Vizier, unprovoked by us, invaded Bahar ; he was defeated, and had thrown himself upon our mercy at the time that Lord Clive returned to Bengal in 1765 ; his Lordship dictated his own terms to the King, Sujah Dowlah, and the young Nabob of Bengal. We had certainly a right to retain the possession of countries which we had conquered in a just and necessary war, and Lord Clive undoubtedly gave the Princes of Indostan a conspicuous proof of his moderation, when he only required fifty lacks of rupees from the Vizier as a com-

penfation for the reftoration of his country, and the ceflion of Benares.

By the treaty which his Lordfhip concluded with the King, he guaranted to him the poffeffion of the provinces of Corah and Allahabad, and engaged to pay him twenty-fix lacks of rupees annually from the provinces of Bengal. Perhaps all the objections to fo fatal a drain of fpecie from Bengal did not then occur to his Lordfhip, or Patna or Monghier would have been fixed upon as the place of his Majefty's refidence. In this cafe, the evils which have fince befallen the unhappy monarch would have been prevented, and our provinces confiderably benefitted, by having the amount of the tribute annually circulated in them. Still the condition implied in the treaty was undoubtedly, that his Majefty fhould refide under our immediate protection at Allahabad, which he quitted in June, 1771, at the infligation of the Marattas, who had engaged to conduct him to Dehly ; a project this Prince had much at heart.

By leaving Allahabad he quitted our protection ; and Mr. Haftings, who arrived in Bengal early in the next year, very juftly concluded that the firft ufe which the Marattas would make of their royal gueft, would be to extort from him the provinces of Corah and Allahabad. He had authentic intelligence foon after, that grants of thefe provinces were  
actually

actually made to them and signed by the King ; and if his Majesty's commands were at all events to be obeyed, we might be required in another year to evacuate Bengal. The danger that was to be apprehended from having the Marattas (not at that time broken by intestine divisions) so near us was early foreseen, and wisely guarded against by an alliance with Sujah Dowlah, which being concluded on the firm basis of mutual interest, was in no danger of being violated.

It is well known that this Prince had been considered as a disaffected ally during the governments of Mr. Verelst and Mr. Cartier. By his conduct in 1768 he had so far excited the suspicions of a majority of the Select Committee, that they deputed two of their members, and a gentleman of the Council, to expostulate and to treat with him. In Mr. Hastings's administration he became a most useful and valuable ally.

When Mr. Hastings succeeded to the government, the province of Bengal had been nearly exhausted of its circulating specie, by the annual tribute of twenty-six lacks of rupees to the King, by the remittances in silver to China, to Madras, to Bombay, and to Europe ; not a rupee of which ever returned again ; by the total stop which was put to the importation of bullion from Europe or from Persia, in consequence of the great increase of our own invest-

ment, and the supplies which were afforded to foreign companies, by the servants of the Company, who had no other means of remitting their fortunes to Europe ; the fatal effects of which Mr. Verelst had foreseen, and represented very fully to the Directors in a series of letters which do great honour to his abilities and foresight.

The regulations which were framed by Mr. Hastings on his accession to the chair, although they immediately contributed to the happiness of the natives, and would in time prove highly beneficial to the Company, were not efficacious to relieve their present wants. The distress of the Directors for cash at home was very great ; they had been obliged to have recourse to Parliament for assistance, in consequence of the large drafts which had been made upon them from Bengal. Their chief dependance was upon Mr. Hastings to extricate the Company from their difficulties, both in Europe and in Asia. Their confidence was not misplaced, and their most sanguine expectations were fully answered. Foreign trade was encouraged to a greater degree than had before been known, and a new commerce, by the way of Suez, was opened in consequence of the encouragement given to it by Mr. Hastings, which promised a relief to the languid circulation in Bengal, opened a quick communication with Great-Britain, and has

has since been of the most essential advantage to us. Dustucks were abolished in the provinces, and every species of undue influence suppressed as far as the authority of government could suppress it.

The King, as I before observed, having ceded Corah and Allahabad to the Mahrattas, it became a question, whether we should tamely permit them to take possession of those provinces, with the prospect of Bengal being invaded the following year, or instantly secure them. The latter resolution was taken ; and a member of the Council was deputed to form an exact statement of their revenues in May, 1773. The King was at this time a prisoner at large at Dehly, slighted and despised by the Mahrattas, who proposed to invade the dominions of Sujah Dowlah, by the route of Rohilound. To prevent this invasion, the first brigade, consisting of one regiment of Europeans, six battalions of Seapoys, and twenty pieces of cannon, had formed a junction with the troops of Sujah Dowlah and the Rohillas, and were advancing towards the banks of the Ganges, by forced marches. The Mahrattas, who had forded that river, recrossed it with precipitation, as we advanced, were pursued, and prevented from doing any further damage than the plundering and burning a few inconsiderable villages in Rohilcund. When the approach of the

the



the rains swelled the Ganges, our troops returned to Oude. This expedition laid the foundation of the Rohilla war, of which I shall speak more fully hereafter.

Sujah Dowlah had repeatedly and earnestly solicited a personal conference with Mr. Hastings, to which he consented, and met him at Benares, in September, 1773, a few months after we had taken possession of Corah and Allahabad.

It was at this time that Mr. Hastings concluded the treaty of Benares, which in its consequences was so extremely beneficial to the East-India Company.

The principal articles were the cession of Corah and Allahabad to the Vizier, the increase of the subsidy, and our engagement to assist him in the conquest of Rohilcund.

The nominal revenues of Corah and Allahabad were twenty-five lacks of rupees per annum ; but the actual collections fell greatly short of this sum : nor could any collections be made without the assistance of a strong military force. Several disaffected Zemindars were to be reduced ; and these provinces were separated from our other possessions by the dominions of Cheyt Sing, the Raja of Benares, at that time a tributary to Sujah Dowlah. Mr. Hastings, after the maturest reflection, consented to cede these countries to Sujah Dowlah, in consideration

tion of his paying fifty lacks of rupees ~~to~~ to the Company. This article of the treaty was highly approved of by the Court of Directors.

We were bound by Lord Clive's treaty with the Vizier to assist him with a military force, and he was to pay thirty thousand rupees\* a month for a complete brigade; which was supposed to be equivalent to the additional expence incurred in the field, though it was in fact very inadequate to it. Mr. Hastings thought, and with justice, that Sujah Dowlah should pay the whole expence of an army acting at his requisition, or a sum equivalent to it. This he consented to, and it was fixed at two lacks and ten thousand rupees a month.† This alteration was warmly approved by the Directors.

The articles by which the Company were engaged to assist the Vizier in the conquest of Rohilcund, however severely attacked both in Bengal and England, may certainly be defended on the strictest grounds of policy and justice.

The Rohillas‡ were a tribe of Afghan Tartars, who about twenty-six years before this time invaded and conquered a large and fertile tract of country lying to the eastward of the Ganges, and

3000l. † 21,000l.

† Dow's History of the Decline of the Mogul Empire, published in 1768, p. 37, gives this account of the Rohillas. "In the year 1744, Ali Mahommud, a Patan of the Rohilla tribe, a soldier

and bounded on one side by the north-east frontier of Oude, and on the other by what are called the Cachmere-hills, which are a continuation of those mountains that separate Bengal from Thibet. Some of the original invaders of this country are yet living. The fixed inhabitants are Hindoos. The Rohillas are Mussulmen and foldiers to a man. The revenues were regularly collected and divided amongst the different chiefs, of whom the most considerable were Fyzula Cawn and Haffez Hamer. The Vizier had long beheld, with great mortification, the settlement of

a soldier of fortune, and native of the mountains of Cabalistan, begun to appear in arms. He had some years before come to Dehly, and was entertained in the service of Mahummud Shaw, and the command of a small district between Dehly and Lahore was conferred upon him, here he entertained all vagrants of his own clan who came down in quest of military service from their native mountains, not paying his rent, Harnind, the Fegedar, to whom he was accountable, raised 15,000 men to expel or chastise him, he was defeated with great slaughter, and thus Ali laid the foundation of the Rohilla government. Upon this defeat the Vizier sent 30,000 men under his son against the rebels. Each side averse to a decision by battle, a treaty was concluded, whereby Ali was to keep the country before governed by Harnind upon paying the ancient revenues to the Crown no payment was made, and Ali continued to strengthen himself, and ravaged the neighbouring country to subsist his army at last the monarch himself was obliged to take the field. Ali shut himself up in Bangur, where he was obliged to capitulate. He was carried a prisoner to Dehly, where he remained six months, at the end of which the Patans not only obtained him his release, but the Feugedarship of Sirhind. There he maintained himself, and collecting his dispersed tribes, kept possession not only of Sirhind, but several districts between the rivers, and beyond the Ganges, without remitting any tax to court." This happened in 1747.

of the Rohillas in a district which had formerly been dependant upon Oude ; but as our Government had entertained so strong a jealousy of his power, previous to Mr. Hastings's accession, and had kept up a correspondence with the Rohillas, he had been prevented from subduing them ; and it is also probable that he did not think himself equal to the conquest of the country without our assistance.

A bare inspection of the map will prove of how much consequence it was, that the power in possession of Rohilcund should be in strict alliance with us.

The soil is so fertile that an army of Mahrattas might subsist in it for any length of time. It is full of strong forts for the security of plunder ; and from hence in the course of one season their ravages might have been extended through the dominions of the Vizier into Bengal. When therefore the Mahrattas were masters of the King's person and of Dehly, and threatened to invade the country of an ally, whom by treaty, and from policy we were bound to defend, it was absolutely necessary either to conclude a defensive alliance with the Rohillas, or to take possession of their country.

Many small states in Europe have been precisely in the same situation. It was impossible that they could remain neuter in our approaching rupture with the Mahrattas ; and they conclu-

ded an alliance with the Vizier and the Company, by which we engaged to protect their country from the ravages of the Mahrattas; they on their part were to join us with their forces, and at the conclusion of the campaign to pay forty lacks of rupees, as their proportion of the expences of the war.

The Mahrattas, as I before observed, did invade Rohilcund, but we arrived so opportunely that they were obliged to retreat very precipitately. The Rohillas as we advanced peremptorily refused to join us, and it was proposed to storm their camp; which they prevented, by forming a junction when we were upon the point of carrying this design into execution.

On the return of our troops to Oude, the Vizier demanded the stipulated payment of forty lacks, which at first was evaded, and afterwards absolutely refused.

Such was the state of this business when Mr. Hastings met the Vizier at Benares.

That the Rohillas would dread the Vizier's resentment for this breach of faith cannot be doubted; and that, to guard themselves against the effects of it, they would apply to the Mahrattas for assistance was highly probable. In truth they did negotiate with them. I need not mention the many fatal consequences with which such an alliance would have been attended. Success in the Rohilla war extended and  
secured

secured the frontier of an ally and dependant on us ; and it was founded on their breach of treaty and their alliance with his enemies.

The advantages which the East-India Company were to reap from the war, were great indeed : Our exhausted provinces were to be relieved from the pay of a third part of our army during the service ; and we were to receive fifty lacks of rupees at the conclusion of it.

The danger apprehended from an increase of the Vizier's power was merely ideal, as the event has fully proved. Mr. Hastings, who had studied his character, knew it perfectly well ; but the gentlemen at home, who had for a long time been alarmed by accounts of the *dangerous ambition* and *high spirit* of Sujah Dowlah, deemed every addition which we might make to his power a measure founded upon *wrong policy*. Fortunately, however, for the Company and the British nation, the man who managed their political affairs in Bengal clearly foresaw and steadily pursued their true interests.

The Rohilla war commenced in 1774, the conquest of the country was effected in seven months, and an equitable peace was concluded with Fyzula Cawn, the principal Rohilla chief, which has continued from that period uninterrupted.

I should exceed the bounds which I have prescribed to myself, were I to enter into a detail of

Mr. Hastings's public proceedings from his return to Calcutta in September 1773, to the commencement of the new Government in October 1774, when his authority was effectually annihilated. But the concurrent testimony of the English gentlemen then in Bengal, the flourishing state of the Company's affairs, the increase of wealth, and the affection shewn by the natives to our Government, are ample proofs that every moment of his time was employed in pursuing the true interests of his constituents.

In the year 1767 I travelled four hundred miles through that country, it was very thinly inhabited; the appearance of an European with his attendants excited distrust and apprehension. I have travelled the same road since that period; I then found it in high cultivation. The natives, secure under the protection of humane and equal laws, were increasing in numbers, and no longer looked upon Englishmen as enemies.

It is certain, however clamour may have obscured the truth, that the lower ranks of people in no part of the world live more happily, or are less oppressed than the natives of Bengal and Bahar. The abuses which existed after our accession to the Dewance are more to be attributed to a defective system of Government than to the want of inclination to correct them in the members of administration; nor could these abuses be corrected until the Governor  
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and Council were authorised to break through the forms of a double Government.

At Mr. Hastings's accession to the chair he intirely new modelled the public offices, and allotted to each its distinct business. The mode of collecting the revenues, as well as the quantum to be collected, had heretofore been regulated by the resident of the Durbar and Mahomed Riza Cawn ; and even after the establishment of provincial councils, Moorshedabad continued the seat of Government. But when the double Government, as it has been properly called, was abolished, Mr. Hastings removed all the native officers of it to Calcutta, and brought every department of finance immediately before the Council

His regulations of the public offices, of the collections, and the various œconomical reforms, which, notwithstanding the difficulties preventing, and the odium consequent, he had effected in the short space of thirty months, added to the supply of treasure, which the treaty of Benares afforded, had raised the reputation of the government of Bengal to the highest pitch, and the Company's affairs, which, when he succeeded to the chair, were to all appearance irretrievable, bore the strongest aspect of affluence and prosperity. The time however was now come when the abilities of the man who had done so much for the Company were to be decried, and  
his



his character exposed as a subject for public derision.

On the 19th of October General Clavering, Colonel Monson, and Mr. Francis, arrived in Calcutta, and with the Governor-General and Mr. Barwell, composed the Supreme Council of India. No Government could have commenced under more favourable circumstances. Our treasury was full ; foreign trade flourished to a greater degree than had ever been known in Bengal. Inland commerce was freed from every impolitic restriction. The reputation of our arms was great, and the supply of wealth to Great-Britain by the investment (the only proper mode of enriching our native country from India) had increased every year since Mr. Hastings came to the Government. The Gentlemen who then arrived from England had no personal connections to gratify ; they had not been bred up in the Company's service ; nor had they formed friendships, to which a small portion of their constituent's interests might have sometimes been sacrificed ; (human nature will still be the same !) and their own appointments were so ample as to preclude even the temptation to act from interested motives. With such advantages, why has it happened that the British nation has not experienced all those good effects which the wisdom of the Legislature predicted when the Supreme Council of India was established ? I shall

shall relate facts as they happened, without a wish to reflect in the smallest degree upon two gentlemen of great honour and undoubted integrity, who are now no more ; and who, I think, would have heartily co-operated with Mr. Hastings, if much pains had not been taken to deceive them by designing men, who unfortunately were but too successful in so pernicious an undertaking.

Although Mr. Hastings received an addition to his former title by the act which constituted the Supreme Council, his powers were considerably curtailed by the instructions of the Court of Directors. Under these circumstances, he was at first undetermined, whether to resign or to retain the Government, but the violent conduct of a decided majority determined him to remain in the chair at all events.

The flame of opposition broke out with great violence at the second meeting of the Supreme Council. The Governor-General, for the information of his colleagues, drew up a clear and distinct statement of our political situation. Our alliances with the Vizier, the advantages which we had already received, and might in future expect to receive from it. Our alliances or connections with the native powers in Indostan, and every other particular which it was necessary to communicate to Gentlemen vested with so high a public trust, and who at the same time were

were so intirely uninformed with respect to a country, which from that moment they were to govern. To elucidate some part of his minutes, Mr. Hastings delivered into the Board several extracts from Mr. Middleton's letters, who had resided for some months as his private agent at the Court of Sujah Dowlah.

A member of the Board, Colonel Monson, immediately proposed that the Governor-General should lay before them the whole correspondence of Mr. Middleton. This was so direct an attack upon the honour of Mr. Hastings, that he absolutely refused to comply with the requisition ; and from this moment commenced the attack upon his former administration.

They began with the Rohilla war. It was a war, they said, which would bring dishonour upon the nation. The money to be received, which they declared would never be paid, was the price of blood. Our army was exposed, in the dominions of a treacherous ally, to the most imminent dangers, and the majority determined to recall it immediately, provided the retreat could be effected with security to our own troops, though at that time Fitz Ulla still stood out ; and by abandoning the Vizier the fifty lacks which we were to receive from him would not have been demandable.

By proceedings thus violent and unjustifiable, the great advantages which have since accrued to  
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the Company had nearly been forfeited, but the earnestness of the Governor General for a short delay in the execution of these intemperate orders had fortunately some effect. The non-payment of the subsidy due from the Vizier to the Company was the principal cause assigned for the recall of our army, although the bad policy of advancing our troops beyond the Carumnassa \* was warmly insisted upon at the same time. A part of the money due by the treaty was soon after paid by the Vizier; this payment as well as that of the remainder was represented as the recovery of a desperate debt, and it was confidently asserted, that the recovery of so large a sum was owing to the firmness and resolution of the majority, though it had never been conceived that he meant to deduct any part of the payment.

Mr. Middleton was immediately recalled from his station; and Mr. Bristow, the confidential friend of Mr. Francis, appointed Resident at the Vizier's court in his room.

The Governor-General's conduct in points which had already been referred to the judgment of the Court of Directors was severely attacked, a most melancholy picture was drawn of the distressed state of the provinces. The natives were said to groan under every species of op-

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pression,

\* That river divides the province of Bahar from the dominions of Cheyh Sing, the Rajah of Benares.

pression, and even murders to have been committed with impunity \*in our most populous cities, and universal ruin predicted.

To those who for more than two years had lived under a Government, vigorous far beyond what had ever been known in India, such a representation appeared extraordinary indeed.—On Mr. Hastings's arrival our dominions and our influence were bounded by the banks of the Carumnassa. The Company was sinking under the weight of a heavy bond-debt, an expensive civil establishment, and an army which cost more than a million sterling annually, and which could not with prudence have been considerably reformed. When the majority of the Supreme Council assumed the Government, the bond-debt was reduced, and funds provided for paying off the remainder; the public disbursements were regulated; the pay of a third of our army was furnished by Sujah Dowlah, and by its remaining in Oude we had a prospect of still farther advantages, which were afterward realized.

Mr. Hastings, sensible of these advantages, and of the falshood of the gloomy prelates of the majority, in his separate letters to the Directors, assured them, that their affairs were at no former period in so flourishing a situation, that they would receive a large investment, the bond-debt would be paid off, and a large sum received

ved in the treasury for emergencies in the course of the following season.

The majority contradicted and ridiculed this representation, but the event has proved that it was not made without full consideration, nor can it be denied that Mr. Hastings alone is entitled to the merit of paying off a debt of a million and a half, of reserving an equal sum in the treasury of Bengal, of supplying Madras, Bombay, and China, with cash, and adding very considerably to the annual investment. His civil regulations in 1772, and his negotiations with Sujah Dowlah in 1773 have, in their consequences, fixed us so securely in the possession of Indostan, from the source of the Ganges to the Ocean, notwithstanding the temporary distress under which we now labour, from Hyder Ally Cawn's successes in the Carnatic, that we are in no danger of a reverse of fortune, except from internal dissensions.

In the condemnation of past measures no public act of the Governor-General's was passed over without a comment. By giving up Corah and Allahabad to the Vizier, he sold what was the property of another; by withholding the tribute which we were by treaty engaged to pay to the King, he forfeited the national faith; and even admitting that it would have been imprudent to furnish his Majesty with so large a sum, when he was a prisoner with the Mahrattas, it

ought at least to have been reserved as a deposit in Calcutta : Probably the consequences of withholding such a sum as a crore of rupees from circulation, when we could hardly find money for our necessary expences, was not considered by the majority. However, as the Court of Directors in the first letter which was received from them in 1775, very highly approved of the sale of Corah, and the non-payment of the tribute, no farther remarks were made on Mr. Hastings's conduct in these points.

I now enter, and I confess with much regret, upon the conduct of the majority towards Mr. Hastings as a private gentleman, in which his reputation and his fortune were principally concerned. I lament sincerely that gentlemen of high honour and unblemished characters should have been so warped by their prejudices. But such are the fatal effects of party spirit.

This attack was authorised by a very impolitic, though well meaning order of the Court of Directors ; " That the Supreme Council should " inquire into past abuses." A similar order had been given to Mr. Hastings on his accession to the Government, and it is now needless to lament the fatal consequences which were occasioned by an inattention to his opinion upon it. Mr. Hastings had found it impossible to detect or to punish those who had abused the confidence reposed in them. Much valuable time  
was

was lost, and much odium incurred by the attempt. Mr. Verelst and Mr. Cartier were men of honour, whose public virtue could not be better proved than by the very moderate amount of the fortunes which they brought home with them. From various causes however, the Company's affairs were in great confusion, and the Directors attributing it to the bad management of their servants in Bengal, were, with reason, anxious to detect those who were guilty, and therefore earnestly pressed Mr. Hastings to commence a retrospect of their conduct. But when the Supreme Council arrived in Bengal, our affairs were in so flourishing a state that such an order was surely unnecessary.

I will quote Mr. Hastings's opinion upon this subject; it reflects the greatest honour upon him. The letter from which I have taken the following extract is dated the 11th of November 1773, and if not received in London before the departure of the majority of the Supreme Council, must have been transmitted to them very shortly after.

“ All my letters addressed to your honourable  
 “ Court, and to the Select Committee, repeat  
 “ the strongest promises of prosecuting the in-  
 “ quiries into the conduct of your servants,  
 “ which you had been pleased to commit parti-  
 “ cularly to my charge. You will readily be-  
 “ lieve that I must have been sincere in those  
 “ decla-



“ declarations, since it would have argued great  
 “ indiscretion to have made them, had I foreseen  
 “ my inability to perform them. I find myself  
 “ now under the disagreeable necessity of avow-  
 “ ing that inability ; at the same time that I will  
 “ boldly take upon me to affirm, that on whom-  
 “ soever you might have delegated that charge,  
 “ it would have been sufficient to occupy the  
 “ entire attention of those who were entrusted  
 “ with it, and even with all the aids of leisure  
 “ and authority would have proved ineffectual.  
 “ I dare appeal to the public records, to the tes-  
 “ timony of those who have opportunities of  
 “ knowing me, and even to the detail which the  
 “ public voice can repeat of the past acts of  
 “ this government, that my time has been nei-  
 “ ther idly nor uselessly employed. Yet such  
 “ are the cares and embarrassments of this va-  
 “ rious state, that although much may be done,  
 “ much more even in matters of moment must  
 “ remain neglected. To select from the miscel-  
 “ laneous heap which each day's exigencies pre-  
 “ sents to our choice, those points on which the  
 “ general welfare of your affairs most essentially  
 “ depends, to provide expedients for future ad-  
 “ vantages, and guard against probable evils,  
 “ are all that your administration can faithfully  
 “ promise to perform for your service, with  
 “ their united labours most diligently exerted.  
 “ They cannot look back without sacrificing  
 “ the

“ the objects of their immediate duty, which  
 “ are those of your interests, to useless researches,  
 “ which can produce no real good, and may ex-  
 “ pose your affairs to all the ruinous consequen-  
 “ ces of personal malevolence both here and at  
 “ home.

“ May I be permitted to offer it, in all defe-  
 “ rence and submission to your commands, as  
 “ my opinion, that whatever may have been the  
 “ conduct of individuals, or even of the collec-  
 “ tive members of your former administrations,  
 “ the blame is not so much imputable to them as  
 “ to a want of principle of government adequate  
 “ to its substance, and a coercive power to en-  
 “ force it. The extent of Bengal and its possi-  
 “ ble resources are equal to those of most states  
 “ in Europe. Its difficulties are greater than  
 “ those of any, because it wants both an esta-  
 “ blished form and powers of government;  
 “ deriving its actual support from the unremit-  
 “ ted labours and personal exertions of indivi-  
 “ duals in power, instead of the vital influence  
 “ which flows through the channels of a regu-  
 “ lar constitution, and imperceptibly animates  
 “ every part of it. Our constitution is no  
 “ where to be traced but in the ancient charters  
 “ which were framed for the jurisdiction of your  
 “ trading settlements, the sales of your exports,  
 “ and the provision of your annual investments.  
 “ I need not observe how incompatible these  
 “ must

“ must prove to the government of a great  
 “ kingdom, and for the preservation of its  
 “ riches from private violence and embezzle-  
 “ ment.

“ Among your servants, who for a course of  
 “ years have been left at large, in possession of so  
 “ tempting a deposit, it is not to be wondered  
 “ at, that many have applied it to the advance-  
 “ ment of their own fortunes; or that those  
 “ who were possessed of abilities to introduce a  
 “ system of order, should have been drawn  
 “ along by the general current; since few men  
 “ are formed with so large a share of public vir-  
 “ tue as to sacrifice their interest, peace, and  
 “ social feelings to it, and to begin the work of  
 “ reformation on themselves,

“ I should not have presumed to expatiate on  
 “ a subject of this nature, although my own  
 “ justification has made it in some measure ne-  
 “ cessary; but that your late advices have gi-  
 “ ven hopes that we shall speedily be furnished  
 “ with your instructions for establishing a system  
 “ of law and polity, which we hitherto want,  
 “ Whenever this work shall be accomplished  
 “ on a foundation of consistency and permanen-  
 “ cy, I will venture to foretel, from the know-  
 “ ledge which I have of the general habits and  
 “ manners of your servants, that you will have  
 “ as few instances of licentiousness amongst

“ your servants as amongst the members of any  
 “ community in the British empire.”

What impression this solid and conclusive reasoning of the Governor-General made upon the Court of Directors is not known; but the East-India Company would have felt the good effects of it most sensibly, if, in consequence of this opinion, and the communication of his ideas upon the system of law and policy, the Court of Directors had new-modelled their instructions.

The disagreement in the Supreme Council became the general subjects of conversation in India. New hopes and fears were excited in all—every former transaction of Government was harshly censured—and the majority publicly declared, that they expected Mr. Hastings would be dismissed with disgrace from his station, as soon as their representations arrived in England.

When every act of Government which could be attributed to Mr. Hastings had been canvassed, his private character was attacked, and the man who had filled the most important stations in India with an unblemished reputation, who might with ease have accumulated a fortune of two hundred thousand pounds, during the many years that he was resident at the Court of Meer Jaffier, but who, it is well known, returned to his native country without a competency, was publicly accused of the most flagrant acts of rapacity and extortion, and of having

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amassed a fortune of four hundred thousand pounds in little more than two years.

To those who are acquainted with the moderation of Mr. Hastings's character, with his neglect of his private interest, this accusation appeared as absurd as it was ill founded ; but the proof was at hand, and Nundcomar stepped forth to support what they had advanced. It would indeed have been a cruel circumstance if the oath of Nundcomar had operated to the disadvantage even of a man as bad as himself ; but that it should have had the least weight in the accusation of a character so respectable, and so firmly established as the Governor-General's, will hardly be credited when the spirit of party has subsided : yet certain it is, that upon the assertion of this wretch, the majority fixed Mr. Hastings's fortune at forty lacks of rupees.

To gentlemen at all conversant in the affairs of Bengal, the character of Nundcomar was well known. Mr. Hastings had employed him on his first arrival at the express desire of the Directors, to whom he had explained his sentiments of the man very freely. He in fact foretold to them the part Nundcomar would act, if he ever had an opportunity. Captain Swinton, in his evidence before a Committee of the House of Commons, declared that Nundcomar had been repeatedly guilty of forgery, and for this crime he suffered death in August 1775 ; whether  
strictly

strictly legally has been questioned, but there never was a doubt of the fact of his being perjured, nor of the majority knowing he was so, when they accepted his service in accusing Mr. Hastings.

This man, before he was committed to custody, had opened what may properly be called an information office in Calcutta. It was well known, that he was countenanced by the majority. I am very clear that neither General Clavering or Colonel Monson, were aware of the dangerous use to which he would apply the power which he had acquired; but certain it is that the most liberal encouragement was given to informers of every denomination by the majority. Accusations as absurd as improbable were hourly received against the Governor-General; but although divested of all power, although Nundcomar was possessed of the means of proving his guilt had he really been guilty, after the fullest inquiry, with rewards offered on the one hand and punishments denounced on the other in order to procure the evidence which he wanted to criminate the Governor-General, nothing appeared that reflected either upon his honour or his integrity; unless it could be deemed a crime to receive from a Nabob a certain fixed sum for his expences during his residence at Moorshedabad, in conformity to the customs of the country, and to the examples which had

been set him by his predecessors, Lord Clive, Mr. Verelst, and Mr. Cartier. It was acknowledged by Sir George Wombwell in the General Court in 1776, that the allowance was to be taken, and that if he had given the Company credit for it, he might have charged them the expences of his progress: this allowance had been settled by Lord Clive in lieu of purveyance.

Let it for a moment be supposed that Mr. Hastings had accumulated the large fortune which the majority supposed him to be possessed of. Was it made at the expence of the East-India Company—had he added to the weight of their bonded debt—had he involved them in dangerous or expensive alliances—had he neglected to make the necessary remittances of cash to our other Presidencies, or to China—or had he diminished the annual investment to Europe—there might have been some excuse for inquiring into the amount of his private fortune, and how he had amassed it. But when this inquiry commenced, the Company's bond-debt of a million and an half was paying off; supplies had been sent to China, Fort St. George, and Bombay; two additional ships, the *Anson* and the *Northumberland*, had been taken up in Calcutta. So much was the investment increased; and the death of Sujah Dowlah gave us a prospect of  
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a still farther addition to our power, our influence, and our resources.

However, I will take upon me to affirm, that when the amount of the Governor-General's private fortune is known, it will appear to the most moderate man in England to be greatly inadequate either to the length or to the importance of his services.

During these violent attacks upon the character of Mr. Hastings, all public business was suspended. The inferior servants of the Company were divided into parties, and after the example of the Presidency, each Provincial Council had its majority and minority. Expensive prosecutions were commenced in the Supreme Court of Judicature against the Governor-General of India, who was reluctantly obliged, in vindication of his own honour, to bear a part in this disagreeable scene. At a time when our dominions and our influence were so greatly increased, at a time when the gentlemen of Bombay had commenced a war against the Mahrattas, at a time when the attention of every member of the Board should have been entirely employed in the consideration of the great political questions which were before them—at this time, the Governor-General and Council were attending as evidences or parties in a Court of law; Mr. Hastings in his own defence, and the gentlemen of the majority, as guardians of the interests



rests of the East-India Company, to criminate the man who had so essentially served his constituents.

So salutary were the regulations which Mr. Hastings had established, so firmly was the Government fixed in all its parts, that notwithstanding these unhappy dissensions, our affairs were at no former period in so flourishing a situation ; and in the course of the years 1775 and 1776, every promise which the Governor-General had made to the Court of Directors was amply fulfilled. Whether this prosperity was owing to Mr. Hastings's regulations, and the political connections which he formed previous to the 19th of October 1774, or to the abilities and exertions of the Supreme Council, since that period, can at once be determined by an examination of the Company's records.

A treaty highly advantageous to the Company was concluded with Asoph Ul Dowlah, by which the sovereignty of Benares was transferred to us, and a net revenue of twenty-four lacks of rupees acquired. The continuance of a brigade in the Vizier's dominions was another article of the treaty, and the subsidy fixed at two lacks and sixty thousand rupees a month.. Let not the Governor-General be deprived of the merit of these important acquisitions. The majority would never have agreed to advance our troops beyond the bounds of the Carumnassa ;  
they

they even were anxious to recall them immediately, and were only prevented from actually doing so, by the earnest opposition of Mr. Hastings. In either case, the death of Sujah Dowlah would have been attended with no advantages to the Company. The provinces of Oude, Corah, and Allahabad would have been torn by civil wars, and must, in the end, have been subdued, either by Nuzoph Cawn or the Mahrattas.

In September 1776 Colonel Monson died. No man was more ready to do justice to that gentleman's abilities than Mr. Hastings, or more sincerely lamented the unhappy prejudices which he imbibed on his first arrival in Bengal. Bred a soldier, and having served with distinguished reputation in India, he was admirably calculated for the command of our army in Bengal; to which had he fortunately been appointed, and confined to his professional duties, the Company would have experienced the good effects of his return to India in a very sensible degree.

At this period too we received advice of the extraordinary revolution at Madras. The Supreme Council were unanimous in their opinion of the measures to be taken upon so critical an occasion, and of the powers which Lord Pigot claimed, as president of a Council in which he had only a casting voice when the numbers were equal. That the powers of a Governor in India are very inadequate to the dignity of his station,  
and

and to the responsibility annexed to it, is beyond a doubt. This was Mr. Hastings's opinion, and he expressed it very freely to the Court of Directors, in the letter of which I have already given an extract: but until those powers are enlarged, a Governor, with a majority against him, must be a mere cypher. The Governor-General had only taken upon him to break up the Council, when the majority had called Nundcomar before them, for the extraordinary purpose of preferring a criminal accusation against their President, and the first British subject in India. For this small exertion of authority he was severely reprimanded by the Court of Directors, and plainly informed, that he had no distinct authority annexed to his station, but that all the powers of government were vested in a majority of the Board. Could the Governor-General allow that a law which was to bind him, was not of force when applied to the Governor of a subordinate presidency. The Court of Directors' sentiments on this subject were of sufficient force to determine the Supreme Council, had the reference made to them by the gentlemen of Fort St. George been a point of difficulty.

It was necessary to mention this unhappy business, because Mr. Stratton has published some partial extracts of a private letter, which he received from the Governor-General immediately

after that revolution, from which it might appear that he was interested in the dispute, although he had not the smallest personal concern in it. To those who have seen the whole letter, this explanation is unnecessary.

By the orders of the Company, wisely framed with a view to comply with Asiatic customs, all political negotiations are conducted through the channel of the Governors of the different presidencies. A native of India can have no idea of a participation of power, and he very naturally concludes that a Governor is either absolute, or has no power in the state over which he presides.

When the connection of this government with Suja Dowla, was more closely cemented, Mr. Hastings thought proper to appoint Mr. Nathaniel Middleton his private agent at the court of that prince. When the Supreme Council was divided into two distinct parties, Mr. Middleton was recalled, and Mr. Bristow, the confidential friend of Mr. Francis, appointed in his room.

By this step the annihilation of the Governor General's political influence was completely proclaimed to every power in Indostan. While Mr. Bristow remained at Lucknow, Mr. Hastings, could only be looked upon as the constrained instrument of an authority raised upon the ruin of his own. This evident truth, will not be disputed by any man who has served in India ; from

the period of Colonel Monson's death to the time of Mr. Middleton's reappointment to the Vizier's Court, the attention of every man from Calcutta to Dehly was fixed upon this single point, as the criterion, by which he was to judge, whether Mr. Hastings meant to retain or to give up the government. I do not rest the propriety of this measure upon the obligation which Mr. Hastings lay under, of doing an act of justice to an individual who had suffered severely for his attachment to him. But I insist upon it, that the public service could not be carried on with effect, while an opinion prevailed in Oude, that Mr. Hastings was upon the point of quitting the Chair; and such would have been the conclusion had Mr. Briskow been permitted to remain there. He was known to be the confidential friend of Mr. Francis; and however Mr. Hastings might have approved of his conduct, he could not give a person so situated his entire confidence, even admitting it possible to answer the other objections which I will venture to affirm are not to be controverted.

The Governor-General surely should not be expected to conduct the complicated affairs of an extensive empire, where our countrymen bear so very small a proportion in point of numbers to the natives, upon principles so different from those upon which all countries are regulated, and so totally different from those by which the  
late

late majority professedly acted. The late Mr. Playdell was deprived of the office of superintendent of the police (which was immediately given to the brother-in-law of Mr. Francis) for his activity in presenting an address to the chief justice that was obnoxious to the majority.\* Mr. Playdell complained bitterly of the ill usage which he had received, but it was observed in reply that what had happened to him, was the chance of the worthiest men in England upon every change in administration, and that no wise government would ever employ men in offices of trust under them of whose attachment they were not very well assured. This reasoning however it may appear in the case of Mr. Playdell, whose appointment was of very little consequence to the state, it is surely conclusive in that now before us.

The removal of Mr. Fowke from Benares was from the same motive.

Benares is one of the richest cities in India. It is the residence of learned men, and the center of all political business. Vacqueels or agents from every prince in India reside here, and as the British government is confessedly now the most

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important

\* Writs had been attempted to be taken out, which would have reached every part of Bengal and brought natives to Calcutta; the Court refused them. This moderation and justice procured them an address of thanks from the different sets of inhabitants at Calcutta.

important in Indostan, it is absolutely necessary that the resident at Benares should be dependant upon the ruling party in the Supreme Council. Upon this principle was Mr. Fowke sent there by the majority, and upon the same principle was he recalled after Colonel Monson's death. It is sufficient to state these facts as they really are, and then the Governor-General's conduct towards Mr. Bristow and Mr. Fowke will need neither a justification or an apology. Whoever shall attribute these removals to a personal pique, or shall conceive Mr. Hastings capable of gratifying a private resentment at the expence of Mr. Bristow and Mr. Fowke, will be much deceived. He is too liberal to act from such narrow principles !

Every measure proposed by the Governor-General, however salutary, was opposed by General Clavering, and supposed to be ultimately intended to answer some private view. The settlement of the lands, having been made for five years only, was on the point of expiring soon after Colonel Monson's death : Mr. Hastings proposed to obtain the fullest information of the state of the country, that the revenues might be fixed upon an equitable scale : to assist him in the laborious task which he had imposed upon himself, he had fixed upon two gentlemen of distinguished abilities and irreproachable characters, whose proceedings were to have been laid before the Council

Council at large, in whom was vested the power of decision upon every point. Much valuable information was procured and transmitted to the Court of Directors in consequence of this investigation, both as to the state of the country and its population and resources; but at that time it really appeared sufficient to blast every scheme, however beneficial, that it was proposed by Mr. Hastings: The minority questioned its legality; and General Clavering denominated it a trick to extort money from the Zemindars for the benefit of Mr. Hastings and his friends.

The last material act of Mr. Hastings's administration, previous to the death of General Clavering was, the increase of our military establishment; a measure which has been attended with infinite advantages to the public and to individuals; and has effectually secured the continuance of our influence in the extensive dominions of the Vizier. To set this matter on a clear point of view, and to free it from the false lights which may be thrown upon it, I will briefly relate the steps which led to it.

Sujah Dowlah died in February 1775. His eldest son, Asolph ul Dowlah, was declared the heir of his father's dominions, but he owed his peaceable succession to the Musnud to the presence of our army. Intrigues were immediately formed against him, and in his troops mutinous  
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and disaffected, were many officers in the interest of his competitors. The Vizier, justly alarmed for his personal safety, which had frequently been endangered, disbanded the most turbulent of his battalions, and applied to the Supreme Council for British officers to discipline those which he retained in his service. In consequence of this requisition nine captains and thirty subalterns were appointed to his service, and were to receive the pay of the rank next above that which they held in Bengal. No funds were fixed for the payment of these officers, or of the troops which they were to command ; so that in fact this new establishment was subject to all those inconveniences which it was meant to redress.

A General spirit of mutiny broke out amongst the Vizier's troops immediately after the arrival of our officers ; this in some battalions was carried to the most alarming lengths. Many officers were seized, confined, and threatened to be put to death. The storm at length subsided. The principal mutineers were punished, and discipline was in some measure restored. Many however were the disadvantages which our service sustained by this establishment. The emoluments were so considerable to those who had the good fortune to be appointed to the Vizier's service, that it created a general spirit of discontent amongst our officers in Bengal ; and trifling as the  
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establishment was in point of numbers, the expence of it so far exceeded all bounds, that the Vizier was unable to keep it up, and to discharge his debt to the Company. Certainly a service in which the emoluments to individuals so far exceeded those in our own, required some regulations. Mr. Hastings had seen the bad effects of a similar establishment in the Carnatic, and the Company at this moment most severely feel it: upon Colonel Monson's death he proposed a remedy for them.

On the principle that our interests and the Vizier's were thus closely connected, Mr. Hastings brought his plan before the Board, which was, that three regiments of horse, three companies of artillery, and nine battalions of Sepoys, should be added to our establishments, and with this addition of force we were to protect the Vizier's dominions. The disciplined corps in his service were to form this body; and to fix them more firmly in our service, they were to take their tour of duty in our provinces, and to be subject to the same regulations with respect to pay as the rest of our army. The Vizier was to appropriate certain fixed funds for the payment of these troops, so that this important addition to our army was made without the smallest expence to the East-India Company.

Beneficial as this plan must appear, and to which only one objection could be urged, the

difficulty of procuring the Vizier's assent to it, it was vehemently opposed. Mr. Francis contended, that all military arrangements should originate with the Commander in Chief, although this was evidently a great political regulation of the highest consequence. The General's objections were numerous. The Vizier's consent was obtained through the agency of Mr. Middleton; the plan was soon after carried into execution, and has so completely answered every good end which was proposed by it, that even those gentlemen who lost considerably by the alteration, have been candid enough to declare, that no act of Mr. Hastings's administration redounds more to his honour or to the Company's advantage, than this establishment, formed against the opinion of the Commander in Chief, and the opposition of Mr. Francis.

The provinces of Oude, Corah, Allahabad, Rohilcund, and the Doab, have been protected, the revenues have been collected, and the troops have been regularly paid from the day this establishment took place; and in the year 1780 the general relief of the army was effected; by which these new battalions were brought into our provinces, and relieved by an equal number from Bengal.

In August 1777 General Clavering died. A man whose character must be always considered with respect, as his errors arose from a good principle,

principle, the hatred of corruption. He certainly brought with him to Bengal a rooted prejudice against the Company's servants in general, and a very unjust one against Mr. Hastings in particular. The Court of Directors by their instructions, in which from the best motives they authorised a review of past transactions, opened so wide a field for imposition, that the General's prejudices were still more confirmed by the improbable tales which were hourly brought to him. The violence of the majority absolutely created a party, where otherwise there would have been none.

Mr. Hastings, through the whole course of his public life, had given the strongest proofs of his integrity and disinterestedness; Sir John Clavering's has never been questioned; had some pains therefore been taken to unite such respectable characters, the intention of the legislature in forming the Supreme Council would have been effectually answered; but as it was, the first impressions which the General received, from a certain perseverance in his temper, grew stronger every day, and the interest of the East-India Company unhappily suffered by it.

I do not mean to infer that no abuses existed in Bengal when the Supreme Council arrived there. Let it be considered that Mr. Hastings was the President of a Council, in which he had a casting voice only when the numbers

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were equal, consequently that he would sometimes be obliged to accommodate his opinion to the sense of the majority of his Council ; but it is a certain truth, that whilst he had the lead, he did more to reform abuses than any other man would have done or attempted : The establishment of the Supreme Council was calculated for completing his plans of reformation, a work in which he would most cordially have taken the lead ; but unfortunately he was obliged to give up that time, which might have been so valuably employed for the public service, to the justification of past, and successful measures, and even to the defence of his private character.

Passing over common occurrences I come to that period in which arose the present expensive (though when Mr. Hastings's scheme prevailed successful) war with the Mahrattas. It has been industriously endeavoured to impute the origin as well as progress of this war to Mr. Hastings. The Court of Directors are possessed of the fullest evidence to the contrary, and both living testimony and authentic documents prove that its origin is not owing to him, and that the continuation of it is the effect of necessity.

It will be proper to take up this important subject from the first connection of the Bombay Council with Ragonath Row, otherwise called Ragobah.

Although

Although the nominal sovereignty of the Mahratta state was in a Raja, the real administration of government, as well as the power inherent to it, was possessed by a Bramin family under the title of Pashwa or Chancellor, and this authority was so fixed in them that it became hereditary, and in case of infancy the State was governed by a Regent, who was generally the nearest in blood. Narrein Row, the last Pashwa, died leaving no children; and Ragobah, who was his uncle, became Pashwa. During an expedition which carried him to a distance from his capital, the Council (consisting of Bramins) dispossessed him, giving out that the widow of Narrein was with child, and accusing him of having assassinated his nephew. The first of these facts was doubtful, the latter most probably false, he having been in confinement for a long time before that event, without any communication with the conspirators. Soon after it was given out that the widow of Narrein was delivered of a son; and Narra, with Saccarum and others of the Bramin Council, acting as they alledged, in support of the infant, drove Ragobah from Poona, and reduced him to such distresses that he applied for assistance to the Presidency of Bombay.

Not relying solely on the justice of his cause, the more readily to obtain assistance, he offered

to make some very valuable cessions of territory to the East-India Company. A treaty was concluded, by which we engaged to assist him with a military force; and an army from Bombay took the field under the command of Colonel Keating; whether our forces, in conjunction with Ragobah's would have conducted him in triumph to Poona is uncertain, but it can hardly be doubted that a few spirited operations would have been productive of an advantageous peace with the ministerial party, both for the Company and for Ragonaut Row.

Intelligence of the transactions at Bombay was received at Calcutta a few months after the first meeting of the Supreme Council, whose authority in this transaction having been totally disregarded, either from inadvertence or design, produced very serious consequences. The treaty with Ragobah having been concluded without the sanction of the Governor-General and Council was disavowed; and an officer of rank (Lieutenant Colonel Upton) was deputed to Poona, with instructions to conclude a peace upon almost any terms, with the ministers who were denominated the ruling members of the Mahratta state; and the English army was ordered to march back.

So glaring a condemnation of past measures, and so pointed an interference in their affairs,  
naturally

naturally tended to destroy the influence of the gentlemen of Bombay, upon the Malabar coast; while it provoked their passions and excited their resentments. Under these circumstances, a co-operation with Colonel Upton could not be expected. It had been fortunate if, from that moment, the Government of Bombay had been fixed upon a plan of the most rigid œconomy; and their troops had been confined to the defence of Bombay, the castle of Surat, and the island of Salsette.

Mr. Hastings, although he joined with the other members in disapproving the conduct of the Presidency of Bombay, thought that there might exist circumstances which should prevent the return of the army, but he was over ruled, and the moderation of our demands was attributed very naturally by the Mahrattas to a want of ability to carry on the war. Colonel Upton was five months on his journey to Poona. He was treated with great disrespect by the Mahratta Chiefs through whose countries he passed. The Ministers, on his arrival, complained bitterly of our interference in their family disputes; and were so high in their demands, insisting even upon the restoration of Salsette, that Colonel Upton broke off the negociation; and by his first dispatches to Calcutta, it was supposed that the war would be



be continued. But this was a mere trick of the Ministers, who were anxious for an accommodation ; and on the 1st of March, 1776, a treaty of peace was signed by Colonel Upton, on the part of our Government ; and on their side was authenticated by the seal of the Pashwa, an infant of about two years old, and by the signature of his two Ministers, Sacaram Bappoo and Nana Furnese. By one article of the treaty, a provision was made for the subsistence of Ragobah, their late competitor, on condition of his residing in the heart of the Mahratta dominions, with a guard appointed by the Ministers themselves, for his state and security. This clause, as might reasonably be expected, defeated the intention of the treaty, since it left Ragobah at the mercy of his enemies, without any pledge or engagement for his safety. The consequence was, that he fled to Bombay and claimed the protection of that Government for the security of his person.

The Ministers exclaimed against this protection ; and mutual complaints of the inexecution of this treaty were made by them and the Bombay Council. About the Month of May, 1777, the Chevalier St. Lubin made his appearance at Poona, in the public character of a Minister from the Court of France. He was received with great honour, and in a little time written engagements

engagements were mutually interchanged between him and Nana Furnese, by which he promised to bring a regiment of Europeans, with military stores, to Poona, for the service of the Mahratta state. Intelligence of this treaty, at first doubted, was soon confirmed by authorities of unquestionable credit, and by a series of facts of public notoriety. It had been always the Governor-General's opinion, that this was the only way by which the French could hope to regain their consequence in India, or to affect ours; and he reasonably expected, that the Presidency of Bombay, which was more immediately interested in the effects of such a connection, would take some steps to render it abortive. This was by no means difficult. The Mahratta army under Hurry Punt Furkia, was at that time engaged in an unequal war with Hyder Ally. The Ministers quarrelling among themselves, possessed little authority, and were dependent for that little upon their own vassals. The Presidency of Bombay had long shewn an impatience to revive the cause of Ragobah; and the slightest movements made by them in his favour\* would have proved sufficient to overthrow the feeble power which they had to contend with, and to establish their own influence in the Mahratta state on its ruins. But Mr. Hastings, that he might leave no means untried

untried to avoid a rupture with the Mahrattas, and to counteract the French influence at Poona, schemed a treaty, which he meant should remedy all the defects of that concluded by Colonel Upton ; every article of which, at that time remained unexecuted. This treaty was laid before the Board in Calcutta, with a very long explanatory minute, on the 23d of January, 1778, and will, if read with the attention it deserves, entirely exculpate the Governor-General from the smallest suspicion of a desire to involve the East India Company in a war with the Mahrattas. On the 29th of January, whilst this minute lay for consideration, a letter was received from Bombay, dated the 12th of December, 1777, informing the Supreme Council that a proposal had been secretly made to the Governor and Council, through their agent at Poona, by a party which had been formed against Nana Furnese, consisting of Sacaram Bappoo, who had signed the treaty, and other considerable men, with a potent Raja, Tuckajee Holkar, to assist them in the design of reinstating Rago-bah in the chief administration of the Mahratta state ; and that they had agreed to join in it, requiring only, as a preliminary condition, a written application to the same effect, under the hands and seals of the confederates. They excused themselves for having so far engaged them-

themselves, without the previous authority of the the Supreme Council, by the obvious necessity of an immediate decision ; and they requested their acquiescence and assistance in it. On the receipt of this letter the Governor-General and Council resolved to ratify what they had done, to authorize them to proceed, and to send them an extraordinary supply of ten lacks of rupees for the undertaking. It was also resolved, to assist them in the execution of their plan with a military force.

In forming these resolutions the majority of the Supreme Council were swayed by the following considerations.

1st. In the event of a rupture with France, which was daily apprehended, the connection formed by Nana Furnese with St. Lubin, and the engagement which he had entered into to land a regiment of Europeans with military stores at Poona, might, if carried into effect, be productive of the most dangerous consequences to the Company's influence, and their possessions in India. This could be prevented only by the removal of the party so closely connected with our natural enemy, and therefore this was an object of the first importance ; and Ragonaut Row was the instrument for this purpose. Mr. Hastings had no predilection for this Chief, nor is it possible to attribute his conduct to any interested view.

2dly, Authorizing the gentlemen of Bombay to take part with Ragobah, was a strict compliance with the orders of the Court of Directors contained in the following paragraph of their general letter of the 5th of February 1777.

“ His (Ragobah’s) pretensions to the Supreme authority, either in his own right, or as guardian to the infant Pathwa, appear to us better founded than those of his competitors ; and therefore, if the conditions of the treaty of Poona have not been strictly fulfilled on the part of the Mahrattas, and if, from any circumstances, you shall deem it expedient, we shall have no objection to an alliance with Ragobah, on the terms agreed upon between him and the Governor and Council of Bombay.”

3dly, The restoration of Ragobah would have been attended by an accession of territory upon the Malabar coast to the amount of the annual expences of the Presidency of Bombay ; by which means no further drains would have been made from our treasury in Bengal.

4thly, The restoration of Ragobah was not a breach of the treaty of Poona, because that treaty was signed by Saccarum Bappoo and Nana Furnese only ; and Saccarum, the first Minister in rank, with the principal officers of the Mahratta state, joined in the proposal to the gentlemen of Bombay, for his return to Poona.

Mr.

Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheeler however, strenuously opposed the measure, on various grounds; and amongst others, because it was in disobedience to the order of the Court of Directors.

I must here interrupt my narrative, to observe in what view the Directors considered the conduct of the Governor-General in this instance.

About the 29th of July 1778, the Court of Directors received dispatches both from Bombay and Bengal, in which they were informed of the plan proposed to the Presidency of Bombay, by the opponents of Nana Furnese, of the sanction given to it by the Governor-General and Council, and of their resolution to assist them with money and a considerable reinforcement, in order the more effectually to carry it into execution, and to support them in the consequences of it. These advices the Court of Directors thought of such great importance, that on the 29th of August 1778, Colonel Capper was applied to by the Select Committee of the Court of Directors, to carry a packet to Bombay of the greatest national importance. He accordingly left London the 1st of September, and by the letters which he brought, both the gentlemen of Bengal and Bombay had the satisfaction to receive the fullest approbation of the Directors, who express very strong anxiety for Ragobah's restoration, and the overthrow of that party at Poona

in alliance with the French. The first ship of the season, brought out a complete approbation to Mr. Hastings, for the part which he had acted, in this important business.

On the 23d of February, 1778, orders were issued for forming a detachment of six battalions of Seapoys, one company of native artillery, with a regular proportion of field artillery, to which were afterwards added, the first regiment of cavalry and five hundred of the Viziers Candahar horse. Colonel Leslie was appointed to command this force, and ordered to march directly to Bombay by the shortest route he should judge most practicable, and for the sequel of his operations, he was to obey the orders of the President and Council of Bombay. This detachment crossed the Jumma the latter end of May, with slight and ineffectual opposition from Ballajee Pundit, the chief of the Mahratta territories dependent upon Culpee. In the mean time the design which had furnished the occasion of this expedition was suffered to sleep at Bombay, the violent ardour of that Presidency for the cause of Ragonaut Row ceasing with the removal of the bar which had been laid on the prosecution of it. It produced however the principal effects intended by the promotion of it. These suddenly assembling their forces on the 30th of March, deprived Nana Furnese of his authority, and invested Moraba Furnese with it in his stead. This easy revolution, without bloodshed or

contest, proved the extreme weakness of the Mahratta government and the great facility with which the plan, offered to the Presidency of Bombay, might have been executed in its full extent, had they immediately engaged in it. When the gentlemen of Bombay first heard of Colonel Leslie's march they ordered him to halt, and a few days after, they sent him an order to prosecute his march, but without any object described, or plan of operations proposed, or thought on : thus abandoned by the Presidency of Bombay, Mr. Hastings had recourse to other means which were more within the compass of his own direction, and for which he had in some degree made a provision a considerable time before, on the presumption of the utility of which it might prove in the event of a rupture with the Mahrattas.

When the Supreme Council determined to send a detachment to the other side of India, the Governor General applied to the Raja of Berar to grant his permission for its free march through his territories, with such assistance as it might require on the way. He received an immediate answer to his application on such terms as he wished, and the Raja at the same time sent a person to the banks of the Nurbudda, which bounds his dominions to the north, with a store of grain for the subsistence of the detachment, and orders to attend it through his country, of which he

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advised Colonel Leslie, inviting him to take that route, and assuring him of his most friendly reception.

The nominal Sovereign of the Mahratta state, who had languished in honourable confinement at Sattarah, Rajah Ram Rajah, died in December, 1777. He left no children, and Modajee Boosla, Rajah of Berar, had the fairest pretensions to the succession, being in direct lineal descent from the ancient stock, and the adopted son of Sahoo Rajah, the predecessor of Ram Rajah, though deprived of his right by the artifices of Ballajee, who was the Peshwa, when Sahoo Rajah died. Mr. Hastings judged Moodajee Boosla to be a proper person to supply the place of Ragobah, in the plan offered to the Supreme Council for overturning the French influence at Poona. He possessed wealth, power, and a territory extending from the borders of Bengal almost to Poona. Ragobah had neither wealth or power, nor had he influence to supply the want of these requisites, except what might arise from the Presidency of Bombay taking an active part in his favour, and it did not then appear that they took any. Mr. Hastings wished and expected the proposal of an alliance to come from Moodajee, and he had deputed his Vackeel to him for that purpose, a man of understanding, and well instructed, but it now became necessary to take a more active and determined part.

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On the 7th of July 1778, advices deemed worthy of credit were received from Cairo that war had been declared between Great-Britain and France; at Paris on the 18th, and in London on the 30th of March. The destination of Count D'Estaings's fleet was not then known. It was very naturally supposed to be intended against Bombay, and the first advices which were received from England, tended still more strongly to confirm this supposition. The Chevalier St. Lubin was known to be still at Poona, and to hold frequent conferences with the ministers of the Pashwa. The Supreme Council, regardless of all personal consequences, determined instantly to take possession of all the French settlements in Bengal, and of the ships in the river. At the same time, they earnestly recommended to the Presidency of Fort St. George, to commence the siege of Pondicherry immediately, and if possible to secure the friendship of Hyder Ally Cawn. It was also resolved to enter into a negotiation with Moodajee, on the grounds which I have mentioned above. Mr. Elliot was deputed on this service. ~~At~~ <sup>Mr</sup> Cuttack he overtook Mr. Chevalier, the Governor of Chandernagore, who had escaped from that place, and was so far in his way to Pondicherry. Mr. Elliot had the address to persuade Moodajee's Deputy at that place, to consent to his apprehending Mr. Chevalier; which he did, and sent him

him a prisoner to Fort William. By his papers the reality of the French scheme against us was fully evinced. He then proceeded towards Naigpore, the capital of Berar : the whole service could not have afforded an agent more proper for such an embassy, and Mr. Hastings's hopes were proportionably raised, but as suddenly blasted by the untimely death of that very valuable young man about a fortnight after he had left Cuttack. It is more than probable that if Mr. Elliot had arrived at Naigpore, an alliance of the most beneficial consequence to the East-India Company would have been concluded with the Rajah of Berar.

Colonel Leslie, when Mr. Elliot died, had advanced but 120 miles from Calpee, having employed too much of his time in settling the family disputes of the Bundella Chiefs. He was recalled from his command on the 7th of October, but by his death Colonel Goddard had succeeded to it before the letter reached the camp.

Colonel Goddard immediately prosecuted his march to the banks of the Nerbudda, and was empowered on his arrival there to treat with Moodajee. He deputed his interpreter to the Court of that Prince ; who, in his letter to Mr. Hastings, after the death of Mr. Elliot, had desired the negotiation might be transferred to his secretary ; and had expressed the strongest inclination to bring it to a conclusion.

A second and unexpected revolution was effected at Poona on the 26th of June, and Moraba Furnese was imprisoned with his principal adherents. Moraba, before his imprisonment, had made proposals to the Presidency of Bombay, who had resolved to conduct Ragobah with an army to Poona : a circumstance well known to Moodajee, who, in consequence of it, declined the alliance which was proposed to him, deeming Ragobah's interests incompatible with his own : but with very cordial professions of friendship for the English nation, which he evinced by furnishing Colonel Goddard with cash, provisions, and draft cattle, for his artillery. Colonel Goddard advanced towards Poona by quick marches.

I have already observed that the Bombay gentlemen had reassumed their design in favour of Ragobah. The period at which they reassumed it was unfavourable ; Ragobah's principal adherents were confined, and Colonel Goddard, whose army would by its presence have insured success, was at a considerable distance. I wish to relate facts, and not to comment upon them. On the 23d of November the Bombay army, consisting of one hundred and forty-three artillery, five hundred and forty-eight European infantry, two thousand two hundred and seventy Seapoys, and five hundred Lascars, was transported to the Continent. On the 23d of December they

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ascended

ascended the Gauts and marched towards Poona, and on the 9th of January it was determined to retreat, on account of a scarcity of provisions, although they had a supply for eighteen days, and there was but one short day's march to Poona. So much alarmed had the ministers been for the event, that, by their agent at Bombay, they had offered fresh terms to the Governor before the army advanced. The commanding officer, Colonel Cockburn, when consulted, said that he had not a doubt of the army's marching to Poona, but that our troops had not been used to retreat. However, the resolution was not to be altered. The army was formed into three divisions, encumbered with baggage, and moved off by night. They were attacked by numerous bodies of Mahrattas, but defended themselves with the utmost bravery, and sustained a loss comparatively small, if the length of the action and the numbers of the foe are considered. In the evening of that day application was made to Nana and Sindia, for an undisturbed retreat of the army to Bombay ; this was granted, upon the humiliating terms, that Salcot, and every other acquisition by the Bombay Government since the time of Mahderow, should be given up, and that orders should be sent to Col. Goddard, to return with his army to Bengal.

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It is true, the Committee \* who governed that army, gave an express declaration in writing that they had not the power to bind the Supreme Council to the observance of these terms, and the Mahratta Chiefs know it was so.

By this fatal check the honour of the British arms was tarnished, the cause of Ragobah Row given up ; and, had the treaty been valid, all our conquests upon the Malabar coasts ceded to the Mahrattas. That the corps which took the field from Bombay, was strong enough to resist the united force of the Mahratta empire, is beyond a doubt ; that it was able to surmount every obstruction which the suddenly collected army of the Mahrattas could have thrown in its way, is highly probable, (since two of our battalions, with four field pieces, in February 1780, put twenty thousand of their best troops under Madjee Sindia to the rout) but that by waiting for the junction of General Goddard's army every possibility of a failure would have been avoided, cannot be disputed.

Colonel Goddard, when he was about three hundred miles from Surat, and the same distance from Poona, received an order from the Poona Committee to return to Bengal, without

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\* The Council of Bombay, on the 4th of November, appointed Mr. Carnac, Colonel Egerton, and Mr. Mostyn, a Committee to carry their plan into execution, this was called the Poona Committee, Mr. Mostyn died during the expedition.

any notice being taken of the disaster, and retreat of the Bombay army ; after mature reflection he determined, notwithstanding this order, to advance towards Surat. On his march a Vackeel from the Mahratta ministers arrived in his camp, with a copy of the convention. Colonel Goddard denied that the Committee had any authority over him, and said that he was directed to march to Bombay for the security of the Company's possessions against the designs of the French, and that he should prosecute his march. He effected his arrival at Surat on the 18th of February 1779.

Sir Eyre Coote arrived in Bengal on the 27th of March 1779 ; the Supreme Council was then complete, and the Governor-General at the first assembly of the Board, although they had not received a full account of the transactions at Bombay, proposed that we should, if possible, conclude a lasting peace with the Mahrattas upon the terms of Colonel Upton's treaty. His proposal was unanimously agreed to, and Colonel Goddard appointed the minister of this Government.

The Supreme Council were as unanimous in disavowing the convention of Worgaum, concluded by the Poona Committee ; but, anxious for peace with the Mahrattas, and on a supposition that the gentlemen of Bombay might not heartily co-operate with them, Colonel Goddard

was

was instructed to use his utmost endeavours to effect a reconciliation. All these resolutions were moved by the Governor-General ; no member of the Board proposed to avow the convention of Wargaum ; upon what grounds therefore hath Mr. Hastings been charged as the author of the Mahratta war ?

Colonel, now General, Goddard, when he had received his instructions, communicated his appointment to the ministers at Poona ; and they deputed a Vackeel to negotiate a treaty of peace with him. Before this Vackeel arrived at Surat, Ragobah had made his escape from the officers of Sindia, who had charge of his person, and were conveying him to a place of confinement. He fled to Surat, and general Goddard agreed to give him personal protection ; informing the ministers at Poona of this unexpected event. The Vackeel arrived at Surat—received our proposals—returned to Poona, and promised to forward a categorical answer in three weeks. After some delays, during which time General Goddard received intelligence that the ministers were negotiating a treaty with Hyder Ally, and making every preparation for war, the Vackeel returned to Surat, with the only terms on which the Mahrattas would consent to a peace. These were, that we should cede Salserte to them, and deliver up the person of Ragobah Row. Thus were the efforts of the Supreme Council dis-



disappointed ; can this disappointment be attributed to a want of zeal for an accommodation, either in the Governor-General or General Goddard ?

General Goddard at the same time received intelligence, that an alliance had been concluded at Poona, between Hyder Ally, the Mahrattas, Nizan Ally Cawn, and Moodajee Boosla. By the principal article of it, the Mahrattas, under Madjee Sindia and Tukajee Holkar, were to act against General Goddard in Guzerat ; Hyder Ally was to invade the Carnatic ; the Nizam the northern Circars, and Moodajee Boosla, Bengal. The truth of this intelligence has since been fatally confirmed. The Nizam, the projector of the treaty, acted the part which he did, in revenge for the Presidency of Fort St. George, having concluded an alliance with his brother Bazalet Jung, by which they acquired possession of the Guntoor Circar ; and Hyder Ally Cawn, very strongly expressed his disgust at our acquisition of that Circar. This business will doubtless be fully investigated ; and it is foreign from my subject to take any further notice of it here. Moodajee Boosla was very unwillingly drawn in to take a part against us. Of this there cannot be a doubt, as he regularly kept the Governor-General informed of the designs which were formed against us, and purposely delayed the march of his army until the

the season of action should be past, with the hope that in the last rains, our differences with the Mahrattas would have been accommodated. The Nizam has hitherto been inactive, though the original projector of the confederacy.

The army at Surat was strengthened by detachments from Bombay and Fort St. George; and General Goddard was furnished with discretionary orders, should the treaty with the Mahrattas prove abortive. He took the field in December 1779; and soon after concluded a treaty with Futty Sing Guicawar, by which the extensive province of Guzzerat was equally divided between the East-India Company and him. He immediately advanced towards Ahmedabad, the capital of that part of Guzzerat, which was in the possession of the Mahrattas. This place our troops took by storm; a conquest which added greatly to the splendour of our arms. In three months he intirely subdued the whole province. Madjee Sindia, who had assembled the Mahratta forces, was marching with an intent to relieve Ahmedabad, not supposing that we should so soon be in possession of it. General Goddard leaving a garrison in this place, advanced towards the Mahratta army to offer them battle; which, notwithstanding their great superiority of numbers, and the unfortunate event of the Bombay expedition, which must naturally have  
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elated them, their General declined upon every occasion.

So anxious was General Goddard, knowing the good consequence of engaging the Mahratta army, that on the 2d of April, 1780, he left his army on their ground, and advanced to storm the enemy's camp at the head of two hundred Europeans, ten companies of grenadier Seapoys, and three battalions of Seapoys, two twelve and ten six-pounders, with the first regiment of Cavalry and the Candahar horse: with this force, so greatly inferior to the troops that retreated before the Mahratta army the preceding year, he advanced, passed their principal guards, and instantly attacked the main body drawn up ready to receive him. Our artillery did great execution amongst their numerous cavalry, and in an hour from the commencement of the action they retreated, after a considerable loss; nor did a single horseman appear to molest our army in its return to camp. Every action of this campaign was equally glorious to our arms. Captain John Campbell, of the Bengal establishment, was detached with a foraging party to a considerable distance from their camp, and on his return with a large convoy of provisions, he was attacked by Sindia at the head of twenty thousand men, the flower of the Mahratta army. Captain Campbell formed his detachment, consisting of two battalions of Seapoys, and four  
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field pieces, to the best advantage, repulsed the Mahrattas who lost between five and six hundred men, many of whom were killed by the fire of the flank companies of our line. Captain Campbell, after this remarkable action, joined General Goddard without the loss of a man or of any part of his convoy. Lieutenant Welsh, of the Bengal establishment was detached by General Goddard on the 3d of May to surprize a body of six thousand Mahrattas ; his force consisted of the first regiment of cavalry and a battalion of Seapoys. Lieutenant Welsh, when he had performed half his march, found, by calculating the time which remained, that if he waited for his infantry, he should not arrive before day break in the enemy's camp. He therefore came to the spirited resolution of advancing at the head of the cavalry only ; with this force he entered the Mahratta camp, seized the enemy's cannon, which he turned upon them in their flight. The rout was general. The commanding officer and a great number of the Mahrattas were killed ; and the artillery, bazar, ammunition, &c. fell into our hands. No victory could be more decisive : and this officer had the good fortune soon after to get possession of two forts, which intirely completed the conquest of Guzerat.

Major Forbes, of the Bengal establishment, at the head of two battalions of Seapoys, effec-

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tually surprized and routed a body of seven thousand Mahrattas, and with this action closed the campaign of 1780, both parties retiring to quarters for the rainy season. General Goddard commenced the present campaign by the conquest of the important fort of Bassein, and by a decisive victory over the Mahratta army, which had been sent to relieve the place. The Mahrattas themselves deeply feel the loss of this important fortress, which they had taken from the Portuguese after a siege of two years.

I now return to the transactions in Bengal, where the measures proposed by Mr. Hastings were attended with the most brilliant advantages.

When the Governor-General found, by General Goddard's dispatches, that we had no hopes of an accommodation with the Mahrattas, he concluded that the only mode of bringing them in one campaign to reasonable terms would be by attacking them in every quarter. For this purpose he entered into a treaty with the Rana of Gohid, an independent Prince, whose country had been invaded by them. Mr. Hastings's motives for entering into this alliance were, to distress the Mahrattas, by making a considerable diversion in one of their best provinces, in conjunction with the Rana's forces, and if possible, to acquire possession of the important fortress of Gualier. But he had another view, which  
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would effectually have humbled the Mahrattas, and in which he must have succeeded, if the distracted state of our Government, and the continual reports of his dismissal from his station, had not deterred the Rajahs dependent upon them from entering into a closer connection with us.

The principal revenues and resources of the Mahrattas arise from the annual tribute paid to them by the Rajahs of Oudepore, Joudpore, Zeynagur, Bopaul, Narva, Bandicund, &c. &c. These Princes, who take every opportunity of evading their payments, had now a fair opportunity of shaking off their dependence. And had the Government of Bengal been at liberty to have exerted itself at this time, or had not an idea of a change of men and measures unhappily been industriously propagated throughout Indostan, the Mahratta war would have been concluded upon our own terms many months ago.

I will now proceed to relate the important consequences which were produced by our alliance with the Rana of Gohid, small as his dominions may be. When the treaty was concluded, the Mahrattas were in possession of the best part of his country. Major Popham, at the head of 2000 Sepoys, 40 European artillery, a body of 120 horse, and 4 field pieces, 6 pounders, marched to his assistance. With this little

army, he in a few months drove the Mahrattas out of the Rana's country ; pursued them, and entirely conquered one of their provinces, producing an annual revenue of six lacks of Rupees. In the course of this service he took several forts, beat up the Mahratta camp ; nor were all the efforts of above 15,000 Mahrattas able to oppose the success of his gallant little army. The most important action still remains to be related. When Major Popham's detachment had cantoned for the rains, Mr. Hastings proposed to him to make an attempt upon Gualier. He knew this place to be so strong that it never could be taken by regular approaches ; and he knew too, that the enemy, confident in the natural strength of the place, would be more liable to be surprized. The importance of the conquest may be well conceived when it is known, that by all ranks of men in all ages, this place has been denominated, The impregnable Fortress of Gualier. As such, Colonel Dow speaks of it in several parts of his History of Indostan.

In a country where we retain our authority, by an opinion which the natives have, not only of our superior genius for war, but also our good fortune, such a conquest, at such a time, would be equal to the most decisive victory in the field. I believe there was not a man in Bengal who differed in opinion with Mr. Hastings

as to the importance of this place ; but I well remember when the treaty with the Rana of Gohid was concluded, the impossibility of our getting possession of Gualier was frequently mentioned. Major Popham, who by the surprize of this place, has acquired immortal honour in India, had the good fortune to receive some important information from a party of Mewattes, who had found means to enter the place by night at different times.

He employed spies to examine the place where these men had entered, and from their report, conceived the design to be possible. In compliance with Mr. Hastings's repeated solicitations, and guided by his own judgment, he made every preparation for the attempt with the utmost secrecy, only two persons being privy to it. The night before the execution of it, he wrote to the Governor General, informed him that the attempt was to be made early the next morning, and he hoped in case of failure, that Mr. Hastings would do him the justice to say, it was at his desire that he had undertaken an enterprize which, if it failed, would be denominated rash and impracticable ; if it succeeded, would redound as much to the honour of the Governor-General, by whose advice it was undertaken, as of those by whom it was executed. The success was equal to the spirit and prudence of the action ; it was taken on the 4th of August,

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1780, and that with the trifling loss of 20 Seapoys wounded.

It is impossible to describe the despondency of the Mahrattas upon this important event. The whole country adjoining to Gualier was immediately evacuated by their troops, and our military reputation proportionably raised. This was the favourable moment for us, and if Mr. Hastings could have profited by it, as he wished to have done, the power of the Mahrattas in India would have sunk at once. Mr. Hastings, previous to the capture of Gualier, had proposed to form a strong detachment in Gohid, for the purpose of advancing into the province of Malwa, the country of Sindia, the Mahratta general. In this the Governor General was overruled; although he had every reason to believe, that in the conduct of that branch of administration he was to meet with no opposition. If the detachment had been formed, as Mr. Hastings had proposed, the capture of Gualier ensured us the utmost success in its operations.

General Goddard had earnestly pressed the Governor General and Council to invade the province of Malwa, which would have diverted the attention of Sindia from Guzerat; and one campaign would have finished the war with honour and advantage on our side. An event which no Member of the Board more earnestly wished to see accomplished than Mr. Hastings; particularly

particularly as Hyder Ally Cawn had, in July, 1780, invaded the Carnatic, where our forces were utterly unprepared to receive him.

On the 19th of September an express arrived in Calcutta from the Secret Committee of Fort St. George, informing the Supreme Council that the flower of their army had been cut off or taken prisoners by Hyder Ally, and that Sir Hector Munro, with the part of the forces under his command, had retreated to the mount with loss of his baggage and of part of his artillery. This intelligence was accompanied by advice, that a considerable French fleet, with land forces on board, were on their way to India.

This important intelligence left little room for deliberation, and at the first meeting of the Board, the Governor General proposed that Sir Eyre Coote should be requested to take the command of the army at Madras. That a reinforcement of Europeans should be sent to the coast by sea, with a supply of fifteen lacks of Rupees; and that a large detachment of Seapoys should be formed to march to the Carnatic as soon as the season would permit. That an instant offer of peace should be made to the Mahrattas upon terms so advantageous to them, as almost to ensure their acceptance of them. The season was so far advanced that the embarkation of troops would be attended with difficulty and danger. But the Governor General, justly considering that  
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every risque was to be run, when probably the very existence of the Company would depend upon their arrival, despised every inferior consideration. Mr. Francis opposed the embarkation of the troops, and would only agree to seven lacks of Rupees being sent from Bengal. However, all these motions were carried by the majority ; and Sir Eyre Coote, with six hundred and forty Europeans, fifteen lacks of Rupees, and a great supply of provisions arrived at Madras, in less than two months, computed from the return of the army under Sir Hector Munro, at the mount on the 14th of September, to the arrival of the last ship of the fleet, the Duke of Kingston, at Fort St. George, on the 5th of November. 'It will undoubtedly reflect great honour upon Mr. Hastings and Sir Eyre Coote, that they had spirit enough to afford such extraordinary aids to the Presidency of Fort St. George, at a season in which the navigation from Bengal to Madras had hitherto been interdicted on account of the dangers which attended it.

I have related as briefly and as clearly as I was able, the rise and progress of the Mahratta war, from the 12th of December, 1777, to the close of the year 1780. Upon what ground on suggestion this war can be attributed to Mr. Hastings, let every man judge who reads this account.

The occasion of the war was planned and executed without the knowledge or previous consent

sent of the Governor General, who had no other participation in it than by providing by an extraordinary exertion for the support of the measures undertaken by the Presidency of Bombay if they succeeded, and for its preservation if they failed. The Court of Directors have warmly approved of the exertions made by the Government of Bengal. Colonel Goddard arrived seasonably for the preservation of Bombay, and for the redemption of the national honour, which had without it been irretrievably lost. Our successes in every part, after the Mahrattas had rejected all reasonable terms of accommodation, gave the Governor General the strongest hopes of speedily terminating it by such advantages as should have amply recompensed the Company for the expences which had attended it, and the calamities with which it had commenced. In the midst of our successes, another and more interesting occasion called for the exertion of the Government of Bengal. The preservation of Fort. St. George depended upon their resolutions. The misfortunes upon the coast cannot be attributed to Mr. Hastings. If the general opinion is to have weight, the invasion of the Carnatic might have been prevented by the assembly of our army in the month of June. If the confession of the Nizam to Mr. Holland may be credited, (and it is confirmed by evidence of the most public notoriety) that invasion was the sole effect of a confederacy

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formed at his instigation, and dictated by his resentment of the infringements made by the Select Committee of Fort St. George, on his rights obtained by the treaty subsisting between him and the Company, and his natural apprehension of hostilities, intended by that government against him.

When Mr. Hastings proposed to conclude a treaty of peace with the Mahrattas, he recommended to the Board to form the treaty in Calcutta, to send it executed by the Supreme Council, to Moodajee Boosla, the Rajah of Berar, who had repeatedly offered himself as mediator between our Government and the Mahrattas. This treaty was rejected, and the reason was obvious; Hyder Ally Cawn had cut off a third of our army. He had taken Arcot, when he was proclaimed Nabob of the Carnatic. He had boasted that he would prevent the English army from moving from the mount, and that he was to be joined in a month by three thousand French regulars from the Islands, when he would commence the siege of Fort St. George. The French fleet, six sail of the line, and five frigates appeared on the Coast of Coromandel. Under these circumstances, the Mahrattas deeming our situation a desperate one, rejected all treaty, except upon the most disgraceful terms to us.

Sir Eyre Coote took the field on the 23d of January, 1781. On his march to Pondicherry, he repeatedly offered battle to Hyder Ally Cawn.

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His detachments were upon all occasions successful, against every superiority of numbers. The army under his command was the finest that ever took the field in India, in point of discipline and numbers, and completely provided with artillery and military stores. The men were eager to revenge the late defeat and destruction of their companions. The French fleet, after appearing off Madras, on the 29th of January, went off without even making an attempt to destroy the ships in that road, in which they must have succeeded. The fleet had not a single soldier on board, except their marines, and on a report that Sir Edward Hughes was returning from Bombay to the coast of Coromandel, quitted the coast on the 16th of February, and returned to the islands. Hyder Ally thus disappointed, will not be able to maintain his ground in the Carnatic. In addition to the army under the command of Sir Eyre Coote, Colonel Pearse was advancing from Bengal, with ten battalions of Seapoys and twenty pieces of cannon. This force would arrive in the neighbourhood of Madras in the month of June.

The Mahrattas at the commencement of this campaign, had been defeated in a general action by General Goddard, who the day after took the Fort of Bassein. Lieutenant Colonel Carnac, advancing at the head of twelve battalions of Seapoys, to the province Malwa,

has had the good fortune to gain a complete victory against an army of 30,000 men, commanded by Sindic in person, the effect of which must be greatly beneficial to General Goddard's designs. Gualier was garrisoned by our troops, and by that means a safe communication was preserved with the dominions of our ally the Vizer. Our forces in Bengal were so stationed as to prevent all danger from an invasion should it be attempted. These favourable circumstances make an honourable peace with the Mahrattas a probable event.

In this review of the rise and progress of the Mahratta war, let it be remembered that the main design of marching an army across India, was not to assist the Presidency of Bombay in the execution of their original plan, but to support them in the consequences of it to us, and to protect the interests of the East-India Company, from the effects of a connection, well known to be formed between ~~the~~ ruling member of the Mahratta state and the avowed agent of the king of France. General Goddard very opportunely arrived at Surat for the preservation of Bombay. The Governor-General, who saw in as strong a light as any other member of the Board, the disadvantages even of a successful war with the Mahrattas, (however great the necessity might be of retrieving our military reputation) should the operations be continued beyond one campaign, proposed to them the most equitable

terms of peace ; and in a letter which he himself drew up to the Committee at Bombay, the Supreme Council observe, " Having given full powers to Colonel Goddard to negotiate and conclude a peace with the Mahrattas, we have only to repeat, that we look to the issue of that commission as our primary object, and the termination of all our political views on your side of India, if it shall prove successful." To Colonel Goddard, the Board observe, " Our first desire is to obtain peace."

When Ragonaut Row had escaped from Madjee Sindia, and had joined General Goddard, who consented to give him personal protection, the Supreme Council approve of its being continued to him, provided he shall not attempt to defeat the effect of your negotiations, to which you are to give your entire attention without regard to any other consideration." With such proofs of Mr. Hastings's sincere disposition to accommodate our differences with the Mahrattas, what are the grounds to suppose he was less inclined to a pacification than Mr. Francis, or any other member of the Board ? The Governor-General was not at all involved in the disgrace which the gentlemen of Bombay had incurred by their ill-timed expedition ; on the contrary, the Court of Directors had conveyed to him, by an express over land, their approbation of the  
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part which he had taken in their affairs. The answer of the Poona Durbar to our proposals, was conveyed in few words. " They would " only consent to a peace on these conditions." " That we should give up the person of Ragobah, and cede the island of Salsette to " them." Was it even proposed by any member of the Supreme Council to purchase a peace by such concessions? It was not. The war was therefore a war of necessity on our part, and from this moment it ought to have been prosecuted with the utmost vigour. Thwarted and opposed as the Governor-General was, the brilliant successes which have attended our arms will fully prove what our Government when united may be capable of.

That I might not break in upon the narrative of the Mahratta war, I have passed over the other transactions of Government, during that period. The resolution to commence hostilities against the French, on the 7th of July, 1778, before any regular advices of a rupture had been received from England, reflects honour upon every member of the Supreme Council in proportion to the responsibility which each incurred by so spirited a measure. The celerity with which two ships of 40 guns each were fitted out, and joined Sir Edward Vernon before Pondicherry, arriving there against the monsoon, in less than two months from the day

day when they were ordered to be equipped, the plan formed for the defence of the river, when the destination of the Toulon fleet was unknown, the reinforcements ordered to be raised for the army, the disposition of our forces, and the assembly of the militia, are substantial proofs of the attention of the Governor-General and Council, to the preservation of the valuable empire committed to their charge, and the spirit which animated all ranks of men living under their Government.

Why the French missed so favourable an opportunity of attacking us on the Malabar coast we know not, but it would have been a very poor satisfaction to his country if Mr. Hastings had stopped the march of the army destined for the preservation of Bombay, at so critical a period, either on account of the expence attending it, or to add still more to the security of Bengal, already well secured, if that place had been attacked the following year. The majority of the Supreme Council therefore determined at this time, that their army should advance; and the Governor-General had the strongest and best founded expectations of carrying the projected alliance with Moodajee Boosla into execution; which was intended effectually to preclude the French nation from territorial possessions in every part of India.

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. The temporary agreement between the Governor-General and Mr. Francis, and the extraordinary event it produced, are facts, the elucidation of which is disagreeable. Certain it is some agreement was made as to the conduct of the war, as certain that Mr. Hastings as well before as in the meetings which he had with Mr. Francis, insisted that as the whole responsibility of the war with the Mahrattas was, by Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheler, thrown upon him, he should have the entire conduct of it, and as certain that the persons in Mr. Hastings's confidence understood that was agreed to.

The Governor-General's plan for carrying on the war was confessedly the best that could have been proposed. The operations of a small army the last campaign had put us in possession of an extensive country, had considerably added to our military reputation, and during the rains, that very season in which Mr. Francis contended nothing could be done, Major Popham took the important fortresses of Gualier. By Mr. Francis's opposition to the Governor-General's plan our army, which was formed the last campaign, was distressed for pay, and continued inactive when it might have moved with great effect: that army which must have so completely divided the forces and  
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the attention of the Mahrattas, and made us successful in every quarter.

The plan which Mr. Hastings proposed for carrying on the Mahratta war exactly corresponded with one drawn up by an excellent officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Upton, of whom Mr. Francis himself had the highest opinion. This gentleman had travelled to Poona by land, and his sentiments were certainly a strong confirmation of the propriety of the Governor-General's propositions. The great expences of the war are doubtless to be lamented, but there are seasons when great expences are absolutely necessary, nor can a Government, like ours, hope to be secure, if in time of war we are contented to guard our frontier only. This we must do at a considerable expence, and with the loss of reputation ; but by invading the dominions of our enemies, we have kept them at home, we have deprived them of resources for carrying on the war, we have infused such a degree of spirit into the native troops in our service, that they look upon themselves as invincible when headed by British officers ; and the conquests which we have made, would have amply repaid us for all our expences, had the invasion of the Carnatic not taken place.

The Governor-General would have had no difficulty in extending the influence of the Company through all the countries now dependent

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upon the Mahrattas, if the native powers of India had had the same opinion of the continuance of his authority, as was universally entertained of his superior abilities and good fortune. But unfortunately, Mr. Hastings, notwithstanding his utmost efforts, could never efface those ideas which had so generally been conceived from Benares to Dehly, and in the Deckan, of his speedy removal from the Government of Bengal.

Before Sir Eyre Coote's arrival, it was universally given out by the friends of Mr. Francis, that he would undoubtedly take a decided part against Mr. Hastings. These declarations so often repeated, made a deep impression upon our allies, and were attended with very serious consequences. I will mention one that immediately occurs to me.

When our military establishment was considerably increased, in consequence of the war with France, Mr. Hastings thought it reasonable that Cheyt Sing, the Raja of Benares, and a vassal of the Company, should pay a proportion of an expence incurred for our common defence. This he fixed at five lacks of rupees per annum, and the Raja was with some difficulty prevailed upon to advance this sum, but he positively refused to continue the payment beyond the first year, and in this resolution, he was confirmed by a knowledge of  
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Mr. Francis's sentiments, who disapproved of any compulsion being used for the continuance of the payment. The intrigues of the Raja's vackeel in Calcutta, previous to the General's arrival, were very well known, but as Sir Eyre Coote supported the authority of the Governor-General, the Raja was obliged, not only to pay five lacks of rupees for another year, but in addition to it, the expences incurred by the march of two battalions to Benares, for the purpose of enforcing the payment, if he should continue obstinate. If the Raja had not received the most positive assurances from his agent in Calcutta, that Mr. Francis was on the point of succeeding to the Government, he never would have reduced Mr. Hastings to the necessity of taking so violent a measure, for the support of his own authority and the Company's interests.

If the expectation of a change in Bengal had been productive of no effects, more detrimental to the public service, than the contemptible opposition of the Raja of Benares, it had been fortunate; but independent of the great relaxation of Government, in our own provinces, which was, and always must be the consequence of it, such an expectation very essentially interfered, with the only plan by which the Mahratta war' could be brought to a speedy, and successful termination. The Rajas

of Jaynagur, Narva, Bundlecund, &c. were all, I can affirm from the best authority, eager to throw off their dependence upon the Mahrattas, the slightest assistance from us would have enabled them to do it; the successful operations of Major Popham's little army has very probably produced this effect, if a peace is not yet concluded.

Our political influence was extended immediately upon Mr. Hastings's accession to the chair. Every power in India has an agent in Calcutta, and these men regularly transmit to their principals the intelligence of the day. Influenced by the intelligence thus received they have universally dreaded, and expected Mr. Hastings's removal, and have been deterred from taking part with so unsteady a Government.

Mr. Francis will excuse me for observing that he is responsible for the fatal consequence which followed, from the opinion of a change in the Government being so universal. The paragraphs of the general letters, from the direction which reflected most severely upon Mr. Hastings, were industriously circulated; Mr. Francis, in the most unreserved manner, expressed his certainty of succeeding him in a few months, nor could all the efforts of Mr. Middleton at Lucknow, or Mr. Graham at Benares, obviate the bad effects which such positive declarations produced

throughout Indostan. I affirm nothing can be so detrimental to the interests of the British nation in India, as a divided or unsettled administration in Bengal, and whatever system the Court of Directors may adopt in future, or whomever they may think proper to employ, they ought to give the ruling members every public support in their power. The hands of Government should be strengthened by every possible means. Prosperity attended the confidence which they placed in Mr. Hastings, and reverse of fortune, the diminution, or more properly the annihilation of his authority.

I now beg leave to offer a few remarks upon the state of our affairs in India.

Our situation is indeed so very alarming, that there are many men who will believe, and many more who will affect to believe them irretrievable; I must confess that it will require all the abilities, the integrity, and the firmness of the Governor-General, with every possible degree of support that can be given from home to restore Bengal to its former prosperity, but that Mr. Hastings will effect this if he is treated with that confidence which his great and important services entitle him to expect, I have not the smallest doubt.

What was our situation in Bengal, when Mr. Hastings arrived there in 1772; and what is it at this time? To bring this subject to one point  
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of view, I must recapitulate what I have already observed. At the former period, the Company's debt at interest was above one hundred and twenty lacks. The Court of Directors the season before had been drawn upon for one hundred and twenty lacks. There was no prospect of providing future investments but by an increase of the bond-debt, as our civil and military expences were barely defrayed by the annual revenues. In one year only what a change was effected. The alliance with Sujah Dowlah brought such an ample supply of treasure into Bengal that every service was fully provided for and the bond-debt reduced. Until this period, our foreign connections only served to accelerate the ruin of our provinces by draining them of the little specie that remained in them.

No one good effect was experienced from our alliance with Sujah Dowlah before Mr. Hastings's accession to the chair; an entire brigade kept at Allahabad, which was paid by the exportation of silver from Bengal, was a ruin.

A very considerable sum was saved by the reduction of the stipends paid to the Nabob and his ministers. In this particular, where the interest of the Company was concerned, Mr. Hastings paid a pointed attention to the orders of the Court of Directors. At the season when the Supreme Council arrived, our investment was so considerably increased, that two extra  
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ships, the *Anson* and the *Northumberland*, were sent home. The following year we obtained a clear additional revenue of twenty-four lacks from Benares, and the expence of at least a third of our army was defrayed by the Vizier. These beneficial advantages are the result of Mr. Hastings's treaty of 1773; a treaty which the majority of the Supreme Council decried in all its parts the first month of their arrival. China, Bombay, and Madras, have been supplied with treasure to a very considerable amount, and the annual investment from 1774 to 1779, was considerably above a million sterling each year. The bond-debt was intirely paid off, and a large balance of cash in our treasury. I had forgot to mention the erection of public granaries, by which the return of famine, which to depopulated that country, is totally prevented.

A series of events which I have already related brought on the Mahratta war; a war in Europe obliged us to increase our military establishment very considerably, to provide a marine force, to reinforce Sir Edward Vernon, and for the defence of the river. These exertions were attended with additional expence but they were absolutely necessary, and have been fully approved of at home. The French, contrary to their usual policy, missed the fairest opportunity which they ever could have had to regain their influence in India. Why they were so remiss we know not, but what would Mr. Hastings have deserved

deserved had he taken no steps to counteract their intrigues at Poona, and in consequence of them two regiments and a hundred French officers had landed at Choule. When our successes against the Mahrattas gave us every reason to expect an honourable peace, the Carnatic was invaded. This was a fresh demand upon Bengal for men, money, and provisions. The exertions of the Governor-General and Sir Eyre Coote have saved Fort St. George. After so many great drains from our treasury, after supporting an expensive war against the Mahrattas, and affording Bombay such effectual assistance in cash, provisions, and stores, after doubling our investment for many years, that debt which, when Mr. Hastings came to the chair, was above one hundred and twenty lacks, was on the 15th of December last only sixty-six lacks of current rupees, and we had eighty-eight lacks of goods in the Company's ware-houses.

I have already stated my reasons for supposing that we are now at peace with the Mahrattas. An accommodation with Hyder Ally, or his intestine overthrow must soon follow. When these events have taken place, our military establishment may be considerably reduced; the Presidency of Bombay must support its expences from the revenues arising from their late acquisitions. The Carnatic cannot recover itself for many years. Before its invasion, the country  
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was almost ruined, and the Nabob either wanted, or pretended to want, money for his private expences.

The Government of Bengal must supply Bombay and Madras with cash, as it has constantly done, if their own resources are inadequate to their disbursements. And from the revenues of Bengal must the interest of their bond-debts be paid. This I contend can easily be done if some care is taken to prevent Bengal from being unnecessarily drained of its specie, and if foreign trade is properly encouraged. To effect these points the Court of Directors must fix upon some equitable mode, by which the private fortunes of their servants can be remitted to England. At present they are under an absolute necessity either of sending their fortunes home in cash, which is ruinous to Bengal; or of lending their money to foreigners, by which means the Company's sales in England must be essentially injured.

If foreigners should once be under the necessity of bringing bullion to Bengal to purchase cargoes, such a flow of treasure to our exhausted provinces would amply compensate for a trifling diminution of the public sales in England; and if the Company's servants are restricted from lending money to foreigners, they must either bring bullion to Bengal, or relinquish the trade altogether. I can say from my own knowledge,

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that

that it is from necessity, not choice, the Company's servants supply them with cash. But an equitable mode of remittance, once fixed by the Directors, dismissal from the service should be the punishment of any man who should lend money to foreigners or to foreign companies.

Perhaps the Court of Directors do not know the extent to which this trade is now carried on. Four Portuguese ships have sailed from Bengal this year. I came to Lisbon in one of them. Her cargo was valued at five lacks of rupees. The others were still more valuable. Some of these ships were taken up in India, the captains and owners borrowed as much money as they wanted to purchase both ships and cargoes, on the following terms; The lenders to receive 12 per cent. interest, and two shillings for each current rupee at Lisbon three months after the arrival of the ship. Prejudicial as this trade may appear to the Directors, it is not half so ruinous to Bengal as the remittance of fortunes in silver would be. The Dutch and Danish Companies, as well as individuals of both nations, have borrowed large sums last year, and the season preceding, upon the terms above mentioned.

The trade to Suez, should if possible, be again opened; it is advantageous to Bengal in every point of view, and can never interfere with the Company's sales in England. Mr. Hastings deserves the highest credit for his encouragement

couragement of this trade, and for his attempts to establish a regular communication with our native country by this route. We owe the early capture of Pondicherry entirely to it.

I own I depart from the line of my profession when I presume to hazard opinions upon commercial subjects, but as I have been fifteen years in Bengal, and have not been an unconcerned spectator of the various changes which have happened in that time, I may be excused for declaring my sentiments upon a subject of such importance.

Arts, agriculture, and commerce, have greatly increased since my first arrival in India. The riches of Bengal are its manufactures. For them there will always be a market, and while we increase in population we must increase our manufactures. Mr. Hastings, it must be recollected, succeeded to the government at a most unfavourable period. The loss by the dreadful famine of 1770, has been estimated at four millions of people; and from my own observations in various parts of Bengal I do not think this an exaggerated account.

However I may be mistaken when I speak of trade, I will venture to affirm, that our affairs in Bengal are much more alarming in appearance than in reality.

Let us suppose that by the time the war in India is at an end, and a general peace has been

established in Europe, the bond-debt in Bengal amounts to 200 lacks of rupees. This is not so large a sum as was in fact owing when Mr. Hastings came to the chair. The bond-debt was then 120, and the Directors had been drawn upon for above 100 lacks of rupees only the season before ; I hope it will be recollected that this great debt was contracted in times of the *most profound peace* ; and the greatest part of it even before the famine. Dreadful as was that calamity its effects were more severely felt after Mr. Hastings's accession to the Government than at the time it happened. It is a fact that the collections in the year of the famine, and the year after, were higher than in either of the two preceding ones.

The interest of 200 lacks of rupees will be 16 lacks a year. All our establishments upon a peace will be considerably reduced ; and if the Governor-General is properly supported, the Government of Bengal will acquire a vigour, to the want of which, and not to the *Mahratta* war, we owe our present misfortunes.

To pay the interest of this debt let us examine our funds, and compare them with those of 1772. I will suppose the actual collections from Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa, to be only what they were at that period.

The savings under the different heads of tribute to the King, stipends to the Nabob, his ministers

ministers and dependents are at least 30 lacks of rupees a year.

The Vizier pays 70 lacks of rupees annually towards our military expences.

We shall receive annually from Cheyt Sing 24 lacks of rupees.

When our dominions and our influence, at least an influence advantageous to the Company, were bounded by the banks of the Carumnassa, our military expences were 105 lacks of rupees a year.

Our connection with Oude, now so profitable, was a most disadvantageous one before Mr. Hastings arrived in Bengal. To the Company it was ruinous, although it answered the interested purposes of certain individuals perfectly well.

Can one good reason be given for the very curious deputation to Sujah Dowla, in 1768, against the opinion of Mr. Verelst, at that time the Governor of Bengal, or for keeping the third brigade at Allahabad until the middle of the year 1769 at the Company's expence.

The transactions of that period are worthy the public attention—I may enlarge upon them hereafter.

At a peace our military expences can and will be reduced to 110 lacks of rupees a year.

The interest of our debt, supposing it 200 lacks, will be 16 lacks a year.

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When Mr. Hastings came to the Government the Company owed something more than 120 lacs.

Upon comparing the accounts of 1771, and they are applicable to a former period, with those at a so much wished for peace, the balance will be 133 lacs a year in favour of the Company, as appears by the following statement.

#### EXPENSES in 1771.

	Rupees.
Military, - - - - -	105
Interest of bond-debt, - - -	10
Paid in tribute, stipends, &c. but retrenched by Mr. Hastings, }	50
Total,	165

#### EXPENSES AT A P E A C E.

Military, - - - - -	110
Interest of debt, - - - - -	16
Total,	126

Credit in favour of the Company, -	
Difference of Disbursements, - -	39
Paid by the Vizier, - - - - -	70
By the Raja of Benares, - - -	24
Total,	133

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While arts, manufactures, and commerce, are encouraged in Bengal ; while the natives continue happy under our Government, and attached to it as the great body of the people are, while population increases, as it has done the last seven years, Bengal must be a most valuable country to Great-Britain ; but it can only yield its tribute by the increase of the annual investment.

Mr. Hastings has been very severely charged with disobedience of orders—Upon this subject I must add a few words. I do not mean to justify the Governor-General's conduct by pleading precedent for it, yet I am reduced to the disagreeable necessity of contrasting it with the conduct of his predecessors in power in Bengal.

I affirm that it had long been reported, Mr. Hastings was to be dismissed the service, that Mr. Francis was to succeed him ; and the reinstatement of Messrs. Bristow, Fowke, and Mahomed Reza Cawn were connected with Mr. Francis's accession to the Government. This report, circulated for months throughout Indostan, obliged Mr. Hastings to adopt measures which were by no means agreeable to the natural humanity of his temper, or to that regard to the just claims of individuals which he is known to possess. He assigned his reasons to the Directors for keeping them out of office, and if they were not approved, he of course expected

pected to be dismissed from the service. To those who served in India I appeal, whether it is not absolutely necessary to strengthen the hands of Government by every possible means, and to impress the natives with an idea of its stability; That the reinstatement of Mr. Bristow, Mr. Fowke, and Mahomed Reza Cawn, would have had a contrary effect is universally known.

When General Richard Smith was Commander in Chief of the Company's forces in Bengal, and third member of the Secret Committee and the Council, he wrote the following letter to the Secret Committee, 24th November 1767, and forced Mr. Verelst to do an act of greater severity than Mr. Hastings was ever guilty of in the whole course of his political life. I must affirm here, that the East-India Company was saddled with the expence of an establishment of a Supreme Court of Judicature, in consequence of the discussions which this famous letter produced.

“ The nature of the intelligence transmit-  
 “ ted from Calcutta to Sujah Dowlah is with-  
 “ out limits. The Nabob is almost as well  
 “ acquainted with the Parliamentary proceed-  
 “ ings as I am; how far the importance and  
 “ dignity of the Company, and the weight and  
 “ influence of administration is lessened in his  
 “ esteem by such communication may be easi-  
 “ ly conceived. Whilst a Vackeel is so ready

“ and so sure a channel to communicate in-  
 “ telligence, few men will be found so hardy  
 “ as to maintain a direct correspondence with  
 “ the Nabob, but there is a man who has  
 “ obliquely offered so great an insult to *our*  
 “ *President*, that was I present at the  
 “ Board, I would move for the exertion of  
 “ our authority to its utmost extent to free  
 “ the settlement from so dangerous an  
 “ inhabitant ; I mean Mr. Bolts ; and  
 “ the inclosed copy of a letter to Mr. Zen-  
 “ til, where he asserts an absolute falshood,  
 “ which tends to lessen *that essential dignity*  
 “ *and necessary influence of our President*, is  
 “ surely deserving of your severest resentment.”

I approve highly of General Richard Smith's arguments ; if he had known how *the essential dignity and necessary influence of Mr. Hastings*, would have been affected by carrying the Director's orders into execution respecting Mr. Bristow, he would upon his own principles have concurred in the disobedience of them, had he been a member of the Supreme Council in December, 1779.

Three poor Armenians, the trading agents of Mr. Bolts, a keen trader himself, who perhaps wanted to come in for some share of the plunder of Oude and Benares, were afterwards seized, and treated with too much rigour. Most men of Bengal attributed General

ral Smith's conduct to private motives. It is strictly justifiable upon public grounds; however I must add in this place, and I can prove it, that our connection with Sujah, Dowlah at that time was ruinous to the East-India Company, in as great a degree as it was advantageous to a few individuals in power.

The Directors most positive orders have been repeatedly disobeyed or evaded during my residence in Bengal. Two very particular instances I will now mention.

As soon as the Court of Directors were informed of the pernicious salt monopoly, they sent positive orders to Bengal to abolish it immediately on the receipt of their letter. In defiance of this order, the monopoly was continued almost two years longer, and the profits arising from it were divided amongst the members of the council, General Richard Smith (Commander in Chief at that time,) and the principal civil and military servants in Bengal.

The Directors had positively prohibited their servants in Bengal from drawing upon them except for a certain amount, and a rate of exchange much more favourable than the present. Yet by a resolution of the council, in October, 1769, bills were drawn upon them at a very unfavourable exchange for the Company,  
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to the amount of one million and sixty thousand pounds sterling. I affirm that three-fourths of the money paid into the treasury in Calcutta might have been borrowed upon bond until the Directors pleasure was known.

Let these instances of disobedience be compared by my fellow proprietors and the public, with the charges brought against Mr. Hastings.

I will here quote General Richard Smith's sentiments upon the subject of disobedience of orders.

In his minute of the 25th of September, 1769, when he proposed opening the Company's treasury, and granting bills upon the Directors, he says, " Although the Court of Directors orders are strong in prohibition, yet I think we shall be *fully warranted* to deviate from those orders, and I do not think I should perform ~~any~~<sup>my</sup> duty to the Company as a member of their administration, if I did not enter this my opinion upon the public records."

Upon another occasion, 24th November, 1767, General Richard Smith writes to the Secret Committee, whose orders he was bound to obey in the same degree as Mr. Hastings is those of the Directors. " My zeal for the welfare of the state I serve would, on occasions of great emergency, induce me not

' only to hazard my commission, but even  
 " subject my life and honour to the sentence  
 " of a general court-martial, rather than the  
 " *public service* should suffer by delay. When-  
 " ever I act *contrary to their orders*, it is not  
 " that I entertain the most distant idea of  
 " disobedience or *independence*, but from a con-  
 " viction that *at this distance from the Presi-*  
 " *dency, their orders and the welfare of the*  
 " *state may happen, they have happened to be in-*  
 " *compatible, and whenever I take upon me to*  
 " *deviate from their orders, it is not from inde-*  
 " *pendent authority I presume, because I know*  
 " *I am totally responsible to them for such a*  
 " *deviation.*"

This is the language of a sensible man. It is manly language. It is the language of Mr. Hastings; but in the Governor-General's case, the arguments operate with ten-fold force when we consider the situations of Mr. Hastings and General Richard Smith; the former could only receive answers from *his superiors* in fifteen or eighteen months, the latter in as many days.

I will now mention a few essential points in which Mr. Hastings pointedly obeyed the orders of the Directors. He employed Nund-comar by their orders.

He reduced the Nabob's stipend from thirty-two to sixteen lacks of rupees. He abolished  
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nominal pensions to a large amount. He suspended Mahomed Ruza Cawn from his office; he brought him to a trial before the Council for his former conduct; and to the justice, the impartiality, and the attention of Mr. Hastings, Mahomed Ruza Cawn has always declared, he was indebted for his life, which the villany of Nundcomar would have deprived him of. In November, 1773, Mr. Hastings received the thanks of the Directors for his great attention to their orders, and for his other eminent services.

Soon after the majority of the Supreme Council arrived in Bengal, they asserted that Mr. Hastings had made 40 lacks of rupees, or 400,000*l.* from the Revenues of Bengal in less than three years. The despicable character of the man on whose information this declaration was grounded, the well known moderation of Mr. Hastings, his active and vigorous administration, the state of his private fortune at that time or at present, which any man may know that chooses to inquire, are solid proofs of the falsity and the folly of this assertion. Are the great servants of the Company who preceded Mr. Hastings in high stations, although not in the chair, willing to put their integrity to this test; will they declare the amount of their private fortunes?



I do affirm, that if public and repeatedly asserted declarations have any weight, the amount of the private fortunes of three gentlemen of high station, who left Bengal in the course of the year 1769, or in January, 1770, equalled the amount of all the private fortunes that have been accumulated during Mr. Hastings's government of ten years from the revenues of Bengal, Bahar, and Orixá, by the civil and military servants of the Company.

If we were to judge from vague reports, what character could be sheltered from calumny. I can recollect perfectly well, that in the years 1768 and 1769, it was universally said in Bengal, that a mint was established at Alahabad; that the good Rupees, which were so absurdly sent from Bengal and Bahar to that place were all recoined into base rupees, called Viziery; that our troops sustained a very heavy loss by being obliged to receive their pay in this base money. That twenty-six lacks of sicca rupees were annually sent from Bengal for the payment of the king's tribute, but that his Majesty actually received it in viziery rupees; and that a very considerable share of the profits arising from this coinage, which was said to be unauthorized by the Governor and Council, centered in the Commander in Chief, General Richard Smith. It does not however follow that this was the fact. I have been long enough in India to know that

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men, who are deprived of the means making money themselves, are very apt to exaggerate when they state the advantages of their superiors. It is very possible to investigate this matter thoroughly; and I must observe, that Mr. Hastings has been accused of speculation upon much more slender ground.

Upon the subject of presents received, which was one of the modes by which Mr. Hastings was accused of having made the enormous sum of 400,000*l.* I shall make but one observation: That, upon a reference to the Governor-General's Durbar charges, it will be found he has brought to the Company's credit the sums which he received, and has drawn the amount of the presents he made from the treasury. This rule was observed, I believe, by his predecessors. In the Consultations of the 8th of December, 1769, and since printed in the Reports of the Secret Committee of 1773, I find, that General Richard Smith made the Mogul, Shaw Allum, a present to the amount of 2000*l.* sterling, *when his Majesty honoured him with a visit* to Sujah Dowlah, Bulwant Sing, and a string of et ceteras. Presents, for which he received from the Company one lack twenty-four thousand six hundred and six Souaut rupees, or 16,000*l.* sterling. I do not see the presents which he received in return brought to account; but if the invariable custom and usage of the country at that time to  
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men of high rank and station was dispensed with, out of delicacy to his feelings, and he received no presents from the King, Suja Dowlah, &c. his liberality was a very unnecessary waste of the public money.

The execution of Nundcomar has been again brought forward. The ingenious *English* writer of A Letter from Calcutta has, without any foundation, quoted the most respectable authority for calling his death a murder. My observations upon it will be very short.

Nundcomar was employed by Mr. Hastings on his first arrival in Bengal at the express desire of the Court of Directors. Mr. Hastings's choice of the man excited very general surprise, as the cause was not known. Nundcomar's villainy was detected in the affair of Mahomed Ruza Cawn, and Mr. Hastings ceased to employ him. On the arrival of the Supreme Council he gave in the curious information which I have already mentioned. It is remarkable, that when Lord Clive and the Secret Committee of 1765, were invested with inquisitorial powers, Nundcomar gave in an information against Mr. John Johnstone and other servants of the Company, similar to that which he afterwards gave in against Mr. Hastings, and upon a full enquiry, the information was found to be void of the ~~smallest information~~. Mr. Hastings commenced a prosecution against him. The majority and Mr. Joseph Fowke visited him in confinement; an  
attention

attention which, of course, attracted the notice of every man in Indostan, and induced Nundcomar to suppose that he should be protected at all events by the Supreme Council.

I now come to the forgery. In 1762 a Gentoo was condemned to be hanged for this crime. The sentence was respited; and his Majesty was pleased to pardon the criminal; but I believe it was understood that the royal mercy would never again be extended to a similar offender. Be that as it may, Nundcomar, when he committed a forgery many years after this period, accompanied with the most aggravating circumstances, well knew the consequence if he should be detected. A lawyer, in 1772, was said, and truly, I believe, to have received ten thousand rupees for suppressing his knowledge of the affair. Nundcomar was well acquainted with the nature of our laws. He had a hundred causes before the Mayor's Court at different times. Before his prosecutor complained, he offered to settle the affair for fifty thousand rupees. He repeated the offer after Nundcomar was in jail. Was Nundcomar's refusal supposed to be the result of conscious innocence? Was there a man in Bengal questioned the fairness of his trial, or the characters of the jurymen who found him guilty? Was he not universally deemed the most unprincipled of all the intriguing natives of Bengal? I am not an advocate for the judges,

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but, as a most illiberal and unjust motive has been assigned for their conduct, their desire to screen Mr. Hastings from the effects of his information, I must assert, and I do it in the most solemn manner, that Mr. Hastings was not concerned either directly or indirectly in the apprehension, the trial, or the execution, of Nundcomar.

The judges might have respited the execution of the sentence; I wish with all my heart they had; but something may be urged in their favour upon this head. It was the first grand cause that came before them. I was at Berhampore, about 100 miles from Calcutta, at the time of Nundcomar's trial and execution. It was the common subject of conversation amongst men of all ranks. I have heard the sentiments of several natives, then, and since, upon it. At the time, they very generally observed that Nundcomar, though he was undoubtedly guilty, was too rich a man to be hanged; and since his death, it was said he depended upon the interference of the Supreme Council, or he would have compromised the affair before his trial. Might not the judges be supposed to have acted as they did, from a desire to impress the natives with an idea of the justice and the impartiality of the Supreme Court? Would not the same set of men, who think Mr Hastings capable of so  
villainous

villainous an action as influencing the judges of the Supreme Court of Judicature, or those judges of being influenced upon such an occasion ; would they not have concluded that Nund-comar, if his execution had been respited, had obtained that favour by improper means ?

In this review of the transactions in Bengal I have avoided as much as possible every expression which may be supposed to convey a personal reflection. It is from necessity, not from inclination, that I have been obliged to contrast his conduct with any man's. However strong the provocation may have been, Mr. Hastings has upon all occasions attended solely to his own justification. It has been the fate of the Governor-General, whose liberality of sentiment can only be equalled by his moderation, or rather by his contempt of money, to be engaged in a perpetual course of party contention. No man could less merit such a fate. With integrity that has defended him against the most tempting offers of private advantage, with abilities and application that have surmounted the greatest difficulties, he has been reduced to the painful necessity of defending himself from the extraordinary charges of private rapacity, and a want of zeal for the interest of his employers. To the first I shall only observe, that he has now been almost ten years at the head of the administration in Bengal, a period much more

than sufficient to answer the private views of any man, if to accumulate money was his object. To the last, I shall oppose the very flourishing state in which the Supreme Council found Bengal, and in which it continued, until foreign wars ; and what is still worse, a continued opposition to the Governor-General exhausted our treasury, and diminished or almost annihilated the necessary power of Government.

POSTSCRIPT.

## P O S T S C R I P T.

**T**HE arrival of the Belmont enables me to carry on this review to the 31st of May last.

The Nizam remained inactive. In the latter end of April he expressed his wishes to join us in an alliance against Hyder Ally Cawn. On this Account Mr. Hollond remained at Hynicabad, although he had intended to quit it on account of his health. The Nizam's conduct is politic. Hyder aspired to the subaship of the Decan, and had applied to the King for sunnuds, through Nuzeph Cawn.

The engagement with the Raja of Berar promises to be followed with the most important and beneficial effects. Colonel Pearse, in his march through Cuttac, received every assistance he stood in need of from the Naib of that province, and his camp was amply supplied with provisions. It is supposed he would be joined at Ellore by 2000 of the Berar horse; the remainder of that army was on its return to Naigpoore, except that part of it which was to act in conjunction with our forces against Guramundeia



Guramundela. It is impossible to detail the negotiation which brought on this agreement, but it reflects great honour upon Mr. Hastings. Mr. Wheeler, who entirely concurred in opinion with him, and Mr. Anderson, through whose agency it was concluded. No chout, as has been represented, was either given or promised, and our superiority appeared through the whole course of the negotiation.

On the same day, the 2d of April, an agreement was signed between the ambassador of the Nabob of Arcot and the Supreme Council on the part of the Company. By this agreement the whole revenues of the Carnatic are appropriated for the service of the war. Credit being given to the Nabob's creditors for the actual collections from those districts which had been previously assigned to them. The utility of this agreement will forcibly strike every impartial person.

Lieutenant Colonel Camac's night attack on the camp of Madjee Sindia was attended with very favourable consequences. Many of the chiefs who were compelled to join him had come over to us; and an overture for a pacification had secretly been made by Sindia himself. His army was dispersed, except about 7000 horse under Ambajee Punt, which were surprized and totally defeated by Captain Bruce, the officer who had so great a share in taking the fortress  
of

of Gualier. These successes and the alliance with Moodajee Boosla gave us the fairest hopes of a speedy accomodation with the Marattas, and their junction with us against Hyder Ally Cawn; events which Mr. Hastings most anxiously wishes to accomplish.

Provincial courts of justice had been established, agreeably to the Governor General's plan, and a controul vested in the chief justice. The Company and the natives, after six months experience, have sensibly felt the good effects of this regulation. To the former it is a very considerable saving; to the latter it has insured an impartial and not an expensive distribution of justice.

The former mode of collecting the revenues has been abolished. An increase of 39 lacks or or 390,000l. is expected from this regulation; which is Mr. Hastings's plan, formed in 1773, and the propriety of it confirmed by eight years experience of the former defective system.

The revenue from salt will be 30 lacks of rupees or 300,000l. sterling this year. The gentleman Mr. Hastings has placed at the head of this business, whose abilities and integrity have never been exceeded in Bengal, has made this declaration, and the authority is incontestible; so that the additional resources from the revenues of Bengal may fairly be estimated for this year at 690,000l.

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The cargo of the ~~Belmont~~ is valued at 16½ lacks or 165,000l. prime cost; the Neptune, which was obliged to return to Bengal, had 14½ lacks or 145,000l. on board; and there remained in the Company's warehouses in Bengal, goods to the amount of 59 lacks or 590,000l.

The investment for 1781-2 is fixed at 90 lacks or 900,000l. and was providing when the Belmont sailed; so that for the ships of this season, there will be goods to the amount of one million, six hundred thousand pounds in Bengal.

The Company's dispatches by the Belmont will prove what exertions the government of Bengal is capable of when unanimity reigns in its councils.

On the 6th of July Sir Eyre Coote gained a decisive victory over the army of Hyder Ally Cawn. In four days after the action Colonel Pearse's detachment, consisting of 7000 sepoy, 100 European artillery, 20 pieces of canon, 100 disciplined cavalry, and 2000 Berar horse, would join Sir Eyre Coote; General Meadows, with 3000 Europeans, might be expected to arrive at Madras in September; so that we have every reason to believe that our next dispatches will be of the most favourable nature, both from Bengal and Fort St. George.

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L E T T E R

TO THE

RIGHT HONOURABLE

CHARLES JAMES FOX.



**L E T T E R**

**TO THE**

**RIGHT HONOURABLE**

**HARLES JAMES FOX,**

**ONE OF HIS MAJESTY'S**

**PRINCIPAL SECRETARIES OF STATE.**

**BY**

**MAJOR JOHN SCOTT.**

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**L O N D O N :**

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**M.DCC.LXXXIII.**



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RIGHT HONOURABLE SIR,

WHILE the iron claw of ministerial encroachment is stretched out over the delegated powers, the chartered Rights, the very corporate existence of all public bodies in this kingdom, while an universal alarm for *the safety of our admirable Constitution*, and for the *essential Liberties of Britons* sits pallid upon every countenance, and trembles upon every tongue, it is become my peculiar and unavoidable province to excite (if I can) a momentary attention to *subordinate concerns*, to set up a separate plea of my

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own,



own, on account of my immediate principal ; and while the cause of Mr. Hastings goes hand in hand with that of the public, I cannot tamely suffer the animadversions unmeritedly cast upon *him*, to operate, (as it is meant they should,) to the annihilation of the East India Company, to the perpetuation of *your* ascendancy, and to the establishment of corruption *by Law*. It is indeed very extraordinary, that while all your Argument in support of your present Bill is so palpably personal, so pointedly harsh against the Governor General of Bengal, you should call repeatedly upon the House to leave the defence of Mr. Hastings out of the question. Nothing can exceed your Artifice, but the plausibility by which it is masked—You bring in a Bill for a Reform of the East India Company—In support of the necessity of that Reform, You adduce various specific abuses said to exist in India, and You charge those abuses separately and collectively to Mr. Hastings. You then insinuate something of corrupt influence acquired by that gentleman, even on a part of the Legislature : and having with wonderful management engrafted the Company's difficulties on *his* conduct, You in the same  
breath

breath disclaim all ~~hostile~~ intentions towards *him* :  
You insist that opposition should *generalize* the  
whole of its reply : You would banish even the  
name of Hastings from the other side of the  
House, and after pronouncing your own harangue,  
You would arbitrarily dictate the measure and  
the terms of the answer.

In fact, therefore, because gentlemen are unwilling to lie under the obloquy (however unjust) of intriguing in favour of a man, whom You profess not to attack, (even while you are stabbing him to the heart) all the principal topics of this grand question must necessarily pass untouched. Even the public prints are instructed to stifle all the virtuous members, who from any cause whatever oppose your bill, "The partizans of Mr. Hastings:" when it is obvious, that the line of your attack is and must be the clue to their retort ; when it is most notorious, that nothing but the impossibility of throwing any light upon the subject, *as stated by You*, without a reference to the measures of Mr. Hastings's administration, could have overpowered their reluctance to admit any personalities whatsoever in a debate of

such general, of such national importance. But that which in every other man in the kingdom might be misrepresented as proceeding from partial or improper motives, and which, if it could not be proved *corrupt*, would at least be branded as *officious*, is in me the plain simple outline of duty to my employer, the immediate function of my appointment. I am not fit, Sir, to cope with Your talents : and it is in full sense of my own insignificance that I venture my appeal to the public against a Minister of State.

But as the whole scope of your reasoning turns equally upon two points, the pecuniary distress of the Company at home, and the instant calamities arising from the misconduct of Mr. Hastings abroad, I know not why in one case the Company's property should be under-rated or frittered away at your pleasure, to exhibit an artificial bankruptcy; nor in the other, why a manifest mis-statement of our political situation in India should be at all events admitted, because an impartial and more comfortable account would necessarily include some portion of Mr. Hastings's merits. I have avowed myself, Sir, as Mr.

Hastings

Hastings's political agent: but it is not only in that capacity that I have now the honour to address you; I am also *a Proprietor of India stock*: My property, my bread is involved in the consequences of your bill, together with that of many hundreds; My privileges, as holden under a royal charter, my rights, as sanctioned by the faith of Parliament, are attacked in common with those of every member of every corporation in England. I examine your bill not with the calm criticism of a speculative reasoner, not with the dispassionate eye of an unconcerned spectator, but with the breathless curiosity of home-felt alarm, but with the trembling calculation of personal interest. Would to God the contents of Your bill for vesting the affairs of the East-India Company in the hands of certain Commissioners had answered my expectations, and the flattering promises of the title, in disclosing something that would be for the benefit of the Proprietors and the Public!—But neither in the bill itself, nor in any of Your speeches on the subject, have I been able to discover a single item from which I can promise to myself any *benefit as a Proprietor*:—nor indeed can I divine, how a forcible transfer of the whole concerns of

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a commercial body from the hands of twenty-four Directors (mostly bred in commercial habits) to those of seven Commissioners (of whom the greater part most certainly were never instructed in business at all) should ever have passed upon the public, as a probable mode of rendering those concerns more productive.

*Profit* is the life of *commerce*; and my stock is staked upon the Company's commerce. What is it to me, that the Company's books be better kept, that the compting-house be more decently arranged, that the shop-men be more ingeniously distributed, by your new bill, and under your Commissioners, if its *trade* produce no additional *gain*? Had you pointed out new sources of wealth, new channels for commerce, new markets for our commodities, you would have been deservedly hailed as the friend, as the saviour of the Company. But is there any thing like this in your Bill? on the contrary, whenever the present servants of the Company come forward with their estimates fairly drawn up, and state to the public the different objects on which they found their expectations of the Company's future responsibility, and the vari-

ous articles, which while they form the credit side of their account, comprehend their whole and ultimate means of solvency—You with emphatic industry attempt to deny and invalidate them all—You affect to prove, and you lay your whole stress on proving, that under every posture of events the Company is and *must necessarily* become bankrupt for eight millions—yet you would flatter me with hopes of deriving *benefit* from the appointment of your Commissioners. If a bankruptcy must ensue, I, as a creditor, do not mean to resign my right of becoming a trustee for management and recovery of the bankrupts effects. Men are always most quick-sighted in their own immediate concerns: and you may be assured that no stockholder will risk (if he can help it) the loss of his stock. It cannot possibly therefore be for the benefit of the Proprietors, that seven Commissioners should be appointed to manage their concerns, who (not possessing nor being bound to possess a farthing of stock) would not lose a single farthing by the Company's ruin. But at the very moment in which you declare the Company to be bankrupt in eight millions, you would set aside that property which is stated on the credit-side of its account: as if a bankrupt's estate could be accurately

ly exhibited, without a compleat enumeration of the several articles which compose that estate. To me, as a Proprietor, who on the Company's bankruptcy can only look to the reimbursement of my capital — it is perfectly indifferent whether the Company's effects be sold by auction, or seized by your Commissioners — provided their true and intrinsic value be fairly brought to account: But it is a new refinement in commerce, that your seven Bailiffs should come expressly by act of Parliament, “ *immediately to enter in and upon, and* “ *to possess themselves of all lands and tenements,* “ *houses, warehouses, and other buildings whatever,* “ *of or belonging to the said United Company,*” and that the said Company should not be permitted to charge the authentic valuation of those lands, &c. in account current with its own creditors. I repeat it, that all the *benefit* which you offer me as a Proprietor, is the fallacious benefit of Parliamentary security for my dividend of 8 per cent. *fallacious*—because if the Company's affairs be not desperate, I am entitled to that dividend without your interference: and because, if the Commerce cannot afford to pay the dividend, I am one of the public who must be assessed my proportion

portion to make up the deficiency of my own dividend as a Proprietor. How then will your bill in any light *benefit the public*? By an appropriation of the revenues of India to the national exigencies. But how will you render those revenues productive here? You cannot remit them in specie: for that would impoverish the Colonies an hundred-fold faster than it would enrich this country. You cannot import them through the medium of commerce, unless you find a new vent and increased consumption for its commodities: which if the commercial sagacity of the present managers cannot discover and turn to account, I must doubt if it be within the power of your political penetration to suggest; you can only shift it to your own—Friends. I am indeed utterly lost in tracing to substantial existence any one article by which you can hold out the prospect of *benefit to the public*. The items of the Company's credit you in general depreciate: Its houses, warehouses, &c. you strike off from the account; the debts due from the Vizier of Oude, from the Nabob of the Carnatic and the Rajah of Tanjore, you would incline to pay from our sinking fund, rather than suffer them to be gradually liquidated



on the spot ; and all that can possibly be deemed of advantage to the public, is the difference between 4,200,000*l.* sterling lent to Government (*as sterling*) by the East-India Company, and the present value of the 3 per cents, which, this very bill has already tended to reduce.

But how much sorer the *public* might abstractedly be *benefited* by the new plan, it will most assured be injured in a much greater degree by the blow thereby given to all public credit. Charters, which not long ago were held as the strongest ties upon the justice of the Legislature, as the most sacred security upon earth, are now to be infringed — openly, avowedly, in the face of God and man, ostentatiously infringed. Former violations (which in truth and reason exaggerate the crime) are triumphantly pleaded in defence of subsequent violation. “ The act of 1773 was a  
“ violation of the charter, those of 1779 and  
“ 1780 were equally so ;” and the necessity of the measure (of which necessity neither the Cabinet, nor the Parliament, nor the nation, could, perhaps, ever form a decisive idea) was the warrant of its execution, I believe, however, that  
the

the present is the first instance in which so *problematic a necessity* was ever produced in the House of Commons as a persuasive for a breach of parliamentary faith, and a previous absolution of national perfidy. Such was not the ostensible doctrine of opposition to the India bills, formerly brought in by a noble Lord now high in office. Such political necessity was never admitted by the strenuous patriots of that day, as a valid apology for such turpitude; and none but themselves could have set up as precedents for their own conduct, those tyrannical and unjustifiable measures, which themselves had so repeatedly and so forcibly exposed.

Let me now, Sir, humbly request your attention to the case of Mr. Hastings: much has been said, and much more insinuated against that gentleman's influence in the House of Commons, as well as in the Court of Proprietors; and *this influence is attributed to money*. The *personal friends* Mr. Hastings may have in either place, are proportionate to the very slender opportunities he has ever enjoyed of cultivating friendships in his own country. Those independent characters who ho-

nour him *as Governor General* with their support, give it upon *public grounds*: and I am sure they need not blush to avow their motives. Unintelligible, Sir, as the language I am now about to use, may appear to you, I do not hesitate to affirm, that Mr. Hastings has a soul that would startle at the very suggestion of such a scandalous traffic, that would re-gorge at the nauseous influence that could be put up to sale. I now pledge myself to take my oath (whenever called upon) at the bar of the House, that Mr. Hastings has never, to my knowledge, expended one shilling, directly or indirectly, in the purchase of any influence at all, not even of a *drop of ink*, but what I have paid for *to the press*: and that if it will tend to undeceive the public with respect to the mode by which his character has been established in this country, I am ready to deliver in *upon oath* to the House of Commons, my accounts for every farthing disbursed by me, as his agent, and chargeable to his estate, up to the present day. I will add, that being his political agent only, I am not entrusted with the receipt and disposal of his private property; but that the gentlemen whom he has appointed to execute that charge

charge (Sir Francis Sykes, Mr. Waller, and Mr. Woodman) are also prepared at any time to lay before the public, a full and accurate account current, of the whole fortune (in England) of their principal, with every article of expenditure, since the first instant of their management. Mr. Hastings's fortune as much precludes him from the power, as his principles estrange him from the wish of recurring to such iniquitous means of support. It is the influence of meritorious services, operating on the public opinion, and *nothing else*, that has enabled him to withstand so many parties, and so many Ministers; an influence, which as bribes did not collect, you find it out of the power of bribery to dispel.

In Your endeavours to establish the necessity of Your new Bill on the mismanagement of the Company's affairs in Asia, You have selected a number of occurrences more or less connected with the Governor General's Administration; And by a happy confusion of dates, of circumstances and of persons, have at once thrown a very undeserved odium upon him, and drawn a most unfair and distorted picture of the state of

India.—And here I cannot but feel with double anxiety the mortifying disproportion of my powers to the magnitude, to the celebrity of my subject : and how can I comprize an epitome of Mr. Hastings's Government for twelve years, and a connected account of the present situation of our settlements—within the narrow boundaries of a few pages ? much more, Sir, how shall I venture to exhibit in its native purity, that canvas which your masterly colouring has so effectually disguised ?—You will, I trust, pardon my presumption, for this effort of duty, and my incapacity, for the faintness of the sketch I shall produce.

Mr. Hastings arrived in Bengal as President and Governor of Fort William in 1772. His plan was that of peace, his system was that of œconomy, his views were those of internal reform. On the instant of his taking the chair, our Frontier Brigade was marching to assist the Vizier Sujah Dowlah at the very extremity of the Rohilla Country, on the requisition of Sir Robert Barker, then Commander in Chief, and without previous communication with the Presidency. Mr. Hastings instantly issued orders for the return of the  
brigade

Brigade—and the greatest part of it actually returned to its cantonments at Dinapore—Does this argue an inordinate thirst for conquest, an unjustifiable ambition to extend our dominions? Three battalions, however, belonging to the brigade had pushed forward with such rapidity as to escape the countermanding order : they joined Sujah Dowla, and put a stop to the incursions of the Marattas. The march of the remainder of the brigade next season, the junction of the whole body with the Vizier, entitled him to forty lacs of rupees, which the Rohillas had bound themselves by treaty, under the guarantee of Sir Robert Barker, to pay the Vizier as the price of their defence. This very money was the cause of the Rohilla war, which you have once again called up to condemnation. The Company's Commander in Chief had pledged himself to the Vizier for the performance of the treaty, and it was therefore *not unjust* that the Company's troops should enforce its articles on those whom that very Commander in Chief had styled in his letters to the Governor and Council “ The most faithless and treacherous of men.” On this state of the case, it would hardly have been decent in

Mr.

Mr. Hastings to with-hold the Company's aid ; but while he sacrificed his own pacific system to the support of that guarantee granted by Sir Robert Barker, he at the same time essentially consulted the interests of his employers, by stipulating that the Vizier should pay *the whole expence* of the troops furnished for his assistance : and thus removed the grand political objection to the employment of our forces on distant service, while their support had been hitherto constantly remitted in specie, to the great impoverishment of our own provinces. The Rohilla war, therefore, arose from *their* breach of that treaty of which we were guarantees ; and the Rohillas, a tribe of Afghan Tartars, who had invaded, subdued, and settled in the province of Rohilkund not forty years before, were forced to relinquish their ill-gotten conquests. The Gentû natives, the Aborigines of the country, continued in the peaceable exercise of agriculture and of their several trades during that war, and continue there to this day. They were before subjects to the Rohilla Chiefs, and they are now subjects to the Nabob Vizier : and the one has at least as good a claim as the others, But as the effects of that war have no longer

longer any influence upon the mass of Indian politics, a mention of it was by no means necessary or pertinent in a detail of the present state of India. And if it be true, that the principle of that war was condemned by the Court of Directors and Proprietors in 1775, it is also true, that in 1779 and 1780 Lord North, with this condemnation before his eyes, twice proposed in Parliament, the man to whom that war had been generally (I will not add *justly*) imputed, for Governor General of Bengal—Mr. Hastings had been found so able in other respects, so useful a servant to the Company, so meritorious a subject to the Crown, that the single demerit of the Rohilla war was of no weight in the opposite scale; a reference, therefore, to that war at this distant period, can never impress the public with an opinion of your candour—can never influence, now that the subject is so remote; can only be intended to stifle cool argument, by an appeal to the passions: an affecting picture of the calamities of any war, since or before that of Troy, would have served just as well.

It is Mr. Hastings's peculiar misfortune, that being most zealously attached to the arts and to



the enjoyments of peace, he has been under an almost constant necessity of engaging in involuntary hostilities. You loudly blame him for the Maratta war, and yet you know it originated at Bombay in 1776. You know that it was suspended, rather than concluded by the treaty of Poorunder, and that upon a dispassionate revision of the recrimination of each party, it may yet be doubted whether we or the Marattas were the first aggressors in its renewal. But at all events you must allow, that the treaty of Poorunder, in the loose indefinite style of its articles, contained the seeds of future dispute; that the Presidency of Bombay, the Governor General of Bengal, and the Court of Directors, equally reprobated its terms, and that the Company's servants were in general encouraged to seize the first decent plea for not abiding by it. After all, it was incumbent on Mr. Hastings to counteract the intrigues of the French agents at Poonah. Positive intelligence, and that from the highest authority of this country, assured him, both of the existence and of the danger of those intrigues, and his exertions on that occasion were no less approved by his Majesty's Ministers, than by the Court of Directors.

**Directors.** But you now criminate the Governor General as author of the renewal of the hostilities, for not consenting to the cession of Salsette in 1779; yet you are not to be informed that Bombay derives its immediate support, its daily bread from that island, and that the Company were anxious to risk almost any thing, or every thing on that side of India, for its acquisition. I repeat it again and again, Mr. Hastings was not the author of that war, he was not the promoter of it; *but he has an exclusive merit in the Maratta peace*; in that peace which, by his efforts, has been ratified upon honourable terms to the Company, when I would stake my existence on the belief, that no other man could have procured any peace at all: In that peace, which an apostate to his duty in the Company's service, an interested convert to the principles of your new bill, has insidiously asserted to have been purchased by the inglorious sacrifice of Broach, worth 16 lacks of rupees per annum. Let him cloak his iniquity, and palliate his misrepresentations as he may, but I here tell him from the records at the India house, that the territory of Broach produced, of nett revenue,

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In

In 1779,	— —	270,000 rupees
In 1780,	— —	240,000
In 1781,	— —	77,000

and he knows that six-tenths of this sum was ceded to the Marattas, *unexceptionably and by treaty*, and Scindia's guarantee is surely more than a counterbalance for the rest.

You, Sir, have objected to the Maratta treaty, on very different grounds—on grounds, which while I cannot acknowledge them to convey the smallest reflection on Mr. Hastings's politics, at least do not discredit your understanding nor impeach your veracity: You have objected to it, on the danger of its eventually provoking fresh hostilities with France, by the possibility of our junction with the Peshwa in protraction of the war against Tippoo Saib on the spirit of the ninth article of the treaty. It was prudence, it was policy, it was necessity that dictated the terms of this article, and at any other moment you would have been the first to applaud it. At the signing of the preliminaries, as late as the ratification of the definitive treaty with the Marattas, we were at war equally with the French and with Tippoo Saib

Saib — It was impossible for Mr. Hastings to foresee and provide for the articles of a peace ~~at the~~ settled among the belligerent powers of Europe. We had an undoubted right of reprisals on the Mysore country for the devastation caused by Hyder Ally in the Carnatic — we had a laudable motive in diverting the attention and arms of the restless Marattas to a new object; we had a formidable French force to oppose both by sea and land. I will answer for the Governor General's caution in avoiding all cause of umbrage or offence to the French in India, from the instant that peace shall be promulgated between the two nations, and for his steady compliance with every stipulation of the treaty.

In your efforts to invalidate the debts of the Company as charged in the late estimate to different powers in India, you have particularly enlarged on the connection with the Nabob Vizier of Oude: and, as usual, you have attributed all the misfortunes which he appears to have incurred by that connection, to Mr. Hastings. To this debt, which the Company states at 730,000l.

you

you at once declare, that eternal oblivion ought to be annexed, notwithstanding the very latest advices from Mr. Bristow give assurances that the whole will be very speedily recovered. But perhaps you rely on the probability of this recovery having already taken place, and are therefore the more unguarded in advising an unconditional release. The cruelties which you have so pathetically painted (if Woodfall be correct) as being the necessary consequence of an attempt to recover the Company's debts in India are most shamefully misstated and most unwarrantably exaggerated. The Continent of India, like the continent of Europe, comprehends many different nations, in very different degrees of civilization : and in very few of them is to be found that regularity of police, or that refinement of manners which is the charm of the western world. The districts *on the coast of Coromandel*, under the sway of those subordinate Chiefs called Poligars, are inhabited by a particularly rude, brutal, and savage race — and the very letter which you caused to be read from Colonel Bonjour, incontrovertibly demonstrated it.

But

But you surely would not by your exclamations against extortion, inhumanity, and oppression, insinuate that all force is unjustifiable in the recovery of a just debt: nor is the desertion of the peasants from an Indian village any proof of the exercise of great cruelty or monstrous rapacity. Some abscond, because they find an occasional concealment less irksome than a faithful discharge of their engagements; some because they will not be pressed to carry baggage—and some merely from an abhorrence of intercourse with strangers. Even in more flourishing times of the empire, the march of the Mogul's army through his own country never failed to cause a temporary depopulation. No revenue is ever collected in India without some degree of force, and the whip is there at least as necessary an instrument to the tax-gatherer as his inkhorn: I will add, that at no period, in no part of India, has severity been so sparingly applied to the operations of finance, as in Bengal since the period of the Company's government. But you could not resist the temptation of a *touch* at the revolution of Benares—*at that revolution, which,*  
while

while it stands perfectly justifiable on the grounds of propriety and expediency, is proved beyond the possibility of cavil to have originated with Cheyt Sing and not with Mr. Hastings—is proved to have commenced in massacre, and concluded in rebellion :—is proved to have been founded on lying pleas of poverty, and gross instances of disobedience. But on your principles the demands of the Company for all debts, however incurred, are at once to be cancelled. I believe indeed the race of *creditors* in general has but small obligations to your justice, or your compassion—but I am astonished that you should be so ready to take the bare assertion and interested *ipse dixit* of the Vizier of Oude, or the Rajah of Tanjore, or of any of the Company's renters, on a plea of incapacity to pay their debts. I can discover but two circumstances, which can reasonably be supposed to operate against the claim—*Either* that the charge is exorbitant, usurious, ill-authenticated, *or*, that the contracting party laboured at the time under some known incapacity and disqualification for binding itself in an obligation to pay. Neither of these objections can fairly be urged against the demand

mand on Afoph ul Dowla. His debt was incurred for articles fairly furnished, for troops regularly employed in his service for his defence, and upon a stated allowance settled by treaty at the express motion of General Clavering and his majority. The former treaty with the late Vizier Sujah ul Dowlah, was, as you know, upon very different terms—and *that* was the treaty of Mr. Hastings. No encroachments were *there* attempted to be made upon the independence of that Prince—the whole stipulation consisted in his agreement to pay 210,000 rupees per mensem for one of our brigades, so long as it should act under his orders, or in conjunction with his forces. This treaty, as it stood at his death, the Governor General thought binding upon us, and upon his successor. Not so the majority of that day, General Clavering, Colonel Monson, and Mr. Francis. *They* pronounced upon the propriety of a new treaty, and *they* dictated the articles. *They* obliged the Vizier to cede to the Company the sovereignty of Gauzipoor and Benares in perpetuity: *They* saddled the Vizier with an additional charge of 50,000 rupees a month for the subsistence



tence of the auxiliary brigade; and under *them* (through the channel of *their* resident, Mr. Britow) were British officers appointed to command the residue of the Vizier's troops. All this was in 1775. In 1779 the Vizier refused to grant assignments for the pay of those very troops thus *officered*; and Mr. Hastings was only prevented from immediate compliance with his request for disbanding them, by the necessity of holding out an ostensible balance to the armies of the Sicks, and of Nejes Khaun, then in the field in great force.

It was on the subject of this refusal that the Vizier, during the interval of a cock-fight or a horse-race, dispatched the very *poetical chapter of lamentations*, with which you have so animatedly warmed the feelings of the House. That he was very sore upon the refusal, I do not doubt; and this establishment of British officers was certainly as well a severe check upon his independency, a great derogation of his dignity in the eyes of the native Princes, as an intolerable burthen upon his finances.

Mr.

Mr. Hastings however was neither ~~unhappy~~ <sup>unfortunate</sup> for the measure by which those officers were appointed, nor for the several circumstances, by which their conduct might irritate the Vizier and oppress his country. But *in September 1781*, the instant that political necessity permitted him, *He disbanded them.*

You were particularly pointed on the late resumption of the Begum's Jaghires—a measure which you also attribute exclusively to the Governor General—as if it were impossible for a despotic monarch to have the slightest principle of independent action, or the most trivial attention to his own concerns. Even so long ago as the year 1775, and very soon after the Vizier's accession to the musnud, the predominating influence of the Begum was a thorn in his side—And he observed to Mr. Bristow, that “two rulers were too much for one country.”—A negotiation was at that time entered into for substituting a regular payment of the value of the Jaghire in money, instead of the possession of the land itself and the troublesome management of

the collections : but the old lady had too deeply tasted the sweets of uncontrouled dominion, to part willingly with so flattering a prerogative ; she refused to listen to any terms of resignation, and supported her servants in a conduct of disaffection, opposition and contumacy, that at last, on the revolution at Benares, broke out into open rebellion. Can there be a doubt but that the Vizier felt the indignity offered to his government, and the danger that involved his throne ? Can there be a suspicion that he would fail to discover in the military jurisdiction and unjustifiable encroachments of his Jaghiredars the true source of the mischief, can there be a motive assigned why it should not equally be his wish as it was his interest to suppress the very possibility of future disturbance ? I will be bold to say, that the Vizier *ought* to have resumed the Jaghires—and that the advice of Mr. Hastings (if indeed the Vizier had no plan of conduct, no policy of his own) was perfectly wise, political, and expedient. . It is an additional proof of the necessity of the measure, that the servants of the Begum should have presumed to oppose *their*

*lawful*

*lawful Sovereign* in its operation. Nothing can so strongly evince their full conviction of the existence of "two rulers in one country" as their most unwarrantable and rebellious appeal to the sword : nothing can so unanswerably establish the propriety of an instant remedy to the anarchy that prevailed in the Subah of Oude. The Begum was therefore on the justest of all pleas dispossessed of an authority which she had constantly perverted to the very worst purposes, but the nett amount of her collections was secured to her by a new agreement ; the treasures of which she had possessed herself by very suspicious means, by a fraudulent concealment of her husband's will, or an artful appropriation of a deposit, those treasures which had always been understood to belong to the state, and which our Resident at Oude reported in 1775 to have been notoriously set aside for the supply of political emergencies, she *consented* to restore to her son, for the wants of his government, after twelve days of reflection upon the loss of her ill-exerted authority, had reconciled her to a just notion of her subordinate situation. We have the Resident at Oude's testimony

mony, in the appendix to the tenth report from the Select Committee, that her treasures were *surrendered by agreement*.

In your indiscriminating search for arguments in defence of your new bill, you have not omitted to state the discordant situations of our different governments in India, and your particular apprehensions for your very valuable friend Lord Macartney. You not only fear that he may have been deposed from his government, but *even* that he may have experienced *the fate of Lord Pigot* ! I ask you in your candour, Right Honourable Sir, if that *fate* were any thing more than *deposition* ? and I flatter myself, I may for this time presume to answer for you in the negative — at least Mr. Hastings cannot by the most extravagant stretch of insinuation be implicated farther than in the *suspension*, which (if Woodfall be right) you are pleased to term a *deposition*: and even here there is nothing in the Company's records, nor in private intelligence, to warrant your conclusion. On the news of certain propositions having been offered to Tippoo Saib, equally unsatisfactory to the Com-  
mander

mander in Chief and to the Council General, Mr.  
 Hastings in Council, desired to know “ whether  
 “ the Members thought that the President and  
 “ Select Committee of Madras had or had not in-  
 “ curred the penalty of the act of the 13th of the  
 “ King, by deputing the Tanjore Vakeel to  
 “ Tippoo Saib to treat of peace on the condition  
 “ of ceding to him a part of the Carnatic?” This  
 question was determined in the negative; and on  
 this simple ground, did your informer in this bu-  
 siness, Sir Henry Fletcher, build his assertion,  
 that Mr. Hastings’s proposal *for the suspension of*  
*Lord Macartney* had been carried against him by  
 a *one* only; as if a *majority of one* were in the Su-  
 preme Council any other than the ordinary and  
 almost necessary consequence of the smallness of  
 its number. But the discordant situations of our  
 governments abroad might be most easily recon-  
 ciled at home without the interference of your  
 bill, or the annihilation of the Company’s charter.  
 The Supreme Council at Calcutta is *by law* to have  
 the sole and entire control in all political negoti-  
 ations and matters relative to war and peace, ex-  
 cept in cases of the most urgent necessity. Did  
 that

that necessity exist when Lord Macartney and the Select Committee assumed the liberty of proposing a separate treaty with Tippo Saib? Sir Eyre Coote positively and pointedly denied it.

I cannot here deprive myself the pleasure of contributing my humble mite of gratitude and applause to that worthy and gallant old general, who to the inflexible virtues of the man, joined the most exalted talents of the soldier, who redeemed us from utter ruin in the Carnatic, who sacrificed the declining years of a most active life, to the difficulties and labours of war, rendered doubly severe by the severities of an Asiatic climate, and who lived but to the moment when his country had just begun to flatter itself with the possibility of sparing his exertions. Methinks I see the wonderful veteran reclined on his laurels, struggling in the very arms of Death, and collecting the last remnant of his exhausted strength, while he dictates to the disconsolate Secretary the animated conclusion of the forcible minute he delivered on this occasion: "Though for my part" says he "I may with propriety say that I have one  
 " soon

“ foot in the grave, and the other on the verge of  
 “ it, I trust in God I shall retain sufficient strength  
 “ both of body and mind to put an advantageous  
 “ and glorious end to this destructive war in India,  
 “ instead of having our national honour and  
 “ military credit degraded by any solicitation  
 “ for peace to an enemy already dismayed :---and  
 “ therefore I trust that this Board will never con-  
 “ sent to so degrading and unjustifiable a measure,  
 “ as is now proposed by the President and Select  
 “ Committee of Fort St. George.” Alas! great  
 and fortunate commander, your country’s ser-  
 vice can but ill brook your loss !---But you have  
 at least left us Mr. Hastings: and you are now  
 looking down with a smile of complacency on  
 those spirited exertions, to which, even in the mo-  
 ment of rival emulation, you had the generosity  
 to ascribe the preservation of the Carnatic! Peace  
 and glory attend your shade!

However meritorious Lord Macartney’s con-  
 duct may have been, however strict his care and



cautious his attention to obey the Company, he has most certainly been involved in differences and disputes upon almost every public question since the commencement of his government. He reminds me of the venturous scholastics of the sixteenth century, who in the fury of disputation, supported thees *de omni Scibili* against all opponents: We have Lord Macartney *versus* the Supreme Council, Lord Macartney *versus* Sir Eyre Coote, Lord Macartney *versus* Sir Edward Hughes, Lord Macartney *versus* General Stuart, and Lord Macartney *versus* the Nabob of the Carnatic. I have an unfeigned respect for his Lordship's character and abilities; but I cannot help lamenting that his exertions should be so unfortunately cramped, and so confined to perpetual struggles against his associates in the public service.

I shall now take the liberty, right honourable Sir, to conclude with a few words on the present state of our affairs in India: my description will, undoubtedly, form something of a contrast to  
 your

your's, and with profound humility I acknowledge that the *ingenuity* is all on your side. Bengal is certainly in a flourishing condition; its revenues productive; its government united; its internal tranquility secured. The same may be said of Benares. Oude is slowly, but gradually recovering from a relaxed system of policy, from disordered finances, from domestic anarchy. —The debts due from thence to the Company are liquidated—or in the way to speedy liquidation (no prejudice I hope to our sinking fund.) It has resumed in a great degree its proper rank of respectability among the powers of India, and its frontiers are on every side in peace. —Tippoo Saib has evacuated the whole of the Carnatic; and it now depends on the combined exertions of our government and of the Nabob of the Carnatic to restore by every species of encouragement, the population of the country, and the advantages of commerce.

On the Bombay side, Peace is effectually ratified with the Marattas——and on terms, which while they are not gallingly severe on either party, are most likely to be permanently observed by both. Tippoo Saib is said to be still formidable in that quarter, but every dispatch from Bombay teems with confidence in the success of their efforts, which they are now free to direct in full force against him. The province of Bednore we have lost by the fortune of war, as we most probably should have been obliged to relinquish it on the conclusion of a peace. It is even likely that we shall confine all our exertions to the acquisition of a specific sum from Tippoo Saib, as a compensation for the ravages of his father's arms—and this seems our wisest policy—But this circumstance will not be at all promoted by the provisions of your Bill—and if I might venture to play the statesman (as precedents are not wanting to encourage me) I would roundly assert, that there is as little mismanagement, corruption and oppression in the different seats of the British go-

vernment in India, as are to be found in any part of the world—that a few years of peace will restore the India Company's affairs to the highest prosperity in Asia :—and that if your Bill were *lost* to-morrow, every corporate body in this kingdom, and every man who values his birth-right and the freedom of his country, would have reason to triumph in the event.

I remain with the greatest respect,

Right Honourable Sir,

Your most obedient

And most humble Servant,

J O H N S C O T T.

L O N D O N,  
November 30, 1783.

T H E E N D.



**I**T has been boldly asserted, that if the India bill should pass, the Minister will acquire no accession of patronage, but will enjoy that power openly, and with responsibility annexed to it, which Lord North, when the Minister enjoyed in secret. It would have been honourable in his Lordship had he contradicted so bold and so ill-founded an assertion — as he did not do it, I will explain what portion of patronage Lord North did, and what he did not enjoy.

All appointments to the command of ships, and of inferior officers in that branch of service, have been under the Court of Directors, without any interference on the part of the Minister.— All appointments to offices in the India House, or the warehouses — all contracts for supplying the East India Company with stores of every kind for their settlements in India, comprehending a most extensive patronage, have been solely under the management of the Court of Directors, without any interference on the part of the Minister.

All appointments of writers, officers, cadets, surgeons, &c. &c. to the several governments in India, have been made by the Court of Directors—In fact the great and principal inducement to almost every gentleman in the direction, to obtain his election, has been that he might have his share of this species of patronage—Most, if not all the Directors have sons, or brothers, or cousins, or intimate friends, whom they wish to provide for, and the Company's service abroad has hitherto afforded an honourable and an advantageous provision for the relations or the friends of the Directors—Consequently they have been exceedingly tenacious of this branch of the lawful patronage annexed to their offices. Lord North when Minister, has not at all times been able to send a writer to India, and if the lists of gentlemen appointed to the civil and military service of India, since the year 1773 were examined, it would be found, that his Majesty's Ministers have been complimented with about one twenty-sixth part of such appointments, *and no more!* This assertion is capable of proof or refutation.

The

The patronage of India has been hitherto in the gift of the respective governments abroad, except in a few instances where the Directors have interfered, namely, in the cases of Mr. Bristow, and Mr. Fowke, the son of Mr. Gregory, the nephew of Sir Henry Fletcher, and a few more instances, in which a faction among the Directors has sacrificed the public interest in order to serve their friends: but in general the Directors have faithfully discharged their public duty, by appointing the servants who are to be employed, and by leaving it to the respective governments to employ them as they thought proper.

This is the present state of the patronage of the East-India Company, and widely different indeed from that which the bill now before the House of Commons means to throw into the hands of the Minister. He nominates seven Commissioners with absolute power to direct, order, govern, appoint, and remove all persons, of all ranks employed by the East-India Company both at home, and abroad---and the patronage thrown into his hands by so bold a step, is rated very low indeed, at two millions sterling a year.





**T H E  
C O N D U C T**

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**HIS MAJESTY'S  
LATE MINISTERS**

**CONSIDERED,**

**AS IT AFFECTED**

**•**

**THE EAST-INDIA COMPANY**

**A N D**

**MR. HASTINGS.**

• •

**MAJOR JOHN SCOTT.**

**L O N D O N :**

Printed for J. DODD, opposite Burlington House,  
Piccadilly. M,DCC,LXXXIV.



TO THE  
COURT OF PROPRIETORS  
OF  
EAST-INDIA STOCK,  
WHO BY THEIR SPIRITED, AND  
HONOURABLE SUPPORT OF THEIR SERVANT,  
MR. HASTINGS,  
AGAINST THE EFFORTS OF NUMEROUS,  
AND POWERFUL ENEMIES,  
HAVE PRESERVED AN EMPIRE TO GREAT BRITAIN,  
BY CONTINUING HIM IN THE  
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA,  
UNTIL PEACE AND TRANQUILITY ARE COMPLETELY  
RESTORED TO EVERY PART OF IT,  
THE FOLLOWING SHEETS ARE DEDICATED WITH  
THE SINCEREST RESPECT,  
BY THEIR  
MUCH OBLIGED AND  
FAITHFUL HUMBLE SERVANT,  
JOHN SCOTT.

*Queen-Square,*  
10th Sept. 1784.



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T H E

C O N D U C T, &c.

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**T**HE Legislature has at length passed into a law, a bill for the better management of the affairs of the East-India Company. During its progress through the House of Commons, the affairs of India have undergone a very full discussion, and, perhaps, this intricate subject is now much better understood by the public at large, than at any former period. The character and conduct of Mr. Hastings has been a principal topic in every debate upon India affairs during the late session. Lord North very justly observed, that Mr. Hastings had been able to resist every endeavour his Lordship made

to remove him : I may add, that his public character bore him up against an unjust, and absurd resolution of the late House of Commons. To suppose that money could have procured that honourable and effectual support which Mr. Hastings has received, even if he were rich enough, and mean enough to resort to bribery, is so exceedingly ridiculous, that the men who insinuate the charge, do not, I am sure, seriously believe it. The fact is, that the people of England who supported Mr. Pitt, this year, against the madness and folly of the late House of Commons, supported Mr. Hastings in 1782 against the same body ; with this difference however, that when the resolution for the recall of Mr. Hastings was carried, Lord Rockingham was the Minister, and his party had great credit in the nation : of course to resist them was hazardous, though rendered in some measure less so, from their own presumption ; but when they joined Lord North, they forfeited the confidence of the people, and consequently their attack upon Mr. Pitt, excited the popular indignation in a much greater degree than their injustice to Mr. Hastings could do.

So

So many misrepresentations have gone abroad, though their season for doing mischief is at an end, that it will be but an act of justice due to His Majesty's present Ministers, the East-India Company, and Mr. Hastings, to prove, there has been no corrupt agreement between them; and that if they have appeared to act in concert, it was merely because the late Ministry, at one and the same time, attacked the Constitution, the Company, and the well-earned fame of the present Governor General of Bengal.

Mr. Hastings certainly owes his situation to the most independent body of men in England, I mean the Proprietors of East-India stock, not, as I have heard it asserted, to a few men, who, for political purposes, have purchased stock, and who compose but one-sixteenth of the whole body, even if we suppose what is not true, that every gentleman who has served abroad and becomes a proprietor, does so for political purposes; but from a very great majority of respectable and independent men, who think they owe Mr. Hastings support in return for long, and faithful service, in difficult and arduous situations.



That their confidence in him is ill placed, his enemies have long and vainly attempted to establish; that he merits their esteem, I shall endeavour to prove as I proceed.

Mr. Hastings has served the Company above four and thirty years. Immediately after the recapture of Calcutta, he was confidentially employed by Lord Clive, and, I believe, the only person about him who did not acquire some fortune. He soon after succeeded Mr. Scrafton, as Resident at the Durbar of Meer Jaffier, the most advantageous office in the Company's service, where he remained until he became a member of the administration in 1761. In 1765, he quitted Bengal with a fortune so exceedingly moderate, that though he neither gambled, nor purchased estates, nor boroughs, nor was in any shape of an expensive turn, he was obliged to apply to the Court of Directors for permission to return to India at the end of three years. I appeal to gentlemen who have some knowledge of human nature, to determine whether it is probable that Mr. Hastings, who the prime of life shewed so great a contempt for money, should go to such extraordinary lengths to obtain it  
(as

(as his enemies have insinuated) at the age of fifty-two. It will be in the recollection of many, with what scandalous and indecent industry that libel, entitled, The Eleventh Report of the Select Committee, was circulated; that it was inclosed under a blank cover to several members of the House of Lords; and that the charges contained in it were artfully brought forward in such a manner, as to preclude every possibility of refutation, because they were declared "to be no charges, though they might hereafter furnish matter for charge." I shall just add in this place, what Mr. Burke declared to me in the month of May, 1782, that there was a direct charge of corruption against Mr. Hastings. I was then, and I am still, as ready to meet it as I was to investigate the case of Almas Alhi Cawn, or the Begums of Oude, from a conviction, that the more Mr. Hastings's conduct is scrutinized, the brighter it will appear. I shall not say more on this subject, than to desire that some one person will produce the charge of his corruption in office, and I pledge myself to refute it. To the nonsense which has been circulated so inefficaciously of large  
sums

sums of money having been expended by me to preserve him in the government of Bengal, and to procure an influence in the present Parliament, I will merely observe, that I am ready, publicly to produce an account of every shilling that I have expended for Mr. Hastings or myself, since my arrival in England; and the world will then be convinced, if farther conviction is necessary, of the gross falsehood of such assertions. \*

In the progress of the India bill through the House of Commons, something has been said of the conduct of His Majesty's late Ministers towards Mr. Hastings. Lord North, with infinite wit and good humour, contrived to confound dates, circumstances, and proper names,

\* An anonymous writer pledged himself to prove, that I had given one thousand pounds in one year to the editor of a newspaper; but when I publicly denied this fact, and called for the proofs, the writer was no more heard of. Insinuations of the same kind have lately been thrown out in the Morning Herald. It so happens, that the letters of Detector, a Citizen, and an Independent Proprietor, were originally published in that paper, and if I paid more than the *market price* for their insertion I have done it ignorantly, however, I entertain no doubts upon the subject I dare say I was fairly treated, and I do assure the editor of that paper, and the public, that I have paid at least four times as much to him as I have done to all the newspapers in London put together.

in such a manner, as to amuse, if he did not inform the House. Mr. Fox too, by talking in general terms of disobedience of orders, servants being masters, and many more topics drawn from the Reports of the Select Committee, drew their attention from the facts which I humbly attempted to establish; but I deny that either Lord North, or Mr. Fox, or Mr. Francis, were able to disprove a single assertion that I have made. With respect to the latter gentleman, his predictions have so uniformly been contradicted by the events, that I imagine the public will not place much confidence in his melancholy forebodings hereafter.

I have asserted that the war with the Marattas, and every misfortune we have suffered in India, originated in the American war, and in the measures adopted in England. Mr. Fox made a similar observation in 1776. If the coalition had not taken place, I am sure he would prove it to be true. In the following detail of facts, should I mistake any circumstances, or draw false conclusions from them, I shall be exposed as I deserve.

Mr.

Mr. Hastings succeeded to the government of Bengal in the month of April 1772, by the appointment of the Court of Directors. At this time the Company had reason to lament the very flattering account which Lord Clive had given them of the acquisition of Bengal. His Lordship had stated the revenues too high, and the expences of government too low. By paying annually four hundred thousand pounds to the State, dividing twelve per cent. upon the capital, and receiving bills from Bengal to a very large amount, in a season of profound peace, they were reduced to the necessity of applying to Parliament for relief, and Lord North seized the opportunity of assuming the management of the Company's affairs. The injustice of this act is fully exposed in that memorable protest, which the Dukes of Portland, and Richmond, Lords Rockingham, Fitzwilliam, &c. have transmitted to posterity. The impolicy we have severely felt. By the act of 1773, General Clavering, Colonel Monson, and Mr. Francis, were appointed a majority of the Supreme Council of India. Mr. Hastings continued Governor of Bengal, under the Directors

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appointment, from April 1772 to October 1774, a period of thirty months. In this time he had introduced order, regularity, and œconomy, into the government of Bengal, and he had provided funds for paying off the public debts which existed at the time of his arrival. The political measures of his government were, the withholding the tribute from the Mogul after he had withdrawn himself from our protection, and concluding a very advantageous treaty with Sujah Dowlah, by which a part of that treasure which had been so absurdly exported from Bengal was brought into it again. It was at this period that the Rohilla war was undertaken. Mr. Burke and Mr. Francis have not scrupled to attribute this war solely to Mr. Hastings; and they have asserted, that it was undertaken without a shadow of justice; that we exterminated a nation merely to acquire forty lacks of rupees. How gentlemen, who are at all acquainted with the history of India, can venture to hazard such assertions, is to me inconceivable; for the facts are directly the reverse, as a plain relation of them will prove.

In the year 1772, Sujah Dowlah and the Rohillas concluded a treaty, to which Sir Robert

Barker, on the part of the English, was the guarantee. The article which gave rise to the war was this : That if Sujah Dowlah and the English forces would assist the Rohillas, in expelling the Marattas from the Rohilcund, the Rohillas engaged to pay forty lacks of rupees to Sujah Dowlah. The engagement on our part was faithfully performed : but on a suspicion that the Rohillas would evade theirs, Sir Robert Barker, proposed to the Governor and Council to put Sujah Dowlah in possession of their country on certain conditions, though the Board declined the plan at that time. In three several letters, dated in March and April 1773, Sir Robert Barker, calls the Rohillas a faithless and treacherous race ; says, their non-compliance with their engagements is notorious, and the only way to compel them is to act upon their interests, or their fears. With these authentic documents, published as they are in the Fifth Report of the Secret Committee, how any man can say the Rohilla war was the war of Mr. Hastings, or that we attacked the Rohillas without a pretence of quarrel, and yet expect to preserve the smallest degree of credit with impartial men, is beyond my comprehension.

sion. The Rohilla war was concluded on the 6th of October, 1774. General Clavering, Colonel Monson, and Mr. Francis, arrived in Calcutta the 18th, and assumed the government the next day. To them were added Mr. Hastings and Mr. Barwell, because, as Lord Loughborough, and Lord North have informed us, it was thought necessary that two gentlemen of local knowledge should be joined with those who went from England to a service so perfectly new to them.

I do not mean to enter now into the particular subjects of dispute between the majority and minority of the Supreme Council. The first ship that sailed from Bengal carried a long letter written by Mr. Francis, and signed by the majority, in which every political act originating with Mr. Hastings was condemned: but before this letter arrived in England, the Directors had transmitted to Bengal their approbation of all Mr. Hastings's proceedings, the Rohilla war excepted; and I scarcely think their sentiments on this subject can be called a censure. They say, " Notwithstanding the pecuniary advantages which the Company have gained, we are exceedingly concerned to find that our



“ arms have been employed in the conquest of  
 “ the Rohillas ; though we must confess, the  
 “ conduct of their chiefs, *in refusing to fulfil*  
 “ *their solemn stipulations, seems to have drawn*  
 “ *upon them the calamities they have suffered.*”

These were the sentiments of the Court of Directors upon the Rohilla war ; and here the subject would have dropped, if Lord North had not determined to remove Mr. Hastings, and if a very improper degree of influence had not been employed at the India House to effect his removal. The Rohilla war was again brought forward, and most grossly misrepresented. A majority of one voice in the Court of Directors determined, on the 8th of May, 1776, that Mr. Hastings should be removed. Every possible exertion was made by Administration to prevent the Proprietors from interfering with effect in support of Mr. Hastings. Every clerk in the public offices ; every person possessing stock, who could be influenced by Government, was applied to. The interest of Lord North and the Earl of Sandwich was very powerful then in Leadenhall-street, and it was exerted to the utmost.

I admire

I admire the ingenuity of the Ninth Report. It contains, also, some striking truths. To the following I willingly assent, that after Lord North's Regulating Bill passed, " those who  
 " were engaged in contracts with the Treasu-  
 " ry, Admiralty, and Ordnance, together with  
 " the clerks in the public offices, found means  
 " of securing qualifications;" and it is fair to conclude, that they voted with the Minister: but notwithstanding all the efforts of Administration, and the industry of their dependants, Mr. Hastings obtained a complete triumph through the honourable and virtuous assistance of the late Marquis of Rockingham, and every independent man in England possessing India stock. At the time Lord North carried on the American war by a majority in Parliament of above four to one, he was defeated at the India House by a majority of 106 in 648, who ballotted on the important question for the removal of Mr. Hastings.

Lord North did not renew his endeavours for his dismissal. His Lordship knows the secret of the resignation I presume. I have related as far as Mr. Hastings is informed, in a former Letter to Mr. Burke, and till the

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Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, or Lord North, shall comply with the earnest request of Mr. Hastings, and produce those powers which were said to be ample and sufficient to authorize them in the acceptance of his resignation, the matter must rest at it is.

From the moment intelligence arrived in England of the death of Sir John Clavering, every idea of removing Mr. Hastings was given up; and however earnestly Lord North might have laboured to effect it in 1776, he himself proposed in 1779, 80, and 81, that he should be continued the Governor General of Bengal by an act of the Legislature; and certainly supported him during these years, though with full knowledge of every step he was taking relative to the Maratta war, as well as of the motives by which he was actuated. I am not at all apprehensive of being contradicted, when I say, that His Majesty's Ministers and the Court of Directors approved of the Governor General's conduct, and that full and complete information was transmitted to them in the Minutes of Mr. Hastings and Mr. Francis, the former in defence of his measures, the latter in reprobation of them.

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When the first intelligence of the invasion of the Carnatic was received in England, a Secret Committee was appointed to enquire into the cause of that invasion ; and a few months prior to this, a Select Committee had been instituted to consider the state of the judicature in Bengal. The objects of enquiry were so totally different, and the reports and proceedings of these Committees were so totally different, that I must desire to consider them separately ; for though I entirely dissent from the resolutions brought forward by the Secret Committee, and am not afraid of asserting that several of them are unfounded, yet the Fifth and Sixth Reports are fairly and impartially drawn ; nor are any papers withheld, which tend to elucidate the subject-matter of the Reports. But the Select Committee, from the day they met in the second session of the last Parliament to the day of its dissolution, appear to me to have had for their sole object the removal of Mr. Hastings and all his Council ; and to effect this, they had recourse to measures the most unfair and unwarrantable, as I have proved, and am ready at any time to prove again, to the satisfaction of any impartial man. Mr. Fox likes a systematic

tematic opposition he says ; and the Select Committee appears to have acted upon system : the world will judge whether it was a just one or not.

Lord North's administration ended March 1782. It will be in the recollection of every gentleman, with what a degree of popularity the new Ministry proceeded for some time. Mr. Fox had a peace with America in his pocket, and Mr. Burke undertook to remedy all the disorders in our Eastern government. Lord North and his friends appeared in force when Mr. Rigby's balances were under consideration, but on all other occasions there was a very thin attendance. In a few days after this great change, I heard Mr. Burke publicly declare, that Mr. Hastings and Mr. Macpherson should be removed. The runners of Administration without doors were busily employed in circulating the grossest and most palpable falsehoods, in order to prejudice the public against Mr. Hastings. The Secret Committee made four reports relative to the war in the Carnatic and the conduct of Sir Thomas Rumbold. In the Fifth and Sixth Reports they detailed the origin and progress of the first and second Maratta

war fully and fairly; and they very slightly touched upon the political transactions in Bengal previous to the year 1775. In truth, this could form no part of their enquiry. It was alledged, that the Maratta war was the cause of the invasion of the Carnatic; it was, therefore fair to trace it to its origin: but no event prior to it could at all affect the peace and tranquility of India. This will not now be disputed, though in the year 1782 it was so much the fashion to accuse Mr. Hastings of having forfeited the confidence of the natives of India.

On the 14th of April, 1782, the Chairman of the Secret Committee made a long speech, which was followed by various resolutions, forty-four in number, all tending to prove, that the policy of the British Government in Bengal had been highly imprudent, and derogatory to the national honour, and that there had been much improper conduct at home. It was something singular, that several of these resolutions, which were passed in a very thin house, censured the Government of Bengal for withholding the tribute due to the Mogul, and the pension of Nuzeph Cawn, as well as the sale of Corah and Allahabad. These several mea-

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asures

sures were adopted in the year 1773, had been communicated to the Directors, of course to His Majesty's Ministers, and had been highly approved of. If it was contrary to policy and good faith, as the seventh resolution asserts, to withhold the tribute from the Mogul, on his breaking off his connection with us, we ought in justice to pay up all arrears, or, at least, to remit the tribute to him in future; but the real fact is, that the English assisted the Mogul when his fortunes were desperate, that they gave up two fertile provinces to him, and made him a remittance of twenty-six lacks annually from Bengal, until, in spite of all our remonstrances, he quitted our protection, and threw himself into the arms of the Marattas. This happened before Mr. Hastings returned to Bengal; and his conduct in a situation which he did not create, but found existing on his arrival, met with the warm approbation of his constituents. The unhappy Mogul is so far from attributing the misfortunes he has suffered to Mr. Hastings, that he keeps up a constant correspondence with him, and depends upon the Governor General's good offices for assistance against the successors of Nuzeph Cawn.

Experience, also, has proved, that to purchase a passage for Colonel Pearce's detachment, was so far from being an extravagant and dishonourable act, as the thirty-ninth resolution asserts, that it was actually the means of breaking the grand confederacy, at the same time that it insured so great a reinforcement to Sir Eyre Coote. Equally unjust is the resolution which condemns the Supreme Council for attempting to procure military assistance from the Dutch, by the cession of Tinnevely. The Government of Madras had written to Bengal, representing their affairs to be irretrievable; it was then that Mr. Hastings proposed the Dutch treaty, leaving the Nabob and the Government of Madras to confirm it or not. A happy change in their situation enabled them to keep the field; they declined to accept the treaty; and the Supreme Council expressed their satisfaction in strong terms, declaring that they proposed it originally, upon an idea of its being better to sacrifice a part of their possessions, than to lose the whole. The first proceeding upon these extraordinary resolutions was, to pass another in a Committee of the whole House — that the Directors should remove those servants whom Parliament had



censured. This, however, was never reported. Just at this period some confused and imperfect accounts of the insurrection at Benares were received in England. These were greedily seized by the Select Committee; and notice was given to the House of Commons on the 27th of May, that a resolution for the removal of Mr. Hastings would be proposed on the following day. When the resolution was read, I counted forty-three members present, and Mr. Robinson, of Canterbury, very shrewdly observed, that it was an extraordinary resolution to be proposed in such a thin House. Mr. Dundas, who proposed it, expressly stated his reasons for so doing; that in his opinion Mr. Hastings had forfeited the confidence of the native princes, and that therefore his removal was necessary: but he fairly declared, that he did not dispute the integrity, or the abilities of the Governor General. Mr. Fox on that day spoke with great moderation. Governor Johnstone, though differing in opinion with Mr. Dundas, declared very freely, that if the Government of this country would not give its confidence to Mr. Hastings, it would be a right measure to remove him: but then it must be done in a constitutional manner,

by

by bill. Mr. Burke on this occasion held very strong language indeed. He declared, that any man, or body of men, who should dare to disobey a resolution of the House of Commons, ought to be impeached. The resolution was carried, and transmitted to the India House. Mr. Gregory and Sir Henry Fletcher filled the two chairs at the time : but the former gentleman having solemnly engaged not to carry into effect any resolution for the removal of Mr. Hastings, until it had been communicated to a General Court, we had time to look about us ; and on the 18th of June, a very full Court of Proprietors determined by a great majority, that to remove Mr. Hastings merely because the House of Commons had ordered it, would be wrong. Again they determined, that the Directors should not carry into effect any resolution which they might come to for the removal of Mr. Hastings, without previous communication to the General Court. No step whatever was taken in Parliament in consequence of this spirited conduct of the Proprietors. Mr. Fox, indeed, did say, that the subject should be taken up in the next session : but a matter of more consequence to that gentleman and his party than

than the salvation of India now happened, The Marquis of Rockingham died on the 1st of July ; and in the struggle for power at home, Mr. Hastings was no longer remembered. Mr. Fox's peace with America had vanished, and he resigned, because their independence was not instantly acknowledged ; from which he predicted the happiest effects, had it been granted, though subsequent events have proved that he was much mistaken in his conclusions. These extraordinary proceedings in England had nearly deprived us of India. Mr. Hastings, after having drawn off Moodajee Boosla from the confederacy, having settled for the time with the Nizam, and secured a reinforcement of five regiments of sepoys to Sir Eyre Coote, was enabled, in the month of October 1781, by having marched a body of troops into Sindia's country, to conclude a *separate treaty* with that chief. A total cessation of hostilities with the Maratta state immediately followed. A negotiation was instantly set on foot for a general peace, and in the month of May 1782, it was signed by Madajee Sindia and Mr. Anderson, and transmitted to Poonah to be ratified—but now we experienced

rienced the miserable consequence of the Government of India being counteracted by the Government at home. In the month of August 1782, accounts were received at Poona, that the Ministry had been changed, and that it was the determination of the new Ministry to remove Mr. Hastings. The Marattas avowed their intention of waiting the arrival of his successor before they ratified the treaty. Every month brought fresh intelligence that served to confirm them in this opinion. They knew perfectly well, that Mr. William Burke, who had been received with every mark of honour by the Rajah of Tanjore, was nearly connected with the gentleman of the same name who filled a high office in England; and it is a fact of public notoriety, that since the establishment of the Supreme Council in 1774, the native Princes of India pay the utmost attention to the political changes in Great Britain, so far as they may be supposed to affect the politics of India. In the month of November 1782, accounts were received in India of the interference of the General Court in favour of Mr. Hastings, the death of the Marquis of Rockingham, and the resignation of Mr. Fox. Madajee Sindia congratulated

gratulated Mr. Hastings on this happy change of affairs ; and on the 20th of the next month the Maratta peace was formally ratified at Poona.

During the summer of 1782, an enquiry into the conduct of Mr. Hastings was carried on at the India House. Mr. Gregory resigned the chair in August, after having condemned in the most pointed terms every act that originated with Mr. Hastings ; and in order to weaken the British Government as much as possible at that critical moment, positive orders were sent for the immediate restoration of Mr. Bristow and Mr. Fowke to Owde and Benares. In the month of October 1782, thirteen Directors passed a resolution for the removal of Mr. Hastings. Whatever Lord Shelburne's sentiments might have been, he supported this resolution, but it was rescinded by the determination of a most respectable Court of Proprietors ; and if any man still believes the nonsense of the Proprietors being the servants of the servants in India, let him candidly attend to the following facts.

When Mr. Fox and Lord John Cavendish resigned in July 1782, the former gentleman hinted in the House, that amongst other causes  
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of discontent which induced him to give up, Lord Shelburne had shewn a disposition to protect East-India delinquents, and that he even expected him to bring in Lord North, but that the nation would not bear it. Perhaps his Lordship conceived, that if he could not venture to support Mr. Hastings, in consequence of the prejudice which then prevailed, it would be right to remove him, and he certainly laboured to effect it. The gentlemen in the direction who voted for his removal, supported it in the General Court. The Rockingham faction exerted themselves on the same account, yet such was the general conviction of the merits of Mr. Hastings, that all these interests combined, could muster but seventy-five votes upon a ballot, to oppose to four hundred and twenty-eight. All the Proprietors who have served in India, residing in Great Britain and Ireland, are one hundred and five, so that if every man had attended and voted in favour of Mr. Hastings, still his majority of English Proprietors would have been very considerable; but so far from there being at that time a general agreement in his favour, I can point out several India gentlemen, added to General

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Smith, and Sir Henry Fletcher, who voted for his removal.

We were threatened with the vengeance of Parliament for this prudent exercise of our rights; but when it assembled in December, 1782, the expectation of peace prevented an immediate discussion of India affairs. The Select Committee was revived, and after the Christmas recess, a bill was promised to be brought in: then followed the peace, and the overthrow of Lord Shelburne for having made it; for although Mr. Fox, in April, 1782, found the country "to be in a "much worse situation than even he had conceived it to be before he came into office," and though "no peace, could then be a bad "one, we had experienced so happy a change in our resources in nine months, that the terms agreed to by Lord Shelburne were so dishonourable, it was deemed better to coalesce with Lord North, than to suffer his Lordship to remain in office. This business, however, was not immediately effected, and India was again left to itself. In the month of April, 1783, the coalition Ministry assumed the government. The Select Committee had been diligently employed

ployed in investigating the affairs of India, and, on the 1st of April, they presented a Report to the House, which appeared to ignorant men to be intended merely for the purpose of keeping Mr. Sullivan and Sir William James out of the direction, by exciting a clamour against them just on the eve of our election, and before they could possibly have time to defend themselves. If this was the intention, it happily missed of its effect, Mr. Sullivan and Sir William James, came in with a high hand, and then Mr. Fox found out, that though this matter was of consequence, yet it was trifling indeed compared to another which would soon be before the House. That all the world knew there was a very important Report on the point of being published, and that then something must be done in the affairs of India; and then too he would consider the Report which affected Mr. Sullivan and Sir William James: thus ended this trifling affair. Mr. Dundas's bill was never read a second time. At length the famous Report alluded to by Mr. Fox appeared; it was intended to prove, that the government of India was totally defective both at home and abroad, and that horrible oppres-



sions had been committed in India, and winked at in England. Unfortunately, however, the business of Mr. Powell, and Mr. Bembridge, and other unlucky accidents, had so soured the temper of the House, that it was not thought quite prudent to attempt any thing that session against Mr. Hastings, as his friends could oppose to vague, and unfounded declamation, undoubted evidence of the most solid and substantial services: the Maratta peace; the relief of Madras; and the improvement of the revenues of Bengal. This session of Parliament ended as the preceding one, by Mr. Fox pledging himself to do something effectual, as soon as the House met after the recess.

During the summer of 1783, advices of great importance were received from India. The French had strained every nerve to distress us; and in the midst of all the efforts of the Supreme Council to defend Madras, the Greyhound packet arrived with dispatches from the Court of Directors, tending to persuade every man in Bengal that the removal of Mr. Hastings was near at hand. He had long borne up against this species of counteraction; but conceiving there was a determination to force him

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him from Bengal, and that without support from home, he could not expect to conduct the public business to advantage; he wrote in the following terms to the Directors on the 21st of March, 1783 :

“ It is now a complete period of eleven years since I first received the nominal charge of your affairs. In the course of it I have invariably had to contend, not with ordinary difficulties, but such as most unnaturally arose from the opposition of those very powers from which I primarily derived my authority, and which were required for the support of it. My exertions, though applied to an unvaried and consistent line of action, have been occasional and desultory : yet I please myself with the hope that, in the annals of your dominion which shall be written after the extinction of recent prejudices, this term of its administration will appear not the least conducive to the interest of the Company, nor the least reflective of the honour of the British name; and allow me to suggest the instructive reflection of what good might have been done, and what evil prevented, had due support been given to that administration  
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which has performed such eminent and substantial services without it.

“ You, honourable Sirs, can attest the patience and temper with which I have submitted to all the indignities which have been heaped upon me in this long service. It was the duty of fidelity which I essentially owed to it, it was the return of gratitude which I owed, even with the sacrifice of life, had that been exacted, to the Company, my original masters, and most indulgent patrons. To these principles have I devoted every private feeling, and persevered in the violent maintenance of my office; because I was conscious that I possessed, in my integrity, and in the advantages of local knowledge, those means of discharging the functions of it with credit to myself, and with advantage to my employers, which might be wanting in more splendid talents; and because I had always a ground of hope that my long sufferance would disarm the prejudices of my adversaries, or the rotation of time produce that concurrence, in the crisis of your fortune with my own, which might place me in the situation to which I aspired. In the mean time, there was nothing in any actual state of your affairs which could discourage

courage me from the prosecution of this plan. There was indeed an interval, and that of some duration, in which my authority was wholly destroyed; but another was substituted in its place, and that, though irregular, was armed with the public belief of an influence invisibly upholding it, which gave it a vigour scarce less effectual than that of a constitutional power. Besides, your government had no external dangers to agitate, and discover the looseness of its composition.

“ The case is now most widely different. — While your existence was threatened by wars with the most formidable powers of Europe, added to your Indian enemies; and while you confessedly owed its preservation to the seasonable and vigorous exertions of this government, you chose that season to annihilate its constitutional powers. You annihilated the influence of its executive member—you proclaimed its annihilation;—you virtually called on his associates to withdraw their support from him, and they have withdrawn it. But you have substituted no other instrument of rule in his stead, unless you suppose that it may exist, and can be effectually exercised, in the body of

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your Council at large ; possessing no power of motion but an inert submission to the letter of your commands ; which, however necessary in the wise intention of the legislature, have never yet been applied to the establishment of any original plan or system of measures, and seldom felt but in instances of personal favour or personal displeasure.

“ Under such a situation, I feel myself impelled, by the same spirit which has hitherto animated me to retain my post against all the attempts made to extrude me from it, to adopt the contrary line. The season for contention is past. The present state of affairs is not able to bear it. I am morally certain, that my successor in this government, whoever he may be, will be allowed to possess and exercise the necessary powers of his station, with the confidence and support of those, who, by their choice of him, will be interested in his success. I am become a burden to the service ; and would instantly relieve it from the incumbrance, were I not apprehensive of creating worse consequences by my abrupt removal from it. Such an act would probably be considered, by Mahdajee Sindia, as a desertion of him in the instant of  
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his accomplishment of the treaty, and defeat the purposes of it, which remain yet to be effected by his agency. I am also persuaded that it would be attended with the loss of the commander in chief, in whose presence alone I look for the restoration of peace to the Carnatic, which he, perhaps, would think too hazardous an undertaking with no other support than that of a broken government. I have now no wish remaining, but to see the close of this calamitous scene, and for that I hope a few months will be sufficient. My services may afterwards be safely withdrawn; but will still be due, in my conception of what I owe to my first constituents, until they can be regularly supplied by those of my appointed successor, or until his succession shall have been made known, and the interval but short for his arrival.

“ It therefore remains to perform the duty which I had assigned to myself as the final purpose of this letter; to declare, as I now most formally do, that it is my desire that you will be pleased to obtain the early nomination of a person to succeed me in the government of Fort William; to declare that it is my intention to resign your service as soon as I can do it with-

out prejudice to your affairs, after the allowance of a competent time for your choice of a person to succeed me; and to declare, that if, in the intermediate time, you shall proceed to order the restoration of Rajah Cheyt Sing to the Zemindary, from which, by the powers I legally possessed, and conceive myself legally bound to assert, against any subsequent authority to the contrary derived from the same common source, he was dispossessed for crimes of the greatest enormity, and your Council shall resolve to execute the order; I will instantly give up my station and the service."

However desirous the friends of Mr. Hastings might have been to retain him in the government of Bengal, here was an earnest request from himself to be relieved. No step was taken either by the Directors or his Majesty's Ministers in consequence of it. The letter was received in September last, and the following month the Court of Proprietors voted him their thanks for his services; to which they added, a request that he would not resign until the complete restoration of peace in India, and the arrangements in consequence of it had taken place.

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This was the precise situation of affairs when the late House of Commons met on the 14th of November. When the resolution passed in a thin House in May 1782 for the recal of Mr. Hastings, we were at war with the Marattas, with Hyder Ally, the French, and the Dutch. A strange idea prevailed, that Mr. Hastings had forfeited the confidence of the native Princes, and that his removal was necessary, as a step preparatory to peace. Subsequent events had proved the fallacy of this opinion. Mr. Hastings made the Maratta peace; he relieved the Carnatic; Hyder was dead, and a peace had been concluded in Europe; Bengal was in a perfect state of tranquillity; and the revenues were annually improving.

On the first day of the session, the 11th of November, Mr. Fox informed the House, that he would open the heads of a bill for the government of India on the following Tuesday. Every possible exertion was made to insure success to his plan; a very artful pamphlet had been published, and generally distributed previous to the meeting of Parliament, in which the grossest misrepresentation were inserted, in order to prejudice the public against the East-India Company and



Mr. Hastings\*. The newspapers were well supplied with paragraphs tending to the same end. The Select Committee, a very few days after they assembled, published their Eleventh Report without an Appendix. This was instantly re-printed by Mr. Debrett, who during the summer had printed the Ninth Report also; and lest the world should want an inducement to read them, they were advertised as containing an account of the conduct of Mr. Hastings, and of money acknowledged to have been received by him. These Reports were sent to the present Lord Chancellor, amongst other Peers, under a blank cover. Is it therefore extraordinary, that feeling an honest indignation at a proceeding so scandalous, his Lord-

\* A considerable part of this pamphlet is very much in the style of Mr. Fox's speech when he opened his plan. Speaking of the Select Committee, the writer says, " This Committee " is composed of gentlemen of the most unfeigned probity and " first-rate talents, whose knowledge of the subject cannot be " questioned, and whose industry and perseverance are only to " be equalled by their candour and fairness. To distinguish " individuals without naming the whole, would be invidious. " The proceedings of this highly respectable Committee have " been always open and public. The testimony of witnesses " has been taken in the most solemn manner."

These are a few of the compliments paid to the Select Committee, and the author then gives up some extracts from the Ninth Report, which he styles an " invaluable document."

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ship should have declared, that to such Reports  
 “ he would pay as much attention as to the  
 “ Adventures of Robinson Crusoe.”

On the 18th of November, Mr. Fox, in a very long speech, opened his plan. Instead of attributing the temporary distress of the East-India Company to their true causes, the American war, and the pernicious interference of Ministers, which no man formerly reprobated in harsher terms than himself, he now declared, that our misfortunes were owing to the mismanagement of Mr. Hastings in India, and to the support which he met with from his agents and dependents at home. In the course of his speech, he went through all the unfounded charges that have been insinuated in the Reports of the Select Committee; and after describing Mr. Hastings as a corrupt, ambitious, and unprincipled Governor, he moved for leave to bring in a bill not to remove, not to punish the Governor, but totally to annihilate the privileges of his constituents, for which he assigned two curious reasons; the one, that the Proprietors were become the servants, of the servants in India; the other, that they were unfit, by their constitution, for the management of an empire.

pire. The first is one amongst many fanciful ideas which are to be found in the Ninth Report; but to prove the truth of it, nothing like the shadow of an argument has ever yet been offered. To mention the conquests acquired during the war by the East-India Company, and the honourable manner in which they have terminated it, would be the completest answer that could possibly be given to the second assertion. During the many discussions that this famous bill received in the House of Commons, Mr. Fox and his friends varied their ground very often. They explained away, in some measure, what had been said of the bankruptcy of the Company. It had been stated in all the newspapers that Mr. Fox declared, we had but three millions two hundred thousand pounds to pay a debt of above eleven millions. This sunk the stock near fifteen per cent. in one day.

It is impossible not to take notice of a very curious circumstance which passed on the day the bill was read a second time: Mr. Fox disputed the items of the Company's account, article by article, in the most ingenious and entertaining speech I ever heard. The Company

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had stated the amount of their cash, bonds, and notes, to be above six hundred thousand pounds, then lying in their Treasury in Leadenhall Street.

After a few items more, there was the following "Silver remaining in the Treasury for exportation — one thousand and ninety pounds." There cannot be a greater proof of the advantage acquired by this nation, from the acquisition of Bengal, than the following: — That from the commencement of the present century to the year 1764, the average of silver exported was near 400,000*l.* each year; but from 1764 to the present time, it is a mere trifle. A considerable quantity of specie has been brought into the kingdom from India since 1764. But how did Mr. Fox turn this? He appeared totally to forget the former sum of cash in the Treasury, six hundred thousand pounds, and observed, "The next item was, silver remaining in the Treasury, 1090*l.* The only notice which he meant to take of this article was, to declare his astonishment, or, rather indeed, not his astonishment, but to point it out as a fact which proved his statement of their finances

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“ to be right. After enumerating their millions  
 “ afloat, their millions in the warehouses, they  
 “ came to the calculation of their specie, and it  
 “ amounted to the sum of 10901. This re-  
 “ minded him of an article in one of our Great  
 “ Bard’s best plays, where, speaking of one of  
 “ his best characters, it is said, ‘ So much for  
 “ sack — so much for sugar — so much for  
 “ burnt hock — so much for this, and so much  
 “ for that ; but for the solid, the substantial,  
 “ the staff of life — bread, one halfpenny.’ So  
 “ it was with this flourishing Company : they  
 “ had millions of goods, of bonds, of debts ;  
 “ but of silver they had one solitary thousand  
 “ pounds.”

This remark was received with the strongest  
 signs of approbation in the House : it was re-  
 peated in every newspaper the following day ;  
 and I am sure the first impression the Public  
 received was, that the Company’s Treasury  
 contained but a solitary thousand pounds on the  
 28th of November last.

The preamble of Mr. Fox’s bill runs thus :  
 “ Whereas disorders of an alarming nature and  
 “ magnitude have long prevailed, and do still  
 “ continue and *increase*, in the management of  
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“ the territorial possessions, the revenues, and  
 “ commerce of this kingdom in the East In-  
 “ dies, by means whereof the prosperity of  
 “ the natives hath been greatly diminished, and  
 “ the valuable interests of this nation, in the  
 “ said territorial revenues, &c. have been ma-  
 “ terially impaired, *and would fall into utter*  
 “ *ruin*, if an immediate and fitting remedy  
 “ were not provided.” The arguments of Mr.  
 Fox and his friends intirely coincided with the  
 spirit of this preamble\*. Mr. Hastings and  
 Sir Eyre Coote were declared not to wish for  
 peace. † They persecuted the excellent Lord  
 Macartney, because he was desirous of accom-  
 plishing it. God only knew whether that no-  
 ble Lord had not shared the fate of Lord Pigot.  
 It was doubtful whether India could be saved at  
 all, or peace restored; but it was only to be

\* Mr. Fox. “ The seeds of war were already sown in India; and a note left by Sir Eyre Coote, a man who deserved every possible praise, independent of his gallant actions, afforded alarming proofs of it.”

† Mr. Fox. “ Did the House know of the disputes in our Presidencies? That Lord Macartney, that great and exalted man, the only man who paid obedience to his constituents, was at this instant perhaps removed, confined, perhaps come to the fate of Lord Pigot.” — Vide Debrett's Debates for November, 1783, pages 160 and 171.

effected, if possible to be effected, by an immediate change of system; and therefore the bill ought to pass without delay. This was the language of its supporters; and when, happily for the nation, it was thrown out, they presented an address to the Throne, in which they say, "That the disorders prevailing in the East Indies call aloud for *instant* reformation."

On the same day that Mr. Fox moved for leave to bring in his bill, a packet sailed from Bengal, conveying to us the fullest proofs that the state of India was at that time the very reverse of what it had been represented, and that the only difficulties the Government of Bengal laboured under were occasioned by the absurd conduct of His Majesty's Ministers at home. We learnt that on the 18th of November the Carnatic had been nearly evacuated; that the conditions of the peace with the Marattas had been faithfully executed on both sides; that we had concluded an eventual treaty with them, in order to compel Tippoo Sultraun to accept of reasonable terms; and that the only object of concluding that treaty was to accelerate the peace with him. That our army had been considerably reduced, and that farther re-

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ductions were determined upon as soon as our foreign detachments should reach Bengal. That the Supreme Council, though highly disapproving the conduct of Lord Macartney, had determined to await the decision of the Court of Directors. This was the actual situation of affairs in India at the moment the late Ministry proposed so violent a measure. Subsequent advices have been still more favourable; and there is not a man of common understanding in England who must not see that the preamble of the India bill was founded in misinformation, or that His Majesty's late Ministers were determined to exaggerate the distresses they had themselves created, in order to seized the patronage and property of the East-India Company for their own security. That we have participated in the calamities which have nearly overwhelmed this country is certain — That the prodigious efforts made by France to dispossess us of India, could not have been so successfully repelled without great and enormous expences, no man will doubt — That in so long a war, some individuals must have acquired money is true; but what proportion do the fortunes lately gained in India bear to the acquisitions of individuals in England



during the unfortunate American war? Yet it was the fashion, last winter, for Mr. Fox and his friends to hurl the thunder of their eloquence at the devoted East-India Company. — If any impartial man examines the funds of the Company, I am sure he will form a patriotic wish, that this nation may have as fair a prospect of being extricated out of all her difficulties as the East-India Company has at the present moment.

The India bill passed the House of Commons by a prodigious majority. — Mr. Macdonald very shrewdly observed, that to carry this enormous design through, three different grounds had been laid on three different days. On the first day, it was the supposed misconduct of Mr. Hastings: on the second, the supposed bankruptcy of the Company; and on the third, a radical defect in the present system.

Lord John Cavendish asserted, “that the bill  
 “was such a measure as the situation of affairs  
 “required. Nobody but a child, or a trifler,  
 “would think of continuing the present consti-  
 “tution of the India Company.” I have too  
 good an opinion of the integrity and honour of  
 Lord John Cavendish, to suppose he would  
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have made such a declaration, unless he had been convinced at the time of the truth of it. The same observation I apply to the other gentlemen who supported it; but it is now proved, beyond contradiction, that the House and the Public were egregiously misled, since every ship that has arrived from India during the summer, has brought full and complete proof, that our affairs, so far from being in danger of falling into "*utter ruin*," are in a state of prosperity, which far exceeds the hopes of the most sanguine of our well wishers.

In the House of Lords, the same arguments that had been so successfully urged in the House of Commons were repeated, but with very different effect. The Company were patiently heard by their Counsel, and they proved to the satisfaction of every impartial man, that the preamble of the bill was totally unfounded. The support the bill met with was exceedingly feeble; but the speeches of the Duke of Richmond, Lords Thurlow, Camden, Walsingham, and other noble Lords, in reprobation of such a system as the bill went to establish, effectually convinced the House and the Public, that they had been hitherto grossly deceived.

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The Lord Chancellor in particular, most happily exposed the absurdity and the iniquity of punishing the Company, for the alledged misconduct of Mr. Hastings, and fairly declared, that it would be scandalous in the highest degree to permit Mr. Hastings to escape if he was guilty, or to brand him with the name of delinquent if innocent. If Mr. Hastings, or his friends in his absence, had ever deprecated the vengeance of his opponents, *if they had bargained for his safety by continuing to stand neuter at this critical moment*, there might have been some ground to suppose, that his conduct would not bear a scrutiny; but this was so far from being the case, that Mr. Hastings has said, “if I have violated the national faith, no punishment short of death can atone for the injury which the interest and credit of the State has sustained\*.” This is the language

\* Many are the honourable testimonies of esteem and regard which Mr. Hastings has received from gentlemen who are utter strangers to him, and totally unconnected with the politics of India. The following much-admired passages are extracted from the letters of Mr. Day to Mr. Burke, published under the signature of Marius.

I must confess it strikes me with no little idea “of the inconsistency of human greatness, and the stupendous revolutions

guage of Mr. Hastings in India; the language of his friends in England has been the same; Mr. Fox, if he really thought Mr. Hastings "an usurper and a scourge to mankind, a  
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" tions that have happened in our age of wonders," when I see a set of men, who have just lost Thirteen Provinces, sitting in judgement upon, and dispossessing those, who have added to the British empire "281,412 square miles, which form a territory larger than any European dominion, Russia and Turkey excepted." Whatever may be now advanced by interest or malevolence about the crimes or incapacity of the Company's servant, is amply confuted by the unexaggerated detail of events. What stronger evidence can be given of the solid basis upon which any human power is founded, than its capacity to resist and triumph over the mightiest attacks? This even, exclusively, is the boast of the East-India Company. With every disadvantage of difficulty and distance, it has prevailed not only over the feeble opposition of Asiatic Princes, but over all the efforts of one of the most politic and warlike nations in the universe. Could this have been effected without a spirit both of counsel and of enterprise? No; whatever may be the representations of parliamentary orators, the world at large will refute the wild and chimerical accusation. Whatever may be the demerits of the Company, whatever the catalogue of its crimes, the comparative series of its Ministers may certainly vie with that of any modern government in Europe. It has undoubtedly produced warriors of intrepid minds, and heroes of immortal fame, chiefs that have dared in their employers' and country's cause, all that men can dare, that have executed every thing which the present colleagues of Mr. Burke *have failed to do*. Even now, "on evil days, though fallen, and evil tongues," it can boast of characters that would do honour to any nation; the foremost of whom is that very culprit that seems singly like an electric rod upon a noble edifice, to have protected the  
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“cruel and a desperate man, whom from his heart and soul he detested and execrated \*,” has acted, as a public man, most unwarrantably. The honour of the nation is concerned not to permit an usurper to escape with impunity, and supported by so powerful a majority as Mr. Fox lately was, if he could have substantiated a single charge against Mr. Hastings, he could have removed him instantly by bill. To say that Mr. Hastings had an influence in Parliament to bear him up against the eloquence and power of Mr. Fox, if he had been “a notorious delinquent,” would be to impose upon mankind. During the madness of the Rockingham Administration, when the House of Commons passed a resolution, “that it was the duty of the Directors to recall Mr. Hastings;” no gentleman offered to divide the House, and the observations made upon

the building beneath, while he attracts the fury of the tempest upon himself. Yet even he, “scarred” as he may appear, with all the lightnings of parliamentary vengeance, nor asks the mercy, nor deprecates the rage of his accusers: he is ready to leave the throne of half the East, in order to meet their impeachments; he bids them take his life, if any thing worthy of death shall be found in his conduct; nor dare his most inveterate enemies accept the offer.

\* Mr. Fox’s speech, Dec. 17, 1783. — Debrett’s Debates, Vol. XII.

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the occasion, were first by Governor Johnstone, that if Ministers were determined to remove him, they did not go the right way to do it ; and next by the worthy member for Canterbury, who said, that the House was rather thin (forty-three members present) considering the great importance of the resolution. What accession of interest or influence had Mr. Hastings acquired in twenty months, that should support him in the same House of Commons, against such an host of able and powerful opponents ? The fact is, he was defended by the people of England, who had sense enough to see through the arts that were practised to depreciate the character of the man who has preserved every thing in Asia, while in other quarters of the globe we have lost every thing ; and who asked no other favour from the late Ministers, than to be brought before some tribunal, where he could be permitted to defend himself. During the progress of the bill through the House of Commons, many efforts were made to effect this, and particularly by Governor Johnstone, who declared, repeatedly, that the foundation of the bill being built on the pretended misconduct of Mr. Hastings, it

was as unjust as it was absurd, not to bring forward specific charges against that gentleman. All his efforts were vain, for Mr. Fox continued to declare, that the merits or demerits of Mr. Hastings were not then a subject of consideration, but when the same line was taken in the House of Lords by one noble Peer; the present Lord Chancellor declared, as in truth and justice he was bound to do, that it would be impossible to discuss the bill without entering fully into the merit or misconduct of Mr. Hastings; the consequence was, that Lord Walsingham's reply to the speeches of Lords Carlisle, and Sandwich, was a most complete refutation of every thing that had been said relative to Benares, Oud, and a variety of subjects which had been partially investigated in the Reports of the Select Committee. Not an argument used by the noble Lords who opposed the bill, was answered, or even an attempt made to reply to their objections.

All that had been said of the bankruptcy of the Company, of the misconduct of Mr. Hastings, of the cabals and intrigues between the servants in India and their dependents in England, most happily missed its effect. The bill

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was deservedly lost, and every day, every hour brings conviction to the mind of every man, that the assertions made by those who supported the bill had no foundation in fact, that they were artfully calculated to catch the prejudices of the moment, with the hope that a measure, big with such important consequences to our happy constitution, would have passed, before the Public were sensible of its pernicious effects.

When Mr. Fox proposed the bill, we laboured under every possible disadvantage. Our Chairman, who was bound to be our protector, was one of the seven Commissioners, and was to have risen upon the ruin of the Company.—If he thought the bill a good one, he was right to support it; but from the moment he took that line, he should have disqualified; it was not, however, till the second reading that he quitted the direction. It was with difficulty we could procure the insertion of any articles in the daily papers (one excepted) which tended to disprove the flagrant falsehoods that were hourly circulating. But when the bill was before the House of Peers, our representations began to have some effect; and I desire the most prejudiced party man in England to contradict me if he can,



when I assert, that every letter received from India in the course of the present year, has fully justified the statements we laid before the Public.

The bill was thrown out by the Lords on the 17th of December, and the change of Ministry followed. In the first tumult that succeeded this event, we now and then heard of Mr. Hastings, and of India. The former was stated to be an usurper, but upon what ground I know not. If the gentlemen who report Mr. Fox's speeches are accurate, he has decidedly affirmed, "that India would be lost without instant reformation: Thirty millions of innocent people were groaning under every species of oppression, and secret influence had destroyed the strongest Administration this country had ever been blessed with." These subjects, however, were very soon abandoned for others of infinitely greater importance to the late Administration. But at length the Parliament was dissolved, without any plan for the government of India being adopted: and here again I must observe, how unfortunate His Majesty's late Ministers were in their predictions last year. It was declared, that without the instant adoption of some plan, India would be lost; a bill must pass before February, and perhaps all the expedition  
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they could use would not save that country. Have not events, universally known, now most completely proved, how fallacious and unfounded these apprehensions were. Peace is completely restored, retrenchments have been made, and the revenues greatly improved; where then is "that utter ruin," in which, according to the preamble, we were to be involved, "if an immediate and fitting remedy was not provided."

While the bill, that has lately passed for the better government of India, was under discussion, much was said of the conduct of Mr. Hastings, and the influence he had acquired in this kingdom; his disobedience of orders, and contempt of superior authority, were frequently mentioned.

With respect to Mr. Hastings's influence in England, whatever may be the degree of it, I can safely assert, that it has been fairly and honourably acquired, and that he may glory in it; that there never was a man in a public station, so totally unconnected with the parties which divide this kingdom as Mr. Hastings is, that he has neither courted Mr. Fox, nor Mr. Pitt, and all he has ever required has been, fairly and  
openly

openly to be supported if he deserves support, or to be recalled if thought unworthy of confidence; he has never sought to preserve his station by cabal and intrigue, and has ever held that bold, decided language in Bengal, which every man of spirit must esteem him for. That Mr. Hastings has, by corruption, by bribery, or by any means whatever that would degrade the character of a gentleman, obtained influence of any kind in England, I solemnly deny;—not a shadow of a proof has been offered to convince the world, that he has resorted to such base means of support. Two or three very good things, indeed, have been said, as to the number of Indians now in Parliament, but I have proved, that there were precisely the same number in the last; the only difference is, that the balance was then in favour of Mr. Fox, and now it is on the side of Mr. Pitt. It has also been wittily observed, that the Treasury Bench was under the Indian Bench in the last session, but here, again, I cannot help recollecting, that I have seen General Smith, Captain Sir Henry Fletcher, and Mr. Jacob Wilkinson upon that Bench, and I cannot help thinking, that Mr. George Vanstuart, Colonel Call, and myself, were as well intitled

to all those seats, as the gentlemen who formerly occupied them.

Mr. Hastings has been accused, in general terms, of disobedience of orders, and Mr. Fox attributed the wars in India to his disregard of the instructions he received from home ; — but from this charge Mr. Dundas most completely defended him, by proving, that whether the Maratta war was politic or not, so far as Mr. Hastings was concerned in it, he was fully justified by the express orders of the Court of Directors, — and he might have gone farther, for those orders had the express sanction of his Majesty's Ministers ; though one set of gentlemen appear now to be totally ignorant, not only of this circumstance, but of the very important intelligence transmitted to Bengal by Mr. Elliot, and inserted in the Appendix to the Sixth Report of the Secret Committee. — I have already detailed the events which gave rise to the Rohilla war in 1773, and it was commenced, and ended in six months. These are the only hostilities in which we have borne a part in Bengal during the last twenty years, — but a stranger, who was to read the late parliamentary debates, would really suppose we had  
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been engaged in perpetual war in Bengal ;— though in truth, at no period of the modern history of Indostan, has that country enjoyed so long a peace, as since the English acquired the government.

It was asserted \*, that Mr. Hastings disobeyed a peremptory order for the restoration of Cheyt Sing, but no orders of this kind ever were sent ; and absurd, and mad I might almost say, as the conduct of the late Ministers, with respect to India, has been, I can scarcely conceive it ever was in contemplation to restore him. — The whole of the proceeding relative to Cheyt Sing was strictly consonant to the constitution of the government under which he lived. — He has been ranked here amongst the native princes of India, but his family owed its consequence entirely to the English. His father, Bulwant Sing, was originally a petty zemindar in the district of Juanpore, and paid about four thousand rupees a year to the government : he then became collector or farmer of a district under his sovereign Sujah Dowlah, and at length was appointed the collector of Benares. — In this

\* Mr. Fox's speech, 16th of July.

situation we found him when Sujah Dowlah was marching to invade Bengal. — We protected him against the vengeance of his Sovereign in 1764, and he was confirmed in the zemindary, by the treaty of Allahabad, in 1765. — From that time to the day the sovereignty of Benares was transferred to the Company, Sujah Dowlah required military assistance from Bulwant Sing and his son Cheyt Sing, whenever his forces took the field, and he received it\*. — We made a similar demand when the war broke out with France, and Cheyt Sing promised to comply with it.—That he evaded his promise I attribute entirely to the dissensions in our councils and his expectation of a change in the government.

In this business of Cheyt Sing there is a circumstance that, I confess, surprises me exceedingly, which is this: The gentlemen who have argued upon it seem totally to forget that the demand of money had been made three successive years previous to the insurrection, and compliance enforced by military execution. —

\* For proof of this, see the evidence given by Colonel Harger to the Select Committee in 1781, long before the insurrection at Benares.

A very particular detail of each year's proceedings was transmitted to England in triplicate. Did his Majesty's late Ministers, or did one gentleman in the direction ever give an opinion that Mr. Hastings and his council had violated the national faith by demanding, on the part of the Company, military assistance from their vassal Cheyt Sing? — Certainly they did not, nor was such an idea ever entertained till it became the fashion to decry the character of Mr. Hastings. — Yet Mr. Gregory and Sir Henry Fletcher were in the direction at the period when the demands were made, and the consequences communicated. Lord North was the Minister, too, at the time. — Shall these gentlemen be excused for their conduct, and shall Mr. Hastings now be calumniated? He and his Council acted right. — As guardians of the British interest in India, they demanded what, in their idea, was the Company's right; but if there were men in office in England of a different opinion, as it seems there were by their subsequent conduct, they are criminal in not protesting against a measure which was deemed a violation of the national faith.

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The other instances of disobedience of orders which have been quoted were the not sending Mr. Bristow to Oud and Mr. Fowke to Benares.—Is there a man of common sense in England who can now entertain a doubt upon this subject? These gentlemen were made the instruments of a party, and Mr. Pitt may as fairly be accused of criminality for not keeping Mr. Sheridan or Mr. Richard Burke in the Treasury, as Mr. Hastings has been for declining to send Mr. Bristow and Mr. Fowke to Benares and Oud, at the moment when every newspaper in Indostan contained accounts that these appointments were made in consequence of a determination at home to dismiss Mr. Hastings, and that his dismissal might hourly be expected.—I confess the idea is so repugnant to common sense, of continuing a man at the head of an empire, and refusing him at the same time the privilege of appointing those who are to fill the first political stations in it, that I am astonished how a gentleman of Mr. Fox's talents can take that ground.—Mr. Hastings stated it fairly in Bengal.—The bill lately passed has stated it fairly too.—Obedience to orders is positively enjoined, — but



in instances where orders are disobeyed, the proof of the necessity for such disobedience must be full, or punishment will follow. — Such was the language of Mr. Hastings. — He never expected a repetition of the orders relative to Mr. Bristow and Mr. Fowke. — He assigned his reasons for acting as he had done, and, if they were not satisfactory, he expected dismissal himself.

Critical, indeed, was our situation when this business was agitated. The Carnatic had just been invaded: The peace with the Marattas was not concluded, a French armament was on its way to India; and Sir Eyre Coote, with a large reinforcement, was on the point of proceeding to Madras. At this moment, Mr. Francis proposed that Mr. Bristow should be sent to Oud, agreeable to the order of the Directors. I defy any man living to controvert the reasons assigned by Mr. Hastings, for refusing to carry the order then into execution. Sir Eyre Coote equally felt the impolicy of the measure, but he had committed himself, and therefore agreed to it, wishing Mr. Hastings to adopt some plan that should tend to prevent any bad effects from the appointment. Our situation  
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growing more desperate in India, Mr. Hastings recalled both Mr. Bristow and Mr. Fowke. It was hard to bring him to a personal contest with two junior servants of the Company. Surely in the situations they filled, it was sufficient to say, that having been sent there by his opponents, when party was at the highest in Bengal, they could not be supposed to be his particular choice, though he wished to do them no injury, and was desirous of employing them in any other line.—The intelligence of the removal of these gentlemen, arrived in England at the very time when we were reasonably alarmed by the prodigious efforts which France was making to dispossess us of India. Lord North was then the Minister, and Mr. Sullivan the Chairman of the Directors. They had too much good sense to think of weakening the Government of Bengal, at that critical moment, by agitating a personal question. But though the state of India became still more desperate, when the Rockingham Administration came in, yet the Select Committee, and a bare majority of the Directors, cordially co-operated in bringing forward every measure that could diminish the credit of the Government

• December, 1781.

of Bengal, or weaken its exertions for the public service. While Mr. Burke did me the honour to examine me on the business of Mr. Bristow and Mr. Fowke; Mr. Gregory and Sir Henry Fletcher were ordering their restoration, and censuring the conduct of Mr. Hastings in the harshest language: I think Mr. Fox once observed, during the late war, that Lord North and Lord Sandwich could not do the business of France more effectually than they did, had they been bribed to the service. I am sure I can apply this remark to the conduct of the Rockingham Administration, respecting India in 1782.

It has been insinuated, that Mr. Hastings's motive for disobeying the orders of the Court of Directors, was in order to strengthen his Parliamentary-interest at home, by providing for Gentlemen who had great and powerful connections here; but surely there never was a more unfounded charge than this is. Mr. Bristow's connections in England were very powerful. He had two near relations in Parliament, Lord Westmore and the late General Fraser. He was patronized by Lord North's Administration. Mr. Middleton, on the other hand, was scarcely known in England except to Mr. Gregory, who

who had taken so hostile a part against the Governor-General: Mr. Bristow came out at a time when his Lordship was desirous of supporting the Governor-General. If Mr. Hastings had studied to strengthen his own interest at home, he could not have done it more effectually than by patronizing Mr. Bristow.

Mr. Fowke was nearly related to Gentlemen with whom Mr. Hastings had passed the early part of his life. It was neither for his interest, nor his ease to remove him, nor was it probable that he would be in a situation to want the service of Mr. Markham's friends in England: That Gentleman had been his private secretary: he thought him the best qualified for the residency of Benares, at the very critical minute in which he appointed him: but surely any candid man, who considers the case, will be convinced that Mr. Hastings neither acted from motives of enmity to Mr. Fowke, nor in order to insure the good offices of the Archbishop of York in Great Britain. I do not know a single instance in which Mr. Hastings has attended either to the mean gratification of personal resentment, or to the establishment of a powerful interest in England, by the disposal of patronage

nage in India. If the conduct and characters of the civil, and military servants who have been peculiarly employed by him, are scrutinized, it will be found that no man in a public station, has been more fortunate in distinguishing and employing in the public service men of honour and abilities than Mr. Hastings ; and that he has never been at the pains to enquire whether their connections in England were powerful or not \*. It is the peculiar fate of Mr. Hastings to be accused by one set of men, of wasting the public money for private purposes, and by another, of being totally inattentive to the recommendations of those who have the power of supporting him at home.

In the course of the proceedings in Parliament on India affairs, the terms usurper and delinquent have been applied to Mr. Hastings ; and  
 Mr.

\* To prove this I could bring many instances. Mr. Shore is one of the number, that Gentleman is called by Mr. Burke a " Creature of the Governor General," because he was the leading member in the management of the Revenue of Bengal, during the absence of Mr. David Anderson. But the truth is, that Mr. Shore had always lived in social intimacy with Mr. Francis, and was patronized by Mr. Hastings, from the high opinion he entertained of his abilities in the Revenue Line, without the smallest regard to his political opinions, or connections.

Mr. Dundas in particular, has been called upon to proceed against him as a delinquent. I could wish the public would attend to a curious fact, which that gentleman stated in the most direct and manly terms. He said, there were gentlemen present, who knew that he had been applied to formerly, to proceed against Mr. Hastings as a delinquent, but that he had peremptorily refused to do so; and for the best reason in the world, because he did not believe Mr. Hastings was a delinquent, nor had he ever thought him one: That he proposed his removal, from an opinion that he had forfeited the confidence of the native Princes of India, and that it was necessary, as a step preparatory to peace.—I can aver, that this is no new idea of Mr. Dundas; for, upon a former occasion, while the Marratta peace was depending, he declared his intention of removing Mr. Hastings by bill; but he expressly stated, that it was upon the idea of its being a measure of expediency, and not from an opinion of his delinquency. It is very necessary this circumstance, should be attended to, because a party in this country have wished to speak of the two Committees, as if they perfectly coincided in their

sentiments of Mr. Hastings, yet nothing can be more dissimilar than their opinions, and their conduct. Every thing that Mr. Dundas thought Mr. Hastings could not do, he has actually accomplished, in spite of the obstructions which were thrown in his way, by the miserable politics of this country ; so that every cause of objection to Mr. Hastings is removed, and it is no discredit to Mr. Dundas, to acknowledge that he was mistaken, or, that though his reports are fair and impartial, the conclusions he drew from them are contradicted by subsequent events.

But the Reports of the Select Committee go upon very different ground ; they certainly were intended to fix a very great degree of criminality upon Mr. Hastings. The essence of all these Reports is contained in Mr. Burke's printed speech of the 2d of December last, in which that gentleman fairly and fully appealed to the tribunal of the Public, and before the same respectable tribunal I also appeared.—To mere declamation I cannot reply ; but when positive assertions are made, they are capable of proof, or contradiction. I have proved, by facts which are not to be controverted, that Mr. Burke has

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has misstated a great variety of subjects; amongst the rest may be mentioned "The Rohilla War;" "the Maratta War;" "Mr. Hastings's Treatment of the Mogul," "the Vizier," "the Begums of Oud;" "Disobedience of Orders;" Management of the Revenues; the Opium Contract; and "the Bullock Contract:" I have fully replied to, and I have fully refuted all these charges: though it is a peculiar hardship attending Mr. Hastings, that while the most powerful, and the ablest men in this kingdom have been diligently employed in effecting his ruin, they have declared, that his conduct was not the object of enquiry; and even the Ninth Report, which, from the first page of it to the last, (I mean Mr. Debrett's Report) is the most intemperate libel against him that ever was published, has the following passage:—"The Reports of your Committee are *no charges*, though they may possibly furnish matter for charge."

Since I am upon the subject of the Reports of the Select Committee, I cannot avoid taking notice of a circumstance which I have publicly mentioned—that the evidence of Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Stuart, a gentleman who had been examined two days by the Select Committee,



tee, was completely suppressed. The Tenth Report was made in order to prove that Mr. Hastings had been guilty of a breach of public faith, in withdrawing the Company's guarantee from the Begums of Oud, by which means, the Vizier had re-assumed their Jaghires, and acquired possession of his father's treasures. Upon the subject of the Begums, I had the honour to be examined, and my evidence is entered in the Appendix to the Tenth Report. Lieutenant-colonel Harper (who quitted India in 1773) was also examined, and his evidence is entered. Colonel Stuart was also examined, who had then just arrived in England, (February, 1783) and appeared peculiarly calculated to give material information, by having commanded a detachment in the Vizier's country ; but not the smallest reference is made to his evidence in the Report, *and it is not entered in the Appendix.* In short, it remains at this moment amongst the mass of minutes taken by the Select Committee.

Colonel Stuart was examined on the 19th and 20th of February, 1783 ; and in answer to the questions put to him, he said, that he had served in India for many years, that he had commanded a detachment for ten months in Rohilcund, that  
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he never heard complaints of exactions by sepoy or officers in our service, from the Zemindars or inhabitants ; that he left Oud in June, 1781, the cultivation of the country was impaired from the time he first knew it ; — that the Nabob Vizier had complained to Mr. Middleton, that his resources were much decreased, and that he wished to strike off the heavy burthen of the Jaghirdars ; — that he thinks Mr. Middleton mentioned this to him in the latter end of 1780 ; — that it was currently reported and believed, that ever since a few months after the late Vizier's death (in 1775), both the Begums, and the Nabob's Uncles were all combined in a scheme against the British interest : — he heard that some correspondence, explanatory of that inimical disposition, had fallen into our hands : — he thinks (in 1777) Zabita Cawn, the son of Nad-jub Ul Dowlah, sent an ambassador to the Vizier with a paper, said to be the original of a confederacy entered into by the different Powers of India, to act in concert with the French, to expel the British from India ; and that the Begums and Uncles, his relations, were said to be concerned in it : — that this circumstance was told him by the ambassador of Zabita Cawn ; that he  
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does not know of any act of hostility committed, but Nudjeff Cawn declared his intention of entering the Vizier's country in a hostile manner, and as he commanded the Western Province, he took every precaution to frustrate his intentions: that Nuzeph Cawn never did enter the country in an hostile manner, as he knows of;—that he does not know the military force of the Begums, but thinks they could not have raised two regiments of sepoy:—that the Vizier attributed the decline of his country, to the specie being drawn from it; that the cause of that drain was, *the subsidies paid to the Company, and the public debts due by the late Vizier to the Company; and that there was a constant flow of treasure from Oud to Bengal*: — that the Vizier did complain of the distress brought upon him by the number of troops kept in his country; and that, in consequence, they were recalled from Rohilcund and Futtygur; and several English gentlemen were also recalled:—*That he first heard of the indisposition of the Begums to our Government, a very few months after the death of Sujab Dowlab (in 1775)*: — That he does not know of any Treaty entered into by the English to protect the Begums in possession of their property: — that

when the ambassador of Zabita Cawn made the communication to him, he passed through his camp, and paid him a complimentary visit :— that he did not communicate this intelligence to Mr. Hastings, as the ambassador told him it had been communicated to the Resident at Lucknow, which he believed, or he should certainly himself have sent intelligence of it to the Council General.

These are some of the material parts of Colonel Stuart's evidence ; and surely it applies infinitely more to the subject matter of the Tenth Report, than any part of my evidence, or that of Colonel Harper's, but *it was wholly suppressed*. Shall I not then rejoice that a tribunal is established, which will supersede this mode of investigation ? — The injustice of the proceeding can only be equalled by its absurdity, unless the fact were really as it is stated to be in the Ninth Report : — “ That the Committee makes no charge.” — But is that the case ? I appeal to the good sense of every man in England to determine that it is not. — A committee is appointed, with power to send for papers, to examine evidences, and to draw up Reports. — Under these powers they examine several gentlemen as to a particular

particular subject: one of them, an officer of high rank and character, is asked a number of questions relative to the state of Oude, and the conduct of the Begums: his replies tend very fully to confirm what Mr. Hastings has asserted, and to justify his conduct towards those ladies: but the whole is suppressed. From no part of the Tenth Report, could the world suppose that there is such a man, as Lieutenant-colonel Robert Stuart, in existence. But as the Reports are no charges, this is deemed of small consequence; and whenever a charge is made, say the Reporters, "It will be at the discretion of the party accused, to call for, and for the discretion of the House of Commons to institute such proceedings, as may tend finally to condemn or acquit." 9th Report, page 33.—I hope every man of honour will attend to the manner in which this doctrine is applied.

A Report thus imperfect, thus partial, is sent into the world. The friends of Mr. Hastings are not to reply to it, because "the Committee make no charge," and his hour of trial is not come: yet every thing that Mr. Fox has said of Mr. Hastings's conduct to the Vizier and the Begums, he actually drew from this partial  
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and imperfect Report. — How often was it observed, while his India bill was depending. “ If any man thinks that the most flagrant enormities have not been committed in India, let him look to the Reports upon your table.” Such was the language in both Houses, till the Lord Chancellor, with a dignity and spirit becoming his high character, declared, “ That to such Reports he would pay as much attention as to the History of Robinson Crusoe.”

There is not a syllable in the Reports, there was not a sentence uttered while Mr. Fox's bill was before the House of Commons, that had a reference to depending events, which has not been contradicted by the latest advices from India. How much has been said and written of the miserable state of Oud, of the oppression the Vizier laboured under from Mr. Hastings, and of his being compelled by the Governor General to plunder the Begums. The balance due from the Vizier to the Company, was pronounced to be a desperate debt, and the unfortunate Directors were accused of audacity for presuming to include it in their accounts — We now find that the Vizier, his Ministers, and the principal people

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of his court, place the most implicit reliance on the justice and good faith of Mr. Hastings — That above eight lacks of rupees of his balance were actually paid in February last, and undoubted security given for the discharge of the whole debt. It is proved, that at the repeated and earnest request of the Vizier, Mr. Hastings consented to his resumption of the Begum's Jaghires, and that upon his request they have since been restored to him. We now find that every rupee of the Vizier's debt will be realized, and without our having recourse to those dreadful means for its recovery which a warm imagination painted in such glowing colours, and described as the common mode by which debts were recovered in India.

It was asserted that in the Maratta peace, we had laid the foundation of a new war — but will any man now regard such an assertion? Much was said of Mr. Hastings' permitting the Vizier to plunder Fyzoolia Cawn, and it was made the subject of a Report, but the engagement with him has been faithfully observed, and he has lately applied to Mr. Hastings to assist him in the securing the succession of his Jaghire to his eldest son — In no instance does it  
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it appear, that \* we are execrated in India, or that our government is deemed a curse by the natives — Men who know as little of India, as I do of the Orkneys, have repeatedly declaimed upon this fruitful subject, while the popular prejudices were strong; but who is there of any information, who does not know, that from the death of Aurungzebe, to the total destruction of the Mogul empire by the invasion of Nadir Shah, India was a scene of blood and rapine — To that period indeed, a period of near fifty years, many of the descriptions that I have heard would in part apply; but are the countries under the immediate management of the English deserted or laid waste? Will any man who travels through Bengal and Bahar, seriously say with the compiler of the Ninth Report, that the inhabitants are reduced to the lowest state of depression and misery—Yet by such flowery declamation were the People of England for a time misled — In all the Reports of the Select Committee, in all the speeches upon the management of Indian revenue, not a line or a word

\* See Parliamentary Debates while the rejected India bill was depending.



has appeared in honour of a man who deserves so much of his country as the late Mr. Cleveland — That gentleman had the glory of subduing by mildness and humanity a barbarous and savage race of men — the inhabitants of the western mountains of Bengal — These people were not to be conquered by force of arms, and they committed continual depredations, plundering the villages on the plains, murdering the inhabitants, attacking boats upon the Ganges, and cutting off passengers from time to time. — During the country government many attempts were made, if not for their extirpation, at least for their subjection, but they are now become obedient and useful subjects — They cultivate their lands, subsist upon its produce, and yield a revenue to the Government. Mr. Cleveland fell a sacrifice to his unremitting attention to the office he held, the collector of the revenues of Boglipoor; and Mr. Hastings has paid the only tribute he could pay to so valuable a man, by ordering a monument to be erected to his memory, in a country where while living he was so much esteemed, and where his death is lamented by Europeans and natives of every rank.

Even

Even the merit of Mr. Cleveland could not secure us from the severity of Mr. Burke's remarks; but if he really learnt his lesson from Mr. Francis\*, and spoke from his works as from a brief, I am sure that gentleman must have told him, that great as Mr. Cleveland's merits were, he was not the only gentleman in Bengal whose abilities and integrity would do honour to any service in the world. — Could Mr. Francis inform Mr. Burke that “ Our conquest there (in Bengal) is as crude as it was the first day,” — Impossible, I think; and yet Mr. Burke avows not only that he himself, but every member of the late House of Commons who learnt any thing good, learnt it from Mr. Francis.

Much has been said of the influence Mr. Hastings possesses in England; and that though not personally present†, he appeared this year in the House of Commons by his representa-

\* This man, whose deep reach of thought, whose large legislative conceptions, and whose grand plans of policy, make the most shining parts of our Report, from whence we have all learned our lessons, if we have learned any good ones; this man, from whose materials those gentlemen who have least acknowledged it, have yet spoken as from a brief, &c.

† Mr. Francis's speech of the 2d of July.

tives. An expression of this kind can only be calculated "*ad captandum vulgus*," and even there will miss of its effect; for of the whole number of India gentlemen who sit in Parliament, there is not one (myself excepted) in the success of whose election Mr. Hastings was in the smallest degree interested. He has not even contributed a shilling towards the expence of the Westminster election. There was a time when speeches, "full of pointed satire," had a very great effect; but Mr. Hastings's character is fortunately now so far fixed with the Public, that they will require positive charges to be brought and fully proved, before they condemn a man who has preserved an empire to Great Britain. Hitherto every charge against him has been found to originate in ignorance, or prejudice.

I have been much surprised to hear gentlemen, confessedly of great abilities, express a wish that we had never acquired territorial possessions in India, and to hear them assert, that we are execrated by the natives; that our Government has been a grievance and a curse to them. It is a satisfaction to reflect, that we never attempted acts of hostility until we were wantonly

wantonly attacked. In our progress to empire have we been guilty of those horrid cruelties which are a disgrace to other European nations, who have acquired kingdoms in India, and America? Mr. Burke seems to acquit us here; but he says, "It is our protection that destroys India." I never yet met with a native of Bengal or Bahar in the middling or lower class of men, who did not declare that he preferred being under the English Government to any other. The sentiment, I believe, is universal, except amongst that order of men with whose advantages, stations, and views, we must necessarily have interfered; I mean the great Mahometan officers; and except we were to expel all the Mussulmen from Indostan, of what advantage would it be to the Aborigines of the country, that all Europeans were driven out of it? I know not by what right Tamerlane acquired or the descendants of Tamerlane possessed the empire, but by conquest: they retained it for many centuries. The Mogul empire was at length destroyed by Nadir Shah's invasion. From that period, till the tyrant, Surajah Dowlah, attacked the British factory in Calcutta, we are told by an impartial historian,

rian \*, that “ the country was torn to pieces  
 “ by civil wars, and groaned under every spe-  
 “ cies of domestic confusion. Villainy was  
 “ practiced in every form; all law and religion  
 “ were trodden under foot; the bands of private  
 “ friendship and connections, as well as of so-  
 “ ciety and government, were broken, and  
 “ every individual, as if amidst a forest of wild  
 “ beasts, could rely upon nothing but the  
 “ strength of his own arms.”

Will any man who reads this description, and knows any thing of the state of Bengal under the English, seriously assert, that our Government has been a curse, and that we were execrated throughout the country? The East-India Company have obtained no advantages by the acquisition of territory in India; but great and important have been the benefits resulting to the State from our Indian possessions, in the increase of customs and excise, in the quantity of treasure brought into the kingdom, and by our being enabled to carry on the trade to China without draining this kingdom of specie, which it now could ill afford to part with, and by the

\* Colonel Dow.

large sums paid at different periods to Government by the East-India Company.

It seems, however, now to be allowed, that it would be carrying Quixotism to too great a length, were we to abandon a country which we have so nobly struggled to preserve ; — and the next question naturally was, What would be the best mode of government for India ?

\* The plan of the late Ministry was, to fix a strong Government at home, to be constantly under the eye of Parliament, possessing complete power both at home and abroad, to make all appointments, and to be looked up to in India as *the Government*.

There is a very curious passage in the Ninth Report, which, I confess, surprized me exceedingly when I read it first: “that a senior  
“ merchant in Bengal was not a servant of the  
“ Supreme Council, as Mr. Hastings hazards  
“ to call him, but their fellow servant.” — Men, who could for a moment entertain an opinion so absurd, may well be supposed capable

\* Their plan was to establish a board, to consist of seven Persons, who should be invested with full power to appoint and displace officers in India, and under whose control the whole Government of that country should be placed.

Mr. Fox's speech, 18th November, 1782. — *Debates*'s Debates, vol. XII. page 43.

of joining in a plan for fixing the government of India, in Parliament-street Westminster; but such a Government could not possibly have lasted six months: destroy the energy and the vigour of *the Government in India*, and you will soon lose the country. The rejected plan was admirably adapted for such a purpose. The whole of the reasoning in support of this measure was so fallacious, that men must now wonder how it could have been attended to;—In truth, the old and wise system of the Company, (under which the Duke of Richmond well observed, they flourished to so great a degree) would never have been trenched upon, but from a mischievous attempt to extend the power of patronage at home. Mr. Pitt has had good sense enough to see this, and virtue enough to provide a remedy for the growing evil. In the time of Lord Clive, of Mr. Verelst, and Mr. Cartier, and for the first thirty months of Mr. Hastings's government, there never existed an idea in Leadenhall-street of appointing gentlemen abroad to specific posts\*. Those upon the spot are the proper judges of merit, and the only way to make

\* A secretary, accountant, and mint-master, were appointed from hence to Bengal in former years, and their appointments occasioned much discontent in India.

a Government respected and obeyed, is to have in its possession the power of reward and punishment. The Directors reserved to themselves the privilege of appointing civil servants to their settlements, but they wisely left it to the Governors and their Council, to employ them. When the regulating bill passed in 1773, and the Minister began to taste the sweets of Indian patronage, the good old rules of the service were broken down. Then it was that party, cabal, and intrigue, were felt in every department of the service, both at home and abroad. Then it was that the Governor General of India was forced into a personal contest with two junior servants; and now Mr. Hastings is accused of temerity, for hazarding to call a senior merchant a servant of the Supreme Council, instead of their fellow-servant.

To complete this system of absurdity, it was proposed, on the 18th of November, to fix the government of India here. The gentlemen abroad would then indeed have been fellow-servants, but how there could have been vigour in the government, how there could have been obedience to orders, how the army could have been commanded, how the revenues collected, how a dominion preserved, even



certain period in the House of Commons. — Perhaps this clause was introduced to prevent Mr. Hastings from contaminating a late virtuous assembly on his arrival in England.

The clause of Mr. Pitt's bill which obliges every man serving in India to declare the amount of his fortune has been deemed a harsh one. It is a sacrifice to the delusion of the moment, I presume, but if it were extended to contractors, commissaries, dealers in loans, and men of various descriptions here, who have grown rich from the public purse, during the late calamitous war, I fancy the world would be convinced that more money may be acquired in England in a week, than in India in twenty years. — Harsh, however, as this clause may be deemed, it is mild indeed, compared to that in a rejected bill, which precluded an Englishman from the honour of \*serving his country in Parliament, and from the privilege of defending himself against the efforts of ignorance and malice, which I have often seen combined to calumniate men of irreproachable characters.

Many insinuations have been thrown out, as if Mr. Hastings depended upon the support of the present Ministers, or of those possessed of  
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still greater power than the ministers. These are insinuations only, and are totally unfounded. Mr. Hastings's support was from the public at large. — There has, indeed, been some difference in the conduct of the late and the present Ministers. From what has already passed, I presume Mr. Hastings will not now be condemned unheard, as he would have been last winter,—but the present ministers are responsible to the nation, for the good government of India; and if there is any thing in the character, or the conduct of Mr. Hastings which renders him unfit for his station, they are bound to recall him, and to punish him. Mr. Hastings has never shrunk from responsibility; he has never attempted, by the low arts of cabal and intrigue, to preserve his situation, nor has he descended to the meanness of deprecating the vengeance of those who were inclined, last winter, to exert their power to the utmost, in order to crush him.

Determined as his Majesty's Ministers were, in 1782, to remove Mr. Hastings, what could have saved him but the high opinion in which his constituents held him? Did they act illegally or absurdly, in differing in opinion from a majority

majority of forty-three members of the House Commons? Will any man of common sense believe, that if at that period, or since, any one, even the most minute of the charges brought against Mr. Hastings, could have been substantiated, a bill for his removal would not have been carried without a dissenting voice? In the rejected bill, was there a clause for Mr. Hastings's removal? Though his supposed misconduct was stated to have produced the necessity for so strong a measure as that confessedly was, yet the bill actually left Mr. Hastings the Governor General of Bengal, until the seven mighty monarchs should determine his fate in close diwan; for we have since been given to understand, (*credat Judeus!*) that it was uncertain whether Mr. Hastings was to be removed or not.

If any thing were wanting to expose the fallacious basis on which the rejected bill was founded, we have ample proof of it in the late advices from India, by which we know that peace and tranquility are restored to every part of it; and to secure us in the possession of that great arm of the empire, we only wanted what I think Mr. Pitt's bill has fully established, a govern-

government, and a strong government in India, under the control of a still stronger government at home.

In the course of our struggles, we have seen the power of the Government of this country unjustifiably exerted to remove Mr. Hastings ; and, unsupported by family connections, or Parliamentary interest, but by the mere force of personal character, he has obtained a complete triumph over his opponents. Neither bribery nor corruption were resorted to, in support of him, and however a certain set of gentlemen may attempt to mislead the public by asserting again, and again, that the proprietors are the servants, of the servants in India, and that the whole body is corrupt ; yet every man of sense and observation must treat these remarks as childish and absurd. The Proprietors have in fact preserved India to Great Britain, as Mr. Dempster has often declared, who, at the minute the late Ministry condemned the conduct of the Proprietors, and were themselves determined to remove the Governor General, publicly defended them in the House of Commons ; and asserted, that he could conceive no act so completely absurd as the removal of

Mr. Hastings, during the war would be, unless General Elliott had been superseded in his command at the moment the Spanish batteries were playing against Gibraltar.

T H E E N D.

# ORIGINAL LETTERS

FROM

WARREN HASTINGS, Esq.

AND  
THOMAS COOTE, K. B.

AND

RICHARD BARWELL, Esq.

&c.

---

Price One Shilling and Six Pence.



# ORIGINAL LETTERS

FROM

WARREN HASTINGS, Esq.

SIR EYRE COOTE, K. B.

AND

RICHARD BARWELL, Esq.

SIR THOMAS RUMBOLD, Bart

AND

LORD MACARTNEY, K. B.

---

L O N D O N

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MDCCLXXXVII.

ENTERED AT STATIONERS' HALL.





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## ORIGINAL LETTERS.

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*Copy of a Letter from WARREN HASTINGS,  
Esq. to Sir EYRE COOTE, K. B. at Madras.*

FORT WILLIAM,  
20th January 1779.

DEAR SIR,

IT will be difficult to give you the history of our late political transactions, though comprising a single subject, without taking it up from a very early period, and entering into a long detail. I will, however, endeavour to relate it in as brief a manner as possible, and confine it to such particulars as are essentially necessary to give you a proper understanding of our present state.

The treaty concluded by Colonel Upton, on the part of this Government with the Mahratta State, was executed on the 1st March, 1776; on their part it was authenticated by the seal of the Pishwa, an infant of about three years

B old,

old, and the signatures of his two Ministers, Succuram Baboo and Nanna Furneefs. By one article of it, a provision was made for the subsistence of Raganaut Row, their late competitor, on condition of his residing in the heart of the Mahratta dominions with a guard, appointed by the Ministers themselves, for his state and security. This clause, of course, defeated the intention of the treaty, as it left Raganaut Row at the mercy of his enemies, without any pledge or engagement for his safety. The consequence was such as might have been expected from it.

Raganaut Row fled to Bombay, and has ever since continued under the protection of that Presidency. The Ministers exclaimed against this proceeding as a breach of the treaty — of the spirit it certainly was, but not of the letter. They, on their part, were not more observant of the former.

About the month of May 1777, the Chevalier de St. Lubin \* made his appearance

\* “ This St. Lubin is a most perfect adventurer, and I believe has cheated even the Ministry of France in this business.” *Vide Mr. W. G. Farmer’s letter to the President of Bombay, dated 21st Nov. 1777, from Poona.*

at Poonah, in the public character of a Minister from the Court of France : — He was received with great honour, and we were soon after informed of written engagements mutually interchanged between him and Nanna Furneefs; by which he promised, to bring a regiment of Europeans with military stores to Poonah, for the service of the Mahratta State; this intelligence has been since confirmed by authorities of unquestionable credit, and by a series of facts of public notoriety\*.

It had been always my opinion, that this was the only way by which the French could entertain a rational hope of regaining their consequence in India, or of affecting ours; and I expected, that the Presidency of Bombay, which was more immediately interested in the effects of such a connection, would take some early and effectual means to render it abortive. This appeared by no means difficult; the Mahratta army, under Hurry Punt Furkia, was at that

\* These notorious facts have never happened. St. Lubin was a low adventurer in India, perhaps. son of the French Government. The Mahrattas soon dismissed him from Poonah, entered into no engagements with him whatever. For the purpose of going to war, all pretences were thought p'issible. *Vide Appendix to 6th Report. Committee of Secrecy, No. 22, and No. 255.*

time engaged in an unequal war with Hyder Ally; and the Ministers, divided among themselves, possessed little authority, and were in a manner dependant for that little on their vassals. The Presidency of Bombay had long shewn an *impatience* to revive the cause of Raganaut Row; and the slightest movement made by them in his favour, would have proved sufficient to overthrow the feeble power which they had to contend with, and to establish their own influence in the Mahratta State on its ruin\*.

I was not deceived in my expectation. On the 29th of January 1778, we received a letter from the Presidency and Council of Bombay, dated the 12th December 1777, informing us, that a proposal had been secretly made to them, by a party which had been formed against Nanna Furncefs, consisting of Succurum Baboo, Moraba Furncefs, the nephew of Nanna Furncefs, Butchaba Poorunder, and Fuckcefee Holkar, to assist them in the design of replacing Raganaut in the chief administration of the Mahratta State; and that *they* had agreed to join in

\* In December 1778, the Presidency of Bombay made the attempt with nearly the whole of their military force. On the 16th of January 1779, their whole army surrendered at discretion to the Mahrattas.

it, requiring only, as a preliminary condition, a written application to the same effect under the hands and seals of the confederates\*. They excused themselves for having so far engaged in the design without our previous authority, by the obvious necessity of an immediate decision, and requested our acquiescence and assistance in it.

On receipt of their letter, it was *instantly* proposed † and resolved to ratify what they had done; to authorise them to proceed; and to send them an extraordinary supply of ten lacks of rupees, for the expence of the undertaking, with a promise of a military force to support them in the execution of it.

On the 21st of January 1778, orders were issued for forming a detachment, consisting of six battalions of sepoy; one company of native artillery, with the regular proportion of

\* The Presidency of Bombay, in a subsequent letter, dated 20th January, 1778, informed Mr. Hastings, that the overtures made by the ministerial Chiefs had produced no effect, and that they (the Presidency of Bombay) had *immediately resolved that nothing could be done, unless Succurum Baboo joined in the application, which he never did*

† By Mr. Hastings and Mr. Barwell, against the protest of Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheeler.

field artillery; to which were afterwards added, a regiment of cavalry and a body of 500 Candahar horse belonging to the service of the Nabob of Oude, and supplied by him on the occasion. The command was given to Colonel Leslie, who had instructions to march directly to Bombay, by such routs as he should judge most practicable; and that of *Berar* was preferably recommended, on account of the good understanding which had long subsisted between that Government and ours. For the sequel of his operations, he was directed to obey the orders of the President and Council of Bombay.

The novelty of the service, and the habits of long inaction, joined to other causes, made it very late before the detachment could be completely formed and equipped.

About the latter end of May, it crossed the Jumna with some opposition, and that very slight and ineffectual, from Ballajee, the Chief of the Mahratta territories, dependant on Calpee.

In the mean time, the design which had furnished the occasion of this expedition was suffered to sleep at Bombay, the persevering ardour

dour of that Presidency for the cause of Ragnaut Row ceasing with the removal of the bar which had been put on the prosecution of it. It produced, however, the principal effect intended by the promoters of it. These, suddenly assembling their forces, all together amounting, by estimation, to no more than thirty thousand men, took possession of the city of Poonah, deprived Nanna Furneess of his authority, and invested Moraba Furneess with it in his stead. — This easy revolution, effected without bloodshed or contest, proved the extreme weakness of the Mahratta Government at this crisis; and the greater facility with which the plan offered to the Presidency of Bombay might have been executed in its full extent, had they chosen to have engaged in it. In this catastrophe they had no part; nor have they since availed themselves of the continued state of distraction which has prevailed, and still prevails, at Poonah, though in a less apparent degree, at present.

I feel the ingratitude and injustice of this conduct; but I shall make no other comment upon it.

The

\* That one party in a State should dispossess another, is no proof of weakness in that State. The moment they were invaded



The first use which they made of the authority given them over Colonel Leslie, was to order him to suspend his march, assigning no better reasons for this procedure than the expence and hazard of the expedition, which were our concern, not theirs; and the opposition given to the original measure by two of their members against a majority of all the rest of the Council.

This order was followed, in a few days after, by another, and by others successively since that, to prosecute the march, but without any object described, or plan of operations proposed or thought of.

Thus abandoned by the Presidency of Bombay, we had recourse to other means, which were more within the compass of our own direction, and for which a provision had, in some degree, been made a considerable time before, on the presumption of the utility of which it might eventually prove in the case of a rupture with the Mahrattas.

As soon as it was resolved to send the detachment to the other side of India, I applied to

vaded by their common enemy, the English, they united and beat us.

Moodajec

Moodajee Boosla, the Rajah of Berar, to grant the permission for its free march through his territories, with such assistance as it might require in the way. I had good reason to expect his ready compliance. I was not disappointed. He returned an immediate answer to my letters, in terms such as I could wish, and at the same time sent a person of trust to the banks of the Nerbudda, which bounds his dominions on the north, with a store of grain for the subsistence of the detachment, and orders to attend it through his country, of which he at the same time advised Colonel Leslie, inviting him to take that route, and assuring him of the most friendly reception.

I am obliged to omit many particulars for fear of swelling this narrative to too great a size, and to confine myself to such facts and circumstances as are essentially necessary to the connection: the rest I hope soon to have an opportunity of communicating to you at large in person.

The sovereignty of the Mahratta State is, by its constitution, vested in a Rajah; but for many years past, that is, since the accession of the late Rajah, the powers of it have been usurped by the Minister of the Rajah, who is

filed the Pishwa, the Rajah possessing only the name. The last Rajah was called Rajah Ram Raja: he died about the latter end of December, 1777. He had no children; nor have I heard certainly that any successor has been named. Moodajee Boosla has the fairest pretensions, being in the direct lineal descent from the ancient stock, and the adopted son of Sâhoo Raja, the predecessor of Ram Raja, though deprived of his right by the artifices of Balajee, who was the Pishwa when Sâhoo Raja died; and, by an accommodation with Ragoonjee Boosla, the father of Moodajee, which was confined to a bare sufferance of Ram Raja's elevation, without any acknowledgement of it, he and his sons, as Moodajee does to this day, styling themselves, in all public acts, the subjects of Rajah Sâhoo.

I had an early knowledge of Moodajee's pretensions, and judged him therefore a fit instrument to supply the place of Raganaut Row, in the plan offered to us by the Presidency of Bombay. He had wealth, power, a territory extending from the borders of Pengal almost to Poonah; Raganaut Row neither wealth, power, nor territory, nor an influence remaining which could suppl. the want of these requisites, except what might eventually arise from

from an active part taken by the Presidency of Bombay in his favour; and they had plainly shewn that they would take none. The only point wanting was to fix Moodajee a party in the design. I expected him to make advances, having sent back his vakeel to him for that purpose, a man of understanding, and well instructed; but it soon became necessary to take a more determined and active part.

On the 7th of July 1778, advices were received from Cairo, and seemed to be of certain credit, that war had been declared between Great Britain and France. It was almost immediately proposed and resolved \* to enter into a negotiation with Moodajee Boosla, on the grounds which I have mentioned above. Mr. Elliot was deputed on this service, and set out on the 19th of July. Mr. Rumbold has a copy of his instructions, and I have desired him to give you the perusal of them. The whole service could not have furnished an agent equally qualified for such a commission, and my hopes of its success were proportionably raised, but these were

\* By Mr. Hastings and Mr. Barwell.

*Quere.* Was this a proper time to engage in a war with the Mahiatta empire?

suddenly blasted, and the whole project *annihilated* by the death of that excellent young man.

I must now return to Colonel Leslie. The distance from Calpee to the river Narbudda is about 140 cos. The only natural difficulties which he had to encounter, were such as might arise from the heats, which are excessive in the dry season. All other impediments had been removed by early applications to the petty Chiefs, whose territories lie in the road, and the most pacific assurances given by them in return. This precaution was indeed more necessary to the credit of the expedition than to its success, since the whole force which the country could furnish, if combined, was not likely to retard it; nor was it the interest of any to attempt it, unless forced to it by extreme provocation.

Unfortunately Colonel Leslie suffered himself to be drawn into a party, in the domestic dissensions of the Rajah of Bundelcund, and lingered with the detachment under various pretences in that country, till at length the Board found themselves under the necessity of recalling him from the command. The order passed on the 7th of October 1778; and on the 19th news arrived of his death, which happened on  
the

the 3d of the same month, at Rajah Gur, at the distance in space of about sixty cofs from Calpee, and in time of exactly four months from the day on which he began his march from that place.

By such events have all our views been disappointed in the very points on which we had placed our principal dependance; — events which no human prudence could have foreseen or prevented; but for which I must still expect to receive the censures which the world always passes on unsuccessful measures.

We had no right to suspect that the Presidency of Bombay would abandon us \* in a project which they themselves had formed, and taken such uncommon pains to engage our participation in it. We had no interest in it, either personal or public †, except in its remote consequences. It was formed without our sanction, and its execution intended to precede our knowledge of it ‡. Unacquainted with the

\* They told Mr. Hastings, in the latter end of the year of January 1784, that *nothing was to be done*.

† Then why engage in a project in which there was no public interest.

‡ Mr. Hastings gave his sanction to the project, and promised to support it, as soon as he heard of it.

characters of Mr. Hornbey and the members who composed the Council, except General Carnac, who, I think, would have acted a very different part had he had the lead, we could only judge what they were likely to do by what they had done; and concluding, that as they had hitherto manifested an impatience for the support of the cause of Ragoba, which *the obligation of the treaty* and the authority of this Government had been scarcely able to restrain, they would be at least as zealous in the prosecution of it when those restraints were removed: it could be no impeachment of our foresight that we were deceived in so reasonable an expectation.

My hopes in Colonel Leslie were as well grounded. He had the reputation of being an active and experienced officer. I had endeavoured to attach him to me by the strongest personal ties. His instructions prescribed the line of his conduct in terms which he could not misunderstand: they expressly warned him against the very temptations by which he suffered himself to be seduced; and the real objects \* of his command were such as would have gratified *the most elevated ambition!*

\* *Quere.* What were these real objects?

I am indebted to Colonel Goddard for having redeemed my character from the consequences of Colonel Leslie's delays, by shewing that the impediments of his march were either ideal, or such as he himself had created, and that they would vanish of themselves on a different conduct presented to them \*. Mr. Elliot's death was a stroke of Providence, for which I could have made no provision, and left me no other resource but in the desire, which I had endeavoured to excite in the Rajah of Berar, to take a leading part in the negotiation.

These disappointments, though mortifying and hurtful as I know they must be to my private credit, have not hitherto produced any other ill effects of a public nature, than in the fruitless expence which has attended Colonel Leslie's delays ; possibly they may prove, in the event, the means (Elliot's death excepted, which is an irretrievable loss) of yielding more solid and lasting advantages to the Company,

\* The impediments to Colonel Leslie's march were, first, the violent heats of June, and then the violent rains of July, August, and September. When both were over, Colonel Goddard marched, and he arrived at Surat, because he met with little opposition in the first part of his march, and none at all in the latter.



and to the British nation, than any which we could have derived from an uninterrupted prosecution of the first design.

Knowing that Moodajee Boosla must have received much earlier intelligence of the death of Mr. Elliot than myself, I thought it advisable to defer taking any step towards renewing the negotiation, until I could learn from him what effect that event had produced on his mind. He was no sooner informed of it, than he wrote to me in the most pressing terms, to transfer the powers with which Mr. Elliot had been invested to his Secretary, that no time might be lost, and to depute another person from hence. On the receipt of Moodajee's letter, the Board \* resolved to transmit Mr. Elliot's instructions to Colonel Goddard, with full powers to carry them into execution, and to conclude the treaty, offensive and defensive with the Government of Berar.

During the state of uncertainty in which Moodajee remained until he could be advised of the commission sent to Colonel Goddard, leisure was afforded to the vakeels of the

\* Mr. H. C. 14, and Mr. G. vel

**Pishwa** and of **Nizam Ally Cawn**, to work upon his mind, and alarm him with menaces from their masters. At this critical period of suspense, and while the detachment was still at a distance, he fell dangerously ill, and it is not surprising that, in such a situation, he should be indecisive and irresolute. It is to these circumstances I attribute a letter, which he wrote to Colonel Goddard in a state of despondency, and *apparently* declining to enter into any negotiation with us, or to co-operate with our detachment;—but having in some degree recovered his health, and been informed by Colonel Goddard of his having received powers to continue the negotiations, and of his intention to send a gentleman properly qualified to open the subject of his instructions, and learn the Rajah's sentiments upon them; Moodajee in his answers, a copy of which I transmit for your information, has again shewn a disposition to unite with us. From the impatience, which he expresses, for the arrival of the gentleman deputed by Colonel Goddard, I draw the most favourable expectations.

You will please to recollect, Sir, that this expedition was undertaken at the repeated instances of the Presidency of Bombay for the purpose of defeating the dangerous designs,

D

which

which the French were meditating by their agent St. Lubin at Poonah. But we had no sooner engaged in it, and shewn our determination to support the plan, which they recommended, than they totally deserted us, and even suggested obstacles to the execution of a plan, which they themselves had framed.

Finding that no reliance was to be placed on assistance from Bombay, I was compelled to adopt means more within my own control, and which might effect the desired purposes without depending on that government.

Incredible as it may appear to you, Colonel Goddard, in a public letter of the 5th December 1778, informs us, that he has not received any letter from Bombay of a later date than the 21st July; although he had constantly advised them of his progress; nor has this Government received any advices from thence of a later date than the 11th of September, although, by private intelligence which I can rely upon, I am informed that some vigorous measures for the re-establishment of Raganaut Row were in agitation. These will not affect Colonel Goddard's operations, if he shall have concluded a treaty with Moodajee Boosla, which will *of course* take precedence of any plan

plan formed by the Presidency of Bombay\*, if they cannot be made to coincide.

I forbear at this time to speak of the measures, which it may become necessary to pursue in the event of a failure of Colonel Goddard's negotiation, because I think it very improbable, that Moodajee should be so blind to his own interest, and even to his present safety, as to suffer such advantages to escape him, as are presented to him in the proposed alliance, and to expose himself to the resentment of the Ministers of Poonah, and of Nizam Ally Cawn, which he must expect as the infallible consequences of his separation from us, after the *notorious proofs*, which he has offered, of his inclination to engage with us in an opposition to them †. His determination must have

\* Supposing the India Company's faith to have been pledged, as it was, to Raganaut Row, by Bombay, it does not appear why such engagement should *of course* be superseded by the subsequent pledge of the same faith to Moodajee Boosla. To one of these persons there must be a breach of faith, if not to both.

† In spite of all these beautiful speculations, Moodajee Boosla joined in the confederacy against us, and marched an army to the frontiers of Bengal, in June 1780, which Mr. Hastings was obliged to buy off with 300,000*l.* of the Company's money. Such was the event of his boasted union with Moodajee Boosla!

been taken long before this ; and I am in daily expectation of receiving the notification of it ; as Mr. Watherston, the gentleman who is deputed by Colonel Goddard to his court, was within two days journey of Naugpoor on the 17th of December.

I, for my own part, have not the least doubt of the detachment reaching Bombay with ease, even without this support, under the same active and able conduct which Colonel Goddard has displayed since he has received the command of it ; nor of his being joined with many partizans of Raganaut Row, who wait but for a safe occasion to declare themselves, should it be necessary to recur to the original object of the expedition ; but I shall reserve this for the subject of another letter, should it be necessary to pursue it.

As I have professed to give you a plain and concise narrative of the facts, I will not discredit the measure, to which they all bear a common relation, by any comment upon them, trusting to your good sense \*, and to the zeal which you have hitherto so successfully exerted

\* Mr. Hastings did not think it safe to trust *entirely* to Sir Eyre Coote's good sense on this occasion.

for the aggrandizement of the British dominions .  
in India, for my best security against any at-  
tempts which may have been made to influ-  
ence your judgement against it.

I have the honour to be,

With much esteem,

DEAR SIR,

Your most obedient,

Faithful servant,

(Signed)

WARREN HASTINGS.

*Extract of a Letter from Mr. HASTINGS to Sir  
THOMAS RUMBOLD, dated Fort William,  
28th July 1779.*

IF I have not been so communicative of the views and measures of this Government, since my letter of the 27th of February, it is owing to the want of materials. The miserable end of the ill-projected enterprize of the Presidency of Bombay has blasted all the hopes of this Government, and left us *no resource, but in the offer of peace on honourable terms.* This we intrusted to Colonel Goddard on the first news of the convention of Wargawm in April last, empowering him to confirm the treaty of Poonundur, provided the Ministers would make a formal renunciation of the rights, which they supposed themselves to derive from the convention of Wargawm, and engage never to admit the French either on the footing of trade or alliance into their dominions. On the 14th of June we sent him other instructions, chiefly relating to the measures which we thought proper to be pursued, in the event of a war. Of these I will send you a copy, and as soon as it is determined what new line of conduct

we

we shall follow on the occasion of Ragoba's escape to our camp, I will give you immediate advice of it. I think it most probable that the Ministers will be glad to yield to any terms, rather than risque another war in the present distracted state of their affairs, and the unequal contest they have to sustain with the single power of Hyder. I have conformed to what I believe will be the general wish, in giving my support to the plan of a peaceable accommodation, *I own, against my own feelings, and wishes*, and the knowledge which I think I possess of the consequences which our influence will suffer in India, if we do not, by some signal act, retrieve the disgrace which our arms have suffered by the misconduct of the late expedition from Bombay. The whole Indian world judges as your friend Dowla judges, that our miscarriage was not owing to misconduct or timidity, but to the inequality of our infantry to their numerous cavalry. *I shall not in my heart be sorry*, if they force us into a situation, which may afford us the occasion of refuting this opinion, which I am certain will be the case, if our forces are *properly employed* and well conducted. We shall apply to you for your assistance, and immediately. We shall also strengthen General Goddard with reinforcements



inforcements from our own establishments, and possess great political resources, if we are called upon to employ them.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WARREN HASTINGS

*Note.* “ In this letter Mr. Hastings declares  
 “ that *no resource was left him but in the offer*  
 “ *of peace*;—yet the offer was against his own  
 “ feelings and *wishes*, and he should not, *in his*  
 “ heart, be sorry that the offer was rejected  
 “ by the Mahrattas.”

*Copy of a Letter from Sir EYRE COOTE to Sir  
THOMAS RUMBOLD; dated Lucknow, 27th  
January 1780.*

MY DEAR SIR THOMAS,

**T**HOUGH I approve your intention of returning to Europe as soon as possible, yet I cannot but lament the necessity you are under of doing so, both on behalf of the public and myself.

I agree with you entirely as to what our conduct ought to be in respect to the Mahrattas, and have, in the strongest terms, both to Goddard and at the Board, urged the expediency, nay the necessity of concluding a peace with them, if it could be done upon terms worthy of us; and I am now more convinced than ever, that it might have been properly effected *had not Mr. Hastings's correspondence with Goddard spoke a very different language*; and with what view this additional weight is brought upon our shoulders, while affairs wear so threatening an aspect at home, I own I do not divine; but so it is, and we now breathe nothing but hostilities against all the great po-

ers in India, who will certainly be supported by the French, and very possibly by the Spaniards also. What condition we are in to warrant such proceedings, you may judge, when I assure you our treasury is so exhausted that we shall soon be obliged to take up money to answer the common exigencies of Government ; and the country already so plundered and impoverished, that the revenues are sunk nearly one half, and that collected with the greatest difficulty.

Whatever gloss the Board, in its correspondence with the people at home, may put upon these matters, assure yourself such is the true state of the case.

I have already informed you of my having told Mr. Hastings, upon my arrival here, that I would certainly give my support to Government as long as his measures were such as I could join in ; and, while I continued upon the spot, he was held within proper bounds, by the conviction he felt that his credit and consequence could not exist without it. But no sooner did I quit the Presidency to attend to the business of my own particular department, which it was absolutely necessary to do in these distant stations

tions *than he has broke out into the most wanton exertions of power against the public good*, and tries every means, by private insinuations and letters through third hands, to lower my consequence among the country powers here, and embroil me with the army. In proof of the first, I enclose you a treaty\* he has entered into with a man so insignificant, as to render the terms in which it is clothed *scandalous* for such a nation as ourselves to condescend to, together with my letter to the Board and protest against it, as well as private letters upon the subject. The protest and letter are withheld from the Board† under pretence, you see, of conciliating matters, and the terms required from me, are to drop my objections, which are made from conviction and feeling for the public service. As it could not be expected such a point was to be gained from me, I conclude other purposes are to be served by it; one perhaps may be the dispatch of the ships without having my dissent appear upon the proceedings; and another, I am assured,

\* Ranna of Gohud.

† They were not laid before the Board until the 14th February 1780. *Vide Appendix to the sixth Report of Secret Committee, No. 239.*

is the idea of getting over Messrs. Francis and Wheler, but more especially the latter, for which purpose overtures have, I am told, been made, and lures held out, which might not succeed so well, if my dissent from this measure of Government was previously known.

If this plan succeeds, and the same principles of Government subsist, you see what must be my situation, how totally useless to the purposes which I came out to serve, and how vexatious to myself. Besides the anxiety and uneasiness I suffer from *these ruinous public, and jesuitical private proceedings*, at a time, when nothing but unanimity can save us from the evils *we have brought upon ourselves*, I have also another serious matter of complaint against those, who ought to have supported me from home, since both Minister and the Directors have failed in the promise made me that I should be placed in my proper seat at the Board the very first time any India matters were brought before the House. Lord North assured me it should be done, and the Chairman pledged himself to see it performed; and, without a confidence in those declarations I most certainly had not come out; yet a bill for prolonging the term of the act has passed without any notice being taken of it.

I con-

I considered this as so essential a point, that I even represented to His Majesty the impropriety there would be in my sitting as youngest of the Board, when holding the rank I did in his service, and possessing his commission as Commander in Chief; and that as no example of the kind had yet been seen, it would be very extraordinary if the first instance of it should fall upon a man who was also the first to hold such powers from himself in India.

The long experience I have had of your friendship induces me thus to trouble you with my affairs; and, in consequence of your very kind offers of service, I shall request the favour of you to represent these circumstances, and my situation in consequence of them, to the Minister, and to employ the reasons I have given you for desiring it in forwarding the recal, for which I mean to write by this opportunity. You will also be so good, when

\* \* \* \* \*

and as I make no doubt he will, from this opening, have the goodness to give you an opportunity of entering farther into the subject,  
you

you will then take the trouble of enlarging upon it, and explain to him the insuperable difficulties I must meet with when thus opposed here, and unattended to from home, in carrying on service, and fulfilling the duties expected from me — a character at stake, and, in that, what is equally valuable to me,

\* \* \* \* \*

I have

I have wrote to Mr. Purling, and shall inclose it, together with my letter to the Secretary at War, in this packet ; but, as time will not allow me to do more, I must refer Sir W. James to you for information ; and I leave it to your discretion to make any use you may think advisable of the contents of this letter.

From what I have laid before you, it will fully appear that my situation here is likely to become every day more critical. I am sure you will readily lend your assistance to lessening some part of my difficulties, which may be done by dispatching, as soon as possible, that part of Lord M'Leod's regiment which I have already wrote for ; and I trust you will be able to have them embarked before your departure.

Affure yourself, my dear Sir, of my best services to the two friends you recommend. As to Tom Law, he really needs no advocate but himself. Mr. Richardson I am not much acquainted with ; but, rest satisfied, I will promote his interest as far as lies in my power.

Lady Coote joins me in sincerely wishing to Lady Rumbold and yourself a prosperous voyage

age



age and safe arrival in England; and may you soon recover the health you have lost.

Believe me to be,

With very sincere esteem,

My dear Sir THOMAS's

Affectionate Friend and

Obedient humble Servant,

EYRE COOTE,

*Copy of a Letter from Sir EYRE COOTE, K. B.  
to Mr. HASTINGS, dated Allahabad, 19th  
December 1779.*

DEAR SIR,

I THIS moment have received your letter of the 9th.—It is true that two days ago I had an intimation given me that Captain Palmer, your Aid de Camp, was coming up here in a public capacity, which I could not possibly give credit to; not only because your letter, inclosing the draft of the proposed treaty with Gohud, did not mention it, but that I could not suppose, while I was so near the spot to effect or assist any public measure, any other channel for its accomplishment could be thought of: and there are many gentlemen of respectable characters here, who could equally well have been dispatched to have the treaty ratified.

The carrying through a measure in this manner, by means of what is in fact *a private agent*, whatever gloss may be put upon the matter, while a member of the Board stands in the situation I do here, destroys not only the consequence and dignity which ought to attend  
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every pledge given of public faith, but, with it, all appearances of co-operation between us: and the country powers, as well as our own community, naturally led to judge from outward marks, and not seeing any necessity why a gentleman from your family should travel the distance between Calcutta and Gohud merely for such a purpose, are not scrupulous to give him an object which, I dare say, you little meant he should come under the suspicion of\*.

In respect to the treaty itself, I have strong objections to some parts of it; and when I receive it officially from the Board, which I have a right to expect very soon, I shall offer them my remarks upon it; but till then it must rest, as I do not care to take it up from the copy which you have obligingly sent me.

I am,

My dear SIR,

Your very faithful and

obedient humble Servant,

(Signed) EYRE COOTE.

\* Viz. To watch Sir Eyre Coote.

*Copy of a Letter from Mr. HASTINGS to Sir  
EYRE COOTE, K. B. dated Fort William,  
29th December 1779.*

DEAR SIR,

I RECEIVED, by yesterday's post, your letter of the 19th.

It is to be regretted that you suffered the reports of others to influence your judgement and determine your resolutions, before you had given me the opportunity, which I solicited, of explaining to you the design of Captain Palmer's deputation; because you would have known that it had no relation to any subject which could possibly affect your consequence, or afford you the most distant cause of offence. But I fear that you have taken your decided line from the first impression, and must, of course, justify and abide by it. The conclusion of your letter too strongly indicates this, and is, in effect, a plain declaration of hostility. What my personal feelings have been on this occasion I will not mention: these have subsided, and given place to very different sensations in the prospect I behold, of a loose, divided,

divided, and distracted Government, assailed at the same time by dangers which require the utmost exertion of all its powers to repel — which is utterly impracticable while those in whose hands they are placed want mutual confidence, and employ them in mutual opposition.

It may be too late to hope for any good effect from an explanation ; yet thus far I shall endeavour to remove the grounds of your objections, by assuring you that the real design of Captain Palmer's commission is *totally unconnected with the treaty with the Ranna of Gohud*, and with his interests, and could only be executed by myself, or by an agent fully and intimately instructed both in my views and in all the circumstances on which I ground my expectation of their accomplishment.—As to the form of interchanging the written deed of the treaty, I think I before told you, that this was no object : *in effect, a common chubdar, or even a coffid, might have been instructed with so trivial a ceremonial.* But whatever were the object, it was as little in your power to give your personal attention to it as it was in mine. The difference between our respective distances from the ostensible scene of the commission makes no alteration either in the right of official jurisdiction

or

or in the propriety of my delegating a trust of this kind. I did understand that you looked for no other employment but that which your military charge, a very weighty one, afforded you, nor any political influence beyond the Nabob of Oud, which, from its connection with your immediate department, may be considered as necessary in a great degree to the support of your credit and authority in it. I have promised to support you to the utmost of my power in the possession and exercise of both. I have most faithfully performed that promise, not only by my voice at the Board, but by my personal authority, wherever I have had any call to employ it, and by public declarations of my resolution to the same effect. — You have also given me your promise and frequent repetitions of it, that you will support my authority. The political department is most especially and most essentially mine. If you deny me this, what is my department, or what is that authority to which you have promised your support?

If, in the cooler moments of reflection, you shall have allowed your reason or friendship to dictate a more temperate conduct than that which your letter portends, we may yet unite our endeavours with effect for the public service, which is my only motive in this letter :  
if

if not, I have the testimony of my own conscience to acquit me of all blame for the consequences.

Captain Palmer has my orders to attend you in his route, to shew you my instructions, and to receive any additions which you may think it proper to give to him. As I hope he will soon perform this part of his commission, I think it unnecessary to say more concerning it, especially since you have made it necessary to explain it more particularly than I had intended, or than could be done by letter.

I have said that the real design of Captain Palmer's deputation was *totally foreign from the treaty lately concluded with the Ranna of Gobud*; and you will understand the expression to imply that this design was but one. It was indeed first suggested by an application from the Ranna's Minister, that a person might be deputed to see the Ranna ratify the treaty, and (as he said) to view the state of the Ranna and of his country. I accepted the proposal, intending to apply it to a better purpose, which I had before in contemplation; but I had also another, though secondary, view in it, which was to prevent what I had some time foreseen or suspected, the effect of any incendiary artifices

tifices which may have been practised to disunite us. Something like this I intimated in (I believe) my last letter.

I cannot conclude this letter without expressing my surprise at one suggestion in yours, which as ill agrees with your professions of the esteem in which you held my character as it was most injurious to it. — You can have had no ground for such an imputation in any past instance of my conduct, and ought to have reſented the attempt in any one to fix it on me. (I ſhould have thought this due to *you* in the like caſe.) — I muſt add, that, were I myſelf capable of making a mercenary bargain for the ſale of the Company's alliance, I have too high an opinion of Captain Palmer's honour to have tempted him to become the inſtrument of ſo baſe a traffic.

I have the honour to be,

DEAR SIR,

Your moſt obedient and

Moſt humble Servant,

(Signed) WARREN HASTINGS.

Note.



Note. *Extract of Bengal Secret Consultations of*  
6th December 1779.

“ *Resolved*, That a person be deputed, on  
“ the part of this Government, to the Ranna  
“ of Gohud, *for the purpose of seeing the treaty*  
“ *executed, and for exchanging the ratifica-*  
“ *tions.*

“ *Governor General.* I move that Captain  
“ Palmer, my Military Secretary, may be de-  
“ puted to interchange the treaties with the  
“ Ranna of Gohud, according to the proposal  
“ of the Minister entered in the former part of  
“ this day’s consultation.”

*Copy*

*Copy of a Letter from Mr. HASTINGS, to Sir  
EYRE COOTE, K. B. dated Fort William,  
3d January, 1780.*

DEAR SIR,

YOUR letter to the Board, with your protest against the treaty lately concluded with the Ranna of Gohud, is arrived. Mr. Barwell has prevailed upon me to keep back the delivery of it until he shall have written to you himself, and received your answer and final resolution concerning it. His motives I applaud, as no less becoming in his public character, than expressive of the zeal and steadiness which influence his friendships; and I yield to him without reluctance, from a conviction, that the end proposed by the delay will completely justify me against any objections of its irregularity. I shall forbear to say any thing concerning the occasion of this intervention, as Mr. Barwell has undertaken it, and shall refer you for a more effectual and equally genuine information of my sentiments to his letter. In the mean time, your public letter shall remain in his

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hands

hands, to be disposed of as you shall think it proper to direct.

I have the honour to be,

DEAR SIR,

Your most obedient

And humble servant,

(Signed) WARREN HASTINGS.

*Copy of a Letter from Mr. BARWELL to Sir EYRE, COOTE, K. B. dated Calcutta, 3<sup>d</sup> January 1780.*

DEAR SIR EYRE,

THE occasion will, I hope, excuse me, let whatever may prove the result. I was sick and kept my house when your letter of the 21<sup>st</sup> arrived; I no sooner read it than I invited the Governor to call upon me, in order if possible to prevent, if it was in my power, the consequences which I dreaded might flow from it. I began the conversation by representing to him  
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the mistake under which I conceived your resentment had been excited, and then slightly touching on the cases which might have conducted to it, I dwelt long and pointedly on the great weight and responsibility your military command and rank in the government gave you : the right you had to participate in every measure ; the respect, caution, and delicacy, with which you should be treated ; and concluded my discourse (an hour long) with a peremptory demand to keep your letter in my possession, and to use my endeavours to conciliate a breach likely to prove irreparable if not immediately healed : that as I was neither deterred by the warmth of your temper, nor by the decided manner in which your dissatisfaction had been expressed, he must give me leave to hope, and to act from that hope.

The obstacle I found most difficult to remove was, the idea, that he might be charged with interrupting your correspondence with the Board : I combated this by observing, that the blame, if any, was mine ; that I should not scruple to avow it. It was my part, if I could, to prevent a division between you, &c. &c. I must, in justice to Mr. H. inform you he not only, at my instance, readily left your letter and

minute to my keeping, but expressed himself in the warmest and tenderest manner. He had sought your friendship, he said, and he would not by any act of his break the connection : he should be happy to strengthen it, and wished me success; and this with such expressions, as to convince me he spoke without reserve, and felt my anxiety, at the instant he gave me his permission to do what I might think proper in an affair so delicate and perplexing. I would willingly enter into the subject with more freedom, if I conceived it would answer any good purpose; but, until I am satisfied by your consideration shewn to the request I am about to make (that you can place a dependence on my motive and principle of action) I shall confine myself to my immediate object in addressing you, without pretending to judge between you. I ask it of you as a favour, to moderate your warmth; to forget the cause, whether real or suppositious, that excites it; and to allow me to assure Mr. H. I have prevailed, and that you have consigned all to oblivion, by empowering me to return your letter, and to give him this farther test of your disposition to preserve a connection, which on his part must be equally well supported.

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I need not assure you of my unremitted endeavours — the public service as well as personal ties equally and strongly influence me — If they are fruitless, I can only lament the persecution of fortune, in fixing me to a perpetual scene of contest, and lament the division which now unhappily deprives me of every prospect of union in our councils. Upon the receipt of your answer all my hopes depend.

I am,

My dear Sir,

Your friend

And very humble servant,

(Signed)

RICH<sup>d</sup> BARWELL.

*Copy*

*Copy of a Letter from Sir EYRE COOTE to Mr.  
HASTINGS, dated Lucknow, 10th January,  
1780.*

DEAR SIR,

I HAVE just received your letter of the 25th, and do assure you, that the idea of a divided and enfeebled Government, at a juncture when every nerve should be strained for the public service, gives me all the painful feelings which you can possibly have experienced yourself.

I do most solemnly declare, that I have not, in any one instance, deviated from the promise I gave of supporting you in every measure which appeared to me to be beneficial to our employers. I desired yours upon no other terms for myself; and you may recollect, that, in order to insure such a conciliation of opinion as might best enable us to carry through the operations of Government, we judged it expedient to give mutual information of every intended plan or proposition previous to its coming before the Board. Had this been attended to in the instance before us, by sending to me the treaty with the Ranna of Gohud, as it is now  
worded,

worded, before it was produced at the Board, you may depend upon it I should have made to you every objection in confidence, which, much to my concern, I was under the necessity of offering publicly, in order to clear myself of a measure which I felt to be destructive in many ways, to our national interest and honour.—I say the treaty as it is now worded ; for though in substance it resembles the first paper you communicated to me, yet the terms in which it is clothed alter and extend every article in such a manner, that I no longer see in it the same object. The point was not of such great importance as to have suffered any prejudice by this short delay in its execution ; and it would have answered the farther good purpose of enabling me to inform you from the spot, that you had been deceived as well as myself in the ideas we had been led to form of the consequence, revenues, strength, and situation of the Ranna and his territories.

In respect to Captain Palmer's deputation, as the ostensible reason given for it is the ratification of the public faith, I must still feel, that it ought to have gone through a member of the Board, situated where, and as I am at present. The private commission he is charged with I can be no judge of, because I am unacquainted with



with it; though, when you first mentioned the character in which he was to appear, you assured me I should receive from you the full information in another letter. Such a proper and well-timed confidence concerning Captain Palmer's *real mission*, and the *gloss intended to be thrown over it*, would have put it in my power to represent to you the impropriety of the latter in respect to myself, and to give you at the same time my sentiments upon the former.

I cannot leave this subject without exculpating myself from the idea you have formed in consequence of an expression in my letter. Be assured, Sir, the attributing to you a mercenary motive was the farthest thing in the world from my thoughts: but, seeing the little confidence shewn me in regard to those transactions, I confess I could not help supposing it possible, *that the observation of what passed here might be one point in view.*

I shall not enter into a discussion of the rights affixed to our several departments; suffice it that I know what belongs to me, both in my military capacity, and as a member of the Board; and that I neither wish nor mean to advance a step beyond the strictest limits of either.

And

And allow me again to repeat, that I still continue, as surely you have found me hitherto, most ready to support every measure of Government, which, according to my ideas, I can support with propriety to the public and myself; that it is my sincere wish and desire to preserve the reciprocal confidence which I believed our concern for the good of the service had so established between us, that my absence from the Board could not possibly have lessened it; and that I have, on my part, in every transaction, both here and elsewhere, most exactly and pointedly adhered to it, by giving, on all occasions, every degree of support and consequence to your authority and character. Opposition from me, as I think I have often assured you, is to measures and not to men.

Whether to avow these principles, and to act from them, portends hostile intentions, I leave you to judge; and let your candour also determine, whether the same proceedings, on your part, would not have spared us all trouble, but that of attending to the exigencies of our present critical situation, and endeavouring to preserve uninjured the important stake committed to our charge.

[ 50 ]

I mean to fet off to-morrow for Futty Ghur,  
and other stations ; and am,

Dear Sir,

Your most obedient

Humble fervant,

(Signed)

EYRE COOTE.

*Copy of a Letter from Sir EYRE COOTE to Mr.  
BARWELL at Calcutta, dated Futty Ghur,  
17th January, 1780.*

MY DEAR SIR,

I HAVE just received your letter of the  
3d instant, as well as one of the same date,  
from Mr. Hastings; to which' my letter of  
the 10th will, I hope, have proved a suffi-  
cient

cient answer, and no doubt he will have shew'd it you.

In full reply to the different points you state, I most solemnly declare that my protest proceeded from enmity to no man; that it arose from no personal pique whatever; and that, so far from warmth, it was dictated by my coolest determination, unconnected with any party or discordant views, but solely to justify myself in my conduct upon a measure that I cannot join in, without giving up the military trust reposed in me: and in proof of this, if the treaty is altered into such a shape that I can subscribe to, as explained in my last minute, my protest shall fall with that amendment: and I flatter myself that my objections to it must appear so forcible, that there can be little difficulty in this business; in which idea I am more confirmed by your withholding my letter, &c. from the Board.

As to Mr. Hastings seeking my friendship, he did not seek it in vain. This is proved both by my conduct towards him here, and *my representations home*: how far it is worth his while to retain it, he is the best judge: but you must concur with me in opinion, that no friendship whatever ought to debar me from self-justi-

fication, when my duty appears to me to call  
for it.

I am,

My dear Sir,

Your very sincere and

Obedient, humble servant,

(Signed)

EYRE COOTE.

*Copy*

*Copy of a Letter from Mr. HASTINGS to Lord  
MACARTNEY, on the River Ganges, near  
Bugle pore, dated 23d July, 1781.*

RIGHT HONOURABLE LORD MACARTNEY.

MY LORD,

**I**N the letter which I have already had the honour to address to your Lordship, I expressed my regret that I had not known of your appointment in time to have furnished you with explanations on some particular points, of which I expect that an advantage will have been taken to prejudice your mind with injurious and dangerous opinions of the designs of this Government with relation to yours. From the candour which your Lordship appears to possess, I have no doubt that I should have found it an easy point to satisfy you of the propriety and fairness of our acts, and even of their necessity: but as it has happened, you will have taken your line; and any thing which I can write upon past subjects may arrive too late to produce their effects. I feel the discouragement of this reflection, but shall not yield to it, trusting  
that

that you will have had the caution, under whatever impression, to avoid so decided a conduct as may disable you from yielding to the influence of better information, or (which I rather expect) that you will have at once resolved to adopt our principles, and heartily to support and carry the measures formed upon them into effect.

Let me premise that our Government has a weight of business of its own already as great as it can sustain, and a responsibility sufficiently hazardous and delicate in itself to make it dread any addition to it; and, my Lord, I fancy that you have found the affairs of the Carnatic in a state which could afford little temptation to us, were we ever so vacant of employment, to assume a participation in the conduct and events of its administration. This may serve for a general proof, that it was not from choice that we have, in any instance, interfered in the concerns of that province, or of your presidency. I desire your Lordship to look back on the transactions of the last twelvemonth, and weigh, by your own judgment, the many things that we have done for the relief and preservation of Fort St. George. That, which was undeniably good, has been accepted as a rightful claim; the rest, as I am told, either treated with derision, or resented as injurious.

injurious. I allude particularly to the treaty proposed with the Dutch, a measure extorted by the cries of despair, and judged in the elation of a sudden return of success; and to the agreement lately concluded with the Nabob Waula Jaw. To this I shall confine the sequel of this letter.

The letters from the President and Select Committee of Fort St. George, from the beginning of the war with Hyder, have invariably represented the resources of the Carnatic as lost beyond all hope to them, either from the Nabob's inability to collect them, or his determination to withhold them. We expressed it as our firm opinion, that every rupee of the Carnatic ought to be primarily and exclusively applied to its defence; that, as our force alone maintained it, we had a right to demand assignments of the whole revenue, and even to take it if refused. In the mean time they had made the demand, and the Nabob had refused it; but the demand and refusal were in one instance so mysterious that we could not comprehend the latent causes of either. The Circars of Rigole, &c had been assigned to the Nabob's private creditors; but as they had gained nothing by the assignment, they proposed to transfer it to the Company, on the condition that credit should



should be given them in the Company's name for the receipts ; that these might be employed in the mean time for the expences of the war. The Committee demanded the assignment, but took no notice of the condition, and the Nabob naturally refused it, because he had already granted it to his creditors ; and with this state of the case, both parties referred it to us ; the creditors remonstrating against the mode in which the demand was made, as subjecting the Nabob to a rejection of it, by which all parties must be losers ; and the Committee stating it as a confirmed proof of the Nabob's disaffection.

At the same time the Nabob's Dewan, Ahlam Cawn, and Mr. Richard Sullivan, arrived in Calcutta, charged with a special commission from the Nabob to conclude a treaty with this Government ; of which the first condition, and the first apparent object of their deputation, was, that we would accept an assignment of his revenues, and employ them on the public service ; and this condition was not offered for our benefit, but solicited, as if his interest alone was likely to be promoted by our assent to it.

This was the foundation of the agreement ; and as it promised a most seasonable relief to the Carnatic, which we could not easily afford,  
having

having already exhausted both our resources and credit in that and other emergent occasions of the Company's affairs, we readily and gladly accepted the offer, guarding it with such provisions as appeared to us necessary to prevent its being defeated, or perverted to other purposes. Your Lordship will not ask, why we thought our intervention on this occasion necessary, and why we did not rather refer the accommodation to the Presidency of Fort St. George, which was the regular instrument of the Company's participation in the government of the Carnatic ? But I will suppose the question. I might properly answer it by another, — Why did the Company withdraw their confidence from the same Ministry to bestow it on your Lordship ? And, after all, what have we done ? For others every thing, for ourselves nothing, — unless it be supposed that we rescued the Nabob from the thralldom, in which he was held by others, to exercise the same lucrative species of oppression on him ourselves; an imputation which I know will be suggested, and the world will be ready to give it credit; but which I should abhor myself, if I thought that any man who knew me would admit but with a moment's hesitation. Had I known that a man of your Lordship's character had been chosen to administer the affairs of that Government, I believe that I should

I

have

have persuaded the Nabob to trust his interests in your hands, rather than make such a separation of them from their ancient and more natural connection; and from the moderation of Mr. Wheeler's disposition, I think he would have agreed with me in that preferable accommodation; but as it has been made an act of this Government, and its faith pledged in the most sacred manner to the performance of it, it can neither be revoked nor qualified; and I most earnestly conjure your Lordship to give it your firm and hearty support.

The principal articles of this agreement are the 8th, 10th, 11th, and 12th. On these I shall offer a few remarks.

To render the mode of collection prescribed in the 8th and 10th articles effectual, I would recommend that the Commissioners be allowed a commission or percentage, and a liberal one, upon the sums which they shall realize, and no fixed appointments. It is the principle which we have lately adopted, and have applied to every great department of our own Government; and I will venture to answer for its complete success, if you will make the trial of it. If you trust to the integrity of those whom you charge with the unchecked receipts of lacks,  
and

and allow them such ostensible salaries as will afford them the bare means of subsistence; they will make up the deficiency by secret perquisites, to which no man ever yet set due bounds. The consequence is inevitable, especially in this remote corner of the world, where men must look to a competency for their latter days. The commission will be an incitement to exertion, and will be a tie on the honour and fidelity of those who receive it; for I am persuaded that the generality of the Company's servants would be better contented with a moderate, but sure, provision by such allowed means, than to be let loose on an unbounded scene of plunder, which must be a source of perpetual reproach and apprehension for the consequences of detection. I beg your Lordship to receive this not as a light recommendation. It is a favourite doctrine, confirmed by many years reflection and experience, although it is but lately that I have had it in my power to apply it. I believe that the same sentiments will appear recorded by myself on your consultations, even at so distant a period as the year 1771.

*I can say little upon the subject of Tanjore, for I can hardly allow it the credit of a serious argument. The meanness of our first letters dignified the Rajah with the title of King, and by that*  
 I 2 *misnomer,*

*misnomer, if I may call it so, he has acquired all the prerogatives of Royalty, though the Nabob, his undoubted Sovereign, has been without scruple treated as a dependant.* If these ridiculous prejudices are allowed to operate against every principle of justice and policy, and (I must add) of common sense, it is a pity that they could not be confined to the season of peace and security. Surely this is not a time to encourage or yield to the delusion — The late President and Select Committee informed us, that the Rajah had refused to contribute a store of grain to the subsistence of the army, for which the President had written to him a letter expressive of his displeasure — This is a language so remote from my conceptions of the actual and absolute rights of your Government, while it is charged with the entire defence of the state of which the Rajah of Tanjore is a member, and of his dependance, that I can scarce offer an opinion, which shall not appear extravagant in the comparison — In a word, I think it improper at such a time, to leave the Rajah an option to withhold a grain of his store, or a rupee of his treasure, from the service of the general state; and most heartily advise, that, while that service, in the present desperate condition of it lasts, the whole, with the single reservation of his own personal subsistence, be taken out of his

his

his hands in better trust for the public use. These are my public and private sentiments, and your Lordship is welcome to avail yourself of them in any manner you please—most heartily do I wish that they may be conformable to your own.

The Nabob's debt to individuals is become an object of too great magnitude and extent to be treated on the principles on which it might have been proper to judge it in its commencement, as it is grown into a kind of national property, and the fortunes of so many are involved in it, that it will force itself upon the protection of the public, if some expedient be not found to put the claims of the creditors on some footing on which they can rely for their recovery.

At the same time, if they are allowed to grow with the yearly accumulation of the present interest, or even the principal to remain at its actual amount, the manifest impossibility of its being ever discharged, or even diminished, will be a discouragement to every attempt to effect either.

It was with an equal regard to these united considerations, that we recommended the plan  
 . of

of adjustment and liquidation which is described in the 11th article of the agreement. Mr. Richard Sullivan, who professed to know the sentiments of the creditors, assured me, that, instead of repining at the retrenchments which we have proposed, they would be thankful for the provision which was left them, having had little ground to hope for any payments. I express my hopes upon this subject with the greater confidence of their meeting your judgment, from a communication which has been lately made me by Mr. Stephen Sullivan, of a letter written by his father to your Lordship, in which he recommends a plan for the liquidation of the Nabob's debt, on exactly the same principles as that of ours, but differing in the application only by the difference, which was rendered necessary by the alteration made in the state of affairs since his letter was written.

The reason of the 12th article is self evident : It may also appear unnecessary ; for surely the past experience of the insecurity of the Nabob's credit would be sufficient of itself to prevent any one hereafter from trusting to it. But this will be forgotten when the danger is past, *and even the remedy will be a lure to new adventurers.*

I shall

I shall not make excuses for the length of this letter. It will cost your Lordship less time to read it than I have spent in writing it; and you will receive it as a proof of the value which I set on your Lordship's concurrence in my line of thinking, by the pains which I have taken to gain it. You will have heard, that I have subjected myself to reproach for the deficiencies of my private correspondence, and as much as I wish to avoid that imputation with your Lordship, I am afraid that occasions will happen to draw it upon me, and I thus early bespeak your indulgence if ever this shall prove the case. I am at this time happily furnished with unusual leisure, and have gratified my own inclinations, and performed, I hope, not an unacceptable service to your Lordship in this employment of it.

I beg leave to conclude this letter and the general subject of it, with a recommendation of Mr. Richard Sullivan to your protection and countenance; you will find him deeply and minutely informed in the Nabob's affairs; of pleasing manners, and, if you shall think it proper to make use of his services, possessed of honourable and faithful principles.

I left



I left Calcutta on the 12th instant, and hope to reach Benares by the middle of next month : I shall proceed to Lucknow, and shall expect to return to Calcutta before the end of October, if no very urgent cause detains me, which I do not apprehend beyond that period.

I shall continue to write to your Lordship upon other important subjects — In the mean time I beg that you will believe me to be with a real esteem,

My LORD,

Your most obedient,

And most faithful servant,

(Signed)

WARREN HASTINGS.

THE END.

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O B S E R V A T I O N S

ON THE

D E F E N C E

MADE BY

WARREN HASTINGS, Esq

---

[PRICE TWO SHILLINGS.]



# OBSERVATIONS

ON THE

## DEFENCE

MADE BY

WARREN HASTINGS, Esq.

### PART THE FIRST.

“ The notoriety of a man's conduct, who has been  
“ unhappily placed in a situation, which has afforded  
“ him the means of drawing on himself the curses of  
“ a whole people, surpasses all other proof.”

*Mr. Hastings to Colonel Champion,  
13th September, 1774. page 308.*

L O N D O N.

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HOUSE, PICCADILLY.

MDCCLXXXVII.

*Many circumstances attending the delivery of Mr. Hastings's Answer to the Charges against him, particularly the very early period of the prosecution, at which it was produced, made it sufficiently apparent, that his justification was intended for the public at large, full as much as for the House of Commons. Accordingly it was, by his authority, printed, published, and circulated with uncommon rapidity. The fact is mentioned without blame, and only for the purpose of establishing the claim of an individual, to examine the merits of a defence, which is voluntarily submitted, and virtually appeals to the judgment of the community.*

**T**HE Introduction to Mr. Hastings's Defence might have been omitted without injury to his cause. If he meant to captivate benevolence, his Address to the House of Commons should have been grave and temperate. He ought to have spoken of himself with some modesty ; and, supposing it to be of use to state general merits or general character against positive charges, he should have done it with decency and moderation. A clear and satisfactory answer to a number of heavy charges might conclude with panegyric ; but no defence should begin with it.

B

While

While the trial of his conduct is depending, he has no right to *assert a general claim to approbation*. If that were admitted, the trial would be superfluous. He has no right to affirm, not yet at least, *that he stands as high in the estimation of the world, as any man of his own rank and pretensions in it*. The language of triumph may be allowed to follow victory, but is ridiculous before it. The stile of the Preface, however, is not the worst part of it. Mr. Hastings is apt to forget himself; and this, to a man who asserts freely, is a great inconvenience. The Preface is full of contradictions. He says, *I am here by no obtrusion of my own*. If this proposition means that he had no inclination to be accused, there was no occasion to state it with so much solemnity. In any other sense, the assertion is groundless. He says himself, *that he petitioned to be allowed to make his defence in person*. He certainly came of his own accord;

accord ;—it was no obtrusion, and required no excuse. *I have too humble a sense of my own consequence, to consider either my reputation, honour, fortune, or life, or all these interests collectively, as having any claim to the smallest portion of the valuable time of the House of Commons, &c.* This extreme humility is evidently affected, and, if it were sincere, would be absurd. The question turns upon his guilt, or his innocence, not upon his personal consequence, and still less upon his humble sense of it. His humility is nothing to the purpose. Whether he be a considerable man or not, it is sufficient that he is accused, to entitle him to be heard. Mr. Hastings must hold his *reputation, honour, fortune, and life* at a very low rate indeed, if he does not think they have any claim to the *smallest* portion of the valuable time of the House. He has told us, how high he stands in the estimation of the world ; and we may easily con-



conjecture how he stands in his own. He  
 says very plainly, " that his political con-  
 duct was invariably regulated by truth,  
 " justice, and good faith ; and that all  
 " persuasions of men were impressed with  
 " a superstitious belief, that a fortunate  
 " influence directed all his actions to their  
 " destined ends !" A man, who speaks  
 of himself in these exalted terms, tho' he  
 proves nothing, may possibly speak truth ;  
 but that he should have a very humble  
 sense of his own consequence, is a thing  
 palpably impossible.

" All my actions were reprobated at  
 " home, and every dispatch from England  
 " brought orders opposing my measures  
 " in their course, and the sentences of my  
 " disgrace and dismissal."—This is a  
 strange proof of the high estimation, in  
 which he says he stands. If his character  
 be universally esteemed, while all his ac-  
 tions

tions have been reprobated, it follows, that he must have had a character made for him, independant of his actions.

But the Directors, *his immediate masters*, have given him their *unanimous thanks*. A series of actions approved, might properly have led the Directors to that conclusion ; but how a series of actions, constantly *reprobated* by those very Directors, came to end in a unanimous vote of thanks, is a question that seems, and only seems, to require explanation. Deliberate opinions, accompanied with the reasons on which they are founded, and continued for a number of years, *may* be contradicted, but cannot be invalidated by a solitary vote, for which no reason whatever is assigned. We know how such a vote might possibly be obtained. It dishonours the Court of Directors, and does Mr. Hastings no service. But, it seems,  
he

he left India with the expressed regrets of *all* his fellow subjects there. For the credit of many of them, whose language concerning this gentleman has been constantly and is still the very reverse of approbation, it is to be hoped that the assertion is not strictly true. But, if it were, we know that a subscription to an address of thanks may be obtained by interest, or influence over men, most of whom are dependant upon power, and that it does not even prove the opinion of the subscribers. In *this* case, many of them might be sincere, for certainly they lost a bountiful patron. The motives of their attachment to Mr. Hastings will appear at large, under the head of Salaries, Contracts, and Establishments. The charge of sacrificing the interests of the publick is perfectly consistent with gaining the attachment of individuals ;—the nature and extent of the sacrifice is proved by the extent

extent of its effect. In point of fact, this boasted address to Mr. Hastings was signed by about two thirds of the British subjects under his government, not by *all* of them, as he ventures to assert.

He says Madajee Scindia has written letters in his praise, to his most gracious Majesty, and to the Company. Any body else would have said simply, *to his Majesty*. The epithet, *most gracious*, is seldom, if ever used, but in direct addresses or petitions to the King. The affectation of introducing it in the mention of so unimportant a fact, requires no comment. But wounds, as well as compliments, come from the same quarter. The spirit that flatters can insult. An author, whose pamphlet, as he imagines, is to deliver characters to posterity, and whose education in the school of Mr. Hastings, is self-evident, has taken upon him to  
assert,

assert, from what he calls an intimate knowledge of his Majesty's character, "that history will neither rank him  
 " among those few chosen and immortal  
 " spirits, raised up by Providence, in her  
 " bounty, for the felicity and admiration  
 " of mankind, nor even place him on a  
 " level with Trajan, Antoninus, and  
 " Aurelius."

Whenever the letters of Scindia are produced, we shall see what they contain. Mr. Hastings is not a perfect judge of the style of the Marattas. To any eye but his, the voluminous epistles he received from his friend Moodajee Boosla, the Raja of Berar, would appear to be dictated by the bitterest spirit of insulting sarcasm, tho' expressed in the language of the grossest adulation. Mr. Hastings professes to understand them literally, and even publishes them in proof of his standing high in the

estimation of the Princes of India\*. With respect to Scindia, it is not unlikely, that his praises of Mr. Hastings may be sincere. It is by no means improbable, that the man, in whose hands Mr. Hastings has principally contributed to unite the chief power of the Maratta State ;—the man, to whom he has sacrificed every interest, which he ought to have defended, and every power and person, whom he ought to have protected, is highly satisfied with his conduct ; *and who will question such an authority ?* undoubtedly he desires, *that others may be instructed to govern themselves by the example of Mr. Hastings.* He says, “ that he has been laid under the obligation of preparing and completing, in five days, the refutation of charges, which it had been the labour of his accuser, armed with all the powers of

\* Vide App. No. 1.

“Parliament, to compile during as many  
 “years of almost undisturbed leisure.”  
 Now, the obligation, if any, was voluntary. He might have taken more time if he thought proper. But then *he knew himself equal to the undertaking*, viz. of completing it in five days; and so indeed he ought to be. He had much more than five days to prepare his answer to the charges, reckoning from the day they were first printed. In fact he knew, many years ago, what the chief of them must consist of. He had the Letters of the Directors, the Reports of the several Committees, and the Resolutions of the House of Commons before him. He says himself, that he had been, during the course of five years, the continued subject of the *same* criminations. He says that *they are not charges, but histories and comments*. Now, that a minute and detailed charge  
 should

should therefore be no charge, is not apparent ; but it is very apparent that, in proportion as a charge is minute and particular, it is the more vulnerable, and liable to be convicted of fallacy or contradiction: If it be diffuse and prolix, so much the better for the party accused. There is something odd and suspicious in his complaining against an evident advantage, as if it were an injury.

The rest of the preface consists of general assertions without argument or proof; of pathetic appeals to the candour, to the generosity, and even to the *passions* of every Member of the House; of professions of gratitude for their wonderful goodness in hearing him, and of lamentations about pamphlets, as if that were a weapon, which he and his myrmidons had never made use of. Such common-place trifling is not worth notice. Let us see



what sort of direct answers he gives to direct charges.

## R O H I L L A    W A R.

Mr. Hastings begins with asserting generally, *that it is not true, that the Court of Directors did positively direct their servants in Bengal not to engage in any offensive war* ; and then he says, there are passages in their letters, *which allow of a dispensation from their general rule*. Here the publick should observe, that the wars, meant by the charge, are such as are strictly offensive ; that is, wars made without injury or provocation received, without the pretence of an expected attack, and avowedly for the purpose of conquest or plunder. Against *such* wars, at least, he cannot deny that there was a general rule ; and, if there had been none, his engaging in them did not require a prohibition to make it a crime.

crime. The company's letters are filled with prohibitions against offensive wars. Does he mean to affirm, that the quotations, stated in the charge, are false ?—If he does, it is a question of fact very easily determined. The Directors themselves, *his immediate masters*, must have been hitherto in an error on this subject. On the twenty-eighth of November, 1775, they resolved, “ That the agreement made with Sujah Dowlah and the then Governor (Mr. Hastings), for the hire of a part of the Company's troops for the reduction of the Rohilla country, and the subsequent steps taken for the carrying on the war, were founded on wrong policy, *were contrary to the general orders of the Company* for keeping their troops within the bounds of the provinces, and for not extending their conquests ; and were also contrary to those general principles of justice,

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“ which

“ which the Company wish should be  
 “ supported.” Even the Proprietors, *his*  
*honoured employers*, were unanimously of  
 opinion, that those measures were contra-  
 ry to the general orders of the Company  
*frequently repeated*. War, *bona fide* under-  
 taken for prevention, though it com-  
 mences the hostility, is properly defen-  
 sive, and has nothing to do with the pre-  
 sent question. In the utmost extent, to  
 which any passages in the letters from the  
 Directors can be strained, they invariably  
 suppose defence to be the object. With  
 respect to Mr. Hastings’s own sense of the  
 meaning of the Company’s orders, it would  
 indeed be very difficult to prove any thing  
 against him, if, as he says, he is not bound  
 by letters signed by himself, and to which  
 he has entered no dissent on the consulta-  
 tions ; and if, as he pretends, *no fair and*  
*unbiassed judge will infer his real sentiments*  
*from the stile and arguments of a political ne-*  
*gociation*. From what source then are his  
 real

real sentiments to be collected? His public letters to the Directors were signed jointly with his council, and usually drawn up by himself, as Executive Officer of the Board, or under his immediate inspection. His letters to the Company's principal friend and ally were drawn up and signed singly by himself; and from neither one or the other is any inference to be drawn of his real sentiments. Yet evasions, such as these, might possibly have answered his purpose, if he had not, on a former occasion, declared himself explicitly on this very subject. The following passage is literally taken from his letter to the Directors of the 10th of November, 1772.

“ We beg leave to assure you, that your  
 “ administration here adopt, with sincerity  
 “ and satisfaction, the plan, which you  
 “ have prescribed to us for our political  
 “ transactions with the country powers ;  
 “ and

“ and we flatter ourselves it would not be  
 “ unpleasing to you to find, that before  
 “ your orders could reach us, we had acted  
 “ in so much conformity to your senti-  
 “ ments. The security and tranquillity  
 “ of these Provinces shall be the ultimate  
 “ end of all our negotiations ; and you  
 “ may trust, that we are too well aware  
 “ of the ruinous tendency of all schemes  
 “ of conquest, ever to adopt them, or ever  
 “ to depart from the absolute line of self-  
 “ defence, unless impelled to it by the  
 “ most obvious necessity and immediate  
 “ exigency of the circumstances.”

He complains that *the charges are histories  
 and comments, not charges* ; yet, in the first  
 article, the answer is ten times as long as  
 the charge. The essential matter of both  
 might be reduced into a narrow compass.  
 He is accused of making a war purely of-  
 fensive, (and not for any remote purpose  
 of

of defence, security, or prevention) in contradiction to the orders of the Company frequently repeated ;—of entering into an engagement with Suja Dowla for a sum of money to extirpate a nation that never offended us, and of having accomplished that purpose, with circumstances of extraordinary and unnecessary cruelty. This is the main body of the charge,

1. Mr. Hastings defends himself by affirming, *that it is not true that the Directors did prohibit offensive wars* ;—That is, he joins issue on the fact of the prohibition. Leaving that question to be determined by the evidence, it is material to observe, that this defence amounts plainly to an admission, that the war itself was *offensive*, in the strict meaning of the charge. He, who affirms, and much more he, who labours to prove, that the act, of which he is accused, (whether crime or not) was

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not

not prohibited, does, *de facto*, confess that it was done ; and the confession, in that form, is infinitely stronger than if it had been made in terms, because it evidently escapes from the conscious heart, overcoming the judgement.

2. *That he shall always be ready to profess, that he does reckon the probable acquisition of wealth among his reasons for taking up arms against his neighbours.* He admits the charge, and submits to judgement. It seems he has *many* reasons for taking up arms against his *neighbours*. To get possession of their wealth is one. A highwayman professes no other. The measures of Mr. Hastings are calculated to answer many collateral as well as their principal purpose. On *his* principles, the Rohilla war was a measure of discipline and oeconomy, as well as positive profit. In his letter to the Directors, dated 3d of December,

cember, 1774, he says, " The very same  
 reasons, which before urged us to shun  
 every military expedition, namely, the  
 expence attending it, and the exporta-  
 tion of our currency, now operated in  
 the contrary direction, and recommend-  
 ed the employment of our army, *for the*  
*purpose of reducing our expences and adding*  
*to our currency.*" In his minute of the  
 26th November, 1773, he says " that the  
 army would be conveniently employed  
 for keeping up its own discipline and  
 practice in war."—viz. in extirpating  
 the Rohillas. Such principles and such  
 language must be left without a comment.  
 An attempt to place them in a clearer light  
 than that in which they stand, would find  
 itself reduced to the difficulty of proving  
 a self-evident proposition.

3. *That the Rohillas are not a nation, but*  
*a body of foreign adventurers, who became*



*masters of the country about sixty years before, viz. about 1714. By this justification, the Parliament of Great Britain are called upon to declare to the world, that a great body of people, who have quietly possessed and prudently governed a great country for sixty years, (inasmuch that every part of it had the appearance of a garden without one uncultivated spot,) may justly be extirpated, because they are not a nation. Let us, see whether the House of Commons will go that length with their Committee. It is a question of national honour, as well as justice. The vote, that adopts Mr. Hastings's principle of defence, dishonours the name of England for ever ! With respect to the facts, Mr. Hastings talks of the Rohillas as if they were nothing, but a troop of banditti. Yet they have always been acknowledged and treated with as an independent nation, even by the India Company. Their consequence*

as a nation may be proved by the number of men they were able to bring into the field. Governor Verelst, near twenty years ago\*, informed the Directors, “that their joint force was computed at about eighty thousand effective horse and foot.” Colonel Champion, in his letter of twenty-fourth April, 1774, says, that Hafiz’s army consisted of about forty thousand, and that they expected a reinforcement of twelve thousand men. Sujah Dowla himself states their numbers at the battle at fifty thousand; yet *all* the Rohilla chiefs were not in arms against us. None of the nations of the second order in Europe, are able to bring such numbers of their own people into the field.

\* Vide his letter of 28th March, 1768.

4. *That the extirpation consisted in nothing more than in expelling, or removing the Rohillas from the country which they occupied.* Colonel Champion understood the word, in its direct and obvious sense, and therefore calls it, an inhuman plan of extirpation, and such it proved in the event. Supposing, nevertheless, that *extirpate* and *exterminate*, (the words constantly used in the negotiation between Mr. Hastings and Suja Dowla), to be mere tropes, or figurative expressions, as Mr. George Vanfartart was pleased to say, it remains to be shewn, how a nation, very considerable in point of numbers at least, could be expelled from their country, (*so as not to suffer the smallest vestige of their power to remain in it*) without resistance on their part; or how that resistance could be overcome, without destroying a great part of them. It appears that the Prince of the country, and above two thousand of his

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people

people fell in the battle. What became of the remainder who were driven out of their country, who were expelled from their possessions, who were forced to abandon their houses, their lands, their temples, and what they most pathetically lamented, the tombs of their noble ancestors;—what became of the multitude whose age or infancy, whose sex or infirmity obtained no compassion, though it made them incapable of resistance;—what became of this whole race of people, emigrating, as it is called, under the sword of a barbarous invader, and whether they found a retreat or not, does no where appear; nor, according to Mr. Hastings, is it a question of any moment. Even in this country there are men so delicate, that they will not turn their eyes to the object that appeals to their compassion, for fear they should find themselves unable to refuse it. There are others so scrupulous, that they will

will not trust themselves with their own generous passions, or even with their virtues, least the appeal to their passions and to their virtues should be too powerful for their judgement. When their office and duty is only to accuse, they pretend to assume the impartiality of judges. They know, that the description of a populous kingdom taken by assault, and sacked from one end of it to the other, would shake the firmest determination. They know that the detail would be insupportable. So little are they acquainted with the duty of an accuser, that they would restrain even *him* from the use of epithets, which the laws allows and expects in every common indictment. According to their doctrine, he should be mild and temperate in his expressions; he should charge the most atrocious facts, without stating them to be crimes; and paint them, if he can, without the colours that belong

to

to them. Between the prosecution and the defence, they affect to balance the scales of justice with an even hand,—*God knows with what equality!*—Having assumed an office, which properly they have no right to, that of judging upon the whole merits,—they assume principles in the discharge of it, which do not belong to the office. Their conduct professes an opinion, that justice should be deaf as well as blind; and that a judge should have no mercy, but for the criminal before him. The truth is, they will not permit themselves, or others, to look directly at a scene of desolation that might rouse their indignation, or melt them into pity. They will not listen to the voice of calamity, for fear they should be convinced by it.

Of such men, however, the resolution is but half taken; and, when they are

E forced

forced to hear, perhaps they may be converted. There are others, who have no such apprehensions, who know by experience that their hearts are invulnerable; who are not deterred from consulting their conscience by any dread of its influencing their conduct. Learned men have told us that they, for their part, have never seen Mr. Hastings; and how is it possible that they should be biased in favour of a man, whom they never have seen! no man who is perfectly sure of his own honesty, and his public character, will submit to say that, whether he has seen the party or not, can make any possible difference in his judgment. What sort of integrity is that, which requires and depends upon such feeble security? In the mouth of a judge, the plea is so manifestly improper and superfluous, that, if it has any effect at all, it is to excite suspicion, not to remove it. Supposing it to be proper, let

us see what it amounts to. If it means any thing, it means to affirm, that the mind of an advocate is no way to be retained, but by putting a fee into his hand. That he should purposely avoid, and, having avoided, that he should disclaim all intercourse, or acquaintance, with the person whom he is determined to defend, in order to give weight and authority to that defence, are things manifestly impossible. Still less is it possible, that he, good easy man, who thinks full surely his greatness is a ripening, should ever have heard or suspected, which way the favour of that power inclines, by which, in proper time, and after proper services, consulting the wishes without expecting the command, he himself may be promoted.

*5. That the Vizier was injured by the Robillas, and that the Company were joined on*



*equal terms with him in the injury, which he had received.* Admitting the Vizier to have been injured by the Rohillas not paying him a sum of money in dispute, and which they said he was not intitled to, was that an injury, which would have justified even *him* in extirpating the whole nation? Or, would it follow that the India Company, who, let them be ever so sensible of the injury done to Sujah Dowla, are not said to have been themselves *directly* injured by the Rohillas, be justified in concurring in the measure? On this point, the evidence of Sir Robert Barker, who commanded the Company's forces in 1771 and 1772, and of Colonel Champion, who succeeded him, is not only competent and in point, but so compleat and conclusive, that it annihilates every idea of a doubt upon the subject. The questions, severally put to these Gentlemen at the

Bar of the House of Commons, with their answers, stand as follows\*,

To Sir Robert Barker, Q. " Were the  
" Rohillas ever at war, or in hostility  
" with the English before 1773 ?

A. " *I never heard they were.*

Q. " Had the Rohillas ever done an in-  
" jury of any kind, direct or indirect, to  
" the English ?

A. " *I never heard that they did.*

To Colonel Champion, Q. " Whe-  
" ther the Rohillas had ever engaged in  
" hostilities of any kind, against the Eng-  
" lish, before their country was invaded  
" by us ?

\* 2d May, 1786.

" *I do*

A. “ *I do not recollect they had.* ”

Q. “ Do you know, or have you heard  
“ that the Rohillas ever offered an injury  
“ of any kind, direct or indirect, to the  
“ English ? ”

A. “ *It never came to my knowledge that  
“ they did.* ”

In the year 1786, Mr. Hastings, for the first time, affirms that, whereas the Vizier was injured by the Rohillas in the year 1772, the Company were then, *ipso facto*, equally injured. The public will hear with astonishment, what to those, who have inquired into the transaction, is notoriously true, that this is the first time he ever advanced that proposition, or any thing like it. In recommending the Rohilla war to his colleagues in office, in accounting for it to the Court of Directors,

and

and in defending it, as he did with all his faculties, against the strictures of Sir John Clavering, Colonel Monson, and Mr. Francis, he never once thought of saying, that the Company had been injured, either equally or partially, by the Rohillas. Even now, the plea, if it were true, would be superfluous in the mouth of a man, who, on a former occasion, when naturally the whole of his defence should have been produced, was intrepid enough to declare, “ that, altho’ there were arguments which  
 “ dissuaded him from the Rohilla expedi-  
 “ tion, yet there were others, which would  
 “ have made him *very glad of any occasion*  
 “ to employ the Company’s forces, that  
 “ saved so much of their pay and their  
 “ expences ;”—and who rests his justification, not upon any injury received from the Rohillas, (for that he never thought of till now,) but “ on the favourableness of  
 “ the opportunity offered by the absence  
 “ of

“ of the Marattas ;—the weak state of the  
 “ Rohillas, which promised an easy con-  
 “ quest of them, and his ideas of the Com-  
 “ pany’s distress at home, added to his  
 “ knowledge of their wants abroad, and  
 “ that the conquest of these people would  
 “ give wealth to our ally, *of which we*  
 “ *should partake !*”—The true nature and  
 purpose of the war are sufficiently proved  
 by the principles and topics made use of to  
 defend it. To rest the justification of a  
 questionable act upon a series of base and  
 infamous pretences, in preference to a just  
 motive of sufficient provocation, suppos-  
 ing such motive to exist, would indicate a  
 mind depraved into insanity. But to act,  
 on such pretences, is much worse than  
 insane. After all, let it be supposed that  
 there may be some colour of truth in his  
 assertion, that the India Company were  
 joined, *on equal terms*, with Sujah Dowla  
 in the injury, which he is supposed to have  
 received

received. Even that monstrous falsehood, admitted for a truth, will not justify the conduct of Mr. Hastings. If the injury was equal, it should have been equally resented by both parties ;—the plan and operations of the war should have been equally concerted, and the burthen, the risque, and the profits of it should have been equally divided between them. Instead of that, Suja Dowla, thro' the whole transaction appears, and is acknowledged by Mr. Hastings himself, to be the principal in the war ; that is, in the controul, the management, and the success of it, and the solicitor to us to engage in it. Whatever was gained by it was gained for *him* ; the entire plunder that was taken, and the whole country that was conquered, was taken and conquered for *him alone*. In all these points of view, the India Company acted, *professedly*, as auxiliaries, not parties, but *really* as mercenaries in the pay

of a foreign prince.\* Consider my friend, “ says his Excellency, repeatedly to Mr. “ Hastings, that it was my absolute de- “ termination to *extirpate* the Rohillas, “ and that I requested the *assistance* of the “ English for that purpose.” Thus far the service was plainly mercenary. They, who call it *auxiliary*, only soften the term, without changing the meaning. In the actual performance of the service, the condition of the parties was reversed; neither Suja Dowla, nor his troops, took any share in the danger; it was the Company’s army alone, that fought and conquered. Colonel Champion has repeatedly charged the Vizier, who was principal in the quarrel, with cowardice and treachery; particularly with deserting him at the battle, and leaving the English troops

\* Vide Colonel Champion’s Narrative in No. 45, of the Appendix to the fifth Report of the Committee of Secrecy.

exposed to the whole power of the enemy. If our little army had then received a check, it is not to be doubted that Suja Dowla, whom Colonel Champion every where calls *the most faithless of men*, would have instantly joined with the Rohillas to destroy us.

6. *That the Rohillas engaged to pay Suja Dowla forty lacks.* Their engagement was conditional. Suja Dowla, as they affirmed, did not perform the condition. That preliminary question was never settled, nor even enquired into by Mr. Hastings. *That the engagement was signed by Sir Robert Barker as a witness, which, in every instance of the kind that has ever passed in the Company's annals, is equivalent to a guaranty.* Mr. Hastings, in his letter to the Directors of 17th October, 1774, contented himself with saying, that the honour of the Company was *pledged implicitly*



by General Barker's attestation. Supposing such attestation to amount to an explicit guaranty, that ground of defence is manifestly inconsistent with the idea of an equal injury received. At least it is superfluous. The nature of a guaranty supposes the interposition of a third party, amicable to the other two, and disposed to promote an agreement between them ; but it absolutely excludes the idea of the guaranty being injured by one of the contending parties equally with the other, for then he must be arbiter in his own quarrel. On the other hand, supposing the company to have been so injured, they were instantly intitled to commence hostilities on their own account ; or if, renouncing their proper interest in the question, they once assume the character and office of Mediator and Guarantee, they are no longer at liberty to revert to the original injury, which they are said to have received

received jointly with Sujā Dowla, nor to justify the war on a principle, which, before the war, they voluntarily abandoned. The only pretence left is, to assert that they exercised the right, and performed the duty of a guaranty, by enforcing the performance of an engagement. Now, whatever the Company's right, on this principle, might be, it is certain that the proper use was not made of it. If Mr. Hastings really understood that he acted as guaranty, his conduct was infinitely more criminal than the charge has represented it. He had then a positive office to execute, a pacific trust to perform, both of them sacred in their nature. To reconcile contending parties, to promote peace between hostile nations, is an office so honourable, so useful, and humane, that it requires no contract to make it a general duty among men. In a mediator that duty is direct and specific. Now, what was the

the

the object of the secret agreement with Suja Dowla? Was it to compel the Rohillas to perform their engagement? No; but in the most formal and explicit terms, to extirpate and exterminate the Rohilla nation, without an alternative of any kind whatsoever. If, therefore, the plea were true, Mr. Hastings could derive no benefit from it. But, in reality, no such thing ever happened.

In the first place, no commander in chief, without special authority and instruction, could take upon him to bind the government by so serious and important an act, as the guaranty of a treaty between two other parties, especially a guaranty, which was to be enforced by war. It is not pretended, that Sir Robert Barker had any such authority or instruction. Secondly, it appears that Sir Robert Barker was called upon by the Rohillas, who had

no faith in Suja Dowla, to authenticate the treaty by his presence as a witness to it on *their* part, not as a guaranty. Thirdly, no fact is produced to support the extraordinary position, to which Mr. Hastings is driven, viz. *That signing as a witness is in every instance of the kind, that has ever passed in the Company's annals, equivalent to a guaranty.* Considering how much has been said upon this subject, it is a curious fact, that Sir Robert Barker never signed the agreement between the Rohillas and Suja Dowla. All that appears on the face of the original instrument, is, *This agreement sealed in the presence of Sir Robert Barker*†. Admitting, nevertheless, that his presence was equivalent to a written attestation, it does not follow that a bare attestation should constitute a guaranty. The terms of the propo-

† Vide No. 21, of the Appendix to the Fifth Report of Secret Committee.

fiction suppose and refer to a known existing custom, to constitute which, in law and common sense, many instances are required. It was reserved for Mr. Hastings to affirm, that a custom can exist without an instance. Assertions without proof are common every where; but assertions, of which the negative can be proved, and even from the evidence of the asserter, are common no where, but in the writings of Mr. Hastings.

In October 1774, Colonel Champion signed the treaty \* between Suja Dowla and the last of the Rohilla Chiefs, Fyzoola Cawn; but, when the latter appealed to the Company's protection in consequence of the Colonel's signature, Mr. Middleton, then resident in Oude, insisted, " † That Fyzoola Cawn could not

\* Vide No. 44. Appendix to 5th Report.

† 20th of April, 1778. Vide 8th Report of the Select Committee, page 9.

“ even have had an idea that it implied a  
 “ guaranty, or that it in any respect  
 “ whatever involved the Company;  
 “ otherwise he could not be supposed to  
 “ have suffered, on an occasion of such  
 “ moment to himself, the omission of that  
 “ sanction, which alone could prove such  
 “ guaranty, which was, in the nature of  
 “ things, necessary thereto, and which  
 “ *the never-failing custom of the country re-*  
 “ quires ; I mean, the expressing, in di-  
 “ rect words, that the party, signing his  
 “ name, is become guaranty for himself,  
 “ or principals, to the convention bear-  
 “ ing his signature ;” and such testimony  
 did Mr. Hastings practically give to Mr.  
 Middleton’s doctrines on this occasion,  
 that, although Fyzoola Cawn was perpe-  
 tually expressing his fears to him, for a  
 whole twelvemonth, Mr. Hastings never  
 once informed the Nabob of his guaranty  
 in virtue of Colonel Champion’s signa-  
 G ture ;

ture ; but at last put Fyzoola Cawn to thirty thousand pounds expence for a formal guaranty by Mr. Middleton.

Again ; in October 1775, the present Nabob of Oude made an agreement with his mother ; in which, after she had paid him certain large sums of money, he gave her a formal *quietus* ; declaring, that he had no farther claim on her, and that he would never molest her. To this agreement Mr. Bristow, the Company's resident, of his own authority, gave the Company's guaranty, not by a bare attestation, but in express terms, and by a separate instrument under his seal. In accounting for this step to the Governor-General and Council, he says ;---*It is necessity alone, which has obliged me to act the part I have done ; for, without the Company, as guarantees of the treaty, the Begum would not have given a single cowry.* But even this formal, specific

cific guaranty by the Company's representative, was not thought sufficient by Mr. Hastings and the Council, without their own own ratification of it. Accordingly they unanimously *approved and confirmed* it themselves \*.

Finally, Sir Robert Barker declared in a letter dated May 20, 1772, not a month before the treaty was concluded, † *That it was the farthest from his intentions, that the Company should, in any respect whatever, be mentioned in the agreement between the Vizier and the Robillas.* And when, in the course of his examination before the House of Commons, he was asked, whether he conceived that he bound the Company by that signature to a guaranty of the treaty by war, his answer was, *I did not.*

\* Vide Appendix No. 1, to the tenth Report of the Select Committee,

† Appendix to fifth Report of the Secret Committee. No. 21.



7th. That Mr. Hastings was not the abettor of the cruelties practised by Sujah Dowla.

The destruction of a whole people is a felony of the highest order. All the accomplices in it are principals. Mr. Hastings was, in every sense that constitutes guilt, a principal in the Rohilla war. He, and he alone, put that sword into the hand of Sujah Dowla, under which the Rohilla nation fell. This is no *ex post facto* charge,—no after-thought, imagined by the prosecutors of Mr. Hastings. The same language was held to him at the very time, and on the spot, where the cruelties in question were practised. It was held to him by his own commander in chief, who never mentioned the service, on which he was employed, without the deepest expression of grief and

and abhorrence \*. “ I too can say, that  
 “ the Nabob, as the agent of oppression,  
 “ is alone culpable ;—but, whilst all Asia  
 “ *knows* that the English gave him the  
 “ rod, and whilst they in vain look up to  
 “ them as those, who ought, if not to  
 “ direct the application, at least to pre-  
 “ vent an ill use being made of that rod,  
 “ will they not reasonably conclude, that  
 “ the scourges, which the agent gives,  
 “ are connived at ? Will they not say,  
 “ every English chief is another Suja ?

In the scale of justice, at the tribunal of conscience, the crimes of Suja Dowla, were subordinate. In the eye of truth, he was no more than the instrument of another more potent than himself. *His* guilt, whatever it was, is lost in comparison. To compare him is to acquit him. He was a tyger in a human form,

\* 15th of June, 1784.

agitated

agitated and blinded by the most violent, not the very worst of passions, by implacable fury and revenge. Not so his cool, considerate, thoughtful keeper, who let him loose upon an innocent people ; who roused his rage, and, with a mild and steady eye, contemplated the bloody havoc that he made. The man, who authorizes, and furnishes the means of executing an iniquitous act, is answerable for all the crimes that attend it. He was regularly and constantly informed by Colonel Champion of the barbarous proceedings of Suja Dowla, in terms that would have melted any heart, but that of Mr. Hastings. The following letter and narrative\* are left to speak for themselves ; there are many others from Colonel Champion to the same effect,

Appendix to 5th Report, No. 45.

To

TO MR. HASTINGS.

*Biffpokee, 10th May, 1784.*

“ DEAR SIR,

“ NOT only do I wish to get down  
“ as soon as possible, to put my affairs in  
“ the best order for my return to Europe,  
“ but I must be candid enough to unbo-  
“ som myself to you freely, and confess  
“ that the nature of the service, and the  
“ terms, on which I have been employed  
“ this campaign, have been inexpressibly  
“ disagreeable.

“ The authority, given to the Vizier  
“ over your army, has totally absorbed  
“ that degree of consequence due to my  
“ station. My hands have been tied up  
“ from giving protection or asylum to the  
“ miserable. I have been obliged to give  
“ a deaf ear to the lamentable cries of the

“ widow and fatherless, and to shut my  
 “ eyes against *a wanton display of violence*  
 “ *and oppression, of inhumanity and cruelty.*  
 “ The Company’s interest constrained me  
 “ in public to stifle the workings of my  
 “ feelings; but I must give them vent in  
 “ private. Though we had no *active* part  
 “ in his base proceedings, yet it is well  
 “ known that the success of our arms  
 “ gave him the power of perpetrating  
 “ these enormities; and I much fear that  
 “ our being even silent spectators of such  
 “ deeds, will redound to the dishonour of  
 “ our nation, and impress all Hindostan  
 “ with the most unfavourable opinion of  
 “ our government. As matters now are,  
 “ I know of no remedy, that would so  
 “ effectually re-establish our character for  
 “ justice and clemency, as your taking  
 “ the family of Hafez under the wings of  
 “ your mercy and protection, and influ-  
 “ encing the Nabob to make a provision  
 “ for

“ for them in some degree suitable to their  
 “ birth. *It would affect your sensibility too*  
 “ *much, were I to descend to particulars ;*  
 “ let it suffice, that the Nabob, Mahub-  
 “ bit Cawn, the eldest son, and the rest  
 “ of the family of Hafiz, who are un-  
 “ der close confinement, (the Begums  
 “ and other women included) have been  
 “ driven to the necessity of making private  
 “ supplications for a little rice and water.  
 “ I wish, my friend, to leave scenes,  
 “ which none but the merciless Suja can  
 “ bear without heart-bleeding pain ! Re-  
 “ lieve me therefore as soon as possible,  
 “ and oblige,

“ Dear Sir,

“ Your’s, &c.

“ A. CHAMPION.”

“ The unhappy Chiefs preferred fre-  
 “ quent complaints to me in the most  
 “ moving terms, and sent the Nabob’s

H

“ origi-

“ original letters to prove how much he  
 “ had deceived them. *He has deprived*  
 “ *us of our country, of our riches, and even*  
 “ *of our honor ; and not satisfied with that,*  
 “ *he is going to send us prisoners to Fyza-*  
 “ *bad. We desire no country, no riches, no*  
 “ *houses ;—but at Bissoulee are the tombs of*  
 “ *our noble ancestors ; near them, under some*  
 “ *shade, we beg permission to spend the re-*  
 “ *mainder of our days, as faquiers. Rely-*  
 “ *ing on the Vizier’s promises, we remained*  
 “ *in this country, otherwise we should have*  
 “ *fled as other Chiefs did, and have preserv-*  
 “ *ed our characters and honours: these he*  
 “ *has taken away with our effects, AND*  
 “ **HOW HE HAS DISHONOURED US IS**  
 “ **KNOWN TO ALL.**

“ It was this deceitful conduct, this  
 “ inhuman treatment, that filled the  
 “ minds of all the fugitive Chiefs with  
 “ such a distrust and detestation of the

“ Nabob ; and, although my represen-  
 “ tations of the distresses of the family  
 “ of Hafiz were ungraciously received,  
 “ and I am sorry to say, gave me but lit-  
 “ tle encouragement to plead the cause of  
 “ the unhappy, yet I regret exceedingly,  
 “ that I have so long suppressed my incli-  
 “ nations of endeavouring to alleviate the  
 “ misfortunes of the much injured Chiefs,  
 “ to whom the letters were addressed, and  
 “ who, as well as the family of Hafiz, I  
 “ have good reason to believe, are even  
 “ now stinted of the necessaries of life ;  
 “ and when I was on the way down, I  
 “ received the affecting accounts of the  
 “ death of twenty-five of the ill-fated pri-  
 “ soners, since their arrival at Allahabad,  
 “ for want of sustenance !”

No man will be hardy enough to say,  
 that Mr. Hastings had no power to put a  
 stop to these atrocious acts, and to redress



or relieve the sufferers. Let it be shewn in fact, that he ever applied his power to that purpose. The charge affirms, that he never did. So far from it, the letters and evidence of Colonel Champion prove, that he was checked and reprimanded for interfering, and that the fear of giving useless offence to Mr. Hastings obliged him to desist. Reader, if you would understand this man, observe his heart. You will soon see, what materials it is made of, and how it governs his mind. Colonel Champion desired to have a conditional authority to withdraw the British troops from the service of the Vizier, recommending it as a measure, that would probably check and restrain him in the career of his cruelty. The Colonel, in his letter to Mr. Hastings of the 15th of June, 1774, says, “ It is not to me, “ what restraints were laid on my predecessors. None of them were ever in “ similar

“ similar circumstances ; nor do the griev-  
 “ ances, which I have represented against  
 “ him from public views, (for I could for  
 “ a time sacrifice, or at least conceal my  
 “ own private feelings,) appear to me to  
 “ have been at all without a preventative ;  
 “ nay, an easy and effectual one ; and that  
 “ too, without coercive means, or being  
 “ liable to the objection of any usurpation  
 “ of the Vizier’s authority, which I am  
 “ as far from desiring as yourself. In the  
 “ case of his Excellency’s failure of paying  
 “ the subsidy to the troops for one month  
 “ beyond the period, at which the pay-  
 “ ment should have been made, I was in-  
 “ structed to suspend my operations, and  
 “ to declare, on the part of administra-  
 “ tion, that such a failure must be confi-  
 “ dered as equivalent to a dismissal of  
 “ the troops. Now, Sir, I think that  
 “ no man will venture to say, that  
 “ a month’s delay of the payment of  
 “ 210,000

“ 210,000 rupees arrears is of any con-  
 “ sequence, compared to that regard  
 “ which we ought to have for the honour  
 “ of the service, and of the English name,  
 “ and which I am persuaded you and all  
 “ the members of the administration pos-  
 “ sels; yet it is undeniable that the very  
 “ same remedy, which was prescribed for  
 “ the lesser, would also have full effect  
 “ against the greater evil. But, since this  
 “ did not occur, or though, for reasons I  
 “ have mentioned, it was not deemed  
 “ necessary by the board at the first, there  
 “ appears no doubt that it is very practi-  
 “ cable to provide for future occasions.  
 “ I am glad you did not address the Vi-  
 “ zier, concerning the family of Hafiz :  
 “ Your good sense figured circumstances  
 “ as they really were. I did not mean to  
 “ say, that Hafiz’s family should be ren-  
 “ dered independent of Suja Dowla; I  
 “ wrote to Mr. Hastings, requesting that  
 “ he

" he would take them under his protec-  
 " ~~tion~~, by influencing the Nabob to make  
 " provision for them in some degree suit-  
 " able to their birth. They themselves  
 " proposed that any, or as many of the  
 " the sons as the Nabob pleased, should  
 " remain in his hands, but prayed him  
 " not to dishonour the Begum and other  
 " women, by dragging them about the  
 " country to be loaded with the scoffs of  
 " his rabble, *and otherwise still worse used*;  
 " but he was deaf maugre all my en-  
 " treaties, which, you will find, by my  
 " letter of the 11th, were also ineffectual  
 " with regard to the destruction of the  
 " villages; a circumstance, with regard  
 " to which I am now sorry I did not un-  
 " deceive you sooner; but it proceeded  
 " from a real disinclination to enlarge  
 " upon his excesses, which has also pre-  
 " vented my descending to the particulars  
 " of his conduct."

Now

Now observe the stile and argument, with which this representation is animated by the humane, benevolent Mr. Hastings. Observe, how steadily he fixes his eye upon the scenes of carnage and desolation, and what is still more horrible, upon the details of personal outrage and cruelty, which the letters of Colonel Champion repeatedly brought into his view. See, how coolly he keeps his temper,—how dispassionately he argues the abstract question of right, and how deliberately he determines, that the Vizier ought not to be controuled *in the treatment of his subjects*, even by so gentle and negative a remedy, as that of withdrawing our assistance from the support of such acts ! According to Mr. Hastings, the moment any country is overrun by an iniquitous invasion, the people of it are the *subjects* of the invader ; and that too, *flagrante bello*, and before any submission on their part, or any accommodation with them,

them. Having thus converted the Rohillas into *subjects* of their enemy, the next thing he does is to deny them the rights of human creatures ;—he palpably considers them as the inanimate property of Suja Dowla, which the owner may dispose of exactly as he thinks fit. But let him speak for himself. To express such principles as *his*, there is no language like his own.

### TO COLONEL CHAMPION.

“ Dear Sir,                      11th July, 1774.

“ I have received your letters, dated  
 “ 15th, 19th, and 20th ult. In the first  
 “ of these, you have pointed out a means,  
 “ which you deem easy and effectual for  
 “ preventing the grievances you represented  
 “ in a former letter, concerning the  
 “ conduct of the Vizier ; but, when the  
 I                      “ extent

“ extent and effects of your proposals are  
 “ considered, it is obviously inadmissible,  
 “ and in no respect corresponds with the  
 “ instance you have produced in support  
 “ of it. It is not officially necessary, that  
 “ reasons should be assigned for the admi-  
 “ nistration’s withholding an authority,  
 “ which they deem improper to be vested  
 “ in you ; but I will enter into the sub-  
 “ ject, because I think I can convince  
 “ yourself, that such an authority would  
 “ be improper. In the instance of the pay  
 “ of the troops, the point is fixed and cer-  
 “ tain ; it respects only ourselves, and is  
 “ one of the positive conditions on our part  
 “ of the treaty ; a failure is a direct  
 “ breach of the treaty, and we have a right  
 “ to enforce its observance ; but where  
 “ is our authority to judge or controul the  
 “ conduct of the Vizier farther than res-  
 “ pects his engagement with *us* ? If we  
 “ had such a right, how shall we ascertain  
 “ the

“ the exact line, that divides the reprehens-  
 “ sible part of his conduct from what may  
 “ be vindicated ? How shall we distin-  
 “ guish facts from misrepresentations ?  
 “ And where is the man, to whose discern-  
 “ ment such a trust might be confided  
 “ without danger of error, or mistake ?  
 “ In short, even granting we had an autho-  
 “ rity to controul the Vizier’s conduct in  
 “ the manner you propose, which we  
 “ have not, we must have demonstra-  
 “ tion of the infallibility of the person  
 “ we entrusted with such an authority,  
 “ before we could be vindicated in the de-  
 “ legation of it. If the commander of our  
 “ army had the power of withdrawing our  
 “ troops, whenever he should deem the  
 “ conduct of the Vizier improper, he  
 “ would become the absolute master of the  
 “ enterprize ; the Vizier could only act  
 “ at his pleasure, and he would be fully  
 “ vested with that authority, which in



“ your letter you disclaim any desire of  
 “ attaining. All the country, which is  
 “ subdued on the present occasion, be-  
 “ comes absolutely the Vizier’s, and the  
 “ inhabitants equally his subjects with the  
 “ inhabitants of his hereditary dominions.  
 “ On the terms that you propose, while  
 “ the English army was necessary for the  
 “ support of his conquests, the English  
 “ commander would supersede his autho-  
 “ rity in the government of his new pos-  
 “ sessions, and, in my opinion, he might  
 “ with equal propriety demand a right to  
 “ control him in the government of the  
 “ Province of Oude, which he also ob-  
 “ tained, and has been supported in by  
 “ the influence of the English army.  
 “ Upon the whole, it appears evidently to  
 “ me, in the first place, that we have no  
 “ authority, either from treaty or other-  
 “ wise, to control the conduct of the Vi-  
 “ zier *in the treatment of his subjects*; and  
 “ secondly,

“ secondly, that if we had, we could not  
 “ answer for the delegation of such autho-  
 “ rity, in the manner you propose, to any  
 “ person whatever in the command of the  
 “ army.”

WARREN HASTINGS.”

It is perfectly true, that Mr. Hastings did order the Resident, Middleton, to *remonstrate and expostulate* with the Vizier against the enormity of his proceedings towards the Rohillas. In a case so flagrant, he could not but be sensible, that something must be done to save appearances. This remonstrance was formal, feeble, and ineffectual. The menace, with which he ordered it to be enforced, shews plainly what he meant by it. After instructing him to argue the case with Suja Dowla, about inhumanity and oppression, about bene-

benevolence and feeling, &c. that is, to  
 whistle to the storm, he concludes with  
 the following words : “ If these argu-  
 “ ments do not prevail, you may inform  
 “ him directly, that you have my orders  
 “ to insist on a proper treatment of the fa-  
 “ mily of Hafiz Rahmet ; since, in our  
 “ alliance with him, the reputation of our  
 “ national character is involved in every  
 “ act, which subjects his own to re-  
 “ proach ; that I shall publicly excul-  
 “ pate this government from the impu-  
 “ tation of assenting to such a procedure,  
 “ and I shall reserve it as an objection to  
 “ any future engagements with him,  
 “ when the present service shall have been  
 “ accomplished.”

He admits, that the reputation of our  
 national character was involved in the acts  
 of Suja Dowla. The grounds of his inter-  
 position, faintly and imperfectly stated as

they are, should naturally have led him to a vigorous resolution. Instead of that, he patiently waits till the present service shall have been accomplished—till the destruction of the people, in whose favor he pretends to intercede, is irretrievable, and shall reserve it as an objection to any *future* engagements with him. In other words ; —“ you may glut your revenge—you “ may satiate your fury with the utter “ destruction of a people, whom the Eng- “ lish have conquered for you ; I shall not “ attempt to hinder you, but you may “ expect, that I shall make it an objection “ to engaging with you again !”

He says, “ that the sons of Hafiz “ Rahmut Cawn were living at Luck- “ now when he was at that capital, and “ that they enjoyed a pension from the “ present Nabob, which afforded them “ a decent maintenance.” If this be true,

true, it is no merit of Mr. Hastings. The provision, which is said to be continued to the sons of Hafiz, was obtained for them by Sir John Clavering, Colonel Monson, and Mr. Francis,

“ That Fyzoola Cawn still remains in  
 “ peaceable possession of as much of his  
 “ inheritance as he held before the war,”  
 The accommodation obtained for this person, the last of the Rohilla Chiefs, was the sole act of Colonel Champion, passionately condemned and resisted by Mr. Hastings, whose treatment, or rather persecution of him, since that period, is the subject of a particular charge\*.

Mr. Middleton palliates the Vizier's conduct, as well as he can, though he says, *he cannot by any means acquit him of*

\* Vide Appendix, N<sup>o</sup>. 5.

*the charge.* The public would have been better informed of the truth of these and many other transactions, if Mr. Hastings had not suppressed the evidence of them, which existed in Mr. Middleton's correspondence. The whole of it has never yet been produced, nor ever can be now. It is a fact never to be forgotten, that Mr. Hastings not only refused to communicate this correspondence entire, as it was demanded of him by his colleagues in the government, and as he was repeatedly ordered by the Court of Directors; but that, in order to prevent it's ever being produced, he had recourse to an expedient, which, of itself, fixes upon him every presumption of guilt that ought to be, and always is inferred from a deliberate and contumacious suppression of evidence. When the above correspondence was called for by the House of Commons in May 1786, Mr. Middleton declared, " that he

he had delivered up to Mr. Hastings, by his  
 “ *peremptory command*, the whole of his  
 “ correspondence with him during the  
 “ period alluded to, containing his own  
 “ (Mr. Hastings’s) original letters, and co-  
 “ pies of his (Middleton’s), together with  
 “ every other paper or document apper-  
 “ taining to that correspondence.” So  
 careful was Mr. Hastings to make it im-  
 possible for any man, at any period, to  
 publish the letters in question, that he  
 exacted it as a matter of duty and right  
 from Mr. Middleton, the Company’s Re-  
 sident at a foreign Court, that he  
 should not keep a copy, or even the  
 smallest memorandum of the contents of  
 his own letters. On this fact it is mate-  
 rial to observe, that the reason originally  
 assigned by Mr Hastings for refusing to lay  
 all Mr. Middleton’s letters before the Go-  
 vernor General and Council, at their for-  
 mal

"mal and lawful requisition", was stated  
 to be, "because there are several parts  
 "which comprehend an unreserved and  
 "confidential communication of his opi-  
 "nion, and of such occurrences as he  
 "judged necessary for my private infor-  
 "mation, entered into, and carried on  
 "by him, on my repeated assurances that  
 "I would never reveal any part of his  
 "correspondence, which might subject  
 "him to ill will, or inconvenience."  
 Supposing this account of the matter to be  
 true, it follows, that the danger of com-  
 municating Mr. Middleton's letters, if  
 any, concerned Mr. Middleton alone.  
 On that supposition, it might be allowed,  
 that Mr. Hastings would have acted ho-  
 nourably to Mr. Middleton in restoring to  
 him all his original letters. Such a pro-  
 ceeding, if not perfectly regular in a Go-

\* Minute of 26th October, 1774-





vernor General, might possibly have been thought, what it certainly would have been called, a brilliant proof of his generosity. On *his* principles, he should have put it out of his own power to be at any time, even the involuntary instrument of injury or censure to a man, who had placed an unreserved confidence in him; and this could only be done by delivering back to him all his letters.

The reverse of this conduct, is the conduct of Mr. Hastings. He demands from the person, whom he had repeatedly assured that he would not reveal any part of his correspondence, which might subject him to ill will or inconvenience, not only the original orders and instructions under which he acted, but that he should surrender to him, Hastings, every copy of his own letters, and every other paper or document appertaining to that correspondence.

pondence. This is an extraordinary course to provide for Mr. Middleton's security. Mr. Hastings not only keeps the evidence, which he has in his hands, for his own purposes, but deprives Mr. Middleton of all means of defending himself, supposing him at any future day to be questioned for any part of his conduct, while he resided in a public capacity at the Court of Oude. Of such a proceeding there is no example in the history of the world. The demand and surrender of the letters took place in the year 1778. As soon as Mr. Middleton's answer was laid before the House, the gentlemen, who conducted the prosecution, desisted from any farther attempt to obtain the entire correspondence. The means, taken by Mr. Hastings to suppress it, proved enough for their immediate purpose; and supposing that the power of Parliament could have compelled him to produce it, in what state could

could they reasonably expect it to appear ? As long as Mr. Middleton was in possession of the original letters of Mr. Hastings, and of the copies of his own, it would have been a dangerous measure, to have delivered to the House of Commons a false or garbled correspondence. But that danger being provided for in the manner we have seen, and all check on the part of Mr. Middleton being removed, what was there to prevent Mr. Hastings from altering or suppressing as many letters or passages in letters, as he thought fit, or even from fabricating new ones in their place ? Such a fraud might easily have been practised, and, though it might have been suspected, could never have been proved ? Before this subject is dismissed, a curious circumstance belonging to it remains to be stated. When carefully considered, it will be found of some importance,

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though

though but of little in comparison with the rest of the transaction.

The first demand of the correspondence in question, was made by Sir John Clavering, Colonel Monson, and Mr. Francis, whose united votes constituted an act of government, and bound the council, in October 1774. Mr. Hastings positively refused to comply with it. In December 1775, the Court of Directors resolved, and the Court of Proprietors unanimously agreed with them, “ That the *whole* correspondence should have been laid before the members of the Superior Council, who ought to have received every information respecting the transactions of the Company’s agent at Suja Dowla’s Court, in order to regulate their conduct at that critical period.” Mr. Hastings admits that he paid no regard to these resolutions, which, it seems, he

he did not consider as orders. In his defence he says ;—“ The latter part  
 “ of this article is true ; namely, that  
 “ I have never yet communicated the  
 “ whole of my correspondence either  
 “ to the Governor General and coun-  
 “ cil, or to the Court of Directors.  
 “ But it is equally true, that the Court of  
 “ Directors *have never demanded it of me,*  
 “ and that I have uniformly opposed the  
 “ right of the Council to exact it, which  
 “ should be first established, before the re-  
 “ fusal to *them* can be made a crime.”

In fair and honourable reasoning, this defence amounts to an admission, that to have refused the correspondence to the Court of Directors, if *they* had demanded it, would have been a crime in him their servant and delegate. Notwithstanding Mr. Hastings’s bold and deliberate assertion of the contrary, the Court of Directors did make the demand,

demand, which he says they never made, and he has never complied with it.

*Extract of the Company's General Letter to  
Bengal, dated 4th July, 1777.*

“ Par. 14. In regard to Mr. Nathaniel  
 “ Middleton, to whose conduct we have  
 “ no other objection, than his refusing to  
 “ submit his correspondence to the perusal  
 “ of the Governor General and Council,  
 “ we feel a concern in being obliged again  
 “ to express our disapprobation of such re-  
 “ fusal ; and are particularly sorry, that  
 “ the tenderness, with which we treated  
 “ the subject in our letter of the 15th of  
 “ December 1775, should have induced  
 “ the Governor General to draw conclusi-  
 “ ons manifestly contrary to our inten-  
 “ tions, and to the sentiments expressed in  
 “ that letter.

“ 15. In order to obviate every doubt  
“ on this head, we hereby order and direct,  
“ That our Governor General do forth-  
“ with deliver in to your Board, all such  
“ parts of his correspondence with Mr.  
“ Nathaniel Middleton, from the day of  
“ his departure from Fort William, to his  
“ return to that settlement, as have hi-  
“ therto been withheld from your perusal,  
“ or withdrawn from the said correspon-  
“ dence,

“ 16. It is also our express direction,  
“ That Mr. Middleton deliver to you,  
“ without delay, the whole of his original  
“ correspondence with the Governor Ge-  
“ neral, with Suja ul Dowlah, and with  
“ all and every other person on public bu-  
“ siness, from the time of his departure  
“ from Fort William, in January 1774,  
“ to his return thither in January 1775,  
“ together with his diary, and all minutes  
“ made

“ made by him in such diary ; and that  
 “ an authenticated copy of the whole be  
 “ transmitted to us by the first opportu-  
 “ nity, for our information.”

Let it be admitted that, when Mr. Hastings drew up his defence in 1786, he might really have forgotten this letter. But let it be remembered too, that it was immediately after the receipt of it in Bengal in the year 1778, that he demanded of Mr. Middleton the surrender of all his papers. He had the positive order of the Directors before him, when resolved to disobey it. But his own disobedience would not have answered his purpose, if he had not, by a peremptory command, disabled Mr. Middleton to yield to the order, which was personally directed to that gentleman.



It is now submitted to the reader to combine the facts and to draw his own conclusions from them. In doing so, many things will naturally occur to his mind, which, tho' pregnant with conviction, yet for want of legal demonstration, cannot properly be insisted on in a formal accusation.

But to return to the Rohillas. It appears that Colonel Champion, after remonstrating a long time to no purpose against the cruelties practised by Suja Dowlah, at last desisted, fearing, as he says in his letter of 21st August 1774, *that he had already run some risque of displeasing, by perhaps too free a communication of sentiments ;* and in another place, *that his representations of the distresses of the family of Hafiz were ungraciously received by Mr. Hastings, and, he was sorry to say, gave him but little encouragement to plead the cause of the unhappy.*

8. Finally,

8. Finally, *that the Rohilla war was not prohibited, but authorised by the Court of Directors.* This assertion, if he could prove it, would make the greater part of his defence superfluous. If he really had their authority for extirpating the Rohilla nation, what occasion for so many words?—Let him produce it. Either he, who affirms that they authorised the measure, or they who, in the grossest terms, have condemned a measure, which they had themselves authorised, must have lost all sense of shame.

It is material to observe that Mr. Hastings, through his whole defence of the Rohilla war, has produced no new matter whatever, beyond what was already before the Court of Directors and Court of Proprietors, in December 1775, and before the House of Commons in May 1782, when they all unanimously condemned

his conduct. If, therefore, the House of Commons approve of it now, they must approve of it on the same evidence, on which they condemned it before. The Directors, he says, *were partial judges*, and the Proprietors *incompetent*; but then they were *his legal and ultimate judges, who both passed their censure upon his conduct, and in that censure he received his punishment*. If this principle be admitted, it is certain that no man could be more severely punished, for no man was ever more severely censured than Mr. Hastings. But his punishment hitherto has sat very light upon him. If the Company were his ultimate judges, the Commons have no right to impeach him;—the Lords have no right to try him;—there can be no jurisdiction beyond an ultimate judgment. The principle, assumed by Mr. Hastings, leads to great consequences. Let the offences, committed in India, be ever so

flagitious, the Company can no way punish their servants but by censure and removal ; and according to Mr. Hastings, their censure alone may be pleaded in bar of any other prosecution. If that plea be admitted, the House of Commons have already acted very unjustly to Mr. Hastings, when they entered into an examination of his conduct in May 1782, seven years after his ultimate judges had condemned and punished him. To receive the present charge, is another act of injustice. With respect to the Rohilla war, they neither had then, nor have they now, any new matter to proceed upon. It is the same transaction which the Court of Directors, *his immediate masters*, and the Court of Proprietors, *his honoured employers*, have declared to be contrary to the Company's orders *frequently repeated*, to policy and to justice ; and which the House of Commons have pronounced to be

INIGUITOUS.—Has he, or has he not, been punished for it ?

For the honour of the nation, it is not to be believed or presumed, that a question of such magnitude, a cause that so powerfully appeals to the honour, to the generosity, and to the justice of this kingdom, can be stifled at its outset by the vote of a Committee of the House of Commons ; or that the people of England will endure the mockery of acquitting Mr. Hastings of any guilt in the ruin of a whole people, by the same voice that impeaches him for the ruin of an individual. When the general subject of the impeachment was first before the House, Mr. Pitt took occasion to declare, that, *if the Rohilla war could be fairly brought home to Mr. Hastings, no man should be more ready than himself to condemn, to censure, and to punish him.* These were the very words he  
made

made use of. When the specific question came to be decided, he observed a profound silence, and voted against the impeachment ; leaving it to others less scrupulous, or less liable to loss of character, than himself, to declare themselves explicitly in approbation of the Rohilla war.

There is no power in this world, that can annihilate such a question. Though it were dead, yet shall it live. The cause itself, by its own energy, will turn upon the force that oppresses it, and sting to destruction the vulnerable heel that endeavours to keep it down.

The story at least shall be told to the present times, and to posterity ; and let it stand so recorded in the annals of England :—That crimes have been committed by English power in India, as horrible as

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those of the Spaniards in America; that they have been forced by a few individuals into the judicial view of the English nation, that public cognizance has been taken of them, and that they have been dismissed with national approbation and applause! The people of Spain were not accomplices in the guilt of their countrymen.

## APPENDIX. N<sup>o</sup>. I.

*Extract of a Letter from Maha Raja  
Moodaje Bhoosla to Mr. Hastings, re-  
corded by himself in the Bengal Secret  
Consultations of 16th Dec. 1782.*

“ **T**HE centre of the compass of the English empire and government depends on your safety. The firmness, perseverance, constancy to their word, and care to the preservation of compacts of friendship and alliance, in the noble race of English, is seen and heard of in *your* wisdom, ingenuity, understanding, penetration, &c. Experience, knowledge; solid undertakings, noble resolutions; extensive wishes, ample designs,



perfect regulations, complete vigilance, and circumspection, immense reflection and perspicuity ! You have established a mansion on the bank of a river, separated at a distance (the computation of which exceeds 1,000 leagues) and there consult of battles, and tumults, prepare armies, destroy ranks, and in every situation are firm and resolved, in opposition to your enemies ; you consider *as nothing* the expence and loss of crores upon crores, the destruction of the English nobles, the necessity of disbursing the productions of all your ports and islands in this service ; though such is your courage, intrepidity, wisdom, acuteness, knowledge, consideration and penetration, still *you never wished for war and dispute*, but have always sought for peace, and reconciliation ; and, in whatever quarter proposals for peace have appeared, and the mode has been established, you have looked upon it as fruitful, and have given information

to your true friend, and never lost sight of the first connection with this place, which has been strengthened by a length of years. The world is a touchstone of proof to the splendid substance of the brave, vigorous, and courageous, of exalted designs, and to those versed in business, *understanding subtile distinctions*, and to those knowing the motion of ages, and to the immovable in the plain of fidelity, sincerity, friendship and alliance. I have taken the name Armand ud Dowla \* Bahauder, merely from the knowledge of your splendid and noble qualities !”

\* Persian title of Mr. Hastings.

APPENDIX. N<sup>o</sup>. II.

*Extract of intelligence relative to the Vizir's treatment of the families of the late Nabobs, Hafiz Rhamut and Doondy Khan, in their confinement. Taken down from the accounts of trusty Hircarrabs; stationed with those families by order of the Commander in Chief.*

*April 30th, 1774.* "The Vizir sent Sclybesheer Khan, with several eunuchs, to the palace of Hafiz, when they searched all the men and women, stripped them of their jewels, gold and silver ornaments, clothes, &c. except one suit of clothes each, and then put the women, to the number of near 400, including maid-servants and slaves, into forty-five covered hackeries, and Hafiz's ten sons, with six chelahs, or favourite men slaves, on horses, and carried them all prisoners to the Nabob's

bob's camp, where the men were put into  
 one tent, and the women into one large  
 tent, and two paals (or small open tents)  
 furrounded with some old cunottes ; but  
 no sattringes, carpets, or any kind of bed-  
 ding, put into the men or women's tents,  
 but reduced to the necessity of sleeping on  
 the ground, without any clothes to cover  
 them, except what they wore in the day.  
 A little after twelve o'clock at night, four  
 pots of provisions were brought them,  
 but so insufficient for the number of peo-  
 ple, that they had not above two or three  
 mouthfuls each ; and they were equally  
 distressed for water to drink.

“ In shedding tears of grief and misery  
 they spent the tiresome night, and the  
 lamentable cries of sorrow and affliction  
 brought on the morning, exposed to the  
 intense heat of the day and the scorching  
 winds. Floor-cloth they have not to de-  
 fend them from the burning sands, nor  
 a sheet

a sheet to screen them from the inclement  
chills of night ; the Begum and daughter  
of Hafiz are in consequence taken very  
ill,

*May 1st, 1774.* “ This morning the Vizir’s army marched, and Hafiz’s family were carried prisoners ; the horses belonging to the chelahs were taken from them. On coming to the ground the whole were confined in the same manner as yesterday, and a small quantity of provisions and water brought them, which rather excited than abated their hunger. About twelve at night they received four pots with victuals, which they were anxious to eat, but a strong wind blowing at that time, their tents were thrown down, and all their provisions covered with sand ; a shower of rain, which then fell, wet their clothes. They endeavoured to cover their heads, and shelter themselves from the cold with the bedding of the hackeries, and in that  
doleful

doleful situation passed the night on the damp earth:

*May 13th.* No material alteration has happened in the treatment of this unhappy family since the first instant. The Begumi is much indisposed with a flux.

“ This morning she sent the following complaint by a Hircarrah, viz. That last night the wind and rain blew down their cunottes and one tent, and no persons being at hand to put them up, almost all the women were obliged to croud into the one where she was during the rain; in this situation she caught cold, and the flux, of which she was recovering, is again returned, and she is now very ill: that after the rain was over, Noor Mahomed, chelah, made shift to put up the tent, and some persons passing that way, pitying their condition, put up the cunottes also.

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The Begum, and the sons of Hafiz desired the Hircarrahs to conclude as follows :

*“ This being our melancholy situation, for  
 “ God’s sake have compassion upon us, and  
 “ give your assistance in releasing us from this  
 “ dismal bondage.”*

*May 29th.* “ The Nabob, with the eunuchs and old women, went into the zenana, where he ordered them to take all the jewels, gold, and silver ornaments, &c. &c. from every person belonging to those families, taking care to search them in such a manner that nothing should escape.

“ After they had performed this business in his presence with the utmost rigour, the bullocks were taken out of the hackeries, which were ready at the door, and the hackeries one after another drawn into the compound of the zenana, and the

women put into them as they were searched, and not allowed to carry a second suit of clothes with them,

“ In this manner, one hundred and fifty women were carried in thirty-five covered hackeries and one doolie, to a grove of mango trees at a small distance from the palace.

“ The Vizir ordered Buffunt ally Khan to get a battalion of Seapoys, and guard the prisoners to Salarjing, to whom he sent orders to halt till he should hear from him, as he (the Nabob) proposed next morning to search the family of Fittulla Khan.

“ His Excellency then went back to sleep at the palace of Mahub ulla Khan, which gave rise to a report shocking to humanity, and which had some appearance of truth, though it cannot be absolutely confirmed.



“ The report alluded to is as follows, viz. That, when the women of Mahub ulla Khan were sent out of the house, his daughter, about ten or eleven years old, was detained behind ; and that, when the Nabob returned to the palace and went to sleep, he took her to bed with him, and soon after sent her to join the rest of that unhappy family in Salarjing’s camp, and to proceed with them,

“ During the time that the hackeries with the women were in the grove, the wife of Azim ulla Khan was reduced to such extremities of hunger and other distresses, that she sent to the Bazar for opium, in hopes of putting an end to a life which became a burthen to her ; but this relief was denied her, as they could not find any.

“ They then brought a small quantity of dried grain and bread, which she and her children were glad to eat.”

APPENDIX. N<sup>o</sup>. III.

*Translation of a Letter from the Nabob  
Mahub Ulla Cawn, to Captain A.  
Macpherson. Received at Bissoulee,  
7th June, 1774, by the hands of a  
Hircarrab who brought it from Be-  
relly.*

“ Merciful and beneficent bestower  
of favors upon the poor, God grant you  
health !

“ Before this, we sent an humble ad-  
dress to the General our master, (may the  
Almighty preserve him in health ! ) as  
yet we have not been honored by an  
answer. The case is this ; that on earth  
we have no protection but him, and from  
his turning his face towards us, do expect  
our enlargement. The Nabob Vizier did  
comfort

comfort us, and then take our country, our riches, and our honor ; and more than that, he imprisoned us, and sent us on our way to Bungley,<sup>4</sup> and we are now arrived at Berelly, but know not our future stages ; and on this account address you, that, *for the sake of God, and Christ, and Moses and Mary*, he does (meaning the Colonel) release us ; and, God willing, during our existence, we will not depart from being his slaves, and our whole lives shall be devoted to his service, and fame will make it known in the seven divisions of the earth, that the Nabob Vizier, after having pledged his promise, treated us in this manner, and that the European gentlemen bestowed life upon us, for which God will in the end reward them,

“ My kind patron, who knows the measure of my situation on earth, I have

no other supporter, and whatever can be done for us will be all from you.

“ For the sake of God, let the subject of this letter be kept secret, as it might expose us to still greater hardships ; but, after reading it, tear it in pieces ; and what more have I to address you on ?

“ O my guardian, turn your face to the business of a slave, and have us enlarged, and it will not go unrewarded !

“ My friend ; whatever the general or you may say to the Nabob in behalf of your servants, let it be from yourselves, that this slave may not appear in it ; for if the Nabob Vizier knows it is from me, it is uncertain what he may do.”

A. MACPHERSON, P. 446.

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APPENDIX. N<sup>o</sup>. IV.

*Extract from Colonel Champion's Letter of  
the 2d of March, 1775.*

“ Captain Wroe was witness of an affecting scene in the house of the Nabob Mahub Ulla Khan, of which he gave me a particular account upon honour; but the paper has been mislaid; however, as he is now at the Presidency, you can, if you please, avail yourself of his information.

“ That gentleman, with another officer, happening to pass through Bissoulez soon after our arrival near that town, he was descried by the Nabob Mahub Ulla Khan, and invited into his house; he can acquaint you with the deplorable situation in which he saw that family.

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“ This much may be observed, that I believe he is the first European, or perhaps the first man of any nation that ever was invited by a Mussulman Prince or Chief into his zenana. He will inform you, how the miserable women threw themselves prostrate at his feet, and grasped his boots, supplicating protection to their honour,

“ The Nabob and the unhappy women intreated, that he and the officer who was with him, would take charge of some jewels and money in order to afford them relief in the event, which they foresaw, and which has since happened, of their being in want of the necessaries of life.”

*Nota bene.*—These Extracts are taken, from a multitude of others, as they were printed from the Records of the India House by the Court of Directors, but not published. Vide second volume of Bengal Papers, called *Bengal Appendix*, page 438, 446, and 454.

APPENDIX. N<sup>o</sup>. 5.

*Extract of a letter from Mr. Hastings to Colonel Champion, dated 16th September 1774. Vide Appendix to fifth Report, No. 27.*

“ I hope, notwithstanding the hesitation expressed in the conclusion, that you have resolved on prosecuting the war to a final issue, without waiting for the reply of the Select Committee to your letter of the 29th of July ; because I think it appears very plainly, that Fizula Cawn and his adherents lay at your mercy ; because I apprehend much inconvenience from delays, and because I am morally certain, that no good will be gained by negotiating. If however, contrary to this expectation, you shall have suspended your operations, or from another cause the

war shall not be concluded on the receipt of this, it is my express desire, that you do on no account depute any person under your comand to treat with the enemy; but leave it wholly to the Vizier to conduct every measure of this kind by his own agents, and in such a manner as he shall think proper; *since he is the principal, and we only accessaries in the war.* Besides, by allowing Fizula Cawn to treat with both, he make appeals from you to the Vizier, and from the Vizier to you, you can hardly fail both of you to become the instruments of his intrigues, and he will acquire a confidence from such an indulgence, which he cannot place on his own strength or consequence."

T H E E N D.





